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ABSTRACT
Persistence amid Transition:
The Views of Malay Students in America
on Ethnic Identity and Religious Change
in the Context of Malay History and Culture
Philip Matanick
The Malay people of Malaysia have had a Christian witness
for centuries, and yet remain resistant to Christian
evangelization efforts . This study seeks to understand why this
is so, by presenting a profile of the Malays. The thesis is that
the Malays have been historically, culturally, and religiously
conditioned to be resistant to Christian overtures. This is
defended through three prongs: historical investigation, religio-
cultural analysis, and an empirical study of modern Malay
university students in the United States.
The first prong, that of the historical investigation,
demonstrates that the successive colonization of Malaya by
Western nations that identified themselves as Christian, coupled
with the Christian missions' close association with the colonial
administrations, their implication in policies seen by the Malays
as detrimental to the Malays, and their neglect of the Malay
people have led to a Malay antagonism against and fierce
resistance to Christianity.
The second prong, the religio-cultural study, analyses the
relationship between Malay ethnic identity and normative Islam.
A strong attachment to Islam coalesces with an exclusivistic
Malay ethnic identity to make the Malays see Christianity as
foreign to who they are as a people. The fact that Malays get
their personal identity from the group militates against
individual Malays breaking the social and religious barrier to
considering Christianity as a viable option.
The third prong of the study entails the findings of
interviews of Malay university students in the United States.
The information adds to the preceding by giving a firsthand
account of what Malays believe about Islam and how they practice
it. It also shows their understanding of Islam's relation to the
state, and their view of their Malay identity in relation to
Islam and other religions, especially Christianity.
The interviews also test whether Malay international
students display the openness to religious innovation that is
typical of many internationals, and whether their exposure to
American culture over time causes them to change their views on
Christianity. We discover that the Malays in the United States
retreat into a Malay ethnic enclave mentality that prohibits free
inquiry and causes them to maintain their allegiance to Islam.
In some cases, moreover, the relative lack of external, societal
pressure to conform to Islam leads them to internalize their
faith, and thus become more personally committed to Islam.
The study concludes by noting that the rapidly changing
Malay society is shattering traditional lifestyles and strong
kinship ties, potentially weakening the societal barriers to
receptivity to Christianity. In addition, we conclude that
Malays overall have never been the object of concerted and
thoughtful evangelization efforts, and that Malays do respond
favorably to Christian gestures of kindness. Finally, a massive
prayer movement is mobilizing to effect the evangelization of
Malays. Knowledgeable, selfless, cross-ethnic and cross-cultural
witnesses, empowered by God, are needed to bring a clear picture
of Jesus Christ to the Malays .
Advisor: Dr. A.H. Mathias Zahniser
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INTRODUCTION
Overview of the Study
"The biggest sin is to convert from Islam to another
religion. If you convert you are no longer Malay."
�A female Malay University of Kentucky
senior, September, 1992
Stunned, Jim hung up the phone. Observing her husband's
crestfallen countenance, Meg hurriedly responded with "What is
it? What's the matter?" Jim, still dumbfounded from his recent
conversation, eventually managed a lifeless "It's Ismail^ . . .
He no longer wants to be a Christian."
"What do you mean?" Meg shot back incredulously. "Ismail's
been so faithful, so committed. I don't understand." Jim then
carefully related his painful conversation with Ismail, their
long-time friend.
Ismail is a Malay young man who came to the United States to
earn a degree in computer science from a large midwestern
university, at which there were nearly one hundred other Malays.
In one of his classes during his first semester he had met Jim
Lapham, an American computer programmer who was going back to
school for a masters degree.
Jim befriended Ismail and in time invited him to go on a
family outing at a state park. Ismail was hesitant, but their
mutual interest in computers led him to accept. Besides, Ismail
didn't want to offend Jim, especially since Jim had helped Ismail
with a major assignment.
The Laphams ' unpretentious kindness proved disarming. On
^All Malay student names are pseudonymous.
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another occasion, Ismail joined the Laphams for dinner, and
eventually became a regular visitor in their home.
Ismail's friends cautioned him against his increasing
involvement with Christians.^ Being a loner by nature, Ismail
never completely fit in with his fellow Malays. Perhaps it was
the fact that he was not particularly sociable within his own
culture that gave him the freedom to step beyond the confines of
his group.
At any rate, Ismail was immediately struck by the moral
character of his American friends. Furthermore, they prayed
often and naturally, and spoke of God in personal terms.
The Laphams were not pushy. In fact, it was Ismail who
suggested that he would like to attend church with them. To the
Laphams, Ismail's immediate positive response was as heartening
as it was surprising. He felt drawn by the loving warmth of the
people, and, above all, loved the music.
In a matter of weeks, after lengthy discussions with Jim,
Ismail prayed to accept Jesus' death on the cross as a sacrifice
for his sin, thus becoming a Christian. It was then that trouble
hit. Ismail's Malay companions, long suspicious of his
involvement with the Lapham family, had begun to monitor his
activities. When they discovered a pattern of Sunday morning
outings, they confronted Ismail, demanding an explanation.
Scared, Ismail denied any connection with the church, insisting
^The Laphams are, in fact, committed Christians. Yet, to
the undiscerning Malay student, all Americans who don't
expressly identify themselves with another religion are
Christians .
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that he had been merely going for long walks. When the truth was
confirmed that Ismail had indeed been attending church, he
vehemently denied having become a Christian, stating instead that
he was going to learn, so that he could better understand
Christianity in order to counter it more effectively.
Ismail's compatriots didn't buy his story. An imam was
called in to reason with him. When this didn't work, Ismail was
threatened with physical and spiritual harm if he ever again met
with the Laphams or went to church.
Fearing for his safety, Ismail moved in with the Laphams.
He went to the university only when escorted by a church member.
For the next several weeks, he immersed himself in church life,
attending whenever possible, and methodically working through a
Bible study course.
Ismail's testimony to experiencing God in an intimacy
unknown in Islam, and his commitment to Bible study, were
thrilling to Jim and Meg, who prayed with and for him daily.
Moreover, the Laphams felt that their friendship with Ismail had
matured to the point of mutual trust, openness, and honesty.
Then the incomprehensible happened. Jim and Meg came home
from work one day to find Ismail and all of his possessions gone.
He had moved out without saying a word. None of the Malays would
respond to Jim's inquiries. Furthermore, Ismail was nowhere to
be seen on campus. Two weeks went by without a trace. It was as
if Ismail had vanished.
Then came the phone call. On hearing Ismail's voice, Jim
was both relieved and apprehensive. Ismail sheepishly apologized
4for his leaving unannounced, and then related that he had wanted
to call, but was only now completely alone so that they could
have this forbidden conversation.
In short, Ismail stated that he could no longer be a
Christian. As a Malay, he was born to be a Muslim. He couldn't
betray his family and his people. Also, he could no longer stand
the isolation. Even Ismail, loner that he was, couldn't
withstand the social ostracism. Besides, he couldn't face the
likelihood that his scholarship would be rescinded and he would
be sent back to Malaysia in shame. The cost was too great.
Breathing a hasty prayer that he'd say the right thing in
what could well be his last conversation with his friend, Jim
urged Ismail to consider the eternal perspective. He reminded
Ismail of the reality of his experience with Christ, and the fact
that he had witnessed the power of prayer in Jesus
' name and had
experienced Christian love. Ismail conceded the above, but
countered that it was not right for him to be a Christian. He
thanked Jim for his kindness, and concluded with regrets that
they could never meet again. Stunned, Jim hung up the phone.
Ismail was one of over 400,000 international students
enrolled in colleges and universities in the United States.
Studies of such students reveal that most report a desire for
American friendships (Altbach and Wang 1989:150). The findings
suggest that contact with Americans helps international students
become more flexible in their thinking and more open to
innovation (Kelman 1962:270, Niyekewa-Howard 1970:72, Sharma and
Jung 1985:38, and Hamid 1979:270). Moreover, through a
5generalization of affect, students with a positive view of
Americans reported favorable attitudes toward American religious
practices, whether or not they had any direct exposure to them
(Salter and Teger 1975:221).
While they generally desire American friendships, many
internationals find it difficult, though, to befriend Americans
(Meloni 1986:4), or to gain acceptance by them, resulting in the
formation of ethnic enclaves for mutual support (Spaulding and
Flack 1976:75) .
Regarding change in religious perspective of international
students, basic cultural and religious values prove the most
resistant to change (Spaulding and Flack 1976:35). Still,
international students typically experience some relaxation of
religious commitment while in the United States (Kedem and Bar-
Lev 1983:387, Coelho 1972:74). Furthermore, many develop a
greater tolerance for religious traditions other than their own
(Salter and Teger 1975:218, Hull 1978:143). Religious innovation
is most likely in students who are isolated from their co
religionist friends (Lofland and Stark 1965:872). In addition,
Matheny (1981:5-6) observed that Muslims (as are all people) in
times of transition are far more receptive to religious
innovation than are those not in a state of transition.
Muslim students in the U.S., in contrast, through exposure
to an array of orthodox Muslims and Muslim student organizations,
more often than not develop an enhanced religious identity
(Haddad and Lummis 1987:22, Poston 1991:126). Focusing on Malay
students specifically. Von der Mehden (1987:185) states that
6Malay students in the United States frequently become more
committed to Islam.
With this in mind, do Malay students fit the description of
the typical international student? Do they seek American
friendships? Do they become more tolerant of other religious
perspectives and more inclined to religious experimentation?
Conversely, do Malays fall into the category of those Muslim
students whose overseas sojourn leads to a greater commitment to
Islam? Do Malay students in the United States experience the
general international student phenomenon of a loosening of the
reigns of tradition, or do they pull more tightly inward into a
more rigorous and entrenched Islam? Was Ismail's openness to
Christianity typical of many Malay international students, or was
his ultimate refusal to break with Islam indicative of a
persistence of Malay ethnic and religious identity that is
stronger than the pull toward innovation commonly experienced by
international students?
My interest in these questions is more than academic. For
the past nine years I have taught English as a second language to
international students. Four of those years were in Malaysia,
where I taught Malay Muslims, and where my family and I lived
with and befriended Malay neighbors.
Malaysia itself has a strong church, but the Malays
themselves remain unevangelized. In fact, informed sources
indicate that among the 22 million Malays worldwide there is no
visible Malay church. Isolated individual converts either revert
back to Islam or assimilate into Western-style, English speaking
7churches, completely out of touch with their families and former
Malay communities.
Christianization of the Malays has been attempted since the
16th century, and Christian contact with the Malay peoples almost
certainly dates back to several centuries earlier.^ As a matter
of fact, Malay was one of the first non-European languages to
have the Christian Bible. ^ How then do we account for the fact
that we have so little to show for all of this?
Definition of Key Terms
Before we go any further, we need to distinguish between the
following important terms:
Malay - This is a term for a particular people group of which
there are an estimated 22 million worldwide. The dominant
group in Malaysia, they also comprise substantial
percentages of the populations of Indonesia, southern
Thailand, and Singapore.
In 2500 B.C. Malays began migrating to what is now Malaysia.
Though Malays are not the original inhabitants of the area,
the Malaysian government considers them, along with the
aborigines, to be Jbumiputera (children of the soil),
connoting a close attachment with the land and indigeneity.
Since their early arrival, they have always been the
predominant people group of the region, and prior to the
large-scale immigration of Chinese and Indians in the 19th
century, they were the overwhelming majority of the
^Nestorian Christians from Persia made their way to the
Straits of Melaka as early as the 7th century, and there may have
been Christians among a trading community on the Malay Peninsula
at that time (Roxborogh 1989:4). Later, Catholic priests and
diplomats traveled through the Straits of Melaka on their way to
China (Dodsworth 1928:9). Also, Armenian Christian traders from
what is now Turkey lived in Melaka during the Melaka Sultanate of
the 15th century (Roxborogh 1989:4).
"The first Malay Gospel, printed in 1629, is significant as
the earliest example of translation and printing for evangelistic
purposes of a portion of the Bible in a non-European language.
The Malay New Testament was completed in 1668, and the entire
Bible was translated into Malay in 1733 (Nida 1972:269).
8population. The Malays are virtually all Muslims, while few
of the other Malaysian peoples have adopted Islam.
Malay also refers to the language spoken by the Malay
people.
Malaya - The peninsula just south of Thailand as it was called
prior to 1963 when it joined with Singapore and the
territories of Sarawak and Sabah to become Malaysia.
(Singapore withdrew in 1965 to become a separate country.)
Malayan - Of or pertaining to the territory of Malaya. It is
also used as a generic adjective to describe the people
who lived in Malaya, without distinguishing between the
various ethnic groups, whether Malays, Chinese, Indians,
or aboriginals.
Malaysia - The name of the country which includes the peninsula
between Thailand and Singapore, and the large states of
Sabah (previously known as British North Borneo) and
Sarawak on the northern part of the Island of Borneo.
Sabah and Sarawak are commonly referred to as East Malaysia,
in distinction from West Malaysia or peninsular Malaysia.
What is now included in Malaysia was gradually taken over by
the British between 18 2 4 (when the Anglo-Dutch Treaty
demarcated the boundaries between British and Dutch
holdings) and 1914 (when the last remaining Malay state
granted British sovereignty) . Prior to its independence
from England, the peninsula was known as Malaya. In 1957
the peninsula became an independent country within the
British Commonwealth, known as the Federation of Malaya.
With the 1963 incorporation of Singapore and the territories
of Sarawak and British North Borneo (renamed Sabah) , the
whole became known as Malaysia. Singapore withdrew in 1965
to become a separate nation.
Singapore - An island of 225 square miles and approximately 2.8
million people just off the southern tip of peninsular
Malaysia, to which it is connected by a causeway. In 1826
it joined with Penang and Melaka to form the Straits
Settlements (Penang, Melaka, and Singapore are ports along
the Straits of Melaka) , which later became part of the whole
colony of British Malaya. In 1955 Singapore became a self-
governing territory within the British Commonwealth. It was
part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. Singapore is now an
independent country, a sort of Greek-style city-state.
Purpose of the Studv
The purpose of this study is to provide a profile of the
9Malaysian Malays^ as an unreached people group, with special
attention given to Malay university students in the United
States. It is my hope that this information will result in more
understanding and therefore more intelligent and thoughtful
approaches to the Malays. My thesis is that the Malays have been
historically, culturally, and religiously conditioned to be
extremely resistant to gospel presentations. I attempt to defend
this thesis through three prongs: historical investigation,
religio-cultural analysis, and an empirical study of modern Malay
university students in the United States.
The first prong, that of the historical investigation, lends
authenticity to the problematic nature of Malay evangelism. The
current thinking of Malays regarding Christianity has been shaped
by centuries of interaction with Western Christian colonial
domination and the presence of numerous Christian missions. It
is unthinkable to discuss intelligently the question of Malay
evangelism without a consideration of the enduring influence of
the previous centuries of Muslim-Christian relations in Malaysia.
The historical study is an account of the history of the
Christian influence on the Malays. Of special interest are
policies and actions that have affected the Malays' views of
Christianity. Numerous works exist on Christian mission in
Malaysia, but none treat the subject of Christian influence on
the Malays specifically as thoroughly as is accomplished here.
The study also evaluates Christian mission efforts specifically
Malaysia itself has 10 million Malays (Johnstone 1993:365).
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regarding Malay evangelism, another area of rather limited
research to date.
After a brief look at pre-Muslim influences in Malaya, I
investigate the influence on Malays of the successive Portuguese,
Dutch, and British occupations of Malaya. Emphasis is placed on
the British occupation, as it was the only one not limited to
coastal ports of entry, and with a large Western immigrant
population. The historical study concludes with the advent of
Malaysian Independence in 1957.
The British colonial study focuses first on the British
themselves, and then on British policies, with a view toward
Western/Christian-Malay relations. The historical investigation
concludes with a look at the six major mission thrusts in Malaya
that were established before the 20th century. These are the
Roman Catholic Church (from 1511) , the Anglican Church (from
1809) , the London Missionary Society (from 1815) , the Christian
Brethren (from 1860) , the Presbyterian Church (from 1881) , and
the Methodist Church (from 1885) . The only other pre-20th
century mission, the Basel Mission, is excluded because of its
comparatively small size, and because it was confined to the
Island of Borneo. Apart from the London Missionary Society, the
six mission thrusts represent Christian denominations which
remain among the largest and most influential in Malaysia. The
Catholic Church, the Methodist Church, and the Anglican Church
are the largest Christian organizations in Malaysia even today.
The mission studies are brief accounts, covering only those
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individuals who engaged in evangelistic efforts among Malays, and
any action by each particular mission or church that may have
positively or adversely affected Christian-Malay relations.
As with the more comprehensive historical study, the study
of Christian-Muslim relations does not include post-independence
Malaysia. This places an admittedly large limitation on the
analysis, for much has transpired in the Malaysian church in the
nearly four decades since independence. It is simply beyond the
scope of this project to delve into the ever-multiplying kinds of
churches and sects in Malaysia. Moreover, the work of those
currently interested in Malay evangelism and the position of
Malay converts and would-be converts would be jeopardized by
specific references.
My hypothesis for the historical study is that the
successive colonization of Malaya by Western nations that
identified themselves as Christian, coupled with the Christian
missions' close association with the colonial administrations,
their implication in policies seen by the Malays as detrimental
to Malays, and their neglect of the Malay people have led to a
Malay antagonism against and fierce resistance to Christianity-
A note of hope for current evangelistic endeavors is that we will
discover, I believe, that a caring, long-term Christian witness
has never been demonstrated on behalf of the Malays. Malays have
not so much rejected Christ as they have a negative Christian
legacy.
The second prong of the investigation involves a religio-
12
cultural analysis of the Malays. This analysis overlaps the
historical chapter in that it traces the development of Malay
identity through time. The Malays have inhabited the Malay
Peninsula for more than two millennia. Islam did not become a
strong presence, though, until the 15th century. Centuries of
Malay tradition evolved into a complex code of customary law,
including an amalgamation of Hindu and primal religious
practices. Orthodox Islam had much to contend with in its
gradual and peaceful spread throughout the Peninsula. The
tension between Malay ethnic identity and universal or normative
Islam is a recurring theme among those who study the Malays.
What is the basis for Malay identity? What is the relationship
between Malay ethnic identity� the tightly controlled, close knit
Malay society�and universal Islam�Malay adherence to the
Islamic religion that goes beyond exclusivistic Malay concerns.
Has Islam become so much a part of "Malayness" that Malay
religion and culture are synonymous?
My hypothesis here is that a strong attachment to Islam
coalesces with and reinforces an even stronger exclusivistic
Malay ethnic identity to make Malays see Christianity as
completely foreign to who they are as a people. I believe we
find the Malays in a defensive posture, guarding their unique
identity against numerous pressures to lose it, and employing
Islam as a symbol of Malayness against a plurality of competing
ethnic and religious groups. New possibilities for Christianity
to gain a hearing are arising, though, in that rapid urbanization
13
and technological development are causing unprecedented social
upheaval and a concomitant deterioration of traditional social
ties, resulting in a hitherto unknown sense of anomie.
The third prong of the study entails the findings of an
interview of Malay university students in the United States. The
interview data corroborate and add to the findings of the
foregoing chapters. The information provides a first-hand
profile of what Malay students (and where possible through
generalization, Malays as a whole) believe, how they practice
Islam, their view of Islam's relation to the state, their view of
their Malay identity in relation to Islam and other religions,
especially Christianity- The interview data not only give a
picture of Malay university students, but also add much to our
understanding of where Malaysia and Malay Islam is headed. Thus,
it helps us know what we will face in efforts to befriend and
evangelize Malay international students, but it also adds clarity
to the whole Malay Muslim landscape, enabling us to anticipate
better the climate of Malay-Christian relations in Malaysia.
Malay international students are, admittedly, not
representative of the whole of Malay society. Thus, we will need
to proceed with caution when suggesting generalizations for all
Malays from the interview data. Yet, unlike other Asians in the
U.S., Malay international students are not an elitist group drawn
from the upper echelons of the socioeconomic pool. The Malay
students in the U.S. are Malaysian government scholarship
students intentionally selected from all geographical regions and
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economic levels of Malay society in order to raise the overall
educational achievement of Malays relative to the other people
groups in Malaysia. Those chosen for overseas education do have
a higher than average secondary school academic record (to ensure
they have a decent chance of academic success in the United
States) , but they are by no means all from well-to-do families or
the shining stars of the Malaysian education system. Thus, they
are, in fact, representative of a large cross-section of Malay
society.
Where they are not representative is in their age group. As
we will observe, Malay Islam is often divided along generational
lines, with the younger generation being less committed to a
primal religious worldview. On the other hand, the typically
heightened receptivity of persons in times of transition and of
international students in the United States make Malay
international students a key subgroup to investigate from a
missiological perspective. If it can be demonstrated that this
population is more open to religious innovation, and yet remains
resistant to Christian witness, it can reinforce the notion that
Malays as a people are in fact resistant.
Yet, I believe we will discover that various religious and
cultural factors will emerge that reveal that Malay
internationals do not exhibit the openness to change that is
common among international students as a whole. Therefore, we
may need to be all the more tentative about assuming that gospel
resistance in Malay internationals necessarily means at least the
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same level of resistance at home. If it turns out that Malay
international students are basically closed to religious
innovation where their non-Malay co-international counterparts
are open to change, an exploration of the reasons for this
finding should reveal much about cultural and societal factors
that shape the Malays. This, in turn, may provide insights as to
how we may most effectively break down barriers to hearing and
understanding the gospel message.
Moreover, Malay international students are a legitimate and
important unreached people block in their own right. One reason
for this is that they are disproportionately influential in
Malaysia upon their return. With this in mind, the student
interviews are also designed to note any changes that may occur
in them during their two-year sojourn, and to see if their
foreign stay influences their receptivity to the gospel.
Consequently, we get a picture of who the students are and what
they believe, but we also discover insights into how American
Christians can make an impact on Malay students while they are in
the United States.
My hypothesis concerning Malay students' sojourn in the U.S.
is that due to previous Islamic indoctrination, continual Islamic
surveillance, and an exceedingly powerful ethnic enclave
mentality, Malay students overseas do not display the openness to
religious innovation that is typical of international students in
general. The hopeful element here is that gestures of
hospitality from non-threatening American Christians can alter
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the strongly negative Malay feelings about Christianity.
The three prongs will combine to paint a picture of where
the Malays have been, and where they are today, and provide some
insight into where they may be going in their receptivity to the
Christian message. A descriptive account of Malays is valid
missiologically only to the extent that the information will
result in more understanding and therefore more intelligent and
thoughtful approaches to the Malays. Thus, a concluding chapter
summarizes the factors causing Malays to be unreached, as well as
the present state of affairs of Malay Islam and ethnic identity,
and gives suggestions for approaches that may be the most
effective in presenting a loving witness to the Malays.
CHAPTER 1
Historical Conditioning, Part 1:
Pre-colonial Influences and the Colonials
"Europeans ... contributed more than their share
to arousing tensions by their own actions"
�John Butcher
Historical and Cultural Conditioning
Recently, I took a trip to Bybee Pottery outside of
Richmond, Kentucky. The potter took portions of clay from the
same lump and made objects as different as sturdy coffee mugs and
delicate flower vases. The flower vases and coffee mugs each
came from the same material and were fired in the same kiln; the
difference was in how the potter had shaped them - applying
pressure here, constricting there, expanding or pinching at some
other points. At the early stages the clay was pliable, the form
as yet undetermined and susceptible to any number of influences.
As the potter worked, his hands gradually shaped the clay until
it assumed a distinct form. In the case I watched, it was a
bowl. Eventually the bowl was baked so that its shape became
permanently fixed. The particular lump of clay I observed was
made by the forces acting on it to become a bowl. Likewise, the
coffee mugs were what they were because of a different set of
forces at different points.
To understand a people, it is essential to know what forces
have operated on them to shape them to become what they are
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today.
^
Hardened through the fires of time, they cannot easily
escape the force of those influences. Thus we begin our trek
through time^ to explore what has shaped or scripted� the Malays
to reject Christianity.
Ancient History
On August 31st, 1994, Malaysia celebrated just 37 years of
nationhood. Young, urbanizing and industrializing - Malaysia is
certainly this. But peel away the layer of modernity, and the
kaleidoscope of Malaysia's history unfolds with a cast of Malays,
Arabs, Indians, Portuguese, Dutch, Chinese, Ibans, English and
others. The legacy of the land abounds with ancient temples,
Portuguese fortresses, mosques, shrines, churches, native
blowpipes, Malay krisses, and British colonial buildings. It all
began unknown millennia ago.
Negrito aborigines inhabited the land as hunters and
gatherers. Around 2,500 B.C., the Proto-Malays spreading south
^See Appendix A for a discussion of the literature
pertaining to the history and culture of the Malays and their
Southeast Asian context, particularly related to the colonial
period, and including Christian-Malay relations.
^It is not my intention to write a history of the Malays .
Rather, I want to highlight the events that have affected
Christian-Malay relations and to evaluate Christian missions to
the Malays. At times a bare-bones sketch of events will suffice
to give the reader a historical context.
�I am indebted to Steve Clarke (1992:1) for introducing me
to the concept of a social script. As a society undergoes its
developmental stages, the shared feelings and responses of a
people form a social script which becomes a lasting and indelible
influence upon the national character and outlook. Furthermore,
the shared feelings and responses "are consequently re-enacted by
subsequent generations."
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from China made their way to the Malay Peninsula and the islands
beyond. Their stone implements were more sophisticated than
those of the Negritos. Being cultivators and sailors, they lived
a more settled life and eventually forced the Negritos into the
hills and jungles.
Around 300 B.C., a new wave of immigrants in turn pushed the
Proto-Malays inland. They were the Deutero-Malays, who had
learned to use iron weapons and tools. The Deutero-Malays and
the people from Java, Sumatra and other parts of Indonesia are
the ancestors of the modern Malays (Area Handbook for Malaysia
and Singapore 1965:31).
Indian Influence
Through trade, the early inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula
were exposed to larger civilizations. Located at the convergence
of two major sea routes linking the great markets of India and
China, the peninsula was a hub of international commerce.
In fact, the sea was more of a highway than a barriei" to the
exchange of peoples, goods, and ideas. The Straits of Melaka,
described as a "gullet . . . through which the foreigners' sea
and land traffic in either direction must pass" (Bunge and
Vreeland 1984:6), became the battlefield in the struggle for
power by indigenous rulers who established states on the western
Malayan and northern Sumatran coasts.
The early development of the Malay Peninsula illustrates the
workings of an international economic system a millennium and a
half before the Industrial Revolution and the advent of modern
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modes of communication. Early Indian texts refer to the
peninsula as the Land of Gold. India had long obtained gold from
Siberia. By the 1st century A.D., however, the aggressive
expansion of the Huns cut off the overland gold trade. An edict
of the Emperor Vespasian (A.D. 69-79) prohibiting gold exports
form the Roman Empire deprived the Indians of supplies from the
West. Thus, the Indians turned to the East, and most
particularly the Malay Peninsula, for their needs. By the 5th
century Malaya was also valued for its rich supplies of tin, for
which its alloys were in perennial demand in India to make
religious images.
Between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D., the growth of an
expansive trade network linking the Middle East, India, the Malay
Peninsula, the islands of the western Indonesian archipelago, and
China was stimulated by the further deterioration of conditions
in Central Asia and the closing of the overland trade routes^
Starting in the early 4th century, the Huns repeatedly invaded
Northern China, causing horrific devastation; but Chinese
dynasties were established south of the Yangtze River, and the
southern region experienced unprecedented prosperity (Bunge and
Vreeland 1984:8) .
Such dynasties were forced to trade by sea for luxury goods
that had formerly come overland. Spices, aromatic woods, incense
and much more were initially obtained from the Arabian Peninsula
and then shipped along the Indian coast and through the Straits
of Melaka to Canton and other southern Chinese ports. Much of
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this Arabian trade was carried in Malay ships operated by Malay
sailors. Gradually, demand for the exotic goods of Arabia was
supplanted by that for substitutes obtained from the trees of the
Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and western Java. Small kingdoms
clustered around the Straits of Melaka and along the west and
east coasts of the peninsula served as control centers for the
transshipment of Arabian goods and as collection centers for
local goods, which were then sent to China.
Although the markets of southern China were of primary
importance for the entrepot states of the region of the Straits
of Melaka, it was India, rather than China, that provided the
main impetus for religious, cultural, and political developments.
Archaeological evidence of Indian influence on the peninsula
includes 4th century Sanskrit inscriptions found in Perai,
opposite the island of Penang, and an early Buddhist inscription
in slate found in Kedah (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:9).
It appears that over a long period of time, and in
increasing numbers, Indian merchants settled along the coasts,
marrying the daughters of local rulers. Indigenous Malay rulers
found Hindu concepts of kingship useful for the establishment of
stable regimes. They adopted the concept of the devaraja (god-
king) , which depicted the ruler as the incarnation of a Hindu
god. Brahmin priests presided over an elaborate system of
ceremony and ritual in the royal court. The infusion of the
divine into the temporal gave a more stable foundation to the
creation of large and more powerful political units. Especially
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significant was the transition from the indigenous concept of the
ruler as a "first among equals" chosen by his contemporaries for
his superior prowess to the imported notion of hereditary
dynasties in which the throne was transmitted from father to son
(Lamb 1964:103^105).
The late 7th century gave rise to the powerful kingdom of
Srivijaya, which controlled passage through the straits and
dominated Malay-Indonesian trade until its disintegration in the
14th century. Srivijaya refers to an assemblage of mainly
entrepot-type Indianized centers encompassing much of Sumatra and
Malaya, with its center in Palembang in southeast Sumatra (Area
Handbook for Malaysia and Singapore 1965:34-35).
Although masters of a commercial empire, Srvijaya's
maharajahs promoted their religious beliefs. Palembang was a
center of Buddhist studies for several centuries, boasting a
flourishing community of 1,000 monks (Bunge and Vreeland
1984:10). The city's renown as a center for Buddhist learning is
underscored by the fact that the Indian scholar Atisa, later
famous for a reformation of Buddhism in Tibet, studied at
Palembang under a master of the Tantric School, in the 11th
century (Lamb 1964:110)
Weakened by rival factions, the Srivijayan kingdom was
eventually absorbed in the end of the 14th century by the Hindu
Majapahit dynasty of the island of Java. Majapahit rulers,
believed to be either the incarnation of one of the Hindu
deities, or their descendants, kept many Shaivite priests as
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attendants in their palaces (Zainu'ddin 1970:50).
Majapahit dominance was short-lived, and by the 15th century
it had been replaced on the trade routes of the Melaka Straits by
the Melaka Sultanate. Never again would the Malays be ruled by
followers of Indian religions, yet, even today, this early Indian
influence can still be felt. The Malay language, so inseparable
from the Malay identity, contains many words borrowed from
Sanskrit. Traditional Malay wedding rites, challenged by Islamic
scholars, but dear to the hearts of many Malays, contain numerous
Hindu customs. The very Islam practiced by the Malays for
centuries has been a syncretistic amalgamation of primal spirit
religion, Hinduism^, and Islam. Hindu tantrism was much more
compatible with indigenous Malay spiritism than was Islam when it
arrived. "Between the primitive beliefs and practices of the
Malay and those of the Hindu there was much in common" (Windstedt
1951:27). Hindu religious ideas continued to permeate Malay
religious life long after Islam became the accepted religion of
the Malays.
In truth, Indian influence lasting a thousand years affected
every department of Malay life. The Indians brought the Malay
race a vocabulary of abstract terms like "religion," "asceticism"
and "fasting." Hinduism in Tantric form established the
'we acknowledge here that Hinduism consists of a
conglomeration of ancient religious tradition of such imprecise
perimeters as to cause some to question the adequacy of the very
term "Hinduism" (Knipe 1991:1-2). Nevertheless, a definable
pattern of beliefs has emerged, sufficient to warrant the use of
the term (see Knipe 1991:7-10).
importance of fasting long before Muslim traders reached the
Malayan archipelago (Winstedt 1951:28).
The Hindu religion shaped the Malay religious and personal
identity. Malay magic became developed under Hinduism. The
influence of Hindu tantrism predisposed the Malays towards Sufi
mysticism and away from Muslim orthodoxy. Hinduism fortified the
Malay shaman by corroborating the efficacy of trances. It taught
the shaman the discipline of meditation and a Sanskrit term
{"tapa") for "ecstatic fervor" (Winstedt 1951:28). It taught the
Malays the breathing techniques and powers of concentration that
enabled the shamans to transport themselves anywhere. As
Muslims, the Malays often claimed to transport themselves to
distant places. An 18th-century ruler of Perak was said to have
visited Mecca every Friday and even brought back green figs as
proof of his journeys (Winstedt 1951:28).
Hindu incantations were introduced into Malay rituals and
the Sanskrit term "puja" came to mean the utterance of a pawang
or an expert in any art believed to need the use of magic. Some
Malays in east coast fishing villages still hold an annual "puja
pantai" (roughly translated "sacred utterance at the beach")
festival to mark the beginning of the fishing season. This
ceremony invokes the guardian spirits of the sea to protect the
fishermen and to grant them big catches (Hamid 1964:183).
Perhaps the concept that most influenced Malay practice vis
a-vis Islam was the Indian notion of the devaraja, the god-king.
Under Islam, Malay leaders assumed the title "Sultan," but the
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title carried with it much of the semi-divine nature of the raja.
Sultans were given uncritical and unconditional loyalty. They
were the guardians of Malay adat (tradition/custom) as well as
the Muslim religious heads of their realms. With the sultans as
the unchallengeable heads of state, subjects had no choice but to
be Muslims. To challenge the sultan was to challenge the
divinely mandated natural order of reality. To attempt to remove
oneself from the protective sphere of the sultan and thus from
what was "Right," by veering from the accepted standards of adat
and/or religion was unthinkable. It would be tantamount to
making oneself a nonperson, a nonentity.
The Melaka Sultanate and the Evolution of Malay Identity
"Malacca in its prime
The image of Malay renown framed in time"
�The opening lines of the preface of
the historical Malay ballad,
"Death of a Warrior"
The foundation of the Melakan empire is shrouded in an
inextricable mixture of fact and legend. What started as a
humble fishing village on a beach near the mouth of a river,
became the center of a Malay kingdom which eventually embraced an
empire receiving tribute from rulers on the peninsula and
neighboring islands. It would be difficult to overstate the
impact of historical Melaka on the Malay consciousness. Let us
review the legend of Melaka to see what it contributes to the
Malay identity to this day.
The founder of Melaka was a fugitive prince from Palembang
who was forced to flee his country. He is known in Malayan
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history as the "Parameswera, " an honorific title he gave himself
meaning "Prince Consort." Through cunning and intrigue, he
escaped dangers on his way to what was to become Melaka (Sejarah
Melayu 1970:12). A delightful Malay story explains why the
Parameswera chose that spot to settle, and how it got its name:
Apparently he was leaning against a tree by the river
watching his hunting dogs holding at bay a pelandok, a tiny
mousedeer� the Brer Rabbit of Malay folk-tales�when it
suddenly kicked one of the aggressors into the water, an
incredible feat for such a small animal. The Parameswera
exclaimed, "This is a fine place for a city. It breeds
bravery; even its mousedeer are full of fight. Let us make
a settlement here." He asked his followers the name of the
tree against which he was resting. One answered that it was
the malaka tree. "We will call our town after it," declared
the Parameswera. (Miller 1966:27)
This event, the founding of Melaka in 14 03, marks the beginning
of the solidifying of Malay power and unity.
The Parameswera negotiated with the powerful Ming Dynasty in
China to become a protectorate of China. This brought the
protection necessary for Melaka to develop into a prosperous
commercial center. The Portuguese who conquered Melaka confirmed
its importance and affluence. One of their chroniclers. Tome
Pires, wrote "Men cannot estimate the world of Malacca on account
of its greatness and profit" (Miller 1966:26). "No trading port
as large as Malacca is known, nor any where they deal in such
fine and highly prized merchandise" (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:14).
By the early 16th century, Melaka might have had a population of
as many as 100,000 persons, remarkable given its lack of
agricultural hinterland (rice had to be imported). Melaka 's
relative size is put in perspective by noting that the
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populations of London and Paris at that time are each estimated
at just 50,000 persons (Needleman 1989:441; Partner 1976:77).
In his last years the Parameswera converted to Islam,
signified by his assumption of the name Iskandar Shah.^� Bunge
and Vreeland (1984:14-15) maintain that the conversion was
politically motivated, for a marriage had concluded an alliance
with the northern Sumatran state of Pisai, whose ruler had
recently become a Muslim. The conversion promoted close ties
with Melaka 's Indian and Arab trading partners. Yet, the
Parameswera ' s conversion was not merely a conversion of
convenience, for Iskandar Shah strongly encouraged Islam in
Melaka until his death in 1424 (Miller 1966:31). Indeed, he
invited Muslim missionaries and attempted to eradicate Hinduism.
Most of the neighboring states were Buddhist or Hindu-
Buddhist, and Iskandar Shah's successor, who took the Srivijayan
title of "Sri Maharaja," remained faithful to the old Indian
religions. Sri Maharaja's death in 1444 brought a succession
struggle, ending in the accession of Muzaffar Shah, a zealous
Muslim (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:15). He proclaimed Melaka a
Muslim state. Thenceforth Melaka 's prosperity and expansion were
linked with the propagation of Islam throughout the region.
As to the question of the spread of Islam, it gained a
^�Iskandar Shah was the Islamic equivalent of Alexander the
Great, whose exploits figure largely in Muslim legends.
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foothold in Southeast Asia relatively late." J.C. van Leur
(1955:111) quoting other sources states that "there are allusions
to Arab settlements or colonies on the west coast of Sumatra as
early as A.D. 674, and that Arab tombstones dating from 1082 in
Java ..." have been found. These provide evidence of the
existence of Arab settlements, but they do not provide certainty
as to whether or not any of the local inhabitants adopted Islam.
The earliest evidence for Islam on the Malay Peninsula is not
until the 14th century. "Apparently, Muslim Arab communities in
the region were neither numerous nor influential enough in the
early centuries to challenge the state Hindu-Buddhist cults or
the animistic beliefs of the common people" (Bunge and Vreeland
1984:15). Actually, it was not the Arabs, but Indian traders who
initially carried out the process of Islamization. These traders
came primarily to trade in the ports of the area. Although
religious conflict was an issue in some local succession
struggles, such as that which brought Muzaffar Shah to power,
overall, conversion was accomplished gradually and peacefully.
"The expansion of Islam in South-east Asia little resembled the
rapid advance of the religion, along with the Arab armies, in the
Middle East in the seventh century A.D." (Lamb 1964:111). For
lack of a centralized polity, Islam was spread by individuals.
Leur (1955:114) maintains that Islam was spread as a "missionary
community in the early christian sense." Its advance in the
"For a more complete history of Islam in the area, see
Coedes (1969), Winstedt (1935), and Leur (1955).
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Malay Peninsula was slow, emanating from Melaka. As the power of
Melaka expanded, so did its religious influence. In fact, Melaka
became the center for the study of Muslim theology for the entire
Indies .
The mystique of the newly formed Muslim state is enhanced by
tales of court life. Hinduized rituals for royal ceremonies were
perpetuated, and shrouded the ruler in an aura of sanctity.
The royal person became sacred and was treated accordingly.
He never walked, not outside the palace anyway. He was
either borne on an elephant with the Temenggong, Minister of
War, in front of him and another minister behind bearing the
Sword of State while swords- and spearmen walked along the
flanks and to the rear, or he was carried in a royal hammock
by major chiefs. On short distances, a slave bore the ruler
on his back. A court language, the bahasa dalam, language
inside the palace, was evolved especially for the rulers ' s
personal activities. For instance, he was never "carried"
but 'borne about on high;" he never ate but "regaled"
himself; he did not "sleep" but "reposed." (Miller 1966: 33)
The ceremonial rituals of the court were prescribed to the
smallest detail. No one could come into the presence of the
ruler uninvited. The colors, white and yellow, were exclusive to
royalty, as was the wearing of gold jewelry (Miller 1966:33).
The Melaka mystique is further increased by virtue of Melaka
being the locus of alleged miracles. Legend attributes numerous
miracles to the powerful Chinese Admiral Cheng-Ho on his visits
to Melaka in the early 15th century (Miller 1966:29). Healings,
miraculous turn of events, and magical objects are prevalent in
Melakan folklore. In Melaka, St. Francis Xavier reputedly raised
from the dead the only son of a devout woman (Coleridge
1872:513), and gave prophecies that were fulfilled in exact
detail (Coleridge 1872:512).
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Melaka is the fount of Malay patriotism and folklore. The
well-known Malay poet Usman Awang, in his poem "Jiwa Hamba" (The
Servile Spirit) writes: "On the remains of Malacca fort, we
inculcate the spirit of independence." Possibly no piece of
writing is more read in schools than the beloved Malay epic poem
"Death of a Warrior." This epic, which recounts the story of a
struggle between unconditional loyalty to the Sultan and
allegiance to justice, is significant to us here in that it is in
historic Melaka that heroic exploits take place. Brandishing a
magical kris. Hang Jebat, "warrior brave and daring," is able to
subdue hundreds .
The only major early Malay history is the lengthy Sejarah
Melayu (Malay Annals) commissioned to give a favorable account of
the Melakan Sultanate. Sejarah Melayu is one of the most
significant pieces of Malay literature ever produced. "As the
author was writing 'for the greater pleasure' of a Sultan of
Malacca, it is to be expected that his central theme would be, as
it is, the greatness of Malacca, its rulers and chiefs, and the
superiority of the 'men of Malacca' over all others" rseiarah
Melayu 1970 :x) . Thus, in Sejarah Melayu we read of the "noble
character," "justice," " humaneness" and "handsomeness" of the
various rulers. In Melaka, every army or fleet is "in number
past counting;" every woman must be "of peerless beauty;" and
every man must be full of bravery and cunning.
Malay cunning, in fact, is one of the central themes of the
Malay Annals, as it is one of the self -perceived traits of Malay
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identity. In the Annals, repeatedly, the men of Melaka are too
clever for the foreigner. In China, Melakan envoys succeed by a
trick in doing what no Chinese could do, namely, see the face of
the Lord of Heaven {Sejarah Melayu 1970:118). In Java, so
successfully do the Melakans turn the tables on a foreign ruler
who had tried to make them look foolish that he has to admit
their superiority (p. 109). Every encounter between Siam and
Melaka is a triumph for the quick wits of the Malays (pp. 97, 99),
and in Pahang the Sultan is so humiliated by the triumphs of
Melakan ingenuity that he abdicates in chagrin (pp. 168-176) .
"Even foreign missionaries of Islam look foolish when they
encounter Malays" (p.xii). More than once foreign Muslim
scholars have their theology corrected by their Malay pupils
(pp. 93-94, 146,149,162).
A second major theme of Sejarah Melayu is, as mentioned, the
superiority of Malays to foreigners. Gentle digs on foreigners
characterize the whole work. In general, the work records the
stages in the advance of Melaka to prosperity and greatness, the
final description being that of Portuguese Viceroy of India,
Alphonso d' Albuquerque, who upon seeing the greatness of Melaka
"was seized with desire to possess it" (Sejarah Melayu 1970:151).
Melakan greatness made the Malay language the lingua franca
of the entire archipelago. Rich and versatile, Bahasa Malaysia
^^The tiny pelanduk (mousedeer) , already mentioned as the
Brer Rabbit of Malay folklore, is a ubiquitous symbol in
Malaysia. It is a symbol of Malay cunning against greater
opposing strength, the triumph of the underdog.
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(the Malay language) has been arguably the single biggest
contributor to Malay cohesiveness and identity. A prominent
British colonial governor, Frank Swettenham, (Clifford and
Swettenham 1894 :ix) stated that "As a tongue which is capable of
expressing, with admirable terseness, the most minute shades of
difference between every physical action, and between many states
of feeling . . . Malay has few rivals." Large billboards
promoting the use of Malay dot the Kuala Lumpur landscape with
the words "Cintalah Bahasa Kita!" (We Love our Language!). The
Malay constitution even proclaims the habitual use of the Malay
language as one of the three distinguishing features of a Malay.
To reiterate, the Melaka Sultanate represents the pride of
the Malays. Malay historical writing has its roots in Melaka.
Along with this goes the pride of the Malays in their language.
Malay patriotism stems largely from Melakan heroism, including
prominently that of the fight against the Portuguese when they
invaded.
The Melakan Empire represents the beginning of the Malays
functioning as a unit, rallying together under a common banner.
In line with this, the Melakan Empire binds the coming of Islam
with Malay identity and Malay greatness. It is of great
significance to the Malays that the earlier Buddhist Srivijayan
Empire was founded in and emanated from what is now Indonesia,
while the flowering of Islam in the area grew from the soil of
the Malay Peninsula.
For over a century the Melakan Empire brought pride and
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prestige to the Malays as never before or since. "Much as
Europeans sought to emulate and recapture the glory of classical
Greece and Rome, Malay rulers through the succeeding centuries
sought to reflect and restore the magnificence of Melaka in its
golden age" (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:12).
Invasion of the "Franks" (1511-1641^
As the 15th century was the Malays' Golden Age, it was also
Portugal's Age of Discovery. The Portuguese were eager to expand
their influence to the East for two reasons: a crusading spirit
against Muslims, and a desire for Asian spices.
Spices were the most important commodity in the trade
between Europe and Asia. The spice trade was so lucrative that
pepper, for example, bought in Asia for the equivalent of U.S.
$45 could be sold in European markets for U.S. $1,800 (Ridsdale
1985:30). Melaka was one of Portugal's targets as it was the
collecting point for spices from the Moluccas, also known as the
Spice Islands. "As the Portuguese writer Barbosa put it,
'Whoever is Lord in Melaka has his hand on the throat of Venice'"
(Ridsdale 1985: 29) .
In 1509 the Portuguese, headquartered in Goa, sent a
delegation to Melaka to seek permission to establish a trading
port. The excited locals, who had never seen Caucasians, called
them "Franks," the appellation commonly used to describe the
Christian crusaders by the Muslims during the Crusades.
Portuguese accounts (Bastin and Winks 1966:45) claim that the
Portuguese were not well-received, but were rebuffed by Malay
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forces backed by Indian Muslim traders. The Portuguese were
forced to flee, leaving behind 20 prisoners. This provided their
justification to return in force.
The Malay version gives quite an opposite account. In the
Malay Annals (1970:151) we find Melaka 's Chief Minister welcoming
the Portuguese commander with "robes of honor." The Portuguese,
to their discredit, return evil for good by attacking Melaka.
The ships forthwith opened fire with their cannon. And
the people of Malaka were bewildered and filled with fear at
the sound of the cannon, and they said, "What sound is this
like thunder?" And when presently the cannon balls began to
arrive and struck the people of Malaka, so that some had
their heads shot away, some their arms and some their legs,
the people of Malaka were more and more astonished to see
what manner of thing this artillery was, and they said,"
What may be this round weapon that is sharp enough to kill
us?" The next day the Franks landed two thousand men armed
with match-locks apart from a vast horde of sailors and
sepoys: and the men of Malaka under the leadership of Tun
Hasan Temenggong went out to repel them. And when they
encountered the Franks, battle was engaged, (the flashes of
fire from the cannon being like flashes of lightning in the
heaven) and the weapons falling like heavy rain. Then Tun
Hasan Temenggong and the men of Malaka charged; and the line
of the Franks was broken and they gave ground. Then the men
of Malaka charged again, and this time the Franks were
routed and fled to the waterside, pursued by the men of
Melaka. (Sejarah Melayu 1970:152)
As exaggerated as this account may be, in Malay folk-
history, the entrance of Christianity to Malay waters is marked
by cannonfire, resulting in the loss of Malay heads and arms and
legs. It is a bloody battle in which God provides victory
through the stalwart bravery of the innocent and wronged Malays.
Furthermore, Christianity is brought by "Franks,"�white
foreigners, crusading enemies. As cosmopolitan as Melaka was in
its prime, it had never been the home of Europeans.
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On May 2, 1511, Alphonso d' Albuquerque himself (the Portuguese
Viceroy of India) sailed for Melaka with 18 ships carrying 800
Portuguese and 300 Indian auxiliaries. Two months later the
fleet entered Melaka harbor. "D' Albuquerque added to the
impressive�and ominous�spectacle by firing salutes from every
ship and sounding all trumpets " (Miller 1966:43).
The Malay Annals give a detailed description of the ensuing
battle, beginning as follows:
The Franks engaged the men of Malaka in battle, and they
fired their cannon from the ships so that the cannon balls
came like rain. And the noise of the cannon was as the
noise of thunder in the heavens and the flashes of fire of
their guns were like flashes of lightning in the sky: and
the noise of their match-locks was like that of groundnuts
popping in the frying pan. (Sejarah Melayu 1970:162)
Meanwhile, Melaka 's ruler. Sultan Ahmed, along with an
Islamic teacher, is on the front lines, perched on an elephant,
calmly studying the doctrine of the Unity of God "amid a hail of
bullets" (Sejarah Melayu 1970:162). Eventually, the Sultan's
teacher can take it no longer and cries out, "'Sultan, this is no
place to study the Unity of God, let us go home! � Sultan Ahmed
smiled and returned to the palace" (Sejarah Melayu 1970:162).
Here we see another great contrast between Islam and
Christianity. The representative Christian, d' Albuquerque, who,
in fact, intended to crush Islam, starting with Melaka (Miller
1966:44-45), reigns bullets on the Islamic head. Sultan Ahmed,
who is peacefully preoccupied with higher spiritual
contemplations. (What could be more noble for a Muslim than the
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study of the Unity of God?) Concentrating on the lofty Muslim
views of God, the Sultan is composed and absolutely fearless.
When the Portuguese launched a ground attack, the Sultan
again mounted his elephant:
The Franks then fiercely engaged the men of Malaka in
battle and so vehement was their onslaught that the Malaka
line was broken, leaving the king on his elephant isolated.
And the king fought with the Franks pike to pike, and he was
wounded in the palm of his hand, saying "See this, Malays!"
And when they saw that Sultan Ahmed was wounded in the hand,
the war-chiefs returned to the attack and fought the Franks.
fSeiarah Melayu 1970:163)
Such language as "the flashes of fire of their guns were
like flashes of lightning in the sky" and "the noise of the
cannon was as the noise of thunder" call to mind the words in the
United States national anthem "and the rockets red glare, the
bombs bursting in air," and evoke the same feelings of national
pride in the Malays as do the words of the "Star Spangled Banner"
in the hearts of many Americans.^'' The key difference for our
purposes is that the aggressors in Melaka were Christians bent on
religious as well as military conquest.
The fort which the Portuguese built upon their eventual
capture of Melaka became a symbol of heroic Malay resistance,
much as the Alamo Mission is to Americans. The Malays who
defended Melaka are seen as freedom fighters. When the British
later destroyed most of the fort, a Malay chronicler lamented
this act of vandalism. "'The fort,' he wrote 'was the pride of
"Throughout this work, I use the term "American" to refer
to citizens of the United States, and not to North, Central, and
South Americans in general.
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Malacca and after its destruction the place lost its glory, like
a woman bereaved of her husband, the lustre gone from her face'"
(quoted in Miller 1966:67). The ruins of the fort, which still
bear the fort's original Portuguese name A Famosa, The Famous,
are a popular Malay war memorial.
On August 24, 1511, Melaka was captured. The Sultan and his
followers fled to the interior. At the hands of Christians,
Melaka lost its independence, never to regain its days of glory.
The "Christian" Legacy
As the Christian flag was raised over the Sultan's palace,
d' Allbuquerque sent his troops six abreast through the streets,
killing indiscriminately (Miller 1966:45). "D' Albuquerque's son
recorded, 'Of the Moors, women and children there died by the
sword an infinite number for no quarter was given to any of
them'" (Miller 1966:45).
D' Albuquerque stayed for three months to set up an
administration and to supervise the construction of a fort near
where the mosque had stood along the seashore. A Famosa (The
Famous) was an impressive stone fortress; its outer stone wall
was eight feet thick and 2 0 feet high. A five-storied tower rose
by the sea, and two towers at the rear faced the countryside.
Huge cannons peered through embrasures on all positions.
A Portuguese city developed within the walls of Melaka. "No
less than nine churches raised their spires in the town" (Miller
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1966:47) The Malays and other races lived outside. On the
hill which the fortress encompassed, and on which had stood the
palaces of the Melakan sultans, rose the most impressive church.
Our Lady of the Annunciation. To the Portuguese, the church
became an inspiring landmark. To the Malays, it was a symbol of
departed glory. Their mosque had been replaced by enemy
fortifications; their palace by a church.
To put things in the proper perspective, the Portuguese were
not the first Christians to arrive in the area. Nestor ian
Christians, Catholic priests and diplomats, and Armenian
Christian traders had all preceded the guns of the Portuguese.
Christian traders had even inhabited Melaka during the Melaka
Sultanate of the 15th century (Roxborogh 1989:4). Undoubtedly,
the Muslim traders predominated in the commerce carried on
between the East and West, but there was a Christian
representation. As Crawford (1856:98) states: "It is probable
that Christian traders of Syria and Egypt frequented the
archipelago along with the Mohammedan, long before the arrival of
the Portuguese, and Ludonica Barthema, in his itinerary, alludes
to having met persons of this description; but no Christian
converts appear to have existed previous to the conquest of
^"I'm reminded of the twinge of sadness I experienced as I
overlooked the town of Bethlehem and was struck by the number of
mosques and towering minarets. I knew in my mind that the
Muslims had a right to be there, but my emotions were telling me
that Jesus' birthplace belonged to Christians. My gut feelings
in Bethlehem give me some indication of the emotions that must
have been aroused in the Malays when they saw the seat of their
former Muslim empire littered with Christian churches.
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Albuquerque . "
Can it be true that there were no Christian converts after
centuries of contact? The contrast between the Christian and
Muslim traders is interesting. Wherever the Muslim traders went,
Islam was planted. Christian traders had contact with the
Malays, but transmitted little or no religious influence. At
this point, attention should be called to the fact that Islam was
spread primarily not by trained religious specialists, but rather
through the efforts of the Muslim traders.
Christian Europe during the time of the Muslim trade
monopoly of the Melaka Sultanate was at the height of sacramental
institutionalism. Christians believed that the grace of Jesus
Christ was dispensed by the church through the sacraments. The
sole practitioners authorized to facilitate such dispensing of
grace were the ordained clergy. Entire populations were baptized
into the church, and individuals were believed to be linked to
Christ only through continual partaking of the sacraments. There
is much speculation as to the extent to which the average
European actually understood about Jesus and the Bible, or
personally experienced inner transformation resulting in a
changed moral character. The evidence suggests that many were
Christians only in the sense that they were baptized into the
jurisdiction of a particular bishopric (Latourette 1938:211).
Such state Christians brought with them a religion whose
rituals had to be performed on their behalf by a professional
clergy. The Muslims, in vivid contrast, with their five daily
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demonstrations of public prostration in prayer, were each visible
object lessons and advertisements for their faith. Moreover,
their lives, governed by Shari'ah Law, typically displayed a
higher moral caliber than did their Christian counterparts. To
reiterate, it was Islam, and not Christianity, that spread as a
"missionary community in the early Christian sense" (Leur
1955: 114) .
Tragically, the Portuguese lives bore no resemblance to the
Christ they claimed to represent. Their lifestyle was no more
endearing to the Malays than had been their initial conquest.
St. Francis Xavier, who visited Melaka three times en route to
destinations further east, was appalled by the drunkenness and
sexual immorality of the Portuguese (Coleridge 1872:349). He
also described them as full of "quarrels and enmities" (Coleridge
1872:391). With impunity, the Portuguese men raped the local
women, and took multiple concubines (Northcott 1991:49). Tome
Pires, a Portuguese chronicler who worked in Melaka after its
capture, described Portuguese Melaka as the "Babylon of the
Orient," and its Portuguese inhabitants as "voluptuous" and
"profligate" (Miller 1966:48). Bunge and Vreeland (1984:19)
describe the Portuguese rule as a "blend of piracy and
proselytization. "
It is not that the Portuguese were irreligious. St. Francis
notes (Coleridge 1872:181-182) that the commandants gave great
assistance in the building of chapels, and that the Portuguese
were frequent attenders of the sacraments of confession and
communion. The Portuguese religious works (often exhibited
ostentatiously, as in their parading of statues of the saints or
the Virgin Mary) , coupled with their cruelty and ungodly example,
must have evoked in the Malays the worst imaginable associations
with Christianity. A Vicar of Melaka for 3 0 years was a
spineless man who curried the favor of the evil Don Alvaro
(Coleridge 1872:570) and "whose life was a scandal to religion"
(165) .
It would be inaccurate to suggest that the Portuguese were
all bad, or that the Christianity practiced was never more than
outward form. If it is true that the approach of the priests
wasn't the most contextualized (locals were taught Latin), it is
also true that Francis could proudly testify that most of the
priests were of godly piety and indefatigable in their labors
(Coleridge 1872:188). While Francis placed great emphasis on the
reciting of prayers and creeds (190), he also spoke of the need
for explanation, and not just rote memorization (391) . While the
partaking of the Eucharist and the hearing of confessions was
stressed (190) , Francis mentioned not just the "rules of
religion," but also the "cultivation of piety" (374).
Tirelessly, he sought to promote virtue and justice. Xavier and
a band of followers humbly and sacrif icially cared for the sick
and dying in the midst of a plague (Coleridge 1872:510). Francis
himself seems to have been highly respected by the Muslim Malays
for his holy life, although Wong (1973:26) contests that Francis
displayed an open contempt for the Muslims.
St. Francis Xavier 's life and work is generally regarded as
the single bright light of positive Christian witness in the 130-
year Portuguese control of the Malay Peninsula. Most likely it
was that, but I submit that Xavier 's conviction that the
Portuguese conquest and the advance of the church were
inseparably tied resulted in a grave misrepresentation of the
true nature of the church. The harm to the witness of Christ
caused by such a gross misrepresentation outweighs the good
caused by specific acts of charity and self-sacrifice.
Xavier saw himself as "an envoy of the great King of the
West" (Coleridge 1872:510). A contemporary of Francis, Faria y
Sousa (cited in Coleridge 1872:410), said of him that he "'was
not less zealous for the honour of our King than for the worship
of our God.'" Francis went so far as to say that the cause of
the Christian religion was "bound up in the East with the
prestige and pover of Portugal" (Coleridge 1872:410).
A certain incident illustrates well Xavier 's position.
During one of Francis' visits to Melaka, Melaka 's bitter enemy,
the Achenese (Muslims from northern Sumatra), attacked Melaka,
burned all but a few of Melaka 's ships, captured a few fishermen
cut off their noses, ears, and heels, and "'sent them to the
Governor of Malacca with a letter written in their own blood,
wherein most proudly and insolently they provoked him to battle'
(Faria y Sousa, cited in Coleridge 1872:409). The Portuguese
commander and his staff, with a small force and their ships in
disrepair, felt there was no choice but to accept the losses.
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Xavier, feeling the dishonor brought upon Portugal "'urged them
in some way or other to wipe out the injury'" (Faria y Sousa,
cited in Coleridge 1872:410). "'So much did that holy wrath of
the great Xavier bring about,'" says Faria y Sousa, "� that he
prevailed, with his zealous discourses, upon some rich merchants
so as to get these rotten vessels put into such a state that the
soldiers and sailors might safely embark in them'" (Coleridge
1872:410) .
When the expedition was ready to sail against Acheh, Francis
blessed them and promised a certain victory. The Melakan fleet,
which Francis sent out "to vindicate the honor of the Christian
name against the infidels," was christened the "'armament of
Jesus'" (Coleridge 1872:411). In its absence, Francis frequently
faced a crucifix and prayed for the success of the expedition.
When the men returned victoriously, it was Francis himself who,
bearing a crucifix, led the victory procession while salutes were
fired on land and sea. Francis "reminded the victors that their
true general had been He (Christ) in whose honor they had fought"
(Coleridge 1872:416). It is sadly ironic that the crucified
Christ, the ultimate symbol of non-vindictive, self-sacrif icial
love for one's enemies, became the symbol of military vengeance
unleashed to "wipe out the injury" inflicted by the "infidels."
The One who said, "Blessed are the peacemakers," was represented
by the "armament of Jesus."
It is bad enough that the Portuguese were cruel; it is worse
that they were so in the name of Christ. The fatal flaw of the
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Portuguese Christian witness is that no distinction was made
between being Portuguese and being Christian. Even had the
Portuguese been morally upright and their rule benign, this one
thing alone would have killed the possibility of the spread of an
indigenous Christian community. As church historian John
Roxborogh (1989:5) put it: "Inevitably, Christianity was
perceived as the religion of invading foreigners whose presence
was unwelcome." In fact, the Portuguese crusading mentality
actually spurred the propagation of Islam as local rulers and
their subjects sought common ground to resist the threat."
Bunge and Vreeland (1984:19) sum up this era with the
evaluation that "The Portuguese contribution to Malay history was
� in contrast to that of the earlier Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic
merchants and seamen� largely negative." The fact is that the
Portuguese conquest of Melaka is known by the Malays to have been
part of a crusade against Muslim influence in the Indian ocean.
To this day, this colors the Malays' attitude toward
Christianity.
Going Dutch (1641-1824)
The Dutch first appeared in Malay waters in 1595. The first
decades of the 17th century witnessed their concerted attack on
virtually the entire global network of Portuguese outposts. By
1618 they dominated the spice trade (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:19).
The following year they conquered the Javanese capital, Jakarta,
"The very presence of the Portuguese in Melaka forced
Muslim traders to take their business elsewhere, thus furthering
the spread of Islam (Roxborogh 1989:4).
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renamed it Batavia, and made it their center in the region. The
native states welcomed the Dutch as rivals of the Portuguese and
took their trade to Batavia, thus striking a telling blow against
Melaka.
In July, 1640, the Dutch, aided by Malays from Johore
(located in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula, Johore had
become the Malay capital since the Portuguese drove the Malay
rulers from Melaka) , initiated a siege of Melaka. After six
months of weary battle, the Dutch prepared for a final assault.
A Dutch chronicler (recorded in Bastin and Winks 1966:73) tells
us that the "Commander-in-Chief . . . and his Council thought
proper to appoint ... a day of public prayers and fasting so
that God our Lord might be pleased to bless our exploit." Four
days later A Famosa belonged to the Dutch.
"In undertaking the conquest of Melaka, the Dutch were
activated more by the desire that the Portuguese should not be
there than by any marked desire to be there themselves"
(Dodsworth 1928a:viii). Trade shifted to Batavia, as the Dutch
preferred it as the chief port in the region. Melaka never
returned to its former status as a commercial center. Its
capture had been a strategic necessity to the Dutch, but in their
plan of empire it was just an outpost.
Like the Portuguese, the Dutch sought monopolistic control
of the spice trade. Unlike the Portuguese, for the Dutch,
Christianity was not the religious arm of imperialism.
Underlining the primacy of the economic interests of the
Dutch (they focused on Batavia in Java not on Melaka) , and
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setting a significant precedent for the future, was the fact
that when the Dutch had sought the aid of Johore for the
conquest of 1639-41 it was laid down that neither party
would interfere in the religion of the other. (Roxborogh
1989:5)
Fortunately for the local population, in religious matters
the Protestant Dutch were more tolerant than the Portuguese had
been. Unfortunately, though, the Dutch were "more thoroughgoing
in the mechanics of exploitation and extraction" (Bunge and
Vreeland 1984:20). According to Isabella Bird (1883:120), a 19th
century traveler: "If the Portuguese were little better than
bucaneers, the Dutch who drove them out were little better than
hucksters - mean, mercenary traders, without redeeming qualities,
content to suck the blood of their provinces and give nothing in
return." Although this harsh judgment is more appropriate to the
Dutch rule in the Indonesian archipelago, it applies to the Malay
Peninsula as well. Abdullah Munshi, a prominent Malay, shared
Stamford Raffles' view that the Dutch despised the Malays
(Abdullah 1970:78) .
Inspite of this, the Dutch were more sensitive to Malay
society than the Portuguese had been. Local adat (custom) was
incorporated into Dutch judicial management (Ellen 1983:52). In
the process of honoring local customary law, however,
specifically Islamic laws were largely disregarded (Northcott
1991:49). This was due primarily to the perceived threat
worldwide Islam posed to the colony. Dutch attitudes toward
Indonesian and Malayan Islam had been shaped by exaggerated fears
stemming from "a lack of adequate knowledge, if not of almost
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total ignorance, of matters Islamic" (Benda 1958:338). Islam was
thought of as a tightly organized religion with a hierarchical
clergy wielding great powers over rulers and subjects.
In reality, widespread unity among the Malays was
nonexistent (Benda 1958:340). Since the expulsion of the Malay
Sultan from Melaka with the coming of the Portuguese, rival Malay
factions had continuously jostled for power. Moreover, the very
process of the spread of Islam was as yet far from complete. The
Melaka Sultanate had brought to power Malay Muslims, but it had
not brought Islam to every Malay. Islam's spread inland was
slow. At the time of the coming of the Dutch, the impact of
Islam on most of the population could still be considered
"slight" (Lamb 1964:111).
The Dutch were able to gain a more thorough control over the
area than had the Portuguese, resulting in less inter-factional
warfare. This Pax Nederlandica (Benda 1958:341) brought the
stability necessary for the peaceful process of Islamization. In
the words of Drewes (1955:296), "Dutch rule . . . was
involuntarily but undoubtedly conducive to the strengthening of
Muslim influence." Freedom of religion and noninterference in
matters of religion combined with the locals' animosity toward
the Dutch to cause an intensification of Muslim feelings.
Furthermore, hereditary local chiefs intent on squelching the
"Dutch literature speaks of Muslim religious leaders as
"priests' and "popes." The so-called priesteraad (priests'
council) was used to designate Muslim religious judicial
tribunals .
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newer, more orthodox Islam were not allowed to resist forcibly.
In summary, resistance to the Dutch sparked holy indignation
which, in addition to resisting foreign rule, reformed local
religious practice (Voll 1982:115).
Although, as we have noted, the Dutch were not on a
religious crusade, and did not necessarily align their desires
with the cause of God, there was no room for any Christian
presence that deviated from the economic self-interest of the
Dutch. The Dutch United East India Company (Vereenigde
Oostindische Campagnie�VOC) coordinated the Dutch efforts.
Although primarily a commercial institution, the VOC was granted
the authority to raise armies, conclude treaties, and build
fortresses (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:19). Christian missions were
bridled by the fact that Christian workers had to be approved by
the VOC and were largely restricted from work among Muslims.
Though there were some missionary efforts towards the Baba (Malay
speaking Chinese) Catholics, the Dutch Presbyterian mission in
Melaka was primarily concerned with the colonial community
(Northcott 1991:49). The only church built by the Dutch in
Melaka still stands. This church has baptismal records dating
back to the 17th century, but there is no record that a Malay was
ever baptized (Dodsworth 1928a: 19). There is no solid evidence
of any Dutch mission to the Malays.
Concerning the mission of the Church, the Dutch era
represents 183 years of lost opportunity. Toward the end of this
time period, a few notable missionaries were beginning to win
49
whole communities to Christ in Indonesia. Writing about missions
in Indonesia at the time, Stephen Neill (1986:248) comments that
"nowhere else in the world have so many Muslims been won to the
Christian faith." Since the Malays and Indonesians are closely
akin, and since the Islam of the Malays was essentially the same
as that of the Indonesians, one might reasonably expect to have
found at least some measure of success among the Malay Muslims if
concerted efforts had been made to reach them with the gospel.
Instead, anti-Dutch sentiment and religious freedom served only
to further the spread of Islam.
The Dutch era also represents 183 years of continued
negative Christian witness. At the hands of "pious" and devout
churchgoers, the Malays were subjected to economic plunder and
exploitation. The Portuguese had taught the Malays that
Christians reserve no love for non-Christians. The Dutch then
taught them that Christians don't even love fellow Christians.
When the Protestant Dutch ousted the Portuguese to become
Malaya's new conquerors, "they at once embarked on a campaign of
persecution against all Roman Catholics. These Calvinistic Dutch
were as intolerant of the Papist Portuguese as the latter had
been of the Muslims" (Wong 1973:26). For nearly the next two
centuries, the Catholics were actively suppressed (Latourette,
Vol 3. 1939:255). Once again the church became identified with
military conquest, and its people with greed.
Under the Union Jack 1824-1957
The British East India Company was an association of
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merchants who were granted a charter by Queen Elizabeth in 1600
for the monopoly of all English trade east of the Cape of Good
Hope. An important trading contract that belonged to the Company
was the export of tea from China to Europe. To replenish
supplies along the route, the British sought to establish a port
in Southeast Asia.
In 1785, the Sultan of Kedah gave the Company trading rights
to use the island of Penang as such a port. Francis Light landed
in Penang in July 1786, planted the Union Jack on the jungle-
covered island, and officially took possession of the island.
Light, a personal friend of the Sultan and a skillful
diplomat, had negotiated the British use of Penang in exchange
for British protection against the Sultan's enemy to the north,
Siam (Miller 1966:65-66). Reluctant to form what would appear to
the Dutch as a defensive alliance, to the Sultan's dismay and
Light's personal shame, the East India Company reneged on its
promise to protect Kedah against Siam. Feeling deceived, the
Sultan assembled a fleet to recapture Penang. Light had no
choice but to subdue the Sultan's fleet. Shortly thereafter,
"civilization" arrived in Penang when the Charter of Justice
introduced English law to the settlement. Ironically, the
"civilization" thrust upon the "benighted" Malays was initiated
by a British act of betrayal.
The French Revolution led indirectly to the British
occupation of Melaka. The French revolutionary armies had taken
over the Netherlands and were soon to take over the Dutch naval
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bases. To prevent the fall of the bases to the French, the Dutch
government-in-exile gave its various possessions to the British
to occupy until the war was over. In this arrangement, Melaka
was transferred to the British in 1775.
The British were determined that when Melaka was returned to
the Dutch, it would be of as little use as possible. To the
chagrin of the local population, A Famosa, the memorial of Malay
heroism, was disassembled. The Dutch reoccupied Melaka in 1818.
It turned out that the fort need not have been destroyed, since
in 1824, under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, Melaka was peacefully
ceded to the British.
The Straits Settlements
When the Dutch returned to Asia, when their war with France
ended, and reoccupied their former bases, including Melaka, they
sought to extend their control over the area. Alarmed by this
trend, Thomas Stamford Raffles, a British East India Company man,
convinced the authorities that another settlement in the Straits
of Melaka would establish British supremacy in the region.
In 1819, Raffles landed on the island of Singapore, which at
the time was largely swamp, inhabited by about 1,000 Malay
fisherfolk. Raffles established a trading post on the island and
through good relations succeeded in getting Johore (the
southernmost Malay territory) to cede Singapore outright to the
British.
With its strategic location and its free port status,
Singapore achieved phenomenal success. By 1825 its trade had
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already surpassed that of Melaka and Penang combined, and, in
addition to Malays, its population included communities of
Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Europeans, and Armenians.
Bunge and Vreeland (1984:26) state well the importance of
Singapore and the increasing decline of influence of the Malays
in their homeland:
Singapore was in a very significant sense the successor
to Srivijaya and Malacca�a link between China and India as
well as a center for the commercial life of Southeast Asia
and for the diffusion of new ideas and techniques into the
region. The difference was that Malays were no longer the
principal actors but bystanders in the development of the
new entrepot. Singapore had a British administration and
what would rapidly evolve into a Chinese-controlled economy.
Singapore's position was secured by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty
of 1824, which demarcated it along with the Malay Peninsula as
under British control, while Sumatra and the Riau and Linnga
archipelagos were placed within Dutch rule. This peacefully
settled the Dutch-British rivalry, but the Malay world, which had
maintained a "considerable sense of cultural and ideological, if
not political, unity through the centuries of fragmentation and
foreign intervention, was split between the two European powers,
and the basis for the two separate nations of Malaysia and
Indonesia was established" (Bunge and Vreeland 1984:27).
In 182 6, Singapore and Melaka were joined with Penang and
Province Wellesley (a small stretch of land on the west coast of
peninsular Malaysia) under a single administration. These
"Straits Settlements" were under the British Indian government
(until 1857 the British East India Company government) , but in
1867 they were made a separate crown colony under the British
53
Colonial Office.
The Treaty of Pangkor
British control, though formally indirect, was more firmly
established in the peninsula by the January 1874 Treaty of
Pangkor. The states of Selangor and Perak had been plagued with
unrest. The treaty settled a succession dispute of the Perak
throne and established the office of "British Resident" to assist
in the administration of the Malay states. The treaty stipulated
that the advice of the resident "must be asked and acted upon on
all questions other than those touching Malay religion and
custom. "
The Borneo States
While the Malay Peninsula was gradually coming under British
influence, the territories on the northern shore of the island of
Borneo were experiencing separate development�Sarawak under the
"white raja," and Sabah under the British North Borneo Company.
In 1835 James Brooke set out in a schooner to explore the
East. Brooke landed in Sarawak in 1839 and found the Raja Muda
Hashim, a relative of the Sultan of Brunei (of which Sarawak was
a province) , struggling to put down a rebellion. The following
year Brooke returned and helped the raja quell the rebellion.
For his contribution, Brooke, then 38, was installed as the Raja
of Sarawak (Turnbill 1964:130-131). This marked the beginning of
over a century of rule by the white rajas.
The British government, though, would not recognize Brooke
as an independent raja, nor take Sarawak over as a protectorate.
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Brooke toured England, appealing for protection for Sarawak and
urging its union with the Straits Settlements to form one crown
colony. In 1863 Britain acknowledged Sarawak as an independent
state, but did not take it in as a protectorate until 1888.
Meanwhile, sovereignty over North Borneo (present-day Sabah)
was obtained in 1877 by what later became known as the British
North Borneo Company. Under a royal charter the Company provided
facilities for the British Navy and was sent officers from the
Straits Settlements to assist in administration. North Borneo,
too, became a British protectorate in 1888.
The inhabitants of North Borneo were not as willing as those
of Sarawak to accept the encroachment of British rule. The North
Borneo Company encountered recurring resistance, the most
significant of which was the rebellion of 1895-1905. Increasing
taxes had stirred one Mat Salleh, an indigene, to lead a revolt
against the Company. Mat Salleh developed a mystique of
invincibility, and because of his fierce resistance to foreign
occupation is revered as a great hero in Sabah today.
The Federated Malay States
Back in the peninsula, in 189 6, Frank Swettenham, at that
time Resident of Perak, persuaded the rulers to sign the Treaty
of Federation, which established a British federal government at
the tin miners' settlement of Kuala Lumpur. The Federated Malay
States were created, including the states of Selangor, Perak,
Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. The governor of the Straits
Settlements was designated high commissioner of the Federated
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Malay States, and a resident general (the first being Swettenham)
was placed in charge of the residents of each of the Federated
Malay States.
The Unfederated Malay States
In 1909, a treaty with Siam gave England supremacy over the
northern Malay states of Perils, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu.
Despite British prodding, the sultans of these states refused to
join their states to the federation. They received British
advisors, who differed significantly from the residents of the
Federated Malay States in that they did not have executive power
but were obliged to use persuasion on matters of policy (Bunge
and Vreeland 1984:32). Only the state of Johore remained
independent. It was not until 1914 that it gave the British the
right to advise in Johore 's internal affairs.
The Unfederated States of Perils, Kedah, Kelantan,
Terengganu and Johore were the least developed of any on the
Malay Peninsula. Being generally the poorest in natural
resources the British desired (most notably tin) their rulers
were allowed to maintain a measure of independence that enabled
them to remain havens of traditional Malay life and culture while
most of the rest of the peninsula was much more radically changed
by colonial social and economic forces.
During the period of British colonialism, increased mining
and plantation activities demanded heavy manpower commitments and
through the years a gradual influx of Chinese and Indians
expanded to a precipitous flow (McGee 1964:72). The non-Malay
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population of around 500,000 at the turn of the century reached
almost 3.5 million at the time of independence in 1957. The
religious complexion of the society was thus changed by the
immigration of Taoist, Confucian, and Buddhist Chinese as well as
mostly Hindu Indians. In addition, a small minority of Arabs,
Indians, and Pakistanis became influential commercial and
religious members of the Muslim population. The result was that
by the first census after independence, the Malays, who were also
Muslims, were but half the total number of people in the new
nation.
When Sabah and Sarawak were brought into the Federation in
1963 to form Malaysia, the percentage of Muslims was further
diluted. Coastal Malays form only a small percentage of the
peoples of the two states, which have a heterogeneous indigenous
population and sizable Chinese elements. In 1960, Sarawak was
only 23.4 percent Muslim and Sabah 37.8 percent (Means 1982:482).
For a period after its incorporation, there were efforts to
convert the people of Sabah to Islam under the political
leadership of Tun Mustapha, and a number of well-publicized
conversions took place (Tunku Abdul Rahman 1978:143). Although
the Muslims have dominated the political and cultural life of the
nation as a whole and have continued to be the largest religious
group, they comprise only slightly over half of Malaysia's
population.
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The British Themselves
"We Malays consider the British to
be the least of the three evils."
�A Malay student reflecting on Portuguese,
Dutch, and British rule over Malaysia.
British Rulers
It is widely acknowledged that the British were the least
disliked of the colonizers of the Malay Peninsula. A Malay who
was present when the English came to take Melaka from the Dutch
observed that "all races in Malacca were pleased, for they had
tasted the bitter nastiness of Dutch rule" (Abdullah 1970:78).
Concerning their cross-cultural sensitivity, the British were a
mixed bag� some exceptionally skillful; some not. A
representative sample of some of the more influential early
British rulers will suffice to make this point.
Francis Light, who governed Britain's first Malayan
territory, Penang, from 1786 until his death from malaria in
1794, was tactful and uncommonly skillful in human relations.
Although the Malays remained suspect of the British East India
Company, Light himself so won the affection of the local
population that at his death they reportedly mourned "the loss of
one who had watched over their interests as a father" (Miller
1966: 66) .
Sir Stamford Raffles, the founder and first governor of
Singapore, was a man of legendary stature. Of all his
biographers, none presents him in such a positive light as do the
writings of his friend and tutor, a Malay Muslim named Abdullah
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Munshi. Abdullah (1970:78) was impressed with Raffles' keen
attention to learning the way of the Malays, his kindness to the
Malays and his treating of all people as equals. Abdullah felt
that both Mr. Raffles and his wife did everything with charm,
modesty, and prudence (Abdullah 1970:80).
Not one to withhold criticism when he found fault, Abdullah
(1970:75) presents Mr. Raffles in the most glowing terms:
He was broad of brow, a sign of his care and thoroughness;
round-headed with a projecting forehead, showing his
intelligence. He had light brown hair, indicative of
bravery; large ears, the mark of a ready listener. . . . His
lips were thin, denoting his skill in speech, his tongue
gentle . . .
As to his character, I noticed that he always looked
thoughtful. He was very good at paying due respect to
people in a friendly manner. He treated everyone with
proper deference, giving to each his proper title when he
spoke. Moreover, he was extremely tactful in ending a
difficult conversation. He was solicitous of the feelings
of others, and open-handed with the poor. He spoke in
smiles .
Colonel Harry St. George Ord, the first Governor of the
Straits Settlements Colony, ruled with an administrative
efficiency surpassed only by his pompous insensitivity. Penang,
the colony's first capital, was festively adorned for the
installation ceremony. A chronicler recorded that Colonel Ord
"stalked" into the town hall for the ceremony "without removing
his hat, and sat down on the dais without taking any notice of
anyone. The impression thus created was never removed and was
justified in the years that he remained in the Straits" (quoted
in Miller 1966:87). When Governor Ord asked permission to
intervene in a local Malay squabble, the Under-Secretary of the
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Colonial Office in London wrote, "Most certainly the present
Governor cannot be trusted to interfere wisely" (quoted in Miller
1966:101) .
More personable than his predecessor. Colonel Andrew Clarke
succeeded Ord in 1873 as Governor of the Colony. A man of action
with an enmity toward bureaucracy, Clarke lobbied strongly for
more direct British involvement in Malay affairs. Clarke was
unashamedly imperialistic, and saw his position as a means of
expanding the British Empire (Miller 1966:104). He followed an
"act-first ; -explain-it-later" style of leadership. Without
London's approval, Clarke negotiated the Pangkor Treaty, which
initiated indirect rule through a British Resident. In a
subsequent letter to the British Secretary of State, Clarke
frankly admitted that he was "perfectly aware" he had "acted
beyond my instructions . . . but I have confidence that your
Lordship will feel that the circumstances at the time . . .
justified me in assuming the responsibility I have taken" (quoted
in Miller 1966:112). Clarke assured London that they could still
withdraw from the position he had taken, but he added that "the
time has arrived when, as a nation, we shall be neglecting a
great and paramount duty if we any longer delay that intervention
which the causes of civilization and good order so loudly demand"
(quoted in Miller 1966:112).
After considerable debate, the Colonial Office concluded
that they could not conscionably withhold civilization from the
benighted Malays, and so Clarke received authority to appoint
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Residents to the Malay states of Perak and Selangor. The
Residents were to "advise" the rulers on administrative matters.
There seems to have been misunderstanding on both sides as
to what the other understood this to entail. Since the Resident
had no executive power, no way of forcing a ruler to follow his
advice, he had to rely on his own powers of persuasion. The
success of the system, therefore, depended on the personalities
of both sides getting along with each other. This proved
disastrous for the very first appointed Resident at Perak, Mr.
J-W.W. Birch.
Birch could not have been less suited for this delicate
task. He so abruptly and forcefully attempted to bring
widesweeping changes that the local rulers suspected the British
of trying to take over their country and destroy their customs
and traditions (Miller 1966:115). Birch's tactless
insensitivities and highhanded obstinacy was revealed in a report
in which he said, "It really concerns me little what were the old
customs of the country, nor do I consider they are worthy of any
consideration." (quoted in Miller 1966:119).
Perak 's Sultan Abdullah responded by refusing even to
entertain Birch's ideas. The functions and purpose of the
Resident had been spelled out in only the vaguest of terms.
Abdullah had not understood that under the Treaty neither he nor
his chiefs were free to collect taxes as they had always done.
He resented the proposed appointment of official collectors.
Even more, he resented Birch's intention to abolish debt slavery.
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For one thing, Birch failed to distinguish debt slavery (in which
persons mortgaged themselves in return for financial assistance
from their creditors) from western slavery. Although debt
slavery had sunken to the point where it was clearly abusive, it
had long been a common institution in the Malay states, and was
the means by which the wealthy ruling class got free labor. In
the Malay rulers' minds' Birched appeared intent on usurping all
their prerogatives.
After Sultan Abdullah's third refusal to sign into effect
laws drafted by Birch to appoint tax collectors and end debt-
slavery. Birch threatened that the British Government would
depose Abdullah unless he complied with Birch's initiatives. At
this, the Sultan, making it known that he was doing so under
duress, signed the papers authorizing the Resident to control the
levying and collecting of all taxes (Miller 1966:130).
Abdullah promptly called together his major chiefs to
discuss how to kill Birch and "to resist the white people." The
local chiefs demonstrated their hatred of Birch by calling the
leading bomoh (spiritist and traditional healer) to hold a seance
into whether the guardian jinn of Perak would kill Birch.
Abdullah himself, acting as one of the mediums, "repeatedly
stabbed an effigy of Birch of rice dough," forecasting Birch's
immanent death (Miller 1966:120).
Meanwhile, Clarke was succeeded by Major-General Sir William
Francis Drummond Jervois as the third Governor of the Colony.
Jervois was a professional soldier who would have annexed the
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Malay States if given the chance. It had been decided that Birch
should be replaced as Resident of Perak, but Jervois postponed
this move fearing the Malays might view it as a sign of weakness.
Both Jervois and Birch scoffed at reports of plots to kill the
Resident, and responded by asserting in no uncertain terms that
"'Her Britannic Majesty's Government have determined to
administer the Government of Perak in the name of the Sultan'"
(quoted in Miller 1966:121). Birch blatantly defied the Sultan,
by himself assisting in the escape of five debt slaves, two of
whom belonged to the Sultan.
Certain that the British were intent on interfering with
Malay custom, Abdullah gave Birch's execution order to a major
chief whose prerogative it was to execute the ruler's enemies and
who was therefore above the law according to Malay custom. The
next morning, as Birch was bathing in a floating bath-house, he
was speared to death and then hacked to pieces with a sword. In
Perak there was feasting for two days.
Jervois immediately called India for reinforcements as he
interpreted the murder as the signal for an uprising against the
British. He personally led 150 soldiers to Perak. Those
implicated in Birch's death were either executed or exiled. The
Malay chiefs were stunned by the intensity of the British
reaction to Birch's death; to them. Birch had been justly
condemned as a foreign infidel who had tried to uproot their
customs and usurp the hereditary powers of the Malay rulers.
Perak was occupied as 1,2 00 troops arrived from India and
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more came from Hong Kong. A naval brigade also landed. For 18
months, the British military ruled Perak, and Governor Jervois
was not hesitant to find reasons for using the troops against
hints of Malay insurrection.
Birch's "head-over-heels way" (Governor Clarke's assessment
of Birch's style) of plunging himself into "cleaning up" Perak,
and his murder, may have ended the experiment in indirect rule
had not Birch's successor been of exceptional character. Mr.
Hugh Low, Perak' s second Resident, carefully studied Malay
religious and customary law and spoke fluent Malay. He gradually
regained the trust by his sympathetic approach and by going to
great lengths to maintain good relations with the chiefs and not
to interfere with their customs. As to the former Resident's
practice of protecting runaway slaves, he wrote in his diary,
I have no intention following ... If I were here long
enough I would undertake to abolish every form of slavery in
a moderate time with the consent of the chiefs and the
people but I shall be of no use here if I do not first
thoroughly acquire their confidence and that cannot be done
if my first acts be to show that I am determined to prevent
or encourage the break of (what) is at present so cherished
an institution." (quoted in Miller 1966:129)
To show the effectiveness of Low's approach, it may be added
that, over a six-year period, step by slow step. Low succeeded in
persuading the rulers to end debt-slavery in Perak.
Low lived in a small, Malay-style house near the Sultan's
palace. Traveller Isabella Bird, who once stayed with Low, was
impressed that his house was always open to any visitor. Bird
(1883:357) wrote that Malays had
free access to him during all hours of daylight and as I sit
64
writing or reading, a Malay shadow constantly falls across
my paper, and a Malay with silent, catlike tread glides up
the steps and appears unannounced in the veranda, on which
Mr. Low at once lays aside whatever he is doing and quietly
gives himself to the business in hand. The reigning Prince
and Raja Dris are daily visitors.
Low included the major Malay chiefs and some Chinese
business leaders in decision-making, and conducted official
meetings in Malay rather than in English.
Another early British official who sought to establish
friendship and understanding between the British and the Malays
was the Colony's first Governor, Sir Frederick Weld. In order to
immerse himself in Malay life, he left the running of the Straits
Settlements to the Lieutenant-Governor. Weld travelled
extensively to understand village life and to meet with local
sultans. He humbly wore Malay hat plumes that identified him as
subordinate to the sultans. During a scheduled visit with the
Sultan of Pahang, Weld graciously waited for several hours for
the Sultan to finish a game of chance in which he was engaged
(Miller 1966: 130) .
By the 1880s "Residents were chosen primarily for their
knowledge of the Malays and ability to govern with firmness
tempered with tact" (Butcher 1979:50). The British had come to
realize that they could not rule without regard for Malay
sensitivities. The District Officers of Sungei Ujong, for
example, were advised that since Malays were not accustomed to
regular office hours they should be accessible at all times
(Sadka 1968:220) .
The British, in fact went to great lengths to earn the
friendship of the Malay rulers. The Residents joined the rulers
in their amusements, went hunting with them, and strove to assure
them that the actions of the British were in their best
interests .
To the chiefs, the Resident patiently explained the
reasons for administrative innovations; to the unyielding
and unfriendly among them, he showed firmness and
determination and where necessary he even went out of his
way, as Swettenham put it, to "outswagger the greatest
swaggerer of them all." (Miller 1966:126)
In marked contrast to the Dutch and Portuguese, the British
took an interest in Malay affairs, and attempted to be fair in
their dealings. Moreover, the Malays came to respect the British
for their administrative skills and their even-tempered handling
of disturbances; the only thing the Malays had respected about
their former colonizers was their military might.
Yet, the Malays were not blind to the fact that the British
were in Malaya for the good of England. However benign,
colonization is always self-serving. Indeed, this self-serving
attitude was not successfully hid from the Malays. It surfaced
in a condescending, patronizing attitude on the part of many
British officials. During the Birch residency. Governor Jervois
maintained that the Perak Malays were not fit to rule (Miller
1966:121). Sir Frank Swettenham (1948:173-174), the great
Malayan administrator, scholar and historian, wrote that "the
Colonial Secretary desired to use British influence to save the
Malays from themselves." Malays were frequently described as
lazy, especially when they failed to respond to British
initiatives (Butcher 1979:59). The social Darwinism of the 19th
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century led the British arrogantly to assume that industrialized
Europe was the epitome of civilization. Physically, the people
of the tropics were believed to lack the innate vitality of the
races of Western Europe (Dodsworth 1928a :v-vi) .
It was common for British officials to see themselves as
lords of the manor and the Malay rakyat (commoners/the masses) as
their tenantry. Butcher (1979:54) suggests that this attitude
was especially prevalent among officials who had come from the
Irish or English landed class. In a letter to his parents, CD.
Bowen, a member of the wealthy Irish landed nobility, wrote in
1887 that "'when I wake up in the morning there are generally six
Malays on the veranda waiting till I have had my bath, etc. It
is just the Irish tenantry all over again . . . ' " (quoted in
Butcher 1979:54). About his village life he wrote, "Living in a
place like Utan Melintan one just represents the Irish landlord;
one goes out in the morning and sees dirty and untidy places and
tells the people to get them cleaned up. Their answer is always
'if it pleases your honour we will do it'" (Bowen 1950:900-901).
Arthur Keyser (1897:71), a District Officer from English landed
society, gave this description: "English officials . . . are
accustomed to pass their lives amongst the Malays . . . much as
those of the cottagers on his estate would be to a home-staying
country squire in England."
Occasionally, the British superiority complex led to the
abusive "white raja" mentality. Robson (1894:14) defined the
white raja as one who "expects to receive as his right the usual
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prostrated homage paid by a ryot to his raja." One District
Officer who exemplified this definition was C.F. Bozzolo of
Perak. He was known for his innovative ways of punishing
offenders. Norman (1895:539) records that on one occasion, two
Malays who had passed Bozzolo without giving a respectful
greeting were forced to obtain dog licenses as signs of their
subhuman behavior.
British Isolation
With an influx of personnel, and more regular communications
caused by the advent of more and better roads, it became
increasingly difficult for an official to rule a district as if
it were his personal domain. Officials in the Malay States
belonged to a rapidly expanding bureaucratic system and had to
conform to its demands (Butcher 1979:55). Treasury work, court
cases, and official correspondence confined officials to their
offices and prevented them from travelling in their districts.
Frequent transfers made it still more difficult to acguire an
intimate knowledge of one's district rselanaor Journal 1896:8-9).
Ironically, the coming of more direct British rule brought a
decline in the personal authority and influence of the District
Officers (Butcher 1979:55). In 1897 a prominent official claimed
that there " ' is no longer that friendly relationship between many
of the District Officers and the people of the country that there
used to be'" (quoted in Butcher 1979:56). Another official
complained that his days were entirely filled with court cases
and office work. When asked about the Malays in his district he
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replied that he never saw Malays anymore (Malay Mail 1897:6).
Significantly, his evenings were now spent at the new local
British club.
As more and more Europeans made Malaya their home,
government officials no longer needed locals for companionship.
As soon as a handful of Europeans settled in an area they
inevitably formed a club. Butcher (1979:59) maintains that the
social clubs were "by far the most important institutions for
Europeans." By 1890 there were government-sponsored clubs in
nearly every district in Perak. Taiping district had two general
social clubs, a rifle club, turf club, and Masonic Lodge. Kinta
district had a recreation club and a gymkhana club (Annual Report
of Perak 1890:22). Bowen ( 1950 : 95) wrote in 1891 that he
regularly attended a club ten miles from the town where he was
stationed.
The diaries of one Hugh Clifford illustrate how the increase
in Europeans could pull officials away from the Malays. An entry
from 1888, when Clifford was one of only two Englishmen in town,
reads :
... To bed at 7:30 A.M. Up again at 3 P.M. Walked�A
thief was caught. Slept before dinner�The Bendahara (Malay
Chief Minister) visited me�Went to the Balai & talked to
To'Raya, To Kaya Cheno ... & the Orang Kaya Pahlawan
(Warrior) . Talking with Alang till daylight, (recorded in
Butcher 1979:56)
Clifford's diary for 1893, when his town had an entire English
community, also contains references to his contacts with Malays,
but there are now a number of passages which indicate a degree of
absorption into English social life. The following excerpts
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serve as examples:
Played L(awn) T(ennis) with Thomas before breakfast & after
Tea. 5 sets in all. He is not a strong player.
Working on papers nearly all day. Played L.T. with Belfield
& beat him 3 sets out of 4�4-6, 6-0, 6-3, & 6-4�dined with
Belfield. Won 1197 points at Piquet (recorded in Butcher
1979:57) .
It is important to note that, except for the most elite of
Malay, Chinese, and Indian society, the clubs were the exclusive
domain of the English. The clubs were meant to encapsulate a
slice of English high society and transport it whole to Malaya as
a respite against the administrative pressures and the
debilitating climate.
The British community rapidly grew distant from the general
public and developed into an isolated social clique. One man,
disenchanted with Kuala Lumpur, wrote cynically, "if your soul is
satisfied with the Lake Club and the Selangor Club; with
criticizing your neighbour's dress and admiring your own; with
tea and scandal; or poker and whiskey and soda, by all means stay
in Kuala Lumpur, for that is the very place for you" ("Treacher's
Hill" 1890: 378-379) .
In considering the fact that the European community became
an increasingly self-contained social group, it is important to
note that to make and maintain a career it became more important
to establish good relations with one's superiors than to befriend
the Malays or other Asians. Although the Governor had the final
say, he generally approved the local Residents' recommendations
for promotions and dismissals (Butcher 1979:57). Since most
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British men worked for the government, the Resident's power over
the European community became immense. Commenting on this,
Robson (1894:5) wrote that if "the Resident is a sportsman, why
we are all death on sport. If the Resident thinks only of work
our energy is something frightful to behold." There are
accounts that some men lost or gained positions based on their
ability at cricket (Butcher 1979:58).
Marriage could also change an official's relations with his
constituency. Clifford (1898a: 161) wrote of men who had to
forego leisurely conversation with the Malays in order to provide
for a wife. In fact, marriage for British men in Malaya was
extremely expensive. The attitude common to the middle class of
Britain at the time, the class to which the majority of British
in Malaya belonged, was that a man should marry only when he was
able to provide his wife with the standard of living to which she
was accustomed in her parents' home. In Malaya, the salary
considered necessary for marriage was much higher than that in
Britain because "the standard of living for Europeans in Malaya
was higher and much more rigidly defined than the middle-class
standard in Britain" (Butcher 1979:84). In a cookbook and
housekeeping guide prepared by Noel Walker, the wife of a civil
servant. Walker wrote: "There is no doubt that as soon as a man
arrived in Malaya his ideas of what he cannot do without become
very much enlarged . . ." (quoted in Butcher 1979:84). A local
newspaper ("Marriage in the East" 1897) chided that "The tendency
out here is for everyone to live exactly after the style set by
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the well-to-do; to keep up the same table equipment, to follow
the same pursuits, to become in fact dumb treaders of the same
social mill."
Women were especially sheltered from exposure to the wider
society. Servants did the shopping, as it was considered
improper for a European woman to venture into the market. One
British woman wrote that her daughter "was induced to go once,
when she first lived in town - but only once. She fled, before
she publicly disgraced herself" (Wilson 1937:64). The fact that
a servant could buy goods more cheaply than could a European also
discouraged women from going to the market.
British Superiority Complex
The isolation from the Malays and other Malayan peoples was
enhanced by a smug air of superiority assumed by the British.
Their world empire spoke for itself of the unparalleled grandeur
of English civilization. Social Darwinism demonstrated to the
world (in the eyes of the British) that humankind had reached its
zenith in the social life of Her Majesty's court.
American traveler and writer Matt Ward wrote in 1853 (p. 247)
that the British residents of their colonies "imagine the
universe to be deeply impressed by the graceful sublimity of
their deportment." Ward (1853:248) observed the typical British
colonial to be "insolent and overbearing to his inferiors."
Moreover,
People shrink from him in disgust, and his vanity ascribes
their conduct to a becoming awe for his pre-eminence; he
imagines the silence which arises from contempt to be a
deferential respect. . . . Indeed he entertains too exalted
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an opinion of himself to doubt another's appreciation of his
surpassing excellence. (Ward 1853:247-248)
Ward believed that English supremacy was maintained only by
an inordinate respect for British power on the part of those
governed. Of colonized Muslims, Ward (1853:215) wrote: "So
exaggerated an opinion do they entertain of England's power, that
the curse of their Prophet is scarcely more dreaded than the
terrors of her ire." In short, "Englishmen . . . have so
carefully stowed away English supremacy in a nice glass box,
guarded at every angle by portentous 'hands off , ' as successfully
to protect it from the too close scrutiny of the masses" (Ward
1853 : 1) .
Were Ward's opinions the musings of an isolated Anglophobe,
or was there substance to his claims? Governor Swettenham
complained of the increasing number of non-Europeans in the civil
service (Butcher 1979:107). As Asian civil servants increased,
the government developed the principle that as much as possible
an English person would never have an Asian as his or her
superior. Swettenham 's successor. Sir John Anderson wrote that
"'Any European would consider it an indignity to be asked to
serve under a Eurasian'" (quoted in Butcher 1979:109).
The British would not appoint an Asian to a position higher
than the most junior European in any particular department.
Malayan doctors who received their training in England and who
had higher qualifications than their superiors were generally not
promoted above entry-level positions (Chelvasingam-Maclntyre
1973:40-41). The best government rest houses were reserved for
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the British. The hospital system included a special British ward
and a special British operating room. The first class sections
of trains were divided into "A" and "B" compartments. The more
comfortable "B" compartments were reserved exclusively for the
British (Butcher 1979:99). Evidently, non-Europeans were even
excluded from "public" balls (Butcher 1979:98). To add insult to
injury, Asian habits that annoyed the British received attention
disproportionate to the injury caused, while incidents of British
misbehavior such as drunkenness and the molestation of Asian
women were downplayed (Butcher 1979:105).
The British truly believed in their inherent superiority, or
at least they stated it often and loudly enough to drown out any
whispers of doubt. J.H.M. Robson, founder of the newspaper the
Malay Mail, and twice unofficial member of the Federal Council,
declared that Eurasians seldom possessed "those robust, rugged,
manly attributes which have helped the Anglo-Saxon race to go
forth and found the greatest Empire the world has ever seen."
Robson (1897) went on to describe the Tamils as "sadly wanting in
backbone and grit when it comes to analysis of character." A
young British official wrote in 1907 that the development of the
rubber industry was "a record of great achievement by courageous
and masterful men�such men as were admittingly turned out only
by the Anglo-Saxon race" (Knocker 1924:149-152).
A government handbook listed that one of the advantages of
living in Kuala Lumpur was that "it does not require the European
and Asiatic to live side by side" (F.M.S. Railways 1914:27-28).
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The respect for the British increasingly was exchanged for a
contempt for British arrogance. Contemporary newspaper
editorials, letters, articles, and speeches are replete with
expressions of the Malayans' dissatisfaction with the British
people. Dr. Lim Boon Keng, a prominent Chinese spokesperson for
the non-European community, spoke for many when he said:
. . . however worthy my posterity may be, they will never be
allowed to be more than the most subordinate servants,
clerks, and so on, under men who think their white skins are
the sole signs of born rulers and administrators, and who
have the impudence to declare that we prefer them in
authority over us before all others. It is a lie. (Lim
1912)
Speaking of the Spaniards, Dutch, and English of the 19th
century, Syed Hussein Alatas (1977:7), professor of Malay
Studies, and himself a Malay, states that:
All three powers were agreed that Western rule and
Western culture were superior; that Western peoples should
lead the world; that they were most suited to exploit the
natural wealth of the East; and that they were the best
administrators. Consequently, the ideology of colonial
capitalism played down the capacities of Southeast Asian
societies. Every conceivable item was invoked to denigrate
the Southeast Asian, including his size and physiognomy.
Hence Geoffrey Gorer (1936:40), an anthropologist whose training
should have helped to correct prejudice, wrote of the native
Muslims: "A purely personal point which prevented me enjoying
their company was the question of size; I do not like being among
people who appear smaller and weaker than I am, unless they have
corresponding superiority elsewhere; I dislike the company of
those I feel to be my inferiors."
After a thorough study of the relations between the British
and the Asians in Malaya, Butcher (1979:121) concludes that
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some Europeans considered anything short of abject servility
as insolence. Europeans, moreover, contributed more than
their share to arousing tensions by their own actions. What
all these diverse examples illustrate is not only that
Europeans saw themselves as superior to other races but that
in this period many of them were also filled with a fear of
anything which might even appear to threaten their
superiority -
British Living Standards
British cliquishness , and the ideology of superiority were
not the only things that alienated the British from the Malays;
the high standard of living of the British made them inaccessible
and resented. The image of the natives and their place in the
scheme of things was reflected in an actual state of affairs.
Government salary scales placed the British at the top, non-
European immigrants (i.e., the Chinese and Indians) in the
middle, and the indigenous peoples (including the Malays) on the
bottom .
Since the British controlled the administration and since
they played a dominant role in the economy it was natural that
they occupied high positions in Malayan society and enjoyed a
relatively high level of comfort. The official British view on
the matter was that the British should live above a certain
standard in order to preserve the respect in which they believed
they were held by the Malayan people. English planters used this
very argument in successful appeals for salary increases (Butcher
1979:223). The colonial government supported unemployed
Europeans or gave them passage out of Malaya because destitute
whites were considered a great threat to British prestige. It
was for the same reason that British drivers were replaced as
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soon as possible.
The British were successful in maintaining a standard of
living above the rest. "Only a very small proportion of the
Asian population enjoyed a standard of living as high as that
enjoyed by most Europeans" (Butcher 1979:224). Unfortunately,
the goal of such a standard�the respect of the Asian population-
-was weakened rather than strengthened by the social distancing
caused by British society.
Alatas contends that the Malays resented the British status
system. He (Alatas 1977:228) writes with contempt that:
The European colonial community had the best of
everything. In the administration and in business they held
the highest posts. In agriculture they owned the biggest
estates. In their social life they kept to the best clubs,
hotels and restaurants, and they lived in the best
residential area. They created in the colonies a social
world which enjoyed all the benefits of health, wealth,
status, residence, power, prestige, and influence.
Alatas' claims are not true in exact detail. For instance,
the Chinese had their own social club in Kuala Lumpur that
rivalled the best of the British clubs. Luxuriously furnished,
it had the highest subscription fee of any club in the Federated
Malay States (Wright and Cartwright 1908:856-857). Furthermore,
in Kuala Lumpur the Resident-General's official residence was one
of very few European houses which could compare with the mansions
built by some of the Chinese entrepreneurs (Butcher 1979:83).
Prior to 1900, the wealthiest individuals in the colony were
Chinese. These points noted, a scholar who lived in Malaya was
able to pinpoint that the "distinguishing feature of the
situation in Malaya ... is not that there are some Europeans
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who are living luxuriously, but that, broadly speaking, there are
none who do not live in that fashion" (Emerson 1937:488).
The British community as a whole clearly enjoyed the highest
living standard, and the social gulf continually widened. Some
examples of the early days when the first Residents had few of
the comforts of home will serve to show how far the British had
fallen in their social rise. Birch for months lived in a
houseboat on the river. Hugh Low in Perak, Hugh Clifford in
Pahang, Martin Lister in Negeri Sembilan, and Frank Swettenham in
Selangor, among the first Residents of their respective states,
each lived in humble conditions. I have already mentioned (p. 47)
that Low occupied a small, Malay-style house that was always
accessible to the Malays. Swettenham 's first home was a palm-
leaf -covered stockade on the banks of a river. Twice a day tidal
waters covered its mud floor. In these early days, the Residents
spoke mostly Malay and searched out Malay companionship. Twenty
or so years later, relations with Malays were devolving as
quickly as British society was evolving. In keeping with the
dignity of his new post as Resident-General, Swettenham had a
house built on a hill overlooking the beautiful Lake Gardens of
Kuala Lumpur. A veritable mansion, the house "contained dining,
drawing, morning, and billiard rooms, five bedrooms, five
dressing rooms, office accommodation, servants' quarters,
stablings, and quarters for the horse-keepers and gardeners"
(Butcher 1979:74). Swettenham, who had lived in a makeshift
house with flooded mud floors, now commented in all seriousness
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that the house was not extravagant " ' nor much more than enough
for a man with a family'" (quoted in Butcher 1979:74).
The socio-economic gap was seen clearly in the number of
servants employed by the respective communities. Whereas in
England a family was considered fortunate to have one servant,
the average British family in colonial Malaya employed between
three and six servants (Butcher 1979:142). A Malayan family,
though, had to be reasonably well-off to be able to afford even
one servant. In 1928 Gibson (p. 120) claimed that it was
"essential" for European families to have at least five servants.
A 1931 Commission on Temporary Allowances assumed that a married
British official would need seven servants - a houseboy, cook,
waiter, gardener, nurse, chauffeur, and clothes washer (Butcher
1979: 130) .
This same Commission outlined the European and Asiatic
standards for a family budget in 1930." The monthly budget was
$960 (a respectable salary for Malaysians even today) for
Europeans, and $176 for Asians or Eurasians. Granted, the
European budget is for an official of slightly greater seniority
and experience than his Asian counterpart, but it is still
grossly inequitable. Even though the Asian family has one more
child than the European family, the Asian family is expected to
suffice on 44% of the European food budget, and 16% of the
European clothes budget. The Asian electricity and water budget
"see Appendix B for Table 1 (Monthly Family Budgets in
1930: European and Asiatic Standards), excerpted from Butcher
(1979) .
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is a mere 22% of that of the Europeans. The Asian education
allowance is, appallingly, only 7% of the European allowance.
For Asians, transportation will be by bus, while the English
example, of course, requires the English to be whisked about in
chauffeur-driven cars. Furthermore, the English gentleman could
not be expected to live without his whiskey, gin, and cigarettes.
To make matters worse, provision was made for European, but not
Asian, widows."
" The resentment caused by inequities in pay must not be
minimized. I observed such resentment when I was working in
Malaysia. I taught English as a second language in an American-
Malaysian cooperative program, designed to prepare Malay students
for American universities. The students completed a not-for-
credit English language track before advancing to one of various
associates degree programs.
The English track was taught by American and Malaysian
(mostly Malay) teachers. The credit courses in the various
majors were taught mostly by American professors and associate
professors. The Malaysian teachers were paid on a Malaysian
government scale. We American English teachers were paid a much
higher salary, based on what we might expect to have been paid as
full time ESL instructors in the U.S. The American professors
were paid more st.ll. They received their current salary from
their respective universities in the States. Since many of them
were tenured and quite senior in their teaching experience (those
were the ones who could afford to take a year or two away from
their jobs back home) , some of the American professors had
salaries upwards of $80,000.
As an English teacher teaching four classes a day, five days
a week, it was naturally hard for me to watch professors who
earned from two to five times what I did, come in only two or
three days a week to teach their six or eight hours. For the
Malaysian teachers, the feelings I experienced were magnified
many times over.
The Malaysians were paid the equivalent of approximately
$6,000 per year. For Malaysia, it was fairly good pay, but that
was small consolation considering that we American English
teachers with whom they rubbed shoulders, and who were doing
exactly the same work (with the exception that the Malaysian
government required the Malaysians to punch a time clock and come
in for half a day on Saturdays, while we Americans weren't
required to do so) , were being paid several times more than they
were simply because we were Americans. Individually, most of the
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The British, indeed, grew to be seen as a soft and spoiled,
pampered people. The tropical climate contributed to this image.
European science at the time taught that residence in the tropics
placed an intolerable strain on the body of Europeans, for whom
the temperate zone was considered natural (Butcher 1979:70-71).
Time away from the heat and humidity was believed to be
absolutely essential to prevent physical and mental
deterioration. Consequently, the British took regular vacations
to various hill stations. These were no experiences of roughing
it. All of the amenities of city life were made available,
servants and all. In an account of a short stay at a particular
hill station resort near Kuala Lumpur, it took 2 0 porters to
carry the provisions necessary for a single British family
(Butcher 1979:72-73). All of the supplies and some of the family
members (transported in chairs which were slung on poles and
carried by four coolies each) were carried by servants seven full
miles uphill. Imagine the emotions aroused in you if you were
forced to carry a wealthy, high society foreigner seven miles
uphill in the scorching sun, only to wait on her hand and foot
when you reached the top. This was all done in the name of
maintaining a certain image and protecting the British from the
effects of the climate.
British Sexual Relations
Americans worked hard, were friendly, and were well-enough liked,
but corporately, we were resented. In my estimation, the
financial gap between the Malaysians and the Americans divided us
as much as the language and cultural barriers.
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The climate and separation from England, or as one writer
put it, from "the unimaginable peace of an English summer night"
(Peet 1934:59-60), were continually invoked to excuse a number of
British foibles. While the climate supposedly deadened physical
and mental capacities, it was paradoxically believed to
strengthen the libido (Butcher 1979:196,204-205). That the
tropical climate was said to heighten sexual passions, and that
it was sometimes also stated that Asian women possessed a
physical attractiveness irresistible to Europeans, led most
Britishers to view prostitution as an inevitable feature of their
life in Malaya (Butcher 1979:196).
In the towns it was common for British men to visit
brothels. The British in Malaya had considerable freedom from
the sexual norms of Victorian England. Governor Swettenham
defended this distinction by stating that morality was dependent
upon, among other things, "the influence of climate." The
official acceptance of prostitution is evidenced by the fact that
the British government reserved an area for brothels when it
planned the city of Kuala Lumpur in 1882 (Butcher 1979:1980). In
1909, when the Reverend Horley of the Methodist Mission
complained of the open visibility of prostitution in close
proximity to a church and school, the Resident of Selangor easily
persuaded the Colonial Office to ignore Horley (Butcher
1979 : 198) .
The British preferred Japanese prostitutes, who were brought
to Malaya primarily to fill the British demand. "In 1911, 900 of
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the 1,692 Japanese women in the F.M.S. (Federated Malay States)
were 'known' prostitutes, and another 129 were, according to the
census, brothel-keepers. It was said that any town large enough
to have a post office also had a Japanese brothel" (Butcher
1979: 197) .
The records indicate that the Malayan men typically
preferred prostitutes from their own race. The low number of
Malay prostitutes" is a strong indication of the widespread
disapproval of prostitution throughout Malay society. The
British who were frequently seen going to and from the Japanese
brothels could not have but damaged the reputation of the
religion of these men in the eyes of the Malay community (Marsh
1968:35-36) .
While prostitution was common in urban areas, away from the
towns it was common for British men to have mistresses.
Malariologist Sir Malcom Watson (in discussion in Culpin
1933:920) estimated that 90 percent of Eiiropean men living in
outstations in the early 20th century had Asian mistresses.
While Watson's claim is impossible to confirm, it should be
treated with respect in that Watson's work brought him into
contact with planters throughout the F.M.S. Many of these
planters were single men who lived for years without the benefit
of the companionship of women of their own race. Watson (in
Culpin 1933:920) related that the planters' mistresses "supplied
"in 1911 there were 2,164 known Chinese prostitutes, but
only 50 Malay prostitutes ("Report of the Secretary for Chinese
Affairs for 1911" 1912:2).
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the only companionship which these men had, often from one week
to another. They were . . . helpmates without whom many
more. . .men would have succumbed to both alcohol and malaria."
Bruce Lockhart, a planter who himself had a Malay mistress, wrote
as if Asian mistresses were the norm among planters (Lockhart
1936: 30, 141, 197) .
Concubinage was by no means limited to planters. Winstedt
(1969:18) implied that government officials in outstations
frequently kept Asian mistresses. If prostitution was expected
in the city, concubinage in the outstations was considered a
virtual necessity. A railway engineer who lived with a Malay
woman put it bluntly: "My God! I've been in this bloody jungle
for fifteen years, and the only things that keep me alive are
Siti and the Sydney Bulletin!" (Wells 1926:69).
I do not want to leave the impression that all, or even most
of the Malayan British approved of the sexual standards in the
colony. Numerous British individuals lamented the prevalence of
prostitution and concubinage.
Bad though it was regarded it appears that much was forgiven
if a man gave no hint that the relationship was anything but
one based purely on necessity. It was one thing for a man
to write . . . that "no sane man would ever form an
irregular union with a woman, who at best is a sorry
makeshift, if he knew that a girl of his own race was
willing to share hardship during early years." It was quite
another thing however for men to give the impression, so
resented by "All Whites," that they actually preferred Asian
women to European women. (Butcher 1979:2 04)
Once again separation, the Asian women themselves, and
climactic conditions are held responsible for the actions of the
men .
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Think of the young assistant standing all day over
Asiatic labour, many of them working with breasts and bodies
exposed to the sun, surrounded by women to whom a few
dollars are a fortune for which they would sell the best of
themselves, and exposed to all the insidious temptations of
the heated tropical zone. ("A Letter to a British Newspaper"
1923:15)
The heat, the climate, had a stirring effect which a man
in England cannot fully appreciate. Add to that the sight
of a graceful brown form with full breasts scantily covered,
a perfect figure, a moon-like face and sensual mouth, framed
in a jet-black head of hair, illuminated by dark soft eyes,
and the bachelor would not be human if he did not set his
thought agoing. (Bailey 1944:129-130)
Neither of the writers in the preceding quotes approved of
extramarital sexual relations. Both were arguing in favor of
early marriages. Under the circumstances, though, it was implied
that no man could be fully blamed for succumbing to such sexual
temptation. The man was forgiven even more if he expressed that
he did not hold the same lofty feelings for his Asian companion
that he supposedly would have for a European woman (Butcher
1979:205). This brings us back to the British concern for image.
The British woman had to be elevated above all others. Once
again, all aspects of British life (in this case British women)
had to reign superior over Malayan society.
British Image
It is most bitterly ironic that the very efforts intended by
the British to win the respect and confidence of the people, were
the things that ostracized the British from the Malayan
population. The British had determined to rule not by force of
military might as the Dutch and Portuguese had previously
attempted, but to command the respect of the population through
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good example. It is here that the notion of prestige comes into
play. As prestige was assumed the basis of rule, any perceived
threat to that prestige was considered a grave offense. Any act
thought to degrade the British in the eyes of the Malayans was
condemned. Thus, the British were constrained to be on their
best behavior around the Malayans. In response to the news that
two English planters had assaulted a Chinese bar-boy, a British
editorial urged "every decent white man to ostracize them from
the society that they have disgraced. They are pariahs, unfit
for the companionship of honorable men" ("Pariahs" 1922:44).
The British' exalted view of themselves caused them to
believe that they were constantly looked up to as examples and
thus that they could not let down their subjects by lowering
their guard.
A white man in the tropics is watched as a minor god. He
may be hated or liked, despised or respected, but being in
the minority he is the object of attention from the moment
his native servant has taken in breakfast to the time when
he has dismissed the chauffeur or rickshaw puller and moved
to bed. From the minute he has entered his office, he is
watched by natives and feels, if he has a conscience, that
he must give an example, in conduct, wisdom and strength.
(Belainkin 1932:69)
The writer was right that the natives watched a Britisher's
every move. Consequently, he spoke of the importance of setting
a good example in "conduct, wisdom and strength." What he did
not see, but what should have been so obvious as to hit him
square across the face, was the resentment caused by the cushy
lifestyle the "white man" in his paragraph enjoyed at the expense
of the locals. From dawn to dusk he is waited on hand and foot
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by "native servant," "chauffeur or rickshaw puller." Undoubtedly
the native onlookers in his office are those earlier described by
Lim (1912) as "the most subordinate servants, clerks, and so on,
under men who think their white skins are the sole sign of born
rulers and administrators."
A major consequence of the need to present a good image was
the reinforcement of the British inclination to separate
themselves from the non-Europeans. The pressure to act above
reproach was difficult to endure.
They therefore attended clubs and private gatherings
that, being confined to Europeans and a very few carefully
chosen non-Europeans, allowed them to relax without worrying
about what kind of image they were presenting. "We ate &
drank & played games like small children," wrote a teacher,
who in his first months in Malaya took a humorous view of
European attitudes, about a party with some friends. "It
was good to put aside our true greatness for a period."
(Butcher 1979:171)
Although wishing to establish a public image of cordiality, the
British in general ceased to seek close relations with the
Asians, and thus forfeited the esteem they tried so hard to earn.
Not every Britisher made excuses for British behavior. G.L.
Peet (1934:59-60), the Straits Times reporter in Kuala Lumpur in
the 1930s, argued that British difficulties in Malaya were caused
not by the climate but by the fact that the British took no
interest in the community around them. They suffered from an
exile mentality by which they refused to give up British ways and
attach themselves to the ways of Malaya.
Dr. Waugh-Scott (1913) , a renowned estates doctor, blamed
the dismal moral state of affairs on neither climate nor
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separation but on a "mental disharmony" brought on by a failure
"to square our manner of living with our ideals of conduct and
behavior." In other words the "tropical Neurasthenia" so
discussed in medical circles was quite simply guilt.
We may choose to ignore in our conscious behaviour the
fact that intemperance, unkindness, improvidence, impurity,
concubinage, etc., are unsocial and wrong, but the
unconscious never ignores . . . such matters. Deep down,
unsleeping, and always maintaining its conflict with the
behaviour which the conscious mind has willed, lies the
great herd instinct which regards such conduct as taboo, and
until our practice agrees with our deepest principles there
can be no real equanimity of spirit.
"Living in sin" is a kind of joke as we mention it round
the pahit table, but on through the day and night the never
ceasing 'Thou shalt not' of the unconscious is grinding its
pathway towards the conscious with serious effects on the
peace of mind of those who do not take steps to mend
matters .
Much of our indulgence in alcohol and the inordinate rush
after pleasures and excitements of all kinds are merely the
symptoms of this lack of mental harmony- (Waugh-Scott 1913)
Although they challenged the status guo, the Peet and Waugh-
Scott quotes are two additional voices in support of our belief
that the image of the British actually conveyed to the Malays was
decidedly negative. The "intemperance, unkindness, improvidence,
impurity, concubinage," "indulgence in alcohol," and the fact
that such "living in sin" was spoken of in jest, would have
offended any sensible Malay Muslim. Furthermore, the fact that
the British did not attempt to appreciate the riches of the Malay
culture, but religiously guarded their British customs to the
minutest detail, displayed a lack of genuine interest in the
Malays as people.
In short, although the British were respected for their
administrative skill and technological know-how, the socio-
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economic gap, the British superiority complex, and the prominence
of what the Malays at least would have considered immoral
behavior, all contributed to a negative view of the British. For
our study, it is important to note that especially since Muslims
don't compartmentalize life into secular and sacred domains, the
Christian church would most certainly have been implicated in the
shortcomings of the British.
CHAPTER 2
Historical Conditioning, Part 2:
British and Missionary Policy
"If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature,
but by our institutions, great is our sin."
�Charles Darwin
British Policies
The Pre-British Malays
We have considered the effect that British attitudes and
lifestyles were likely to have had on Malaysians in general and
Malays in particular. I would now like to focus on British
policies and programs to determine whether or not they are
perceived by the Malays to have been detrimental to the Malays.
In this, I am interested in how the British colonial system
affected the Malays' relationship to the Christian gospel. The
colonial rule over the Malays has bearing on the Malay
international students' perceptions of Christianity even now.
To understand the changes brought by the British, it is
necessary to know something of the Malay situation before the
coming of the British.
For centuries the Malays lived in scattered villages along
the banks of the main rivers. The few larger centers of
population did little to detract from the impression of a
sparsely populated forested land. The majority of the settled
population were peasant farmers engaged in a primarily
subsistence agricultural economy based on rice. The Malays kept
some livestock, fished the rivers, and supplemented their diet
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with fruits and vegetables grown on home plots. On both sides of
the peninsula, but especially on the east coast, many made a
living from fishing the sea.
Although the economy was basically a subsistence one, there
was always considerable trade along the rivers, in the hands of
the local nobility, or "foreign Malays, "^� Arabs, and later
Chinese. Under a system of tribute to their local chiefs,
villagers collected forest produce such as rattan, bamboo, and
resin which were traded for imported textiles, tobacco, salt, and
iron tools. There was also a valuable export trade in tin and a
smaller one in gold, the two products for which Malaya was most
well known outside of Malaya (Wheatley 1962 : xxi-xxiv) .
The largest political unit in peninsular Malaya was the
independent state, ruled over by a hereditary monarch with the
Malay title yang di-pertuan (he who is made Lord) or by the Hindu
term for ruler, raja. The title sultan, known in the Malay
states since the coming of Islam, was not widely used until the
2 0th century. The ruler was supported by a number of territorial
chiefs, holding areas of the state in which they lived; they in
turn were supported by minor chiefs and village headmen whose
responsibilities included administration, revenue collection, and
mustering the people necessary for war or joint labor projects.
The office of yang di-pertuan was first and foremost to express
the symbolic unity of the State and to protect its order and
^�The term was sometimes used of Malays from another state,
but more commonly of ethnic Malays (mainly Buginese and certain
Sumatrans) from outside the peninsula.
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integrity. The yang di-pertuan was invested with an aura of
sanctity and the supernatural that were expressed outwardly in
elaborate ceremonial practice and belief, important even though
it often represented no corresponding concentration of power
(Roff 1967:2-3) .
The exercise of power by the ruler beyond his district was
limited by the extent to which he could control and command his
territorial chiefs. In the mid-nineteenth century as incomes
from the richer tin-bearing areas gave some chiefs a
disproportionate source of economic power, the district ruler was
sometimes left with little control beyond his own district.
In fact, the actual workings of the Malay political system
were seldom characterized by any form of centralized authority in
the mid-19th century when the British presence was being
established. The district chief was the key to political
organization, holding under commission from the sultan an area of
the state in which he exercised direct personal control. Because
the non-subsistence sector of the economy was based on trade
along the river, a chief nearly always lived in the main village
of his district at a strategic point on the river, enabling him
to exact toll on the traffic and to defend his district.
The district chiefs' basis of authority was people, so that
much depended on the ability of a chief to gather and retain a
following both from among his own kin and from the peasants.
In the absence of adequate communication or of a centralized
administration, a sultan had to possess extraordinary personal
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authority in order to be, in effect, more than a district chief
among district chiefs. It is true that the usual position of the
royal capital at the mouth of the state's principal river, and
thus at the most advantageous of taxation points, gave him an
economic edge, as did the system of tribute. Nevertheless,
proportionate to their power, chiefs retained more income than
they paid and achieved positions rivaling that of their rulers.
The situations in which lesser chiefs did in fact attain power
closely rivaling that of their superiors were marked by
jealousies, fighting, and fission. These were counterbalanced,
though, by a recognition of the value of the sultanate with its
established hierarchy of authority as a validating mechanism for
the whole system.
It was to the advantage of the chiefs to maintain the
sultanate, the symbol of the state and fount of title, as a
basis for their position vis-a-vis each other, as a source
of prize in dynastic maneuvering, and as the embodiment of
the larger political unit with its advantages for trade and
defense. Thus, although the real power of the ruler might
be little greater in political and economic terms than that
of one of the senior chiefs, and though the life of the
state was punctuated by periodic quarrels and intrigues,
there was a general acceptance of the sultanate, if not
necessarily the sultan, as formal head of state.
(Roff 1967: 6) .
The whole system rested on the division of Malay society
into two main social groups: a ruling class (those of royal
descent) and a subject class. The ruling class consisted of
families which had a customary right to various chiefly offices
which were ranked in a complex order of seniority based on a
system in use during the Melaka sultanate in the 15th century.
As with the office of sultan itself, all the lesser titles had
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their own privileges and symbols of rank, "respected and
jealously guarded as an expression of the virtue inherent in the
office and shared by the holder and his kin" (Roff 1967:4). The
concept of the sharp distinction of status between the rulers and
the ruled and concern for its expression was of critical interest
to the traditional elite. The boundary between subject class and
ruling class was thus strictly enforced. At the base of this
social system were the ordinary Malay rice cultivators, owing
obedience to their local chief and with little knowledge of the
world beyond their village.
A Double Standard
Early British administrators, seeking rationalization for
British intervention in Malaya, were quick to point out abuses in
the Malay system. Swettenham (1900a:260), for example, referred
to the rule of the various chiefs as despotic. He (1948:141)
elsewhere said that the rulers had stripped their people of all
initiative and that "the normal state . . . was robbery, battle,
and murder . "
Malay historian of Malay history, Syed Hussein Alatas (1977
:131) complains that this is a case of the colonial Europeans
parading the vices of native rulers while ignoring their own. It
is true that the colonial rulers never failed to point out the
inhumane actions of their Malay predecessors, while explaining
away the great injustices perpetrated by their own people.
Referring back to the Dutch rule, American historian Clive Day
(1904:49) says the opportunism and economic exploitation of the
Dutch "was the natural motto to follow when in contact with the
native political organization." The following description shows
that Day (1904:49) is somehow able to twist even the worst of
Dutch policy into something respectable:
In attempting to pick their way in the tortuous paths
of native politics the Dutch made mistakes which were
sometimes followed by disastrous results, and the course
that they pursued in some cases is decidedly questionable
from the standpoint of modern ethical standards. There is
much to criticize, but there is something of boldness and
sagacity that commands admiration in this side of Dutch
policy.
What was "decidedly questionable" ethically was blamed not on the
Dutch but on the "tortuous paths" of native politics. The
victims are blamed rather than the exploiters. The full force of
the colonial evils is softened further by the terminology used.
Whereas Dutch mistakes are "decidedly questionable," Malay
mistakes are labelled the result of "greed," despotism" and
"moral depravity."
This double standard is seen in the British criticism of the
native rulers' inability to fight epidemics, while aggressively
promoting the sale of opium, the result of which was far more
devastating than any epidemic which hit Malaya (Alatas 1977 : IS
IS) . Edwin Hodder (1890:73), in a history of the worldwide
expansion of Christianity entitled The Conquest of the Cross.
wrote of English adventurer Rajah Brooke's mistakes in Sarawak
merely that it would be "inopportune to attempt to discuss the
vexed questions that have arisen in connection with the energetic
methods and severe repressive measures ..." Hodder went on in
detail to praise Brooke for his skill in administration.
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"especially in connection with the civilization of the natives
and the planting of Christianity amongst them."
Going back to Malay society at the time of the coming of the
British, the British account of Malay social disintegration was
clearly exaggerated, especially where it suggested either
systematic or motiveless tyranny (Roff 1967:9). Yet, the British
view finds strong support from a few extant Malay accounts.
Malay author Abdullah wrote in 1843 (1970:269) a dismal
description of the situation of the Malays under Malay rulership:
I viewed with particular disfavour the lives led by the
Malays and the circumstances of those with whom I had been
acquainted. I had observed their conduct, behaviour and
habits from my youth up to the present time and had found
that, as time went on, so far from becoming more intelligent
they became more and more stupid. I considered the matter
carefully in my mind and came to the conclusion that there
were several reasons for this state of affairs, but that the
main one was the inhumanity and the repressive tyranny of
the Malay rulers, especially towards their own subjects.
Abdullah accused the Malay rulers of stifling the will to
learn, to work hard, and to better oneself. He wrote as follows:
As it is, under Malay rule ordinary folk cannot lift up
their heads and enjoy themselves, and dare not show any
originality for it is forbidden by the ruler. Wishing
possibly to build themselves finely decorated houses of
stone they are afraid to do so. They are afraid to wear
fine clothing, shoes and umbrellas in case they are taboo.
They are afraid even to keep fine clothing in their houses
because it is said that such things are the perquisites only
of royalty. Rich men especially live in perpetual fear and
are fortunate if their only losses are their belongings.
For indeed their very lives are in danger. Means are found
whereby such men may be penalized and mulched of their
belongings. If a man is reluctant to lend any of his most
cherished possessions, it is accounted a serious offense.
And once he has given them up they are lost forever; he will
never see them again. A beautiful young girl in his house
is like a raging poison, for it is quite certain that the
ruler will take her as one of his wives with or without her
guardian's permission. This practice more than any other
arouses the hatred of the servants of Allah. I heard of
one courageous man who refused to part with his daughter.
The ruler ordered him to be murdered on some pretext, and
then took the child away. All such acts as these are
forbidden by Allah and His Prophet and incur the censure of
mankind throughout the world. (Abdullah 1970:271)
Alatas (1977:135) counters that Abdullah's beliefs are
atypical of Malays in general in that he was a Western-educated
British sympathizer, employed by the likes of British
dignitaries. Alatas believes, moreover, that the British
colonial scholars suppressed material critical of British rule,
but promoted Abdullah's work specifically because it was pro-
British.
Alatas (1977:13 5) admits that there were numerous cases of
Malay abuse of power, but he contends that this was not the norm
and that the British have blamed a whole social class for the
abuses of a few. There were in fact a number of checks on the
arbitrary use of power by the aristocracy. Firstly, the ruler
and ruled alike shared a common rural life in which status
differences were reflected only to a limited extent by
differences in material welfare. Secondly, systematic
oppression would have been counterproductive in village life
because it would have resulted in lack of cooperation in
production of goods and services. A ruler's power lay in his
ability to attract and keep people under his protective sphere.
If he could not win the allegiance of people, he could not
increase his own wealth and security. Finally, there was the
ultimate protest open to peasants faced with intolerable
conditions - departure to another area. Roff (1967:11) reports
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that this option was frequently taken. There was no shortage of
land, houses were easily built, and peasants had few possessions.
A ruler who became despotic could easily lose his subjects to a
more benevolent ruler down the river.
Malay Devolution
While the British overemphasized the bad state of affairs of
the Malay states, I believe Alatas and the Malays have been too
favorable in their assessment of pre-British Malay society. In
his determination to put the colonial powers in a bad light,
Alatas downplays examples of abuse on the part of pre-British
Malay rulers. For example, he makes no distinction between the
inhumanity of certain sultans who had their entire families
tortured and put to death, or who for entertainment threw naked
women into a pit of hungry tigers, and a senior British officer
who enjoyed forcing young boys to box each other until the blood
flowed and who delighted in the spectacle of releasing ducks in
the midst of fierce dogs (Alatas 1977:11,131,133).
The aforementioned mitigating factors granted, there appears
to be no question that the determining characteristic of the
relationship between the Malay subject and ruling class was
unquestioning submission. This relationship is expressed in a
number of rueful Malay sayings: "Whoever becomes king, my hands
still go to my forehead" (in homage) ; to try to help someone
under the wrath of the sultan is "like helping a cow catch a
tiger"; and a peasant standing up against his or her ruler is
"like a soft cucumber fighting a prickly durian fruit."
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Neither the subordinate position of the subject class nor
the right of the ruling class to demand goods and services from
them were questioned. Any significant accumulation of property
was expropriated from the peasants. Indebtedness was common and
led to the personal servitude of debt-bondage (Roff 1967:10).
The system of corvee labor which supported the ruling class and
built and maintained village paths, boat docks, and mosques, was
typically onerous.
Though it may be overdrawn. Miller's description (1966:90)
of mid-19th century peninsular Malaya paints a basically accurate
picture of how far the Malay states had fallen from the glory
days of the Melaka sultanate:
Life existed under a dark pall of lawlessness and inter
necine warfare in which the chiefs with the best fighters
remained in possession of a port, or a stretch of river, or
a slice of country in the interior, and the ruler clung to
his throne by armed might. Robbery and murder went
unpunished unless royalty or the nobility were victims.
Taxation on the peasants was crushing, and the homes of
rulers and chiefs were stocked with slaves who worked off
their debts in years of subjection. To the immediate
outside world, many of the Malay States were reaching a
stage of complete disintegration; Winstedt, in one of his
histories, described some of the States as "committing hara-
kiri."
Why Malay society had devolved to such a state is a matter
for future discussion. The point here is that when the British
entered Malaya, civil wars, fratricidal struggles, and oppressive
conditions were rampant so that the Malay states were in a state
of serious decline.
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Malay Subordination
The primary goal of British involvement in Malaya was the
creation of political stability and Western-style government as a
necessary precondition of and context for economic and commercial
development (Malays would say "exploitation") of the country's
natural resources. Providing a moral rationale for this endeavor
was an expressed concern for the welfare and advancement of the
Malay people within the framework of traditional Malay society.
The contradiction inherent in these aims, the one impossible to
realize under existing Malay institutions and the other dedicated
to their preservation, led to what Roff (1967:13) calls "the
schizoid character of British Malay policy."
The British recognized that the Malays were not asking for a
new government system. Partly as a means of avoiding social
unrest, and partly in the interests of the "protectorate"
relationship, the British colonial policy sought to shield Malay
village life from the disruptive effects of the new economic
development. An abundance of land made it possible to allot
large tracts to European and Chinese plantation and mining
enterprises without seriously infringing upon Malay property
rights. The problem of providing a sufficient and cheap labor
force when the Malays were either too few in number or reluctant
to become wage laborers was solved by the wholesale introduction
of immigrant workers from southern China and the British
possessions in India. Land policies in the 2 0th century were
calculated to keep the Malays cultivating traditional crops on
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their customary land.
Roff (1967:13) states that British rule and the importation
of immigrant labor had the cumulative effect of leaving "Malay
life behind like a prahu in the wake of an ocean liner, rocking
slightly but otherwise left to its own way." Malay society was
indeed rocked with ocean liner-sized changes that came with speed
boat rapidity. Between 1880 and 1900 the combined population of
Perak and Selangor (the two states with the most direct British
involvement) rose from 13 0,000 to about 600,000, most of the
growth coming from foreign, predominantly Chinese, immigration.
Tin mines boomed, and countless hectares of primal jungle were
transformed into oil palm and rubber plantations, to the extent
that Malaya quickly became the world's leading producer of tin,
palm oil, and natural rubber. The total revenue of the states
under British protection rose more than 30-fold, and the value of
exports increased more than 80-fold. By 1900, 1,500 miles of
paved road and 300 miles of railway traversed the peninsula (Roff
1967:13) .
The growth of the government administrative bureaucracy kept
pace with the other developments. In the separate protected
states and after 1895 in the new federation centralized
departments were established for finance, public works,
education, police, agriculture, and lands and mines. With the
The virtually unlimited supply of cheap labor from China
and India made possible the exploitation of Malayan agricultural
and mineral resources without obliging the Malays to share
significantly in the task or its rewards.
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executive positions reserved exclusively for the British, all
areas of public life quickly were subsumed under British control.
In all practical terms the Malays came to play little part
in the shaping of their lives, though side by side with the
Western structure of economic and administrative growth, the
form and some of the substance of the pre-colonial world was
preserved in sufficient degree to ensure that traditional
life could to all appearances go on much as before. (Roff
1967: 14)
After the initial and disastrous neglect of local
sensitivities displayed in the events surrounding the 1875 Birch
murder, the British attempted to make the traditional Malay elite
feel included in the running of the government. The chiefs were
given salaried positions as "Native Magistrates" and were
consulted on all matters of state, especially those concerning
Malay affairs. Although the British had taken over the
government, the traditional Malay hierarchy was preserved and
even strengthened by British rule (Butcher 1979:8). The
centralization of power within each state had the effect of
emasculating the independent authority of district chiefs. The
sultans' position was now supported by real as well as ritual
authority, and so they enjoyed a security previously unknown.
With British endorsement they were no longer in danger of being
outshone by district chiefs of lower rank.
The Malay aristocracy's traditional hierarchical order was
preserved by the bestowing of administrative titles and
corresponding salaries commensurate with their previous rank and
influence. (In practice they were not expected to do much more
than live off of their government allowances.)
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The British educational policy also maintained the
distinction between the aristocracy and the rakyat (the masses) .
Special government schools were established exclusively for
children of Malay royal descent. Although the schools did little
to prepare the students for anything but subordinate government
posts, they became one more symbol of the sacrosanct nature of
the Malay aristocracy.
Overall the British had stripped the substance from Malay
rule, leaving the skeleton of Malay traditional status intact.
The swift and severe retribution for the 1875 Birch murder and
the equally decisive response to a rebellion in the state of
Pahang caused by chiefs who were discontent about salary scales
(Linehan 1936:129,134) made it clear that it was futile to openly
resist British power. Thus, the Malay chiefs settled for the
best that they could get� the security that came with the
official recognition of their status. Even then it was an
unwilling acquiescence to a situation beyond their control.
Throughout the British rule, records are full of petitions by
Malay aristocrats complaining of inadeguate representation and
insufficient attention to their interests (Roff 1967:17).
As the complexity of the administration grew, because of the
rapidly expanding Chinese mining and commercial community, with
concomitant urban growth, financial operations, land management,
and communications, the sphere of influence of the Malay chiefs
correspondingly diminished. Their traditional status intact, the
chiefs were left with no real say beyond assistance in minor
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incidents of Malay life alone.
The educational system also reflected the schizoid tension
inherent in a system committed to preservation for the Malays in
the midst of far-reaching innovation. With the exception of a
few Malay elite who were provided an education patterned after
the British public school system (and this only in order to give
the Malay elite token subordinate government posts) , the
educational policy towards the Malays was designed (with the
approval of some of the Malay aristocracy) merely to make them
better farmers. While English was fast becoming an indispensable
qualification for government appointments, the British pushed
Malay vernacular education for the Malays. English classes were
not even offered. This had the effect of excluding Malays from
positions of influence, not to mention involvement in the broader
commercial sphere.
Clearly, the subordination of Malays was intentional. In
1896, a survey of 4,365 past pupils of Malay vernacular schools
in the state of Perak found that only 118 were employed as
"clerks and orderlies." The majority were farmers. The
situation only worsened with time. Of the 2,900 students who
left the vernacular schools in 1903, only one became a clerk
(Roff 1967:25). Resident E.W. Birch approved of this pattern,
commenting that it was good that the Malays were not being "over-
educated," but rather were following in the footsteps of their
parents by working on the fields (Birch 1912:444).
An official 1905 government report ("The System of Education
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1905:9) on education admitted that the Malay vernacular school
curriculum was extremely limited (confined to literacy and basic
arithmetic) , "but sufficient for the ordinary requirements of
Malay boys, who will become bullock-wagon drivers, padi growers,
fishermen, etc."
Commenting on the exclusion of English from the curriculum,
Frank Swettenham (1891:16) explained that it was not advisable
"to attempt to give the children of an agricultural population an
indifferent knowledge of a language that to all but a very few
would only unfit them for the duties of life and make them
discontent with anything like manual labor." Swettenham
(1906:258), later, in his usual patronizing manner, defended
Perak state's allocation of only one percent of its budget to
education by stating that
the results are not unsatisfactory, and the Government has
never desired to give the children a smattering, or even a
larger quantity, of knowledge which will not help them to
more useful and happy lives than they now lead. To the
Malay the principle value of school attendance is to teach
him habits of order, punctuality and obedience.
In fairness to the British, it must be said that many of the
Malays themselves resisted anything that threatened to disturb
their traditional village life. The introduction of free
government Malay schools in Perak and Selangor in the 1870s and
1880s was met with suspicion. It was only by patience and
persuasion that school attendance was increased.
Much of the village Malays' distrust of the British-
sponsored schools lay in the fear that the children would be
seduced to the Christianity with which the British were
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associated. To counteract this fear, the British appointed
Quranic teachers and made classes in Quran reading mandatory.
The standard of instruction in the village schools was
appallingly low. I have already alluded to the serious
underfunding. A system seriously handicapped by a gross shortage
of materials was further debased by incompetent teachers.
Teachers' skills were barely above those of their students. R.J-
Wilkinson (1906:61), Inspector of Malay Schools for the Federated
Malay States from 1903 to 1906, discovered that very few of the
Malay school teachers had ever read a single book beyond the
textbooks and prayer books that were actually used in class. He
lamented that "The destruction of the old Malay literary instinct
�even more than the loss of so much of the literature itself�
is a painful feature of the change that has come over Malay
letters since they have been entrusted to European guidance."
The low priority given to the education of the Malays is
demonstrated by the fact that prior to 1902, the salary of a
Malay assistant teacher was less than that of the lowest ranking
Tamil laborer (Wright and Cartwright 1908:226).
Subsequent reforms gradually lifted vernacular Malay
education from its miserable state, but it remained designed
essentially "'to educate the rural population in a suitable rural
manner and equip them to live a useful, happy rural life'"
(Personal communication from O.T.Dussek to William Roff recorded
in Roff 1967:28) .
A growing demand for English-educated staff from both the
106
government bureaucracy and private business placed a financial
strain on the administration. The government turned to the
Christian missions to supply much of this need. Because the
government discouraged proselytization among the Malays for fear
of arousing Muslim-Malay antagonism, the missions turned
naturally to providing education for the non-Malays, who
predominated in the towns of the protected states where all such
English-medium schools were established. Some attempt was made
to compensate for the effects of the schools being in urban areas
by providing scholarships and hostel accommodations for rural
Malays prepared to come into the towns. The system did not work
very satisfactorily: village children did not adjust well to the
towns away from their own homes and were often neglected, and
parents were reluctant to let them go. One effect of the
transfer of education to the Christians missions was to place
instruction in English even further beyond the reach of Malays.
Although the mission schools were willing to give ordinary
secular schooling to Malays, few Malay parents were willing to
risk the possible alienation from Islam that sending their
children to Christian schools might entail. By 1900 there were
twenty-four English schools in peninsular Malaya, all but seven
of which were under mission control, with an overwhelmingly non-
Malay enrollment ("The System of Education in the F.M.S."
1905: 12-15) .
The seven non-mission government English schools were also
located in the towns, thus available mainly to the Chinese,
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Indians, and Eurasians. The 1901 census (Report on the Census of
the F.M.S., 1901 1902:28) of the Federated States showed that of
the three largest towns (Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, and Taiping) , fewer
than ten percent were Malay.
The overall effect of the British educational policy on the
Malays (of which the Christian mission schools were a part) was
to keep the Malays hopelessly out of step with the rapid changes
going on around them. They were ill-prepared to compete in the
highly competitive Chinese business sector, ill-equipped to cope
with the rapidly encroaching industrialization, and made
powerless against the British administrative juggernaut.
British Impact on Malay Life
Benefits
We have briefly viewed the effect of the British
administration upon Malay schooling. We now turn to the broader
topic of the British impact on the quality of life of the Malays.
In his 1900 book. The Real Malay ( 1900a : 258-262 ) , Frank
Swettenham gives a lengthy discourse on the positive changes
brought by the British. Permit me to cite a lengthy portion of
the text, as it is representative of the nearly universally
accepted British colonial belief about British influence in
Malaya :
There was a time, not many years ago, when the Malay
Peninsula was a sealed book to white men. The whole country
was divided into eight or ten States, and each State was
despotically governed by one man�sultan, raja, or chief, as
the case might be. Under this hereditary ruler there were
always a number of more or less powerful chiefs, who
nominally held their offices from the head of the State; but
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cultivated it. Work was plentiful, wages high, and the
labourers few; so all classes became rich, as the resources
of the country were exploited by Chinese and other
immigrants, who now flocked into the States. Hospitals were
built, the sick attended, sanitation insisted upon, and epi
demics of cholera and smallpox�the scourge and terror of
the country�disappeared as by magic. The long-abandoned
fields were cultivated, and plentiful harvests added to the
comfort and prosperity of the labouring classes, who saw
their children educated in Government schools, where
reading, writing, and simple courses of figures, all taught
in Malay, were supplemented by the study of the Koran. The
man who used to walk about with three daggers in his belt,
two spears in his left hand, a sword under his right arm,
and a gun over his shoulder, now goes into the jungle with
only a chopping knife; and the boy of tender years has given
up his array of miniature weapons for a slate and a bundle
of books .
"The old order changeth," and, in the case of the Malay,
the change amounts to something like regeneration. But the
miracles that have been wrought are all evident to eye and
ear. The increase of comfort, the better houses, better
clothes, the cultivated fields and cared-for orchards�
signs of freedom, prosperity, and safety�these are but the
reflection of administrative progress; of roads, railways,
canals, and waterworks; of solid and even handsome public
buildings, populous well-ordered towns, and beautiful parks
and gardens.
In short, says Swettenham (1948:xvi), the British "have raised
the Malays to a condition of comfort and happiness never before
known in their history."
While we may wish to completely dismiss Swettenham as a
pompous British official, blind to all faults of his beloved,
noble British Empire, there were, in fact, some Malays who shared
Swettenham 's views. Abdullah (1970:269-271) had much to say
about the corruption and tyranny endemic to the ruling class:
It was no light tyranny that was exercised by the Malay
rulers, apart from a few who were good. Women and children
who caught their fancy they have abducted by force as though
they were taking chickens, with no sort of fear of Allah or
regard for His creatures. They have often murdered men
whose offenses in no way merited death, just as they would
kill an ant. They have plundered the property of other men.
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killing the owners or dragging them off into captivity. If
they owe money they refuse to pay it. They are very fond of
gambling, cock-fighting, opium-eating and keeping a host of
slaves. . . . They send the royal spear to a house demanding
the owner's goods with threats, and they take away his
womenfolk by force. There are many other disgraceful
practices apart from these, which I feel too
ashamed to mention in this book. Besides, they despise the
servants of Allah, human beings like themselves, and look
upon them as dogs. When they pass by on the road, they
order everyone to stay by the roadside, in the mud and the
filth. They keep young girls by the score, sometimes more
than a hundred, as concubines in the palace. . . . It is
obvious that the things I have mentioned are simply means of
gratifying the ruler's lusts. They are neither right nor in
accordance with the laws of Islam, nor are they approved or
condoned by public opinion. They are done just to suit the
ruler's own pleasure. Sometimes he has ten or twenty
children. One or two of them may be good but the rest
behave like devils. . . . When they grow up however wicked
the things their father did they themselves may be three
times worse. As for the poor people who are the victims of
this oppression, this injustice, this tyranny, they are in
no position to make any complaints, save only to Allah.
. . . Was there not a time when half the world was under
Malay dominion and rule? . . . Why have their lands been
despoiled by Allah ere now, and passed into foreign bondage.
Is it not because of extreme injustice and tyranny that
Allah has weakened them and enslaved them under alien
rule?^'
It is possible to assess the sentiments of the subject class
towards the ruling class from the proverbs and idioms of the day.
While the literate ruling class likely encouraged and preserved
those which supported the status quo, several sayings have
survived which reflect the popular resentment against the ruling
class. The unopposable power of the ruling class in relation to
the subject class was compared to that between a tiger and a goat
^^Alatas (1977:135) rejects Abdullah's writings as those of
a British propagandist because Abdullah worked for certain
British higher-ups. While it is true that he rubbed shoulders
with British elite, it is also true that his writings were
completely independent of British patronage, and were not
uniformly uncritical of the British.
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{Macam kambing dengan rimau� "Like a goat against a tiger") . The
unequal relationship was also expressed by the comparison between
the soft cucumber and the thorny durian fruit {Macam timun dengan
durian� "Like a cucumber against a durian"). The effects of a
ruler's impositions are compared to those of a rampaging elephant
entering a village {Gajah masuk kampong) . The suffering caused
by the struggles between rival chiefs is compared to the
suffering of a small animal caught between two fighting elephants
{Gajah sama gajah herjuang, pelanduk mati di tengah� "When two
elephants fight, a mousedeer caught in the middle is killed.").
The expression Kais pagi, makan pagi; kais petang, makan petang�
"Scratch/dig up the soil in the morning, eat in the morning;
scratch/dig up the soil in the evening, eat in the evening" was
used to express the day-to-day survival drudgery experienced by
the subject class.
Mohamed Amin (1977:68), himself a Malay, and Jomo (1988:20),
a Malaysian, note that pre-colonial resistance to the British
lacked popular support because of the Malay rulers' oppressive
and exploitative relationship to the rakyat (masses) .
There were clearly elements of truth in Swettneham's
assessment. Particularly at its beginning, British colonization
brought definite benefits to the Malays. Most of the Malays
remained peasant cultivators, and as such were better off
following the imposition of British control. The establishment
of internal peace and ordered government removed the constant
fear of embroilment in the rivalries of Malay aristocratic
112
factions. The stripping of the power of the chiefs to exact
service and tribute lightened the burden of toil. Debt-slavery
was abolished. Furthermore, the introduction of civil law based
neither on power nor hereditary social rank removed some of the
uncertainties of life.
Detriments
Indebtedness. Certainly the pro-peasant rhetoric of the
British administration was strong, but we need only to dig a
little beneath the surface to find the true and lasting impact of
the British upon the bulk of the Malay population. To begin
with, colonial rule transformed a primarily subsistence economy
into one increasingly dictated by market forces. The more
predictable and stable order imposed under colonial rule
contributed in a decisive manner to encouraging peasant commodity
production. More importantly, it established the conditions for
cash crop cultivation, primarily for export to foreign markets
While the peasantry stood to enjoy considerably higher incomes
from export-oriented cash-cropping, it was also exposed to the
vicissitudes of a capitalist-dominated world market beyond its
control .
Ultimately, the most destructive consequence was that the
growing commercialization of the Malay peasant economy,
especially with trade expansion and the increasing market
orientation of production, increased the role of credit. The
spread of commodity exchange and the introduction of capital
undermined long-existing forms of mutual assistance, which
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previously served to minimize credit needs in pre-colonial Malay
society .^^
In the newly monetized and commercialized colonial economy,
the absence of a fair credit system hurt the peasants badly
(Kratoska 1975) . Having little access to cash beyond the returns
from the sale of their produce, the peasants became fair game for
unscrupulous money lenders. Used to producing for their own
consumption needs, Malay peasants were ill-prepared for the
rapidly commercializing economy. With old social and economic
relations breaking down and non-monetized forms of exchange
displaced by transactions requiring cash, peasant dependence on
credit mushroomed.
Indebtedness among padi cultivators tended to be especially
high because of the seasonal nature of their production and,
hence, income flow. Approximately 80 percent of rice cultivators
in Melaka (Narkswasdi and Selvadurai 1967:150, cited in Jomo
1988:43) and Selangor (Selvadurai 1972:66 in Jomo 1988:43)
borrowed annually, mainly for consumption purposes.^" Although
most of the seasonal loans were usually repaid at harvest time,
some was carried over. Before long, this accumulated, resulting
" "The erosion of the significance of tolong menolong
(mutual help) in rural life is part of the process of the
incorporation of the rural economy into the capitalistic system
with its stress upon the maximization of profit and . . . the
individual rather than the interests of the community" (Mokhzani ,
Abdul Rahim 1973:429).
For example, in Melaka in 1965, "two-thirds of all loans
were used for consumption or domestic purposes...; loans applied
to direct farm investment made up only four percent of the
average borrowed" (Ho 1969:30).
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in chronic debt.
Indebtedness was also correlated to the incidence of tenancy
and landlordism. Land, a saleable commodity since the coming of
the British, could be advanced as collateral for credit (and thus
could be lost in case of failure to repay) , as well as sold to
relieve indebtedness. As a result, many peasants were reduced to
sharecropping. Land ownership also undermined the practice of
shifting agriculture.
Class Differentiation. Another result of the introduction
of credit was the widening of the gap between Malay social
classes. Since wealth was seen as an indicator of the likelihood
of loan repayment (Barnard 1973:127), credit was less easily
available and interest rates were substantially higher for the
poorer peasants. This was especially serious because poorer
Malays spent a greater proportion of their credit on meeting
consumption needs than on productive investments. Thus, their
productivity tended to decrease year after year, resulting in
increased poverty and increasingly exorbitant interest rates on
loans. The end result was that the poor Malay rice farmers
became relatively poorer.
One of the major prongs of colonial agricultural policy was
the encouragement of increased Malay peasant food production for
consumption by the labor force engaged in the capitalist sector
(primarily Indians on rubber and oil palm estates, and Chinese
tin miners) , thereby minimizing the loss of foreign exchange.
Discouraging Malays from engaging in cash crop (rubber and palm
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oil) production was ostensibly to shield them from vulnerability
to the vicissitudes of the world market. Actually, the British
did not want to lose money importing food for their labor force.
The British saved money, while the Malays were excluded from the
lucrative rubber market.
The Malay Reservations Enactment of 1913 is another example
of a policy which was alleged to protect the interests of the
Malay peasantry, but, in fact, accelerated the process of class
differentiation among rural Malays (Lim Teck Ghee 1971:154).
Under this Enactment, colonial Residents were empowered to
declare any land within their state, reservation land, which
could not be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of to non-
Malays. Colonial legislators blamed the shortage of peasant land
on non-Malays, but it was really due to rapid alienation of land
to plantations for British capitalist interests.
The colonial authorities made the Malay peasantry pay a
heavy price for reservation land by imposing crop conditions.
Since rubber cultivation was consistently more remunerative than
padi production, the Malays continually opted to switch to
rubber. While it is true that the new policy kept the
reservation land within Malay hands, its objective from the
British viewpoint was to protect the traditional padi land. The
British insisted on traditional rice cultivation on the
reservation land (Lim Teck Ghee 1971:158).
The British further excluded the Malay ra;cyat (masses) from
the more lucrative cash crops by passing laws stipulating that
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rubber could only be tapped on large tracts of land, thus
favoring the wealthy Malay ruling class and further widening the
Malay social gap.
The implementation of the reservations policy also resulted
in the falling of land prices by as much as 50 percent, so that
Malay peasant land-owners often petitioned for their property to
be excluded from reservation land (Lim Teck Ghee 1971:206).
Since reservation land was no longer good security for credit
from non-Malays, the participation by wealthier Malays in
usurious activities was encouraged considerably since they alone
were able to accept Malay peasant land as collateral for loans.
With this advantage, Malay creditors could charge higher interest
rates. Consequently, wealthier Malays were able to purchase the
developed reservation land at lower prices than on the open
market. The Malay Reservations Enactment thus contributed to the
social stratification of the Malay community and to some
concentration of land-ownership among wealthier rural Malays.
This can be seen in the case of a Malay reservation
established in 1919 which was studied by Fisk (1961:22):
Under these circumstances it must be concluded that the
application of the Malay Reservation Enactment to this
reservation, while preserving Malay ownership of much of the
area, has not been effective as a means of promoting a
sturdy, independent and relatively prosperous Malay
peasantry living from the operation of its own land. On the
While the British regularly cited the Malay Reservations
Enactment as an example of their protecting the interests of the
Malays, the fact that a majority of the Malays petitioned against
it, and that the Malays were not included in the formulation of
the policy (Lim Teck Ghee 1971:205), indicates that the British
were merely looking out for their own self-interests.
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contrary, disruptive social and economic factors are tending
to produce a small number of Malay landlords renting their
land . . . and an increasing body of impoverished landless
Malays living within the reservation.
Besides claiming to protect Malay interests, British
propaganda made groundless allegations that the Malay poor were
reckless in their rubber tapping methods. The British claimed
that, among other things, the Malays ruthlessly tapped so that
the bark replacement could not keep up with bark consumption (Lim
Teck Ghee 1971:228). A 1930 survey by the Rubber Research
Institute presented evidence refuting the claims that the Malays
were inefficient rubber tappers (Lim Teck Ghee 1971:229), but the
myths prevailed.
Moreover, the British blamed non-Malay middlemen (petty
traders and small money lenders) as the cause of peasant
impoverishment, while administrative causes were conveniently
ignored. Jomo (1988:35) states that "the middleman represents
the conspicuous tip of the iceberg of commercial capital
exploiting peasants."
While the British all but forced the Malays to continue padi
cultivation, administrative support was minimal. Drainage and
irrigation services for peasant land were virtually non-existent.
"Roads and other communications were built to serve estates and
mines; any benefits to peasants were mainly incidental, rather
than by design" (Jomo 1988:70).
In short, the colonial state consistently responded in the
interests of capital�especially British capital�against the
interests of the poor Malays.
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British Ideology
Alleged Western Superiority
In this research, I am interested in the Malays' view of
their colonizers. What faults did the Malays find with the
Portuguese, Dutch, and British, and more importantly, how closely
did the Malays associate Christianity with those faults? In his
important volume. The Myth of the Lazy Native, Syed Hussein
Alatas, professor of Malay studies at the University of
Singapore, presents the representative current Malay viewpoint.
He argues that the European colonizers utilized the idea of the
lazy native to justify innumerable unjust practices.
The image of the native under domination is the most un
provoked prejudice entertained by a dominant group towards
the subject people. The Malays gave up their land and
political power to the British. They were displaced from
mining. They accepted the situation where the wealth of the
country was drained to England and to other countries. They
became the poor in their own country. They had to share
their country with a sizeable immigrant population who were
brought down in the interest of colonial capitalism. Yet
despite their acceptance of all these they were accused of
indolence, treachery, amok running, etc. (Alatas 1977:127)
Alatas (1977:2) further contends that although the British
rulers were personally benign individually, colonial capitalism
was ruthlessly exploitative, designed solely to suit the interest
of the alien ruling power.
It is vital to our interests that Alatas associates
Christianity with the evils and self-interest of colonialism.
"The twin gospel, commercial benefit for the mother country and
civilization for the natives, which includes Western Christianity
(emphasis mine), became the reigning ideology" (Alatas 1977:117).
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In the eyes of many Malays, the European colonizers. Christians
included (the Malays made no distinction between Europeans as to
religious practice�all were "Christian") , promulgated this "twin
gospel" "to justify conquest and domination" (Alatas
1977:117) .
Alatas' thesis is that the colonizers employed degrading
stereotypes of the natives to further justify their exploitative
control. In his Introduction, Alatas (1977:17) names "the
church" as one of the institutions which used its power to impart
the ideology of the lazy native in order to keep the Malays in
subjection to British rule. Furthermore, it is highly
significant that Alatas includes Christian missionaries among
those who proclaimed the natives "indolent, dull, treacherous,
and childish" (Alatas 1977:112). Whether or not these
accusations against the church and missionaries were generally
true is far less important than the fact that it was or is
perceived to be true.
Based on the ideology of the lazy native, a status ranking
dominated by race was created: "The Europeans formed the ruling
class at the top of the hierarchy; next came those of mixed
European blood and Christian in faith; then came the foreign
Asian immigrant communities and finally the native population"
(Alatas 1977:18). Put simply, in the Malays' estimation, the
Christians were at the top and the Malays were at the bottom.
The rest were in between.
As discussed earlier, the British endeavored to be
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gentlemanly and humane in their treatment of the Malays on an
individual basis. Yet, they were not entirely successful in
presenting a positive image of themselves. Abdullah (1970:71-
72) , who was himself generous in his judgment of the English,
lamented that his people, the Malays, judged their colonizers on
the basis of a few bad Britishers "following the Malay proverb,
'A single buffalo has mud on it and the whole herd is smeared. �
Such deeds and behaviour remain long in the memories of other
men, for one man tells another and the tale passes round until it
becomes firmly rooted in peoples' minds." The result, according
to Abdullah, is that the British were generally feared. "Anyone
happening to meet an Englishman at once fled far away" (Abdullah
1970:71) .
Alatas agrees that the British were feared, but he
challenges Abdullah's belief that the British did not deserve
such a reaction. Alatas (1977:134) contends that Abdullah was
blindly sympathetic to the English, and that his work was
aggressively disseminated by the British for the very reason that
it served as pro-British propaganda.
Indeed, the British had to rely on propaganda, says Alatas,
because their schemes were so patently self-serving that they had
to find a means of justifying their actions. The British did
this so thoroughly that, in the end, they had convinced
themselves that their involvement in their colonies was the
highest expression of altruism (Alatas 1977:15). Even J.S.
Furnwall (1948:489), one of the rare Britishers who were critical
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of certain colonial policies, insisted, nevertheless, on the
necessity of colonialism.
European conquest was bolstered by the prevailing theory of
social Darwinism or evolutionary socialism. Industrialized
Western civilization was believed to be the apex of evolutionary
development. Bernstein, an influential Marxist socialist in
Germany, wrote that the question is not whether but how the
Europeans should occupy the tropical lands. "Moreover, only a
conditional right of savages to the land occupied by them can be
recognized. The higher civilization ultimately can claim a
higher right" (Bernstein 1963:178-179). Bernstein invoked the
authority of Marx for his pro-colonialist view. Tutelage of the
civilized over the uncivilized was regarded as a necessity
(d'Encasse and Schram 1969:130).
The condescending and at times contemptuous attitude toward
Asians was widespread among Europeans of all persuasions. For
example, the great Russian revolutionary, V.G. Belinsky (1811-
1848) , known for his sense of evenhanded rationality, wrote that
"National pride is a lofty and noble sentiment, an earnest of
true excellence; but national conceit and susceptibility is a
purely Chinese sentiment" (Belinsky 1956:125). Like the Spanish
priests who blamed the Filipinos for the low moral standards of
the Spaniards, Belinsky (1956:127) blamed the Tarters for the
negatives of Russian life. Another Russian thinker, advanced in
his notions of social justice, Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) ,
contrasted the Russian culture with that of India, which "has
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outlived its prime and is wasting away in senile impotence"
(Herzen 1956:481) .
The technological superiority of the West gave rise to the
claim that it was superior in all fields, and this was applied
retroactively to history. Rengers (1947:41), summarized the
position:
Being Western in education and thought, we easily
criticize or condemn institutions and customs intimately
connected with the mentality of the Easterner. What seems
absurd or reprehensible to us, through the centuries has
often proved not only acceptable but the only workable
solution. The fact that the East is different from the West
should not automatically mean condemnation of the
institutions of the East. For centuries this prejudice and
lack of knowledge had created a very bad impression of the
native population. The Portuguese had warned the Dutch that
the natives could not be trusted. The bad impression had
remained during the whole period of the East India Company
although there were notable exceptions.
A cursory review of the literature reveals clearly that the
British did indeed see the Malays as lazy. Thomson (1875:16-
17,33) a traveller in the region, said that
the Malays do as little work as possible. . . . There are
many Malays in Province Wellesley, but they do not work on
the plantations, and indeed it is almost impossible to say
how one-twentieth part of the Malay population occupies
itself. As Mohometans they practice circumcision, and
recite frequent prayers. The rest of their lives they seem
to spend in rearing large families to follow their fathers'
example, and to wait lazily for such subsistence as the
bounty of nature may provide.
Frank Swettenham (1948:137) added that "the Malay has no
stomach for really hard and continuous work, either of the brain
or the hands." He claims, in fact, that the "leading
characterization of the Malay of every class is a disinclination
to work" (Swettenham 1948:136).
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Misplaced Responsibility
Alatas admits that this image, however prejudiced, was not
entirely unfounded. "The European colonial image of a lazy,
incapable, treacherous and scheming native partly did reflect a
section of native society" (Alatas 1977:204). Yet, Alatas
submits, as the evidence suggests, that the Malays were victims
of what he calls "the principle of misplaced responsibility"
(Alatas 1977:205). The colonials attributed to the natives
traits that the colonials had created themselves. For example,
Malays were considered incapable of large-scale business and
commerce, when, in actuality, the Dutch trade monopoly had
eliminated what had been a highly successful Malay trading class.
Dutch expansion in the 17th and 18th century stopped the
emergence of commercial coastal states. Independent Malay
coastal states which revolved around commerce had provided the
Malays with the means for far-reaching trade networks. At least
as early as the mid 12th century, Malays were regularly trading
with eastern Africa. By the early 14th century Malay traders
freguented China, the Malabar Coast, and the coast of Bengal .
By the 15th century Malays were in Hormuz (Schrieke 1957:244-
245) .
Since business and commerce were an important part of the
colonial capitalist concept of industriousness , a society lacking
in such a class, as the Malays now were, was considered indolent.
The British took all the top political, economic and
administrative positions, thus blocking the upward mobility of
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the Malays. The resultant lack of motivation on the part of
Malays was cited as evidence that the Malays lacked drive and
ambition.
Misplaced responsibility was even employed in regard to the
native physical constitution. When the Malays received greatly
inferior medical care and were thus generally less healthy, the
British labeled them frail.
Perhaps the best instance of the principle of misplaced
responsibility was the spread of opium. Here again Malayan
society was blamed for a situation created by colonial rule.
Before the coming of the Western colonial powers, opium
consumption was confined to the royal court. Within only several
years of the start of British rule, opium addiction was
widespread, especially among the Chinese.
From official reports, newspaper articles, books, and
private correspondence it is beyond doubt that the British
intentionally promoted opium usage on a scale hitherto unknown.
Opium sales boomed to the point that opium became the single
largest source of revenue of British Malaya. Between 1896 and
1906 opium sales alone accounted for between 43 and 60 percent of
the entire revenue of British Malaya (La Motte 1920:24). It
became so lucrative that the British promoted it as necessary for
survival in jungle life. It was claimed to prevent malaria,
diarrhea, dysentery, and tuberculosis. Opium was also said to
relax the nerves, strengthen the body, and stimulate the mind
(Jackson 1961:55). In 1910 the British government nationalized
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and monopolized the manufacture, sale and distribution of opium
(La Motte 1924:53) .
The sheer hypocrisy of this is clear from the fact that
opium had long since been forbidden in England, recognized as it
was for its destructiveness (La Motte 1924:12-13). The Malays
are all too aware of this. Alatas (1977:23) states that "This is
the clearest known instance in history of a policy being adopted
and organized on a huge scale, without any moral scruple, in the
interests of colonial rule and capitalism. . . . Thus for more
than 100 years, the civil servants of British colonies were paid
partly from opium, from the proceeds of human misery and
degradation." Or, as La Motte (1924:12-13) put it: "An opium has
been called upon to waste this human life, by destroying its
value and efficiency, in order that Europeans might prosper."
Alatas believes that the rapaciousness of the Spanish and the
exploitation by the Dutch do not equal the evils brought by the
British, although virtually all Western historians count the
British as the best of the three.
Greed Over Scruples
Despite British rhetoric to the contrary, "the colonial
capitalist ideas of development were largely based on unlimited
greed for profit and the subordination of all other interests to
this" (Alatas 1977:84). The profitable and corrupt indentured
labor system exemplifies this. Laborers from India and China
came on a credit-ticket system. Their passage to Malaya was
debited to their account. These laborers were then supplied with
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opium, toddy, and gambling to relieve them of what little wages
they might have. The result was that many coolies never received
any cash wages, but were in perpetual debt (Blythe 1947:70-71).
Gambling, opium, and toddy were the three addictions
supported by the colonial government. These addictions served
colonial capitalism in that they tied the workers as virtual
slaves to the employers for longer periods than originally
stipulated. In addition these were sources of income. The
government outwardly blamed the local supervisors for the abuses,
while it secretly supported the use of the three vices.
Christianity, sadly, is here again implicated by
association. Sir Stamford Raffles is believed by Malay scholars
to have been at the same time a leading promoter of both the
opium trade and Christian missions (Alatas 1977:138).^^
Regrettably, the response of many of the Christian missions in
Malaya was to attack the vices, but not the source. Government
policy was rarely questioned.
Myth of the Lazy Native
The Malays view the stereotype of Malay indolence as
entirely unfair and based on the grossest misinterpretation of
history- For starters, the Malay will note that before colonial
I could not substantiate Alatas' claim that Raffles
promoted opium trade. Ferguson-Davie (1921:16) claims the exact
opposite. What is important here is what Malays believe to be
true .
Imagine what most Americans' view of Islam would be if a
Muslim country took control of the U.S. and openly pumped highly
addictive drugs into the country while it also brought in Islamic
religious teachers.
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bondage there was little or no technological gap between
themselves and the Europeans, and that the subsequent gap was the
result of colonial blockage of the flow of trade and ideas from
the Western world (Alatas 1977:216).
When Raffles and many of the British administrators of the
19th century arrived on the scene, the Malays and others in
the region had passed through more than three centuries of
political, economic, social and military onslaught by
predatory European powers who took them by surprise when
they first arrived. Many of the negative traits described
by the 19th century observers were the creation of the
Europeans of the earlier centuries. (Alatas 1977:117)
Alatas (1977:119) adds that "Neither culturally nor
religiously has laziness been approved by the Malays." Moreover,
"anyone having first hand knowledge of Malay fishermen and padi
planters will realize how absurd the contention is."
The Malay image of themselves is of a people with dogged
determination and acuteness of mind.
Let us first consider the image of the Lazy Malay. It
struck us as odd that a people who, in the words of Raffles,
�is so indolent, that when he has rice, nothing will induce
him to work', could be continuously engaged in war and
piracy against formidable opponents. The history of the
Malays from the 16th century onwards was full of internal as
well as external conflicts. As a matter of fact the Malays
were the most harassed people. No region in South East Asia
had been attacked and occupied by so many forces from so
many parts of the world. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the
Siamese, had all attacked and occupied certain parts of the
Malay Peninsula. We may also mention the attack of Acheh
and the Bugis raids. If the Malays were that lazy they
would have lost their independence long ago. The fact that
the British succeeded in occupying Malaya through diplomacy,
while those using force failed, was partly the result of the
activity and alertness of the Malays. (Alatas 1977:117)
The picture of the Malay ruling class created by colonial
historians was one of instability, anarchy, and despotism. While
admitting that the description fits certain rulers in certain
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time periods, Alatas (1977:13 3) counters that Western colonialism
"introduced its own form of despotism, instability, anarchy,
backwardness, and the absence of the rule of law." As for the
charge of Malay treachery, Alatas (1977:117-118) submits that it
was no more than the expected "situational response towards
groups who were themselves cunning and treacherous."
Alatas believes that British commercial and political
interests were the criteria upon which the British based their
judgments. Since commerce and empire building were the most
esteemed activities to the Europeans, the Malays, not motivated
by such interests, were considered lazy. "Industriousness was
eguated with acquisitiveness" (Alatas 1977:119). What makes the
British interpretation more unfair in the Malays' minds is the
fact that it was European colonial domination that had stripped
the Malays of an independent trading class. Winstedt (1956:17)
comments along these lines that "Because he is an independent
farmer with no need to work for hire, the Malay has got an
undeserved reputation for idleness." In stronger language,
Alatas (1977:72) says the same: "It was this unwillingness to
become a tool in the production system of colonial capitalism
which earned the Malays a reputation of being indolent."
Put simply, Alatas holds that the stereotypes of the Malays
amount to no more than European "snobbery, conceit and naivete."
Missionaries' View of Malays
Some Accepted Western Superiority
What of the missionaries? Did they develop a fair and
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accurate picture of the Malays and their plight? Bishop Blasdell
(1952:83-89) lamented that, overall, the church identified
closely with the Western colonial powers that put the Malays in a
relatively low position.
L. Richmond Wheeler (1928:344), a missionary to Malaya,
accepted that the British were no less than the Malays' greatest
benefactors who only reluctantly became involved in the affairs
of the Malays in order to save them from destroying themselves.
"The British, after much delay and unwillingness, took over the
control of the anarchic interior, and only this saved the race
from extinction." It is hard to believe Wheeler is describing
the very same situation that Alatas (1977:127) labels "the most
unprovoked prejudice entertained by a dominant group towards the
subject people."
The truth, of course, lies somewhere in between. It is just
as easy to stereotype unfairly the early missionaries as it was
for the colonials to stereotype unfairly the Malays. Their
detractors love to highlight a few choice comments of the more
bigoted and imperialistic missionaries. One such person. Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) missionary Ferguson-
Davie, had a number of disparaging things to say about the
Malays. For instance, buying into the myth of the lazy native,
he wrote that "The Malays themselves, from their racial
characteristics ... seem a particularly difficult people to deal
with. The spirit that can leave all to follow Christ, or that is
willing to suffer hardship for His sake, is so alien to the
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naturally indolent (emphasis mine) and easy going temper of the
Malay" (Ferguson-Davie 1921:16). He also noted that although
"Malays are polite, friendly, and easy going, they are very
attractive to the casual traveller . . . their best qualities are
superficial" (Ferguson-Davie 1921:13-14). The Malays were so
inferior in Ferguson-Davie ' s mind that he had questions as to
"whether or not the Malays will die out amidst the more virile
immigrant races" (Ferguson-Davie 1921:12-13).
In a discussion of the issue of Malay evangelism, Ferguson-
Davie (1921:18) blames Malay resistance solely on Islam and the
Malay character. There is no mention of the atrocities of the
Portuguese, or of the economic exploitation of the Dutch.
Instead, in a stroke of nationalistic pride, Ferguson-Davie
praises the Portuguese and Dutch as pioneers of the great Western
civilization built up in Malaya by the British.
Most Admired Malays
A closer look at the writings of missionaries in Malaysia
reveals that Ferguson-Davie was exceptional in the degree to
which he held anti-Malay, pro-British sentiments. In fact, his
anti-Malay feelings were not shared by most of the other
missionaries. A more representative viewpoint comes from
Laurence Browne, also of the SPG. Browne (1936:20) found the
Malays "charming," "courteous," and "contented" with a "love of
sport and of home life." He understood that their apparent lack
of initiative was due to the coming of British rule. Moreover,
the laziness for which Malays were infamous was due to a
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"philosophic outlook, rather than an innate characteristic"
(Browne 1936:21). The Malays were content to live off the land.
They had few wants and these required little effort to satisfy.
When the Malays need to "they work hard and intelligently when
they apply themselves to work."
The most lengthy description of Malay character was penned
by British administrator Frank Swettenham. Though not a
missionary, Swettenham considered himself a Christian. He
unabashedly supported the right of British involvement in Malaya,
and shared the opinion of Ferguson-Davie that the British had
saved the Malays from themselves (Swettenham 1900:258-262). Yet,
his view of individual Malays was almost entirely positive.
Like many others, he did believe that "the leading
characteristic of the Malay of every class is a disinclination to
work" (Swettwenham 1948:136), and that Malays could be very
difficult to manage (read: they would not readily submit to
exploitative employment relationships) (Swettenham 1948:152).
Yet, he softened these criticisms by noting that the Malays were
the product of a "climate which inclines the body to ease and
rest," and that they were conditioned to shy away from
overlordship since they had experienced unjust treatment at the
hands of their own despotic rulers (Swettenham 1948:137). These
few negative comments, along with the statements that the Malay
is "inclined to swagger," "extravagant," "a coxcomb," and
ethnically exclusive, are the only blots amidst an otherwise
spotless 3 5-page catena in praise of the Malay character.
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The Malays are described as "smiling." Toward outsiders
they are "shy and reserved" but become "open and pleasant" to
those who befriend them. Indeed, they are famous for their
hospitality. They are also "artistic," "cheerful," "loyal," and
"courageous." And while the Malay has no stomach for really hard
work . . ."if you can only give him an interest in the job, he
will perform prodigies; he will strive and endure, and be
cheerful and courageous with the best" (Swettenham 1948:139). In
fact, "you will wish for no better servant." The Malay is,
moreover, of "quick intelligence" and "a ready imitator." Malays
are fine conversationalists and possess a "strong sense of
humour . " They
are "guided more by their hearts than their heads' and are not
jealous, envious, or materialistic."
Swettenham wrote briefly about Malay women specifically.
The Malay woman's "intellectual education is so slight that one
can only be surprised at the quite uncommon intelligence shown by
many" (Swettenham 1900:269). They are "witty and interesting,"
have a "cheerful temperament" and "a strong sense of humour." In
short, they are "capital company."
Missionary writer L. Richmond Wheeler (1928:345,347) said
that the Malays have a "natural kindliness and good sense" and
"are a quiet, stay-at-home folk." Bishop Thoburn (1892:496) was
impressed with their "pride" and "courage." Missionary Laurence
Browne (1936:2 0) wrote that Malays "have retained a charm
peculiarly their own. Their courtesy, their contentment, their
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love of sport and home life, make them attractive people, perhaps
especially to the British."
We will see later that Western missionary efforts almost
entirely excluded the Malays, targeting only the Chinese and
Indians of Malaya. My speculation is that one of the reasons for
this was a view held by some (albeit not openly articulated as
such, and possibly even subconscious) that the Malays were less
in need of salvation than were the Chinese and Indians. The
Malays were, as Wheeler said, attractive to the British.
Missionary J. Thomson (1875:33), while believing Malays to be
lazy, also considered them to be "gentlemanly" and not given to
the most odious practices found among the Chinese, who "smoke
opium, lie without restraint, and whenever opportunity offers are
dishonest, cunning, and treacherous" (1875:16-17).
Alleyne Ireland (1905:45) noted that the Chinese were
addicted to gambling and opium, and the Indians were drunkards,
but that the Malays were relatively free from such vices. Alatas
(1977:115) believes the views the Europeans generally held of the
respective races were that the Malays were "lazy," the Chinese
"venal," and the Indians "cringing and cheating." Perhaps it is
stretching it to try to rank these qualities in order of gravity,
but to at least one segment of the missionary force, those
Victorian legalists for whom the stamping out of opium, gambling,
and prostitution in the colony was their highest calling, mere
laziness was a Sunday School picnic compared to the vices of the
immigrant races.
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C.G. Warnford-Lock' s description of the races in Malaya
echoes closely Alatas' statement. "By nature, the Malay is an
idler, the Chinaman is a thief and the Kling (Indian) is a
drunkard" (Warnford-Lock 1907:38). Warnford-Lock (1907:39-40)
goes on to give a most scathing account of the Malayan Chinese:
"The Chinese coolie must be made to realize that he is not
on an equality with Europeans. He is the mule among the nations
. . . stubborn and callous; unlovable and useful in the highest
degree. But never under any conceivable circumstances to be
trusted or made a friend of." Moreover, "In the whole philosophy
of a Chinese coolie, there is not a particle of fellow-feeling .
. . no more sympathy." A Chinaman "will think nothing of
knocking a sleeping mate or helpless woman on the head, for the
sake of a dollar or two."
Contrast this with descriptions of the Malays. "With many
virtues, the Malays... are above everything but the immediate
pressure of want. . .the Malays are essentially gentlemen too; they
have no acquisitiveness, and if they can satisfy the wants of the
moment they are happy - they lay great store by the proverb that
sufficient for the day is the evil thereof" (Cameron 1865:133-
134) Similarly, "'The character of the unsophisticated Malay is
remarkable for its simplicity and honesty. Having no artificial
wants, they are satisfied and content with what would be
considered positive destitution by a Chinese; ... they have a
regard for truth, and may generally be depended upon in their
statements'" (Oxley, quoted in Swettenham 1900:237). J.D.
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Vaughan (1857:125) considered truthfulness a prominent feature of
the Malays, and appreciated the absence of obscenity in their
language. In addition, "when the Malay is treated as a man and
not a brute, he proves docile, faithful and industrious; without
exception superior to any eastern sailor afloat" (Vaughan
1857:125) .
It is my opinion that the British, and especially the
Christian missionaries, were fond of the Malays. They were not
the "wretched heathen" that the Chinese were. This attitude may
ironically have pushed the missionaries in the direction of the
Chinese and Indians, who, with their idol-strewn altars, and
their back-alley toddy shops and opium dens were obviously in
need of redemption. Malay Islam was, in sharp contrast,
inoffensive. One unidentified SPG missionary wrote in 1913
("Mohammedanism in Malaya": 243) that many Europeans "are
impressed by Mohammedan piety" and "its striking virtues (such as
temperance and the observance of the outward forms of religion)
being those which appeal to us by their very contrast with our
own particular weaknesses."
Why Missionaries Neglected Malays
Yet, this factor was only a small part of why the Malays
have not been reached with the gospel. I have already mentioned
that the Malays were rarely the target of Christian evangelism.
In fact, pitifully little effort was made in evangelizing the
Malays compared to the personnel and resources expended in
reaching the other people groups. The nonexistense of a Malay
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church today steins largely from the fact that, in spite of
opportunities to do so, the missions and their churches did not
put forth the effort necessary to establish and maintain
relations with the Malays.
As suggested, it was not that the missionaries did not like
the Malays. They neglected the Malays, though, for a variety of
reasons. One simple fact was that few missionaries were willing
to live in the rustic interior villages inhabited by the Malays.
As did the rest of the Europeans, the missionaries congregated in
the major cities, where an affluent Western lifestyle was more
easily obtainable, but, unfortunately for the work of Malay
evangelism, where relatively few Malays lived before the 2 0th
century .
It was widely believed in European circles in Malaya that
missionary work was actually forbidden by treaty in the Malay
states. The origin of this misunderstanding is that in 1874,
when a treaty was signed on the island of Pangkor between the
British Government and the chiefs of Perak, it was agreed that
"the Sultan receive and provide a suitable residence for a
British Officer to be called Resident, who shall be accredited to
his court, and whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all
questions other than those touching Malay Religion and Custom."
" The 1901 census of the Federated States showed that of
the total population of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants
each (Kuala Lumpur, Taiping, and Ipoh) , fewer than ten percent
were Malay. In Kuala Lumpur, with a population of 32,381 (of
whom more than 23,000 were Chinese), there were only 3,727
Malays; in Taiping with a population of 13,331, there were only
787. (ppport on the Census of the F.M.S., 1901 1902:28).
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A similar condition was made in 1895, when the Federation was
formed, with regard to the Resident-General. The clause only
forbade the Resident to use his position to interfere with Malay
religion or custom, and says nothing about missionary work.
The question arises whether the Sultan had the power to
prevent missionary work within his State, although there was no
treaty forbidding such work. If the shari'ah or Muslim law had
been the law of the States it would have been possible for a
Sultan to restrict non-Muslim activity. Such was not the case,
though. A Sultan had to act constitutionally with his Council of
State (which included British officers) . Thus, it would have
been hard for him to justify the banishing of a missionary unless
it could be proven that the missionary had actually caused a
disturbance of the peace.
But the insistence upon legal rights does not mesh well with
the gospel of love. The Malays had great respect for the office
of Sultan, an office that dates from pre-Islamic days, when the
Sultanate was thought to be invested with a measure of divinity.
Missionary work was at times limited relationally , if not
legally. To force oneself into a state against the wish of the
Sultan would have been an act of grave discourtesy which would
have thus militated against a favorable reception of the gospel
message. In response to this, Browne (1936:71) points out that
the Sultans were generally courteous and friendly, and usually
gave permission to reside in their states and do unobtrusive work
to missionaries who had proven themselves to be inoffensive
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members of society and a friend of Malays.
The Straits Settlements� i.e., Singapore, Melaka, Penang,
and Province Wellesley�were British territory, and thus subject
to no official barriers to missionary work. As Browne (1936:68)
put it, "The Government there is British, and it would be
contrary to British ideas of liberty of conscience to hinder the
propagation of Christianity -
The Unanswered Call
The London Missionary Society
Compared to the situation today, in colonial Malaya,
missionary work among Malays was unrestricted. How then did the
Church respond to this opportunity? The first English-speaking
missionary to Malaya came to Malaya only as a second choice
because he was denied access to China. During the years of 1808
to 1842 missionaries were not able to gain a footing in China
itself. Europeans were allowed to live only in coastal Canton
and Macau (Lovett 1899:399). William Milne was appointed by the
London Missionary Society (LMS) to work with Robert Morrison
(missionary to China 1807-1834) . Milne reached Macau on the 4th
of July, 1813. The refusal of the Chinese authorities to permit
Milne to reside in either Macau or Canton led Milne and Morrison
to originate what became known as the Ultra-Ganges Mission
(Lovett 1899:429). The plan was to choose places freguented by
Chinese, as near to China as possible, and make the work there a
base and training ground for successful work in China when the
time should come for China to be open to missionaries. Melaka
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was chosen, and Milne arrived there in April of 1815, as the
headquarters of the mission, with other stations in Batavia
(currently Jakarta), Penang, and Singapore (Lovett 1899:429).
Since the hope was to get into China, the emphasis of the
LMS in Malaya was work with the Chinese and the learning of the
Chinese dialects. To its credit, however, the LMS did not
completely ignore the Malays.
Milne was soon joined by W.H. Medhurst, C.H. Thomsen, and
Samuel Milton. In those early days they did not find a ready
response from either the Malays or the emigrant Chinese. In his
history of the LMS, C. Silvester Horne (1904:135) gave this
reason for the lack of response:
It is to be feared that the natives had learned to suspect
every institution that was called Christian as being
designed to accomplish some sinister political end. The
first difficulty which Christian missionaries experienced
in many fields was to live down the effect produced by
so-called Christians who had prededed them.
After over a year and a half of preaching, teaching,
"personal intercourse with the heathen," and especially the
printing and distribution of literature (all primarily to the
Chinese) , the mission baptized its first convert, Leang Ah Fa,
the Chinese printer (Horne 1904:434). From then until Milne died
in 1822, there is no record of additional converts. The Anglo-
Chinese College (a Christian school for Chinese) became the focal
point of the mission. Of the nine LMS missionaries who came to
Melaka between 1820 and 1839, four of them worked almost
exclusively with the Anglo-Chinese College (Lovett 1899:437).
In 1843 the opening of the Chinese ports led to the
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establishment in Hong Kong of the Anglo-Chinese Theological
Seminary, of which James Legge, the last of the directors of the
Melaka mission, became Principal. This brought the college and
mission at Melaka to an end. The order came from London for the
entire Malayan operation to close.
The same ending came to the Malayan mission of the American
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) , which had
sent the Rev. Ira Tracy and Alfred North, a printer, to Melaka in
1834 (Wong 1973:29). Together they worked closely with the LMS
until the Board also closed shop in Malaya upon the opening of
China. Both mission agencies left Malaya without establishing a
church. For both Missions their work in Malaya was seen only as
a stepping stone to China.
In its 27-year tenure in Malaya, the LMS appointed only two
missionaries to the Malays, one in the beginning and one at the
end of the period. The first was C.H. Thomsen, who arrived in
Melaka in September of the mission's first year, and who later
transferred to Singapore after it was occupied by the British in
1819.
The Rev. Claudius H. Thomsen was a German who studied the
Malay language in Malaya under the renowned Malay Muslim author
Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir. Though zealous and extremely hard
working, Thomsen was not well-liked by his Malay tutor. Munshi
Abdullah found him obstinate, especially in his refusal to be
corrected in his Malay translation of Bible passages. In his
monumental work. The Hikayat Abdullah, Abdullah (1970:152) makes
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the following disclaimer:
If they come across any mistakes in the Gospel according to
St. Matthew due to Mr. Thomsen 's clumsy renderings in the
Malay language, they should kindly remember I was acting
under instructions and could do nothing to add or remove a
single word without Mr. Thomsen 's full authority. I myself
have fully realized that in this Gospel there are many
awkward-sounding passages, and words used in impossible
contexts. Because of these solecisms people are liable to
misconstrue the sense. But what could I do, especially as I
did not know the original language of the Gospel which, I
believe, is a translation from the Greek? If it had been
partly at least in English I would have understood a little.
I hope that in view of all these troubles my readers will
not heap insult and calumny upon my reputation on the
grounds that I was Mr. Thomsen 's teacher.
Again of his translation errors, Abdullah observed that Thomsen
incorporates beliefs in which the Christians put their trust
and which they hold in high esteem. Should it not be a
place where men can find a model of good writing, in the
spelling of words and in the letter-combinations, and where
they can obtain or borrow the finest phrases? If you treat
the book thus, as if you had no respect for it, neither will
others who see it pay any respect, for they will realize
that the author is foolish and inconsistent, a man of no
education. It is not just a matter of the spelling and the
joining of letters. The whole meaning is often wrong, as
far perhaps from the original sense as the earth from the
sky.
In Singapore, Thomsen opened a class for Malay boys and his
wife opened one for Malay girls. By 1828, 12 Malays had been
converted to Christianity and were baptized. There was never
much support from the Mission, and the 12 baptized Malays soon
returned to Islam (Sng 1980:32). Considering the initial
nonresponsiveness of the Chinese to the work of the LMS
(especially taking into account that the Straits Settlements,
where the LMS worked, had a Chinese majority and that the LMS had
several workers targeting the Chinese) , the response of the
Malays to Thomsen, whose relationship skills were questionable.
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is impressive.
Most of the Malay work of the LMS was Malay Scripture
portions and tract distribution. In fact, by 1830, tens of
thousands of pieces of literature had been given to Malays (Sng
1980:129). The response to this was discouraging. An 1837 LMS
report concluded that there was not a single Malay Christian, nor
even any hopeful catechumens ("Editorial" 1871:92-93).
This instance of seeming Malay nonresponsiveness can be
partly attributed to three factors. First of all, the Malay
literature portions were Thomsen translations which were
sometimes tragically unclear or misleading. Secondly, perhaps a
majority of the Malays of the time were illiterate. Thirdly, the
LMS did not have Malay-speaking missionaries (and did not use
local Chinese Christians who also spoke Malay) to personally
follow-up literature distribution. Expecting results from such a
method is tantamount to expecting a well-groomed garden by doing
no more than blindly scattering seed.
The only other LMS missionary to Malays was Benjamin Peach
Keasberry. Born of British parents in India in 1811, Keasberry
worked as a clerk in Batavia (presently Jakarta) , where he
learned the Malay language. Also in Batavia, under the influence
of LMS missionary William Medhurst, Keasberry became a committed
Christian and learned printing and bookbinding. He then went to
the U.S. for theological studies in preparation for a missionary
career in China.
In Singapore in 1839, enroute to China with his new American
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wife, Keasberry grieved that no one had continued the work
Thomsen had initiated among the Malays (Sng 1980:49). Benjamin
and his wife, Charlotte, decided on the spot to join the LMS with
special assignment to work with the Malays.
The work of the Keasberrys is a clear indication that the
Malays were not "hardened" or unreachable. The Keasberrys
immediately started Malay services at the LMS chapel. In a
letter written in 1839, two other missionaries wrote of the
openness of the Malays:
many others here are willing to receive instructions, as is
evident from the regular attendance of Malays, both men and
women, in our Mission Chapel every Sabbath afternoon, on
Mr. Keasberry 's and Mr. Youngblood's sermons. A spirit of
enquiry is at work among some of the Malays and this spirit
neither of us can satisfy.^�
The work outgrew the Mission Chapel, and so, in 184 3, the
Malay Chapel (affectionately known by the Malays as "Gere j a
Keasbury" or Keasberry Church) was built. At its opening service
over 60 Malctys attended.
It was at this time that the LMS closed all work in
Singapore and Malaya. The Keasberrys again declined the chance
to go to China, this time by resigning from the LMS. Keasberry
became a self-supporting, independent missionary to the Malays
through income he earned from printing for the government and
private businesses.
The Keasberrys opened and operated a boarding school for
Malay boys. The boys were taught English and Malay, printing,
^� Alexander and John Stronarch's letter to the LMS in
London, quoted in R.M. Greer (1959:18).
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lithography, and bookbinding. There were also daily Bible
readings and weekly chapel services conducted in Malay. A girls
school was later established.
Like the Malay Chapel, the boarding school is evidence of
the openness of Malays at that time. "Despite its distinctly
Christian background, the school gained ready acceptance from the
Malays' (Sng 1980:51). Enrollment went as high as 60 Malay
students. It is amazing that this overtly Christian school even
won the respect and approval of Malay leaders. The Sultans of
Muar and Kedah sent their sons to the school. The students also
included two sons of the Temenggong (Malay chief military
officer) of the state of Johore, one of whom later became the
Sultan Abu Bakar of Johore.
Perhaps Keasberry 's most lasting work was in writing,
translating, and publishing Malay literature. In an
extraordinary example of positive and nonthreatening Muslim-
Christian relations, Munshi Abdullah worked closely with
Keasberry in the publication of the New Testament in Romanized
Malay as well as in Arabic. Keasberry wrote or translated
several other Christian works into Malay, in addition to
compiling the first Malay hymnal (Sng 1980:51).
To his disappointment, Keasberry only ever gained a handful
of Malay converts, and never established a permanent Malay
church. After his death, the converts reverted back to Islam. A
contributing factor to the lack of permanency of the work is that
Keasberry was a one-man show- There was no support base beyond
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his immediate family. Even the boarding school was literally a
family operation. Keasberry and his two sons taught the boys,
and his second wife�his first wife had died�and their two
daughters taught the girls. When Keasberry died, the work died
with him. Keasberry had appealed to various mission boards to
send workers, but none were interested (Sng 1980:53).
Considering the formidable obstacles barring Muslims from
conversion to another religion, the accomplishments of the
Keasberry family are heartening. God alone knows what might have
taken root had there been a team of missionaries to work
alongside the Keasberrys and to continue the work after
Benjamin's death.
For 3 8 years Keasberry labored on behalf of the Malays -
preaching, teaching, translating, printing, and frequently
visiting in Malay homes. Although those 38 years saw few
converts, Keasberry possessed a self-giving, listening spirit,
and a warmth that clearly won the admiration of the Malay
community (Makepeace 1921:238). The seed had been planted, yet
no one followed to water the seed in preparation for a harvest.
In 38 years, was God calling no one else to work among Malays?
It is significant that Keasberry spent 3 8 years among the
Malays [Thomsen had spent 20 (1815-1835)]. To my knowledge, no
one before or since has given that much time to Malay work. The
lesson here is that Muslim ministry with long-term results will
not be accomplished through short-term efforts. Keasberry was
one who did not allow barriers to obstruct his vision. On
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September 6, 1875, Keasberry collapsed and died while preaching
at the Chapel. His last words reflect the single-minded
conviction that inspired his efforts: "The time is coming when
the Mohamedans will acknowledge and worship the Savior" (quoted
in Sng 1980:52) .
The Anglican Mission
We will now consider the impact of the Anglican Mission on
the Malays. The Church of England was seen by the British
government as an extension of itself to be used in the "noble"
work of civilizing its colonies. Men like Sir Francis Light of
Penang and Sir Stamford Raffles of Singapore felt their efforts
were part of a grand moral enterprise. As a British member of
Parliament put it: "In every quarter of the globe we have planted
the seed of freedom, civilization and Christianity." This
ideology caused the Anglican Church's witness to the Malays to
suffer from two inherent weaknesses. First and foremost, the
Anglican Mission was too closely associated with the colonial
government and its policies. Secondly, the Mission long
maintained an ingrown chaplaincy style of ministry.
A third weakness was unrelated to the close relationship
between the Church of England's mission and the mission of
England. Like the LMS and the ABCFM before it, the Anglican
Mission viewed Malaya as merely a springboard for mission to
China, rather than a place of mission in its own right. These
Hutchisson in 1828, cited in Max Warren, The Missionary
Movement from Britain in Modern Histnry 1965:30
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weaknesses will be discussed in reverse order.
For over a hundred years Anglican missionaries passed
through Malaya on their way to China, but not until they were
driven out of China in the early 1950s did they concentrate on
the evangelization of Malaya. "Malaya seemed 'just too far
beyond India to participate in her attractive glamour; just too
far short of China to profit by the calls of her teaming millions
. . . on the highway to everywhere, but until recently, nothing
in ourselves'" (Smith in Northcott 1992b: 36).
The close church-state relationship that existed in England
was transferred to the colonies and resulted in a chaplaincy
style of ministry. The Anglican church in Malaya was not
intended to be a missionary church. It was initially established
to minister exclusively to the English community. Not until the
1950s did it turn its focus outward. In fact, Anglican
missionaries in Malaya were called "chaplains," not
"missionaries." Chaplains were government employees answerable
to the East India Company and after 1867 to the Colonial Office.
It must be remembered that the East India Company's overriding
concern was trade, and it rigorously opposed any inclinations of
the Anglican church to develop as a separate entity from the East
India Company- funded chaplaincy (Warren 1965:30). The funding of
Anglican churches and chaplains enabled the East India Company
effectively to keep the Anglican Mission under its thumb.
"Governors tended to regard the church as a department of state
and the chaplain as just another civil servant" (Hunt 1992:37-
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38) . The boundaries between church and state became so blurred
that disputes arose between governors and chaplains over the
scheduling of services and the wearing of vestments.
The church was seen by the Malayans for what it was - one
branch of the colonial administration. Its close association
with things British discouraged the development of indigenous
congregations (Dumper 1964:11). Another factor that worked
against indigenization was that, as civil servants, chaplains
were frequently shuffled from place to place. Chaplains rarely
stayed in one place for more than a couple of years (Harrison
1985:131). Consequently, even for those who might have wished
to, there was not sufficient time to develop a lasting foundation
upon which to build an indigenous congregation.
Furthermore, its accountability to the East India Company
made the mission of the church subservient to the interests of
British trade. This position found its ultimate symbolic
expression in the Treaty of Pangkor, which gave the British
Residents jurisdiction over all matters save Malay religion and
culture. In effect, the British government was saying, "We're
taking over everything. We are assuming unquestionable right to
exploit the country for our self interests. (Of course, British-
style democracy and civilization will be to everyone's benefit,
and for such you should be forever grateful) . To prove that we
have no hard feelings, and don't mean to intrude into your
private affairs, and to let you feel that you are still calling
the shots, we promise not to push Christianity on you. Keep your
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religion of the prophet, and your peculiar little festivals.
Don't bother us and we won't bother you."
From the standpoint of the Kingdom of God, it is a tragic
loss that, for all of its lofty moralizing rhetoric, when it got
right down to it, the one thing the British government was
willing to sacrifice was the spread of the gospel. The colonials
were all too willing to risk the ire of the Malays when British
pounds sterling were at stake. Sadly, when the eternal souls of
the Malays were at stake, the risk of offending Malay
sensibilities was considered too high. Thus, when in 1846 the
Bishop of Madras visited Malaya, he wrote: "It appears that no
missionary operations against heathenism are directly carried on
at this station" (quoted in Hunt 1992:38).
With the vast resources of the colonial government, the
Anglican Mission could have had a far-reaching influence among
the Malays. Some educational initiatives did, in fact, do some
good. The Anglican Penang Free School took in many Malays from
elite families. No less than Bapa Malaysia (The Father of
Malaysia), Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first and most beloved
prime minister, claimed the school as his alma mater. The
Christian influence of the school was evidenced in his lifelong
attitude of friendliness toward Christians, and his even-handed
treatment of all religions.
Malays were not averse to sending their children to
Christian schools when it was clear to them that the educational
quality was excellent. The prospects for social and economic
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advancement for their children outweighed their misgivings about
exposing their children to Christianity. It also proved to be
true that caring, sensitive missionaries, such as Benjamin
Keasberry, won the respect and admiration of the Malays. Had the
Christian missionaries taken a greater interest in the interests
of the Malays, the whole tide of opinion about Christianity among
the Malays may well have been different today.
Unfortunately, the Anglican Church, among others, upheld the
status quo against the best interests of the non-whites. No
attempt was made to break down racial barriers. In fact, non-
whites were often excluded from services for the English (Loh
1964 : 11) .
The British only reinforced the strong racial enclaves that
existed in Malaya. Malays were kept in their rural villages,
growing rice. The Chinese were the tin miners and the merchant
class. Indians were rubber-tappers, laborers and clerks.
Although the Church in Malaya attacked individual vices, it did
not challenge the systemic injustices that put one race above
another, or question the divine right of England to impose its
own brand of "civilization." In the words of Michael Northcott
(1992:51) ultimately "the Anglican Church failed to act as a sign
of the Kingdom of Christ in which people of all classes and races
are called to worship together."
The Anglican Church was so wrapped up in being the Church of
England in Malaya, and so aloof from Malayan society, that as
late as 193 6, at a church council, the locals reported that the
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expatriates (who made up the majority of the council) "had no
comprehension of the issues the Asian clergy were trying to
raise" (Diocesan Council Records, cited in Northcott 1992:53).
In the 2 0th century, the church's commitment to the process
of independence was weak. Church leaders called for government
reform, but would not concede the possibility of local rule. The
manner of British rule was subject to scrutiny. That British
rule was best was not open for debate.
The close identification of the Anglican Church with the
colonial government ultimately made the Church's relation to the
Malays adversarial, when it came to the issue of Malayan
independence. It also caused a major identity crisis when, in
1957, British rule was abolished.
What of Anglican outreach specifically for the Malays? As
with the other mission boards, workers targeting Malays were
lamentably few. Writing in 1921, Anglican Bishop Ferguson-Davie
(1921:85) said that while "there have been many clergy of
different religious bodies working among these two latter peoples
(Tamils and Chinese) , there has only been one missionary in 100
years (he was referring to Keasberry) , as far as is known, who
has devoted himself to Malay work." While not literally true
(for example, in his own Anglican tradition one Bishop McDougall
founded a school for Malay children in Sarawak, East Malaysia in
1848), Ferguson-Davie' s statement is not far off the mark, and
underscores the virtual neglect of the Malays by Christians.
This fact prompted Ferguson-Davie (1921:17) to cry out: "Is it
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not a reproach to our Church that there are no missionaries
living amongst these people�our own fellow subjects . . . ?
'Whom shall we send, or who will go for us?' Do we not seem to
hear the question asked? Is there none to reply, 'Here am I,
send me. ' "
Ferguson-Davie opened a Medical Mission in Melaka in 1911 as
a means of building a foundation of trust among the Malays, and
simply to demonstrate Christlike love. The Malays immediately
welcomed the Christian doctor and her three Chinese assistants.
In her very first report, Dr. Mildred Staley wrote "'We have paid
eighty-seven visits to kampongs in six months and receive a warm
welcome everywhere, and some of these kampongs already send for
us in cases of serious illness and see;n to trust us fully ^"
(emphasis mine) (Ferguson-Davie 1921:64). Soon three
dispensaries were established in outlying Malay kampongs. That
the confidence of the Malays had been won is shown by the fact
tl:at in the first year of operations, over 5,000 Malays visited
the dispensaries (Ferguson-Davie 1921:64).
The work continued to expand, and there are reports of
Malays walking for miles to receive medical attention from the
Christian dispensaries. In 1914 the work was moved to bigger
premises with three wards for inpatient care. A Sunday School
for interested patients was also begun. Bishop Ferguson-Davie
observed that the medical personnel were, through their
sacrificial giving of themselves, bearing witness to the meaning
of Christianity to the Malays among whom they worked. In the
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1919 report, Dr. Warren, who had succeeded Dr. Staley, wrote that
'"There have been six baptisms during the year� four of orphans
adopted by the Mission, one of a patient, and one of a servant'"
(Ferguson-Davie 1921:65).
Dr. Staley had found the Malay women particularly ripe for
the gospel. She recounts anecdotes of Malay kampung women "who
had lost all faith in pawangs' (traditional healers) or
ha j is '(those who had made the pilgrimage to Mecca) treatments"
(Ferguson-Davie 1921:66). Others lashed out at Islamic fatalism
that asked them to accept passively the suffering of their
beloved children. Dr. Staley believed that the women felt "the
bitter sense of injury and outrage" (quoted in Ferguson-Davie
1921:67) at the double standard Islamic women were expected to
live under. The men were free to be relatively carefree, while
the women were left with the daily burden of sustaining large
families without the aid of modern conveniences.
In 1919, ill-health forced Dr. Warren to leave the Mission.
By the time of Ferguson-Davie ' s writing in 1921, a replacement
had not yet been found. In Melaka and a similar Medical Mission
that had opened in Singapore in 1913, the work was never able to
maintain the number of workers that were needed to do the
visiting in the Malay homes that was being called for.
Ferguson-Davie predicted that the Malay work would expand.
In actuality, insufficient funding and lack of personnel came to
curtail services. In the 192 0s, the Malays shied away from the
Melaka clinic as Chinese patients were admitted. Finally, in
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1933, the hospital was closed for financial reasons (Browne
1936:53-54). Once again, an effective ministry among Malays died
because of the lack of support from the Christian church. It is
true that from the standpoint of numbers, such works were not
wildly successful. It is equally true, though, that the
foundations of credible Christianity were being laid, and that
hints of Malay receptivity to the gospel were turning up here and
there .
After commenting on what he perceived as the very positive
effects on the Malays of the Melaka medical mission, Laurence
Browne (1936:54) in 1936 bemoaned the fact the in all of Malaya
"There is at the moment not a single missionary able to devote
the greater part of his time to the Malays" (emphasis mine) .
Browne ' s statement occurs in the context of a country which was
completely open to Christian missionaries, and in which there
were literally hundreds of missionaries to the non-Malay races of
Malaya. Where was the church?
The Methodist Mission
The founding fathers of the Methodist Mission in Singapore
and Malaysia, James M. Thoburn and William F. Oldham, arrived in
Singapore on Saturday, February 7th, 1885. They found almost
immediate interest among the Chinese. By March 1st, 1886, they
were running a Methodist English school for the Chinese (the
Anglo-Chinese School) . The start of Tamil work was no less
dramatic. By September of 1885, Oldham was conducting
evangelistic services among Tamil prisoners. Within eight months
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of arrival, the mission had established a growing Tamil school
(Doraisamy 1982:9). In early 1887, a Tamil church was built.
Also in 1887, the capable Sophia Blackmore arrived in
Singapore. She trained Eurasian and Chinese Christian women, and
together they did house to house visitation and opened and
operated a Chinese girls school and a Tamil girls school (Means
1935:31) .
By 1900 the Anglo-Chinese School in Singapore had an
enrollment of around 600 (Sng 1980:113). Other active ministries
included day schools, Sunday schools, Bible studies, a girls
home, visitation at a leper colony, street preaching, home
visitation, and witnessing at any event that drew a crowd,
including Chinese festivals. These were all for the Chinese,
Indians, or Eurasians.
There was also organized lobbying of the colonial government
for more just treatment of women, the closing of brothels, the
banning of the importation of women for prostitution, and the
outlawing of opium and alcohol sales. Except for the efforts
against the sale of opium and alcohol, the lobbying efforts of
the Methodist missionaries were largely successful.
These activities were carefully planned and carefully
evaluated. Personnel and funds were allocated. There was also a
strong emphasis on leadership development. In short, in those
early years the Methodist Church did much effective outreach, and
they were thorough in training, execution, and follow-up (Hwa
Yung and Hunt 1992:154-155).
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The one exception to this was evangelism of the Malays:
From the beginning this was set aside for one or two
missionaries who had a reasonable command of the Malay
language. There was never the widespread participation of
every person associated with the Church. Local preachers
and exhorters who engaged in this work were few. From 1890
up to 1919 only William Shellabear and various short term
Chinese assistants or WSFM teachers were involved on a
consisant basis, and even Shellabear was rarely directly
involved. (Hwa Yung and Hunt 1992:155)
William G. Shellabear came to Singapore in 1891 to work with
Malays. Muslim evangelism was slow, but Shellabear was able to
establish a small Malay congregation. The only recorded converts
were Silas Salleh, a Chinese convert to Islam who subsequently
became a Christian under Shellabear, and a Malay, Haji Abdul
Shukor. Silas Salleh went on to become a missionary to the Baba
(Malay-speaking non-Muslim Chinese) population. Haji Abdul
Shukor was baptized in 1895. Eventually, death threats by the
Malay community forced the mission to move him to Hong Kong (Hunt
1991:411). In those days it required great personal sacrifice
for a Malay to make the haj to Mecca. Only the most devout made
the effort. Therefore, it is significant that a Haji (one who
had made the haj) became a believer in Jesus.
Sopia Blackmore joined Shellabear in his efforts to reach
Malays. She met fierce opposition when she and her women
attempted to sing songs or tell Bible stories in the Malay
kampungs around Singapore (Hunt 1991:411). Her girls home
sometimes took in orphaned Malay girls, but there is record of
only a single convert to Christianity.
Blackmore attributed the slowness of the Malay work to
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"Muslim prejudices" (Hunt 1991:411). Yet, in this case the
guarding of Malay racial solidarity was a stronger factor than
the Islamic religion. This is evidenced by the fact that no
opposition is recorded upon the conversion of Silas Salleh, the
Chinese-Muslim convert to Christianity, whereas the conversion of
a Malay, Haji Abdul Shukor, provoked physical attacks by the
Malay community.
Both Blackmore and Shellabear became increasingly involved
in the administrative duties of their respective schools, and
were unable to devote much time to evangelism or recruitment of
Malay pupils. At a critical time, following the baptism of Haji
Abdul Shukor, Shellabear returned to England for a year upon the
death of his wife in 1895. On his return in 1896, Shellabear was
made the head of the Singapore District of the Methodist mission.
As a Malay language scholar, he was also devoting more and more
time to translation work. These two preoccupations forced him to
give up his small Malay congregation. Since there was no one to
replace Shellabear in the work, the congregation dissolved.
Shellabear felt that the distribution of Christian
literature, and especially of Scripture portions "would probably
be the surest and most effective method of reaching the hearts of
the hitherto almost neglected Malay people" (Shellabear
1946:237). From 1888 until 1940 he wrote or translated no less
than 57 books, chiefly for the use of Malay Muslims, but also for
Malay-speaking Christians. Besides Christian publications,
Shellabear took a great interest in Malay literature as having
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value in and of itself. He produced a still-acclaimed critical
edition of the Malay historical classic, The Malay Annals. He
edited a collection of Malay proverbs and wrote a Malay-English
dictionary. In addition to this, he edited several volumes in
the Malay Literature Series for the British government.
Shellabear promoted not only Christian literature, but also Malay
literature and the appreciation of Malay classical works.
Shellabear realized that there could be no shortcut to the
hearts of the Malays. Driven by a love of the Malay language and
people, he went to the greatest possible lengths to understand
the Malays through a thorough mastery of their language,
folklore, and culture. He went so far as to learn Dutch so that
he could read the Dutch literature on the Malay language.
Shellabear was recognized by the Malays as a leading Malay and
Arabic language expert, and respected for his accomplishments.
The sad fact that bears repeating is that so few shared
Shellabear 's heart for the Malays. The "hitherto almost
neglected Malay people" became the henceforth almost neglected
Malay people.
With Shellabear off the scene (poor health had forced him to
return to the U.S. in 1920), no one continued evangelistic
efforts among the Malays until 1931 when Robert and Fanny
Blasdell were appointed to Melaka to build hostels for Malay
children who would attend the Methodist School. Fanny Blasdell
was the daughter of William Shellabear and spoke fluent Malay.
From her father she had caught a love for the Malay people. The
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Blasdells had come to Malaya to do Muslim evangelism. After 12
frustrating years of teaching in an English-medium school, they
jumped at the chance to work with Malays in Melaka.
The Blasdells lived in Malay kampongs, establishing good
relations with the Malays. Eventually they were able to persuade
parents to send their children to the hostels (one for girls and
one for boys) and the school. This was only possible because of
the Blasdells knowledge of the Malay language, and their
sensitivity to Malay customs and to Islam. Both hostels had
special prayer rooms, and school classes were scheduled around
the regular Islamic prayer times.
We have already seen that in the mid-1800s the colonial
government realized that it was cheaper to farm out education to
government-aided private schools than to establish and operate
government schools. The requirements for a school to receive
government grants were only that the school pass a yearly
inspection and that the requisite number of students pass the
examinations. Otherwise, such schools were free to do as they
pleased. With government encouragement and financial aid, as
well as land grants for the building of new schools, the missions
jumped at the opportunity. The fact that the schooling was to be
English-medium and concentrated in the more well-developed urban
areas made it all the more readily accessible to the missions.
None entered into the ministry/business of schooling more
wholeheartedly than did the Methodists. From 1900 to 1940 this
branch of the Methodist mission grew from 1,850 students in 13
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schools to 17,472 students in 56 schools (Hunt 1991:413).
The Methodist Church grew to become so dependent upon this
program that in 1920 only two of the 90 Methodist missionaries in
Malaya were not teachers receiving salaries through the Grant-in-
Aid program (Doraisamy 1982:56). The entire English-speaking
mission became financially dependent upon the government money
received for the operating of schools. As one missionary put it
succinctly in 1935, "No schools, no Grant-in-Aid, no Mission"
(Barclay 1956:774) .
This missionary's comment could just as well have been "No
opium, no Grant-in-Aid, no mission." Over half of the money the
private schools received from the government was derived from
opium sales (Hunt 1991:411). Bishop James Thoburn, whose
initiative lead to Methodism's spread in Malaya, justified
receiving money from opium sales by saying that it was no
different from the daily protection and services the churches
received under the British government, which was heavily funded
by opium revenues. This compromising position made it impossible
for the Methodist Church to lobby credibly against opium. The
testimony the Methodist Church could have had in joining the
Malays against the widespread introduction of opium was
effectively muted.
Following unfounded accusations that the Methodist school
students were being forced to convert, in 1917, the colonial
government placed restrictions on religious activities in the
schools and on church management of the schools. Teachers had to
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receive government approval. In 1928, compulsory attendance at
chapel services was prohibited, as was the teaching of religion
during school hours. The percentage of students involved in
Christian activities dropped steadily (Minutes 1931:37).
The religious influence of the Methodist schools was
narrowing and could not counterbalance the increasing emphasis on
academic performance and secular learning. One teacher
complained in 193 5 that the schools taught enough Western
knowledge to make students disbelieve their old religion, but not
enough Christianity to turn them to the new faith (Hunt
1991:414). With most of the Methodist missionaries wrapped up in
schools, and the schools becoming increasingly subject to
government controls, the Methodists were steadily losing their
Christian impact.
The major influence of the schools upon Malaysian society
was found in their role in the creation of an English-educated
urban elite. The benefit went to urban Chinese and Tamils. The
rural Malay society was virtually ignored.
The Methodist Church's involvement in the economic
development of Malaya was another area which benefitted the
immigrants to the detriment of the Malays.
In 1901, Chinese entrepreneur Wong Nai Seong brought a group
from China to Sarawak to develop the agricultural potential of
the Rejang Valley- Because many of the group were Christians,
and because the Methodist Church was known to be a responsible
administrator, Wong invited the Methodist Church to help run the
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new colony. Bishop Frank Warne went from Singapore to Sibu,
Sarawak to be the pastor in charge. When Wong went bankrupt in
1904, Rajah Brooke appointed Methodist missionary James Hoover as
the arbiter between the colony and the government. For three
decades Hoover was the Kapitan China for all of the Rejang Valley
Chinese. His position gave him enormous scope for expanding the
role of the church in the Rejang Valley (Barclay 1956:114-133).
Hoover energetically ventured into economic development,
bringing in additional Chinese workers, and granting them land.
In the process the Methodist Church dispossessed the Iban and
other indigenous peoples. Hoover's vision was one of "manifest
destiny." He regarded Chinese dominance as inevitable in
Sarawak, and even doubted the survival of the indigenous peoples.
In 1910 the Chinese were given a 12-mile frontage of choice land
on either side of the Rejang River at Sibu, and "all Dyaks,
Malays, and others" were forced out (Barclay 1956:122). This
action, though obtaining an immediate Methodist stronghold,
identified the Methodists with colonial power and exploitation in
the eyes of the Malays.
The "success" in Sarawak prompted the Methodist Church in
West Malaya to launch into economic development. In 1903, H.L.
Leuring negotiated with the Perak government to bring Chinese
settlers to the present site of Sitiawan. Subsequent groups of
Chinese colonists were brought to other areas under cultivation.
The Methodists won many Chinese converts from among those they
brought to Malaya, and built many congregations. Furthermore,
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the agricultural work generated income for the Mission. The
Methodist Mission ran a plantation, and several individual
missionaries purchased property (Barclay 1956:172).
In both East and West Malaya, church leaders were intimately
involved with the economic development of the country. A
Methodist missionary played a key role in the introduction of
rubber cultivation into Malaya (Hunt 1991:413). Money from the
sale of land grants to the Chinese benefitted the Mission.
The relative size of the Methodist role in Malayan economic
development was small. Yet it was important for the statement it
made. Ministries of caring, such as medical clinics and
children's homes, were dwarfed by Methodist business concerns.
Considering its perceived role in society, "Methodism clearly not
only supported but had vested interests in the colonial policy of
making land grants to Chinese for the development of an
agricultural export economy" (Hunt 1991:413). The Methodist
Church helped develop the economic power base that was dominated
by non-Malays. Through education and economics, the Methodists
excluded (sometimes intentionally) the Malays, relegating to them
an ever decreasing piece of the pie.
So, not only did far too few missionaries actually
evangelize among the Malays to establish solid, ongoing Malay
congregations, but even the other activities and policies of the
Methodist Mission did not provide a positive climate for the
reception of the gospel by Malays. The church's overall
testimony to the Malays was negative.
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The Blasdells demonstrated the possibility for Methodists to
take a constructive and appreciated role in Malay society, but
they were on the margin of the Methodist Church establishment.
Their work was only grudgingly allowed by then Bishop Edwin Lee
(Hunt 1991:415). The Blasdells constantly had to fight their
superiors for the right to work among Malays. The Methodist
schools were so consuming of personnel that the Blasdells were
continually sought to be put in charge of schools.
At a time when the Methodists had nearly 100 missionaries in
Malaya, they did not feel the need or the ability to spare even
one of those missionaries for work among the Malays, who made up
50% of the population. With huge amounts of effort directed at
evangelizing and educating the other half of the population, the
Methodist Church was content to relate to the Malays through the
distribution of literature alone.
Why was this so? One factor is that prejudice against Islam
was high. English language articles denigrating Islam appeared
in the Methodist publication "The Malaysia Message." There was
also the question of the legality of evangelism among the Malays.
Yet the major reason for a lack of interest in mission
among the Malays seems to have been financial. Virtually
all the missionaries were tied up with school work, which
paid for itself and supported the English and Tamil language
congregations. The Chinese churches were likewise
financially independent, or could be supported from the
business profits of the mission. Work among Malays, on the
other hand, showed little prospect of being self- supporting
. . . or evangelistically successful. Expending money or
human resources on such mission never had strong support
from either the American mission board or the Methodist
Mission leaders. (Hunt 1991:415)
The Christian Brethren
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The Christian Brethren were another of the early missions in
Malaya. The 1842 opening of five ports in China following the
First Opium War cleared the way for Chinese from impoverished
South China to immigrate to Southeast Asia. Many ended up as
laborers in the newly discovered tin fields of Malaya. The
Christian Brethren came to Malaya in 18 60 to work among Chinese
immigrants, as well as to take over the property the LMS had
vacated when it moved its operations to China (Lee Kam Hing
1992:110). Thus, from the start, the Christian Brethren, as did
the other missions, "assumed a non-Malay character" (Lee Kam Hing
1992 : 115) .
In fairness to the missionaries, the challenges to
successful Malay evangelism, even back then, were formidable.
The 1874 Pangkor Treaty essentially was about restoring order in
the state of Perak so that British rule would be unchallenged,
and so that Chinese immigrants could safely be brought in to work
the tin mines. Blood had been shed, and Malay misgivings were at
a fever pitch. "British administrators, anxious that the various
economic activities be not disrupted by any return to disorder,
scrupulously restrained missionaries from venturing into Malay
areas lest their zeal lead to hostile reaction from the Muslims"
(Lee Kam Hing 1992:115).
Furthermore, accounts of the ill-effects of living in the
tropics were not entirely fanciful. Nineteenth century
missionaries to Malaya faced real health hazards. Two of the
first five Brethren missionaries returned to their homeland due
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to failing health. One J. Moore lost both his wife and child to
fever. Moore himself returned to England because of sickness and
died soon afterwards. Another missionary died shortly after
contracting leprosy. The Malays and other indigenous peoples
tended to live in the rural villages, where health care was far
behind that of the cities. Living among Malays posed health
risks to Europeans unaccustomed to tropical diseases.
One Brethren missionary did venture into the Malays' domain.
J. Moore, whom we noted had suffered the loss of his wife and
child, went to Melaka in 1889 after having learned Malay.
Determined to be all things to all people, Moore rented a house
in a Malay village, wore Malay clothes, and sought to live as
closely to the Malays as possible. It is not known why, but his
presence was strongly opposed by the Malays, and by his own
account, after eight years in Melaka there was no response to the
gospel from the Malays (Lee Kam Hing 1992:117). Eventually, the
Malay opposition caught the attention of the British authorities,
and Moore was asked by the British to leave Melaka. Moore left
Melaka, went back to England, and died shortly thereafter.
Brethren outreach to Malays had begun and now ended with Moore.
The Presbyterians
By far the earliest Protestant presence in Malaya came with
the Dutch Presbyterians who conquered Catholic Melaka in 1644.
During British colonial rule, missionaries from the London
Missionary Society (LMS) were sometimes Presbyterian, though the
LMS in Malaya was essentially Congregationalist . LMS
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missionaries in Singapore and Penang worked closely with the East
India Company Anglican chaplains in ministry to the Scottish
community.
When the LMS uprooted for China in 1842, the Scottish
communities called their own ministers, and this lead to the
arrival of Charles Moir, the first missionary to come to British
Malaya under the auspices of the Presbyterian Church (Roxborogh
1992:79). Moir arrived in Penang in 1851, and learned Malay,
hoping to do Malay mission work. Swamped with responsibilities
both as a parish minister to the Scots in Penang and as an
assistant in the pre-existing Chinese mission work in Province
Wellesley, Moir could not make time for the Malays.
I did not previously mention that one of Benjamin
Keasberry 's major outreaches "was among the Straits Chinese at
the Malay Chapel in Princep Street (in Singapore) which he had
built in 1843. What had been intended as a mission to Muslim
Malays bore more fruit among Malay-speaking Chinese whose
ancestors had been in Malaya for several hundred years"
(Roxborogh 1992a:80). After Keasberry died in 1975, the
Presbyterian Church eventually took over Keasberry 's Chinese
work. A mission could have just as easily carried on Keasberry 's
Malay work, but being "less fruitful," it was left to die on the
vine.
Actually, the Presbyterians had ties with the Chinese from
China (many Chinese Christian immigrants to Malaya had been
converted in southern China through the English Presbyterian
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Mission) and desired to maintain this connection. Thus, it was
natural to focus on the Chinese rather than the Malays.
Like the Anglican Mission, the Presbyterian mission followed
a chaplaincy model of ministry. Its primary concern was for the
expatriate community. The rationale for such a model was that
the credibility of mission work was believed to suffer when the
Europeans lived immorally. Many also believed that the economic
and political forms of Western civilization were morally
dangerous apart from the influence of the biblical principles of
righteousness, self-control, and servanthood to counteract greed
and moral license. Certainly, the need for chaplains was rapidly
increasing. When Presbyterian services began in Kuala Lumpur in
1902 there were less than 150 expatriates in the city, but by
1911, expatriates had increased to 1,396 (Roxborogh 1992a:85).
In summary, the Presbyterians worked among the Chinese and
Tamils, but in the main, churches were built by and for
expatriates .
The Roman Catholic Church
A final mission to consider is that of the Roman Catholic
Church. The Portuguese, as we have discussed, were a negative
witness to the gospel, and as such, set the tone for centuries of
anti-Christian sentiment among the Malays. There were elements
of caring service from the church, though, that mitigated to a
degree the harsh, warlike tenor of the Portuguese era. Beginning
in 1515, Father Alfonso Martinez spent 34 years as the parish
priest of Our Lady of the Annunciation in Melaka. Martinez built
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a Pauper Hospital and a Miser icordia for the poor, widows and
orphans (Roxborogh 1992b: 29). Under Martinez' ministry, there
were a few Muslim converts, but their conversions were evidently
motivated primarily by the benefits they would receive as
Christians under the Catholic Portuguese (Roxborogh 1992b: 29).
When Melaka fell to the Dutch, the Roman Catholic Mission in
Malaya did not dissolve. The Catholics of Melaka became poor,
but were able to sustain themselves, and even managed to grow.
The church there developed a blend of Malay and Portuguese
culture, unique to Melaka. Some Malays, surprisingly, have even
suggested counting the Portuguese-Malay Catholics of Melaka among
those who qualify for special government benefits as either
indigenes or Muslims.
The Dutch and English did not like Catholics, but struggles
within the international Catholic Church hindered evangelism and
church growth more than did any threat from Protestants, who from
1815 were also sending missionaries to Malaya (Balhetchet
1976:12). The problem was a struggle between the Portuguese and
the French over who would have jurisdiction in Malaya.
^�
"The
conflict was not without irony - Catholics from two European
powers arguing over who should run a mission to Chinese, Indians
When the Portuguese government became increasingly unable
to fulfill its obligation under the Padroado,* the French
Catholics sought to expand into territory previously allocated to
Portugal .
*The Padroado was the system of royal patronage by which the
Pope in 1493-94 had divided the world into Spanish and Portuguese
jurisdiction and had made the respective kings responsible for
all missionary appointments.
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and Eurasians in a Malay part of the world under British rule"
(Roxborogh 1992b: 10). The issue was not completely sorted out
until the late 1800s. In the process, Catholic outreach was
stunted .
In spite of the ecclesiastical wrangling. Catholic churches
were eventually established throughout Malaya, often before any
Protestant works were begun. To its credit, the Catholic Church
was not ingrown, but attempted to reach the local populations.
This was surely due in part to the fact that since the Portuguese
expulsion from Malaya, expatriates had always been predominantly
Protestant. Therefore, the Catholics had nowhere to turn but to
the local population. The Catholic Church was the first to
ordain locals. As early as 1788 (27 years before the arrival of
the first Protestant missionaries) a local Eurasian was ordained
in Penang (Roxborogh 1992b: 11)
Although the Catholic Church sought to Christianize the
Malayan peoples, baptismal records throughout the 19th century
indicate that, like the other missions, the Roman Catholic
Mission did not penetrate into the world of the Malays. The
Catholic Mission in Taiping, Perak is a fairly representative
example. From its founding in 1875 until 1897 there were 245
Indians baptized, 225 Chinese baptized, 120 Eurasians baptized,
and no Malays baptized (Roxborogh 1992b: 15).
Vatican II and the Charismatic Renewal have breathed fresh
life into the Catholic Church. Lay participation is high. The
Roman Catholic Church has emerged as a leader in social
171
consciousness, and as such has earned the respect of the
Malaysian government and its people.
Yet, historically, the highly institutionalized,
hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church was foreign to the
religious style of both traditional Malay spiritism and Malay
Islam. Williams (1985:112) maintains that Rome held a rigid
mentality which directed the Church along the lines of the
European model, and viewed with grave suspicion any adaptation to
local mentality and custom. Purity of faith was identified with
conformity and uniformity with Rome. With its images,
cathedrals, and Latin Mass, the Catholic Church was perhaps the
most "churchy," and thus foreign to the Malay Muslims. The pre-
Vatican II Church was, by the Church's own admission, "mainly the
kingdom of the priest, the organist and the trained choir" (E.A.
Skelchy, quoted in Roxborogh 1992b:27).
Summary of the Church's Neglect of Malays
In summary, I want to reiterate that Malays were not
targeted for evangelism by any denominational mission board or
independent mission agency in the history of Malaysia. Malay
evangelism was never even attempted by some missions. For the
others it was spasmodic, temporary, and completely tangential to
their overall thrusts. What little work that was attempted, was
done by relatively isolated individuals who rarely had the full
backing of their respective agencies.
Certainly, personnel were not allocated for Malay
evangelism. Even in the Depression years of the 1930s the
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Methodist Church always had at least 44 missionaries in Malaya.
Malaya was their third largest mission worldwide, following only
India and China. Yet, in those years, not one of their
missionaries worked among the Malays (Journal of the 121st Annual
Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, Dec. 2-5, 1939) . From the arrival of the first
Protestant missionaries in Malaya in 1815 until Malaysian
independence in 1957, literally thousands of missionaries lived
and worked in Malaya. Of those thousands, perhaps half a dozen
worked mainly with Malays, and another dozen worked with Malays
at some point or another in their ministry.
Consequently, when we consider why Malays are unreached, we
must first point the finger at ourselves as the church. With the
empirical research in view, we must also pose the question of
whether Christian relations with Malays during colonial times
affect Malay students' openness and even prospects of conversion
to Christianity. At the risk of belaboring the point that Malays
were historically neglected by mission boards, I present the
following sample of quotes from mission leaders who worked with
and/or wrote about Malays:
1887-Being myself specially interested in the Malays, I was sur
prised to find that none of the Singapore missionaries were
doing anything to reach them. �William Shellabear
(1946:236)
1911-In Java altogether we have 19,000 Christians won from
Islam. . . . There is no mission, however, among the Muslims
in Malaya. �John Rauws (1911:246)
1913-There are thousands of Malays, and to whom, with the
exception of the Malacca work mentioned, there is not one
single missionary.�Charles Tisdall (1913:173)
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1921-There has only been one missionary in 100 years, as far as
is known, who has devoted himself to Malay work.
�C.E. Ferguson-Davie (1921:21)
1928-Malays have been . . . neglected people. �Marmaduke
Dodsworth (192 8a: 56)
Under British rule there have been various efforts (to
reach Malays), but mostly poorly organized. �Wheeler
(1928:349)
Few missionary workers in this country have a sound
knowledge of Malay or of the outlook and mode of thought of
the Malays, so direct evangelistic work among this people
has been weak and spasmodic. �Wheeler (1928:350)
There has been no determined effort on the part of the
Church in prayer, hope, study or propaganda. �Wheeler
(1928 : 350)
Missionary work among Malays has been spasmodic and
relatively meagre.�Wheeler (1928:350)
Singapore is the centre of one of the largest Muhammadan
areas in the world; yet the Church of England, which has
missions in nearly all other large Muslim areas, has never
had a single ordained man or catechist for similar work
here where there are some forty million Muslims, of whom one
and a half million are under British protection in the
Peninsula.�Wheeler (1928:351)
1936-By some strange chance one corner of the Muslim world has
been overlooked in the programme of missions , a country for
the administration of which Great Britain is responsible,
the Malay Peninsula . In that country there are 17,000
Europeans, presumably all nominal Christians, 36,000 Indian
Christians, and 30,000 Chinese Christians. But the Malays,
who number 1,644,000, are all Muslims, and there is
practically no effort being made to evangelize them. There
are probably not more than six Christian Malays in the whole
country. The possibility of intercourse between the 80,000
Christian residents in the country of the Malays
constitutes in itself an open door, (italics mine)
�Laurence Browne (1936:9)
1954-The Malays have not been the object of serious evangelistic
approach.�Blasdell (1954:189)
Throughout the years of . . . ministry effort in Malaya,
little attention has been given to the Malays. �Blasdell
(1954 : 189)
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1957-Concerning "the possibilities of evangelism among the Malays
. . .no obvious advances can be claimed.�Healey (1957:24)
Missionary societies . . . have tended to neglect Malays in
the past.�Healey (1957:19)
The churches have more or less accepted the idea that
Malays are not to be evangelized, and thus have ceased to
think about the subject.�Marrison (1957:297)
Some would argue that we should not invest limited resources
in "resistant" people groups, but rather should target
"receptive" peoples. It is precisely such reasoning that led
missions of the last two centuries to turn away from the Malays.
The result has been lost opportunity, and still no Malay church.
I would like to show a brief, chronological progression of
Malay Islam, to prove that we have indeed missed opportunities to
change the whole Malay religious environment.
CHAPTER 3
Religio-cultural Analyis
"Muslims we are but animism we feel"
�Wazir Jahan Karim, 1990
Historical Overview and Progression of Malaysian Islam
Since the Advent of Colonialism
We concluded the last chapter with a look at the "unanswered
call," the church's overall neglect of the Malays. To picture
what the missionaries to Malaya faced when they encountered
Islam, it will be helpful now to look at the type of Islam
practiced by the Malays through time."""
Colonial Pre-British
The earliest Christian missionaries to Malaya found an
Islamic facade barely if at all masking a Hinduized court,
officials administering a system of Hindu and customary law, and
the populace looking to shamans and Hindu magic and astrology for
the cure of disease and for success in agriculture, fishing,
love, and war. "Both the men and women of Malacca," wrote 16th
century Portuguese chronicler Tome Pires, "are fond of mimes
after the fashion of Java" (quoted in Winstedt 1950:35-36),
enjoying the shadow play with its repertory from the Hindu epics
the Mahabharata and Ramayana. By changing names and inserting
Quranic prayers, Indian Muslim missionaries had "baptized," not
replaced, a thousand years of Hindu practice. Hindu incantations
^Appendix C discusses the sources covering the interplay of
Malay religious practice, culture, ethnicity, and politics.
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were called prayers (do 'a -Arabic) and made unobjectionable by
the addition of the new confession of faith, acknowledging the
One God and Muhammad his prophet:
It is not I who get rid of the evils of black magic.
It is Batara Guru; it is the gods of the Hindu heaven.
It is seven deities of supernatural power.
Son of Batara Kala, grandson of Ganesa!
Descend and dispel all hazard and ill-luck.
Dispel them from the home of all the sons of Adam!
The sword of Vishnu is before my face.
Genies in whose keeping are earth and water,
Genies in whose lap is the world.
Return ye to your place, the broken rock at the navel of the
seas !
Enter not the line drawn by my teacher!
If ye enter, I will curse you with the words of the Prophet
Solomon;
I will curse you with the creed, "There is no God but Allah and
Muhammad is His Prophet." (quoted in Winstedt 1950:36)
With the appropriate Islamic prayer attached, shamans
invoked their predecessors and Siva and Vishnu to defend the
fellers of a new rice clearing from the malice of Arabic genies,
Persian fairies, Hindu demigods, and Indonesian nature spirits.
An effective mode of syncretism was the supplanting of the heroes
of the Hindu epics by a fictitious picture of Alexander the Great
as a forerunner of Muhammad in the fight for monotheism. Malay
rulers who had been incarnations of Indra and Vishnu were now
made descendants of a Macedonian man-god through the Sassanian
kings of Persia.
In place of the shaman's fearful initiation in the forest
and the fasting and seclusion copied from Hindu ascetics in
order to acquire magic, the Malay now submitted to listen
shrouded to the prayers for the dead read over him; fasting,
he would repeat the name of Allah five thousand times,
until hysteria brought hideous visions of ravening tiger or
coiling snake to be succeeded in those who endured by
visions of prophets and angels teaching the neophyte the
magic arts for which he craved. (Winstedt 1950:37)
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The Hindu Malayan religion included a gnostic concern for
mystic names and formulae and the worship of innumerable saints.
As for the mystic names and formulae, in Hindu days the
Malay had invoked nature-spirits and deities by every
possible designation so that an incantation might not go
astray. It is therefore no break with tradition to invoke
Allah by all His Excellent Names and to replace Om the Hindu
word of power with the Arabic Kun "Let it be" and with the
Basmala, whose recital can attract fish from all the seas,
make the barren fruitful, lay the tyrant low and bring
honour and salvation. The Malay's new teachers taught him
how the appropriate Arab text written on an amulet at the
right astrological moment in scented rose-water musk and
saffron with a recitation of the proper formula would save
a woman from all attempts on her virtue even by the black
art and would protect a man from a bullet, spear, pestilence
and shipwreck. (Winstedt 1950:38)
British Colonial
By the time the British entered the picture three hundred
years later, the Hindu names had been dropped. It is obvious,
though, from early British observers that Islam in Malaya
certainly had not rooted out pre-Islamic religious beliefs and
practices. It is equally obvious that Islam had not yet become
the integrated way of life that it is to many Malays today.
Writing about her 1875 trip to Malaya, Isabella Bird's
description of Islam is of a religion devoid of genuine vitality
or moral imperatives. It is no more than an oppressive club of
theocratic law wielded by an elite few for the legitimization and
preservation of their special status. Islam was, in Bird's
or Bismillah, as in Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Raheem ("In the
name of God, the Merciful, the Mercy-Giving") . It is a phrase with
which Muslims begin endeavors or actions.
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estimation, causing a "slow decay" and a "freezing and retarding
influence" on the Malay spirit (Bird 1883:35).
While Malays were ignorant of Quranic teaching, Malay Islam
was teaming with vampires, were-tigers, specters, storm fiends,
innumerable spirits, and "a gigantic demonology" (Bird 1883:452).
"I never heard of any country of such universal belief in devils,
familiars, omens, ghosts, sorceries, and witchcrafts" (Bird
1883:451). In fact. Bird saw the Malays as "wholly given to
idolatry" (Bird 1883:462). Not only were such beliefs tolerated,
they were incorporated into Muslim practice. One example of many
is that the official regalia of the sultans (who were the heads
of Islam) were believed to possess supernatural powers that made
the rulers invulnerable to the agency of spirits.
Bird's unflattering depiction continues with a picture of
Islamic teaching. Islamic education "consists mainly of teaching
the children to repeat, in a tongue they do not understand,
certain passages from the Koran" (Bird 1883:29). Bird concludes
that Malays "are for the most part ignorant" of what Islam
actually teaches (Bird 1883:177).
Another evidence of the great divide between past and
present Malay Islam is that in Bird's time, Muslims freely drank
of the fermented juice of the toddy palm (Bird 1883:31). No
self-respecting Malay now would risk drinking an intoxicant in
the presence of others.
Bird's assessment of Malay Muslims, in short, is that they
were "ignorant and grossly superstitious" (Bird 1883:460). Her
179
statements must be tempered, of course, with an understanding of
her own bias. She repeatedly labeled Malays as "bigoted Muslims"
simply because they let it be known that they disliked
Christianity, yet she reserved for herself the right to view
Islam disparagingly without considering herself bigoted.
It would be unfair, though, simply to write off Bird's
assessment as the product of a close-minded Victorian Christian
ethnocentrist . For one thing. Bird is not stingy with praise of
the local people, and frequently sets their customs in a
favorable light. Furthermore, she is not blindly pro-British, as
can be seen from her thoughts on the universally maligned Malay
phenomenon of running amok.
Considering how punctilious and courteous the Malays are,
how rough many of the best of us are, how brutal in manner
many of us are, and how inconsiderate our sailors are of the
customs of foreign peoples, especially in regard to the
seclusion of their women, it is wonderful that bloody
revenge is not more common than it is. (Bird 1883:453)
Malay writers themselves wrote of the Malays as
superstitious and of the poor quality of Islamic teaching.
Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir had written in 1843 that Islamic
schooling was little more than the uncomprehending, rote
memorization of the Quran (Abdullah 1970:79). Teachers were so
heavy handed and excessively strict that pupils were sometimes
chained to poles and ordered to recite the Quran.
Abdullah, moreover, spoke of his fellow Malays as
fatalistic, superstitious, and ignorant of scientific knowledge.
During a smallpox epidemic, many refused to allow their children
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to be vaccinated, believing that if it was the will of Allah,
their children would die with or without the vaccination
(Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir 1970:237). In the area of scientific
knowledge, Abdullah claimed that although it had been over three
hundred years since Magellan circumnavigated the world, none of
his friends had ever even heard that the earth is spherical
(p. 235). This is all, of course, in stark contrast to current
Malaysian Islam, which prides itself in keeping abreast of the
latest scientific insights.
Abdul Majid was another Malay writer who commented on Malay
Islamic practice. Written after Bird, his observations lend
further weight to our contention that 19th century Islam was
wanting by current standards. Again we hear that Islamic
teaching was "confined to Qur ' an-reading only," and that the boys
grew up to be "men ignorant of Islam" (Roff 1978:63). It was not
uncommon for a bridegroom to be taught for the first time the
five pillars of Islam immediately prior to his wedding so as to
be sure that he was a good Muslim and knew at least the first
lesson in Islam. Referring to mandatory daily Islamic ritual
cleansing, Abdul Majid laments that "Many young men, I knew, did
not even know how to wash themselves" (Roff 1978:63).
Malays were fearful of the spirit realm, and put great stock
in omens (Roff 1978:45). Moreover, Abdul Majid describes his
culture as one in which gambling was prevalent (Roff 1978:78,86).
Drinking was also apparently common and openly practiced among
upper class Malays, even during Ramadan (Roff 1978:109). In
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short, most Malays were religious, but their understanding of
Islam was minimal (Roff 1978:xii).
Lest we mistakenly conclude, though, that large numbers of
Malay Muslims would inevitably have converted to Christianity if
the missions agencies had only devoted more resources to Malay
evangelism, Dutch Islamicist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (Benda
1958:3 39) warns against the "erroneous assumption that the
syncretic nature of Islam at the village level would render
conversion to Christianity easier in Southeast Asia than in other
Muslim lands." After all, for all the "impurities" of the
village Islam of the peasantry, Malays considered themselves to
be good and devout Muslims, profoundly attached to their own
version of the faith. As early as 1894, Bishop Thoburn (1894:12)
wrote that "In the Malay Peninsula and in the islands beyond, the
Mohammedans have gained a strong foothold, and their Malay
converts are extremely bigoted in their attachment to the faith
of Islam."
Hurgronje 's caution is a point well taken, and Thoburn 's
remark is undoubtedly true. Yet, the historical evidence still
suggests that Malays were relatively open to the gospel during
the early British colonial years, and generally grew
progressively resistant. Concerning Thoburn 's statement, however
hardened in their attachment to their faith, staunchly Muslim
Malays were at the time a minority. Yes, orthodox Islam had
gotten one foot in the door, but the other foot was still solidly
grounded in traditional Malay spiritism.
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In an impassioned 1913 article entitled "A Plea for the
Malays," Charles Tisdall observed that the "heathen tribes" of
Malaysia and Indonesia were rapidly falling to the encroachment
of Islam. The Islamization of the Malay Peninsula was going on
before the very eyes of the British, and the church was standing
back and watching it happen (Tisdall 1913:172). A Methodist
school teacher who just arrived in Medan, Sumatra wrote at the
time:
Scattered through the vast regions are multitudes who have
never heard of Christ, but who are rapidly learning the
faith of the false prophet. If things go on at this pace
Mohammedanism will be the religion of Sumatra. It is now a
race between the Cross and the Crescent. The one who gets
to the ears and hearts of the people first will be the
ruling faith. What will the Christian churches at home do
about this matter? (quoted in Tisdall 1913:172)
Tisdall adds:
Today the heathen tribes in Sumatra and Borneo would quickly
become Christian if only missionaries could be found to go
and preach Christ to them, as may be seen from the result of
the Rhenish Mission in the Battak country, Sumatra, the
total Christian community of which numbers over 100,000
souls. But there are only a few missionaries for this work,
and in many districts there are none at all; and so the
religion of Mohammed, which is being carried in by Arab
traders, is fast claiming these people for its own. ... In
allowing the Mohammedans to forestall them, the work of
converting these people to Christianity is being rendered
more difficult every year. (Tisdall 1913:172)
Of the Malays specifically, Tisdall writes: "The greatest
need in this part of the world at present is a Mission to the
Malays... The colporteurs of the Bible Society. . .report that the
Mohammedans are anxious to hear about Christianity and more ready
to buy Gospels than ever before" (Tisdall 1913:172-173).
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Tisdall goes on to lament that in all of Malaya, with the
exception of a work in Melaka, there is not a single missionary
to the Malays. He notes that almost all the Missions, at one
time or another, started Muslim work, but finding little or no
results, quickly abandoned their effort, and devoted themselves
entirely to work among the Chinese and Indians. Tisdall proposes
that a new Mission be started for Malay work only.
It was Tisdall 's opinion that Malay Muslims were in fact
easier to work with than many other Muslims:
I would point out also that Moslem work here is very much
easier than that in Arabia, India, or Persia, where a worker
must know Arabic, the Koran and the Traditions, as well as
all the arguments against Islam and in opposition to the
Mohammedan ideas of Christianity, before he can really do
any work worth speaking of. Here, none of these things are
so immediately necessary; and a worker who would be a
failure through inability to learn the language for work in
Arabia, India, or Persia, might be a success here, where
only Malay (a comparatively easy language) is needed.
(Tisdall 1913:174-175)
This opinion was shared by others, including W.T. Cherry
(1907:94): "But it is our opinion that their invulnerabilicy
against the truth is greatly exaggerated. It would probably be
found that there are nothing like the difficulties here that
beset workers in North Africa and other hotbeds of Islam."
Tisdall 's final analysis was that the Malays were "ripe for the
harvest. "
In response to Hurgronje 's cautions against expecting easier
results among Southeast Asian Muslims than Muslims of other
areas, it can be pointed out that part of Indonesia had already
seen significant Muslim conversion to Christianity. True, it did
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not come easily, but it did happen. Three-quarters of a century
of efforts in Java resulted in well over 60,000 Christians of
Islamic origin (Browne 1936:55). Browne believed the Javanese
were not less committed to Islam than were the Malays, indicating
that results may well have been likely among the Malays had
comparable efforts been made (Browne 1936:56). Sadly, "The
efforts made on behalf of the Malays have not been sufficiently
intensive or continuous to give any expectation of success"
(Browne 1936:54) .
The earliest Protestant missionary efforts in Malaya
indicate that the Malays were not necessarily more resistant to
the gospel than were the other Malayan people groups. One Dr.
Legge (1898:141), speaking of the work of the LMS in Singapore in
the first half of the 19th century, said "Our Chinese mission in
Singapore has been a failure; the Malay mission had a little
success." That the Malay work was more successful than the
Chinese work is most significant. Dodsworth (1928a:27), writing
in 1928, reports the opposite to be true. This indicates that an
earlier window of opportunity was already shutting by 1928.
Administrator Frank Swettenham 's years of service in Malaya
led him to conclude in 1900 that Islam in Malaya was little more
than a thin veneer covering a bedrock of "superstitions and
animistic practices." Contrary to Bishop Thoburn 's assessment,
Swettenham (1900a: 147) believed "the Malay is hardly ever a bigot
in matters of religion."
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Swettenham (1900a: 145) notes a lackadaisical attitude taken
by most Malays regarding Muslim basics such as prayer, fasting,
and mosque attendance:
I have said the Malay is a professing Muhammadan, his life
is ruled by the Muhammadan law, and he accepts the teaching
and injunctions of the Moslem priesthood, but, with rare
exception, he cannot be called devout; he does not pray five
times a day, he does not rigorously observe a forty days'
fast, he is not a regular attendant at the mosque. He is
married and buried as a Muhammadan, he is circumcised and
goes through the outward observances imposed by his Faith,
yet, when he is hard pressed, he has a way of harking back
to original sin, and the practice of witchcraft abhorred by
the priesthood. This tendency to backsliding applies to all
ranks of Malay society, from the highest to the lowest.
Swettenham continues: "If Malays are not inclined to work,
neither are they greatly inclined to religious discipline or
observance; still they are more tolerant than others whose lives
are guided by a relation to higher moral principles" (1900:145).
The above indicate that Malays at the turn of the century
displayed a general lack of discipline with respect to Islamic
practice, and that their observance stemmed from social pressure
rather than from intrinsic spiritual motivation. It is
noteworthy, though, that the primal religious practices which
Swettenham calls "witchcraft" were by now "abhorred" by the
religious leadership.
Swettenham 's description of an unthinking, animism-based,
blindly accepted Malay Islam is echoed in a 1913 article entitled
"Mohammedanism in Malaya" :
Though a professing Mohammedan and ready to die for the
faith which he only dimly understands, the Malay never
entirely abandoned the superstitions of earlier days. He
goes through the outward forms imposed by his faith, is
circumcised, married and buried as a Mohammedan but in times
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of stress has a way of harking back to the practice of
witchcraft, and resorting to the propitiation of the spirits
of earth, air, or mountain, which has no place in Orthodox
Muslim belief, (p. 244)
In an article written in 1911, Hugh Clifford speaks of the
Malays as a people whose conversion to Islam was far from
complete:
Their conversion was slow and gradual, and may even now in
some respects be regarded as imperfect. Upon the bulk of
the Malayan peoples their religion sits but lightly. Few
are found to observe the law concerning the Five Hours of
Prayer, and many fail to put in an appearance at the Friday
congregational services in the mosques. The Fast of
Ramadan, however, is generally observed with some
faithfulness. Compared with other Mahommedan peoples, the
Malays are not fanatical. . . . Throughout, the
superstitions of the Malays show indications of this Hindu
influence, and many of the demons whom their medicine-men
invoke in their magic practices are clearly borrowed from
the pantheon of India. For the rest, a substratum of
superstitious beliefs, which survives from the days when the
Malays professed only their natural religion, is to be found
firmly rooted in the minds of the people, and the influence
of Mahommedanism, which regards such things with horror, has
been powerless to eradicate this. (Clifford 1911:476)
We see again that the Malay Islamic establishment was,
albeit unsuccessfully, attempting to eradicate pre-Islamic
practices. At the time of the Portuguese, Hindu and primal
religious practices were freely and openly admitted under the
umbrella of Islam. Another observation is that the fast of
Ramadan, which was listed by Swettenham in 1900 as one of Islam's
rules that was not being observed, was now being generally
observed .
Clifford also notes that Malay grievances with the British
were based on political or social rather than religious issues,
indicating a lack of integration of Islam within Malay society.
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Today in Malaysia, Islamic principles are invoked whenever Malays
discuss political or social issues. In other words, Islam is now
not a separate sphere, isolated from the wider concerns of
society.
Finally, in Clifford's estimation, Malays were "much
addicted to gambling" and held extremely lax standards of sexual
morality (Clifford 1911:476). Clifford was not blind to the good
in Malays. He described them as a race which is "exceedingly
courteous and self-respecting," and against popular opinion
stated that "the Malay is not treacherous" (Clifford 1911:476).
The point is that Clifford did not have an ax to grind when he
made his comments about Malay gambling and sexual conduct. A
similar observation is found in an 1880 article about Malays, in
which the writer, after praising the virtues of the Malays
compared to other native peoples, states that "the moral
character of the Malays does not stand high" ("Malays" 1880:400).
No one today, though, however critical he or she may be of the
Malays, is about to say that the Malays as a whole are given to
gambling or sexual promiscuity. Such accusations would be so
patently contrived as to expose the accuser as having no more
than a baseless personal vendetta against the Malays. Surely,
therefore, Islam has made great headway in squelching practices
unacceptable to Islam.
The aforementioned general ignorance of Islamic teaching in
Malaya had remained basically the same at the time of Tisdall 's
observations in 1913 (170):
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The greater number of the Moslems of Malaysia, on the other
hand, are very careless about religion, know little or
nothing about Islam or Christianity, but have a very real
belief in the spirits of trees, etc., derived from the
religion of their forefathers before they became
Mohammedans. If you ask a Malay whether he is a Sunni or a
Shiah he will stare at you in astonishment, not having the
slightest idea of what you are talking about. He cannot
tell you how many Imams there were; after whom his two sons
Ali and Omar are called, nor any other point concerning the
religion he claims to follow. It is quite an uncommon thing
to see a Moslem at prayer; and in every way they are as
unlike the Persians as it is possible to be.
It is striking that even the prescribed prayers, displayed openly
and even ostentatiously in modern Malaya, were still uncommon as
recently as 1913.
In another passage Tisdall contrasts Muslim Malays with
Muslim Arabs, Indians, and Persians, implying that, unlike the
others, Malays do not know the Quran or the Hadiths , the sayings
of Muhammed (Tisdall 1913:174-175).
In a 1917 account, we are told that though the Hadiths had
been translated into Malay, they were seldom read (Warren
1917:208) .
A 1918 article submits that "a rigid Turk being set down in
their country would scarcely allow that they (the Malays) had a
chance of safely skating over the narrow bridge into paradise of
the prophet" (Tisdall 1918:7).
The superficial nature of Malay Islam whereby the deep,
underlying belief system remained essentially the same as it had
been in pre-Islamic Malaya, is underscored again and again
throughout the first half of this century. In 1923. Wilkinson
(10) observed that "In times of pestilence or trouble the people
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of a Malay district fall back upon their old primitive faiths and
offer up vain sacrifices to the spirits of the country."
In the same year, Cherry (1923:30) expressed that "Islam
does not satisfy the religious needs of these people. . . . There
is as little significance amongst the Malays of the name 'Moslem'
as there is amongst Europeans of the name 'Christian.'"
At this time we get a glimpse that the forces of
secularization were making inroads. Malay Islam was actually
reported to be stepping away from, not towards, more orthodox
Islam. "Every year brings additional laxity in what the devoted
Malays would consider essentials of religion" (Wilkinson
1923 :89) .
In 1928, traditional spirit-religion was still at the core
of Malay religion. "Islam in Malaya is most superficial. The
Malays have not completely thrown off the spell of their
primitive Animism" (Dodsworth 1928a:56).
Their Islamic beliefs are thickly interwoven with others
from earlier days when first animism and then Hinduism held
sway over their ancestors; their marriage customs and rice
planting and harvest and other everyday practices are still
largely influenced by the other cults. (Wheeler 1928:345)
The poor state of Islamic education was also still in
evidence in 1928: "Very few Malays can read the Koran in Arabic
which means that for the masses the reading of the Koran is a
mere repetition of words" (Dodsworth 1928a:43).
By this time, though, the non-observance of regular prayer
times and fasting reported in 1913 had changed. "The five
'foundations' (rukun) of Islam are well in evidence�confession
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of faith, prayers, fasting (chiefly in the month of Ramadan) ,
almsgiving, pilgrimage" (Wheeler 1928:345). This is a major
change from 15 years previously.
Somewhere between 1913 and 1928, Islamic revival had
occurred, but was subsequently being challenged by the
encroachment of industrialization and Western civilization.
Dodsworth noted in 1928a (pp. 56-57) that mosque attendance and
the keeping of the fast of Ramadan were less strictly adhered to
than they were a decade earlier. In the same year. Wheeler
(1928:346) contended that Islam "which was so impotent, has
revived considerably and become a force to be reckoned with in
moral and practical behavior among all sections of the Malay
3
community." Wheeler stated that as opposed to earlier years,
the Friday service was well attended, daily prayers were observed
by many, and the fast of Ramadan was widely kept. It appears
that at this stage in Malay history, Malays were simultaneously
being pulled in two opposite directions away from Malay
Wheeler's quote in fuller context shows the dramatic changes
that had taken place in Malay Islam since the Portuguese first
arrived. In Wheeler's estimation, Islam was insignificant to
Malay life until at least 1875: During the melancholy period,
from 1511 till 1875, Islam was a negligible force, save as an
added weight on the side of obscurantism and oppression.
Superstition was rife; education utterly neglected; mosques were
unused. Gambling, drunkenness and vice combined with constant
feuds to produce disastrous conditions. . . . When the present
condition of the Malays is compared with the prevailing condition
up to about fifty years ago, a great improvement is seen. . . .
The old religion, which under less propitious circumstances was so
important, has revived considerably and become a force to be
reckoned with in moral and practical behavior among all sections of
the Malay community (Wheeler 1928:346).
191
traditional religion: toward secularization and toward orthodox
Islam, and that orthodox Islam was beginning to gain the upper
hand.
In 1936 we find Malay traditional religion still strongly
entrenched, but steadily losing ground. Browne (1936:41,44)
states that although the religion of the Malay Peninsula is
basically the shamanistic religion, fertility rites to ensure
successful harvests and the birth of healthy offspring "which
were common at the end of the nineteenth century, are fast dying
out." Yet, Malay religion was still largely a syncretistic
mixture of traditional practices and Islam. "The Malay believes
and practices the primitive religion we have described
simultaneously with his belief and practice of Islam" (Browne
1936:45). Islamic observance in 1936 was not what it is today.
For example, no Malay women wore the veil. Yet, old laws were
beginning to be replaced by Islamic law (Browne 1936:19).
In 1945, "most of the people of the eastern part of the
Peninsula are recent converts to Mohammedanism and still conform
closely to the pagan Malayan religion in many respects" (Cole
1945:112). It is noteworthy that the Islamization of the
Peninsula had not yet been completed at least as recently as
1945. Today, this very region (the eastern part of the
Peninsula) is the most staunchly Muslim. Cole makes a strong
case for her belief that the Malays were not strict Muslims (Cole
1945:111-125). Women still did not wear a veil. There was
little difference between a Muslim and non-Muslim village, and
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Islam was said to be little more than a "veneer" over "paganism"
(Cole 1945: 120) .
Mid-century Malay Islam demonstrated great ingenuity in the
assimilation and reconciliation of old and new beliefs. The
Malays had accepted the ideas of the great Islamic civilization,
"without abandoning their own prehistoric paganism" (Winstedt
1951:3-4). Winstedt (1951:7) labels Malay Muslims as orthodox,
yet superstitious. Islam "allowed the Malay to retain the native
spirits of the animist and even the gods of the Hindu under the
orthodox designation of infidel genies or jinn . . . the spirits
and goblins of Arabia's pagan days" (Winstedt 1951:97).
Winstedt 's thorough description of Malay religious practice,
published in 1950, reveals an Islam still replete with
divination, magic, and spirits of all sorts. Moreover, the
ancient belief in a vital or effective force {semangat) was in
Winstedt's words "in widest commonality spread" (1950:19). This
impersonal life force, akin to the Melanesian concept of mana,
was believed to inhabit inanimate as well as animate objects. As
we shall see in our student interviews, this concept is no longer
widely accepted. For one sample of Malays, at least, it is a
matter of great ambivalence.
Sympathetic magic was much in evidence. For example, Malay
women would let their hair hang loose when they were sowing so
that grain would be luxuriant, and then would clothe themselves
lightly at harvest so that stalks would be thin to cut (Winstedt
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1950:18). One way for a lover to abduct the soul of a girl was
to boil or steam any possession of hers or sand from her
footprint, reciting at the same time Quranic incantations.
Religion teachers were invited to spit into children's mouths or
upon their heads in order to transfer to then the ability to
recite the Quran (Winstedt 1950:19).
It was not until the mid-2 0th century that non-Muslim
observers began to identify the Malays as orthodox Muslims. It
was widely recognized, though, that the Malays were adept at
keeping their traditional beliefs under the umbrella of
orthodoxy .
Missionary to Malays, Robert Blasdell, said the Malays were
"almost solidly Muslim" (Blasdell 1954:189). Yet, he too speaks
of the Malays as clinging to their animistic past. He tells us
that the only physician known to the village Malays is the pawang
- a traditional healer/shaman using a combination of divination
and herbal remedies. This is definitely not the case today, as
Western medicine and science have penetrated even the remotest
Malay villages, and as the Islamic establishment has removed its
imprimatur from such practitioners. In fact, an aggressive
Islamization is attempting to displace pre-Islamic traditional
religious practices with universal, orthodox Islam.
Blasdell also comments that the Malays "are opposed to
Christianity and show no inclination to be even mildly interested
in it" (1954:190). He believes, though, that Malay resistance to
Christianity was more of a defense against assimilation and the
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inroads of Westernization, than a well-thought-out rejection of
Christianity. At this time, Islam was evidently not well-
integrated into the worldview of the Malays. The adherence to
Islam was an uncritical acceptance of an ethnic identifier and
boundary maintainer. Likewise, the lack of interest in
Christianity stemmed not so much from religious principles, but
from a natural resistance to something that was perceived as a
threat to Malay ethnic identity.
Blasdell 's writing pictures the Malays as in a time of
transition. As Malaya was approaching independence and
nationhood, the Malays were seeking to define their identity.
The Malays were conscious of their technological, economic, and
educational backwardness relative to the Chinese, and in sight of
independence, to much of the world. They were seeking (as they
still are) ways to develop without sacrificing their traditional
values and village and family relational ties. Blasdell tells us
that at this point "their sense of need and of frustration is
compelling them to look for help beyond their own community and
country" (1954:190). He believed that abundant openings were
there for Western Christians to help Malays enter the world scene
using biblical principles to counteract the evil sides of
modernization and capitalism. Christians with skills sorely
needed by the Malays would be welcome (Blasdell 1954:190).
Concerning education and literacy in particular, Blasdell
believed the way was wide open for Christians who would learn the
language and live among the Malays. Blasdell believed the Spirit
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had provided a "high tide" of opportunity that would eventually
recede. The door was wide open to establish good relations and
bridges of trust.
In retrospect, Christians had the opportunity to convey to
the Malays that true Christianity is not coterminous with
Westernization, but challenges the greed and rapaciousness of the
Western model of development. The Malays are rejecting secular
models, but do not see Christianity as having anything to
contribute to the solution. Instead, Islamic principles of
economics are being explored, and initial attempts are being made
at their implementation. I submit that if the church had
distanced itself more from the colonial power base and ideology,
and had been more sensitive to the Malay cause, the Malays now
would not view their choices as an either-or polarization between
Westernization and Islamization.
In a 1957 article, Marrison grants traditional Muslim
opposition to Christian expression. Yet he describes the Malays
as neither bigoted nor bitter, and says that they are not well
informed about Islam (Marrison 1957:290). Their attachment to
Islam is firm, in that they identify their race with Islam. Yet,
they have no sophisticated arguments against Christianity.
Marrison, like Blasdell, recognized that the Malays were looking
for bearings as a newly independent people. "The present-day
Malay has many perplexities to face in his political and social
life, and anything the churches could do, not to take advantage
of the situation, but rather to help in his thinking and facing
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these problems would be a gain" (Marrison 1957:297). Marrison,
too, believed the Malays would welcome aid from Christians,
especially in their "acutely felt need" for education (1957:297).
Again, the door was open wide for sympathetic contact between
Christians and Malays.
Hamid 's 1964 description of the Malays states that all the
Malays are Muslims (Hamid 1964:180). Still, syncretistic
practices are the rule. The Malays of Hamid 's time still
believed unquestioningly that everything, animate and inanimate,
has a semangat (soul) , even though official Islam taught
otherwise.
Hamid describes magic as widely prevalent. Practices
which I understand to have died out, were routinely carried out
when Hamid wrote his article. One such practice was an annual
beach ceremony in which the fishermen of the state of Kelantan
invoked the help of guardian spirits of the sea so that they
would have protection and big catches (Hamid 1964:189). The
Malay students I have talked to reject this practice as anti-
Islamic and have no personal recollection of the ceremony.
Kirk Endicott's An Analysis of Malay Magic (1970) is the
standard work on Malay magic. At the time of his writing,
traditional Malay spiritism was still rampant. The Malays he
questioned all believed that all objects, whether animate or
inanimate, had semangat (a soul or vital energy) . Malays spoke
of the semangat of, among other things, rice, fruit trees, and
tin ore (Endicott 1970:50).
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However prevalent the pre-Islamic practices, it is clear
that by around 1970, Islamic prescriptions were much more
carefully observed than they were in the early part of the
century. Ryan (1971) notes that most Malays observed the five
daily prayers, and that the fast of Ramadan was generally kept.
Besides Ramadan, Muhammed 's birthday and Hari J?aya Haji (the day
commemorating the conclusion of the Haj or Pilgrimage to Mecca)
were now celebrated widely. Previously, of the Islamic calendar,
Malays gave little if any attention to anything but the fast.
By this time also, the State Department of Religious Affairs
was enforcing the collection of zakat (the obligatory alms) .
This newly centralized system enabled an equitable distribution
of funds. Ryan says that in the former days the zakat collection
was sometimes not enforced, or the money not channeled to the
poor (Ryan 1971:42). Ryan reports, further, that Malays
abstained from eating pork, drinking alcohol, and from gambling.
Moreover, Islamic law, as opposed to traditional customary law,
was more and more being implemented.
While Islamic practice was coming to full bloom, according
to Ryan the pre-Islamic flower had not yet begun to wilt. The
Malays were following two parallel cycles or calendars: the
Islamic one and the seasonal one. In Ryan's day the Malays were
still largely rural people whose way of life and very existence
was closely bound up with the seasons. Many of the celebrations
and festivals of the rural people were connected with agriculture
rather than with formal religion. As of the time of Ryan's
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writing (1971) , ceremonies to propitiate the spirits responsible
for the preservation of the semangat padi ("soul of the rice")
were commonly practiced (Ryan 1971:60). Likewise, sacrificial
offerings of buffaloes and goats were given routinely by
fishermen on the east coast of Malaya to propitiate the spirit of
the sea. To my knowledge such animal sacrifices have stopped
completely.
The treating of sickness is another arena in which we note
the slow progression of Islam (and secularization) amidst
strongly entrenched traditional beliefs. Ryan observed that with
the spread of Western medicine, the younger generation was
abandoning traditional healers. Still, the pawang
(medium/medicine man) and the bomoh (herbalist/medicine man) ,
both of whom practice medicine through the counteracting of
spells, were preferred by the older Malays. Ryan stated that
hospitals were viewed as the last resort to the older generation.
Today, in my estimation, it is the other way around. When
modern medicine offers no hope, Malays turn in desperation to
those who deal in the spirit realm.
Pre-Islamic traditional entertainment was still popular, but
on the wane. One case in point is the wayang kulit, the shadow
play in which the cut-out figures representing the characters are
manipulated behind a screen in such a way that their silhouettes
appear on the screen. The background is Hindu and the stories
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are based on the Ramayana and Panji legends with their hosts of
gods and goddesses, heroes and heroines. Ryan tells us that,
with the exception of villages in the east coast state of
Kelantan, the wayang kulit is "not seen very often today" Ryan
1971:65). Thirty-five years earlier, British colonial officer
Guy Madoc commented on the abundance of traditional Malay
entertainment, including dancing and the wayang kulit (Allen
1983:94) .
Other traditional forms of entertainment which Ryan says
Islamic teaching was clamping down on were the makyong play,
which includes music, dancing, and narrative, and the joget dance
(Ryan 1971:62). The joget is especially frowned upon today
because it involves men and women dancing together, even though
the dancers do not touch.
Ryan states that of the three strands of Malay culture
(animism, Hinduism, and Islam) , Islam is beyond doubt the
strongest. "Islam has successfully absorbed these animistic and
Hindu influences, and in so doing has produced historical Malay
culture" (Ryan 1971:52). It is significant that Ryan says that
Islam "absorbed" rather than "displaced" or "eradicated"
animistic and Hindu influences. Ryan saw Malay culture as an
amalgamation of animism, Hinduism, and Islam under the cover of
Islam. It is noteworthy though, that Ryan believes that the
The Ramayana is the famous Sanskrit verse epic which was
introduced to Southeast Asia centuries ago when Hinduism was the
predominant religion. The Panji legends are Javanese popular
stories based on quasi-historical figures from East Java.
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Malays were developing a new consciousness of being part of the
universal brotherhood of Islam.
Ryan speaks much of the traditional Malay wedding ceremony,
an elaborate, Hindu-based celebration culminating in the bride
and groom sitting motionless on a decorated dais, while ritual
offerings are placed before them. The dress is non-Islamic, and
the symbolism full of spiritism. Finger tips are stained with
henna to ward off evil spirits. Eggs are offered to enhance
fertility. Amidst the festivities that can last up to seven
days, the only Muslim element is a brief ceremony in which the
kadi (registrar of Muslim marriages and divorces) pronounces the
couple husband and wife. "The Malay wedding ceremony is still
perhaps the most significant ceremony in a person's life and it
also affords a good example of the way older traditional customs
have been only touched by Islam" (Ryan 1971:52). As we will see
from the student interviews, Islam has now more than "only
touched" the Malay wedding.
David Banks' study of Malay kinship, published in 1983, but
based on fieldwork done between 1967 and 1974, reveals that rural
Malay society, at least, was permeated with spiritism (Banks
1983:121-123). Spirits of the dead, familiar spirits, and
spirits associated with particular places were part and parcel of
everyday life. Appeasement and manipulation of the spirits was
the order of the day. The pillars of Islam were all practiced
more or less consistently, but the daily activities of life, and
even the relationships between people were determined by
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interaction with spirits. The Malays didn't question the
supremacy and sovereign control of God, but in the nitty gritty
of temporal life, the spirits were real and had to be dealt with.
God was "out there", while the spirits were in the jungle next
door.
Writing in 1978, Ronald Provencher makes an interesting
comment about the continuation of pre-Islamic traditions in Malay
culture: "In this syncretism Islamic elements are not distorted
or diminished by animistic or Hindu-Buddhist elements; rather
each religious tradition has appropriate places within the whole
Malay religious belief and practice" (Provencher 1978:255).
According to Provencher, the individual religious practices were
not new mixtures blending Islam into pre-Islamic practice.
Rather, both pre-Islamic and Islamic practices were distinct
entities used for distinct purposes. Hence, primal religious
conceptions were maintained and their rituals carried out intact,
with Islamic prayers tacked on at the beginning and end. These
traditional spirit-religion practices were reserved in
Provencher 's time primarily for agricultural rituals. Hindu-
Buddhist symbols were preserved in the rituals guarding the
sanctity of Malay royalty and in ceremonies utilizing metaphors
of royalty, such as the traditional wedding ceremony.
While noting the two distinct spheres of Malay religious
life (Islamic and pre-Islamic) , Provencher is clear on which one
was predominant:
Islamic ritual is more commonplace than animistic or Hindu-
Buddhist ritual. The ritual includes five daily prayers.
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the Friday sermons, the several Islamic holy days, the
occasional Islamic religious feasts {khenduri) to celebrate
good fortune or security or remembrance of the dead, the
annual month of fasting, and the return of family and
friends from pilgrimage to Mecca. They outweigh the
animistic and Hindu-Buddhist portions of curing rituals and
elaborate weddings. (Provencher 1978:255)
Coming down to the present. Von der Mehden (1987:181) echoes
the others by stating that Malay Islam stems from a complex set
of influences derived from Sufi (Islamic mysticism) , Hindu, and
animistic sources. According to Von der Mehden, non-Muslim
elements are more prevalent in Malay villages than they are in
urban areas, where both secular and religious teaching serve to
weaken pre-Islamic influences. The rural Malay is generally
conservative and ritualistic in religious belief. Moreover,
strong community norms and expectations place restrictive
guidelines for defining his or her place in the world. As
Winzeler (1970:77) observed earlier, "They see Islam or at least
certain aspects of Islam as enveloping them in a set of ritual
relationships, and as being a major dimension of community life
and organization. . . . Along with this is a set of constraints
which reflect an emphasis on social obligation, particularly of a
ritual or ceremonial nature."
We turn now to the pillars of Islam: declaration of faith,
prayer, fasting, giving, and pilgrimage. Virtually all Malays
accept the belief that there is no deity except God and that
Muhammed is his prophet. Concerning the mandatory five daily
prayer times and special services at midday on Friday, at the
village level, "these precepts are generally followed, not so
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much because of sanctions established by law as to personal
belief and peer-group pressure" (Von der Mehden 1987:181). Urban
Malays are said to be less regular, perhaps even lax, in their
observance of these practices. Yet, an increasingly religious
environment is causing more and more attention to be paid to the
prayers and mosque attendance.
Fasting during Ramadan is the most important event in the
Malay religious calendar. "The restrictions during the fast are
widely followed" (von der Mehden 1987:181). Here again, legal
sanctions are less important than individual attitudes and peer-
group pressure.
Zakat, the religious tax or required alms, has long been an
accepted practice. In the more atomized urban centers, there is
less social cohesion and thus less social pressure to enforce
collection.
The number of Malays making the pilgrimage to Mecca, the
haj, has risen considerably since independence. The government
has aided in developing savings for the haj, organizing the trip,
and seeing to the comfort and safety of the pilgrims to the
extent that a higher percentage of Malays now make the haj than
any other Muslim country in the region (Von der Mehden 1987:182).
The haj is one event that has catapulted the Malays into the
wider world of Islam.
Von der Mehden believes that Malay Muslims carry out the
basic rituals of Islam in a conscientious and orthodox manner.
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Moreover, this is done more from the dual motives of personal
conviction and social pressure than from fear of legal sanctions.
The rural Malays, however, though they consider themselves
part of the worldwide community of Islam, are in Von der Mehden 's
estimation still "deeply influenced by a set of primarily non-
Islamic beliefs, a folk Islam that often combines Islamic
elements with animist and Hindu factors" (Von der Mehden
1987:182). Von der Mehden (1987:187) notes that, outside the
Islamic pillars, syncretistic ceremonies dominate in the various
rites of passage in the human life cycle�birth, circumcision,
marriage, death. This is not unlike Provencher 's postulation
that Malays simultaneously follow two distinct calendars, an
Islamic one and a seasonal one. Magic with its sorcery, amulets,
and formulas, and a wide-ranging spirit world that necessitates
propitiation through various ceremonies, is incorporated into the
rural Malay's orthodox religious framework.
Von der Mehden 's conclusion regarding the place of pre-
Islamic elements in Malay Islam is as follows:
There has been some decline in these more traditional
beliefs and practices as religious leaders have urged the
populace to give less emphasis to spirits and magic; the
influence of Islamic modernism has challenged these "impure"
views and ways; and the process of education, modernization,
and urbanization has weakened traditional ties. However,
there is no doubt that a substantial portion of the rural
population as well as less educated urban migrants retain
and accept these beliefs. (1987:182-183)
Pre-Islamic elements don't affect the ritual pillars of
Islam. Yet, pre-Islamic beliefs are still prevalent, though
declining. Moreover, though pre-Islamic traditional religious
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practices are challenged as "impure" by the ulama (Islamic
religious specialists) , folk-practitioners of Islam don't see
such elements as in opposition to orthodox Islam, but include
these practices under the Islamic umbrella through the approval
of local Muslim religious leaders who incorporate verses from the
Quran and the names of God in their magical formulas.
The current literature, with which my own observation
concurs, suggests that the ritual pillars of orthodox Islam are
observed rather strictly, and increasingly so. The increase can
be attributed to intensified government encouragement of
Islamization, which includes extensive Islamic teaching. There
is both an increasing social pressure to conform to strict
Islamic observance, as well as a general Malay societal increase
in the personal conviction of the importance of the integration
of Islam into every facet of life.
Summary of Islam in the Colonial Period
In summary, the Malaysian colonial period began with the
Europeans finding a Malay community in which Islam was relatively
new and only in the early stages of spreading throughout the
region. Beneath the surface, a deep-rooted pre-Islamic religious
belief system was vibrant. With little understanding, the masses
uncritically adopted Islam as a banner around which to rally
against the foreign invaders. As Islam made territorial
advances, the underlying traditional religious beliefs and
practices remained intact, though increasingly adapted to the
Islamic framework through the use of Arabic prayers and the
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redefining of the gods and spirits into good and evil jinn
(spirits) in an Islamic cosmology.
It was not until the late 1800s that Islam can be considered
to have been a significant force in the life of the typical Malay
peasant. Islamic teaching was until then, at least, in a
miserable state, and the pillars of Islam were generally not
observed. Throughout this century. Islamic teaching and practice
have made great strides, but have not succeeded in rooting out
pre-Islamic religious practices, especially in rural areas.
Islam is now more well integrated into the everyday life of the
Malay than ever before. Malay Muslims are orthodox in belief and
practice and proudly identify themselves as part of the worldwide
Islamic community.
British Colonial Impact on Islam
Our brief survey of Malay Islam has focused on the general
tenor of the Islam practiced by the Malays through time. Malay
Islam was never monolithic, and that most certainly applies to
the current situation. We will later examine the various styles
and movements within Malay Islam, but before doing so we will
sketch the British colonial impact on Islam.
The imposition of "Christian" colonial rule brought
ironically both a threat and a legitimacy to the place of Islam
in Malay society, both of which further solidified the position
of Islam. The threat came from the fear of Christianization.
Legitimacy came from official British governmental sanction of
traditional Malay political and religious offices.
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Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah remarked in 1916 of the Mufti^ of
Johore :
To become a Government Mufti in Malaya is a great glory -
You have an official uniform, with a whole banana-comb of
epaulettes on the shoulder, a jubbah (robe) embroidered with
gold thread, a silk turban, and your own car. The ra'ayat
(masses) fear and obey you, eat the scraps from your table,
your spat out sireh (betel vine). (Hamka 1950:59)
Despite its rather specific reference, this comment is an
indication not only of a reactionary, universalistic Islamic
criticism of established religious authority but also of the
nature of this authority in the Malay states.
Prior to the British
Prior to the protectorate period, Islam in Malaya had not,
in any effective sense, been a "state religion." There was a
general awareness that all Malays were Muslims and that this
distinguished them from, for example, Chinese or Siamese. To
undergo conversion to Islam was in fact to masuk Melayu i "enter
Malayhood") , but this identification of ethnic group with
religion was of future rather than present significance. In the
realm of religious belief, as in that of political organization,
the Malay state as a rule lacked the resources necessary for
centralization of authority. Such religious officials as existed
were those members of village communities who, for reasons of
exceptional piety or other ability, had been chosen by the
^The Mufti in Islam is a jurisconsultant , empowered to give a
formal legal opinion {fatwah) on matters submitted to him.
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community to act as imam of the local mosque, or the court imam
of chiefs or the ruler, who commonly possessed no authority
beyond their immediate responsibilities and belonged to no
separate or organized class. The absence of a priesthood in the
Malay states was often puzzling to Europeans, who persisted in
finding one where it did not exist (McNair 1878:276).
There certainly did exist, though, a clear if frequently
inactive association between the secular power and the religious
life of the people. Indeed, to speak of "secular" power in this
context is a misnomer, for the relationship between the ruler and
ruled embraced the spiritual as well as the material well-being
of the state as an entity. At the installation of the new ruler
of Perak, for example, it was usual at a certain point in the
proceedings for an official of the court mosgue to invoke God's
blessings upon the ruler and the state and to recite the Quranic
text, "Lo, We have set thee as a Viceroy upon the Earth," as a
warranty of the ruler's responsibilities as defender and arbiter
of the Faith (Wilkinson 1932:97). And though formal means of
discharging these responsibilities were in practice often absent,
this was not always the case. In Rembau in the 1830s there
appears to have been a State Kadi (religious magistrate) ,
responsible to the ruler, who had general oversight of all the
mosques in the state (Newbold 1839:58); and in Kelantan in the
1880s the chief minister of the state was successful in enforcing
restrictive Islamic legislation upon a large proportion of the
population (Clifford 1898:24). In Perak, at a much earlier date.
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an office corresponding to that of State Mufti was exercised by
one of the eight major hereditary chiefs.
The assimilation of religious authority to customary
political authority is shown also in the treatment accorded to
zakat and fitrah taxation.^ According to Islamic law, zakat and
fitrah taxes should be collected by mosque officials and
disbursed by them for certain specified ends, among which are the
bestowal of gifts upon travelers, indigent Muslims, and converts
to Islam. In practice, says Wilkinson (1906:112-113), "the Malay
chiefs, by identifying themselves with Imams and by a liberal
interpretation of the term 'pious poor, ' succeeded in securing
the tax for themselves." But this is an overstatement, for the
right to the collection of religious revenues carried with it a
corresponding obligation to serve at least some needs of Islam by
contributing to the building and upkeep of mosques, the payment
of mosque officials, and occasional employment of itinerant
teachers and scholars. In sum, for the Malays, custom and
religion�adat (by which was meant customary law, ceremonial
procedures, and the norms of behavior between individuals and
classes) and ugama (religion) �were related parts of the one
whole, together ensuring the proper functioning of society and
preventing its disintegration. Of this complex of values, the
^Zakat is an alms tax levied in different kinds of property and
distributed to eight categories of deserving persons. The zakat
al-fitr, known in Malaysia as fitrah, is an obligatory gift of
provisions made at the celebration of the end of the fasting month.
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prescribed caretakers were the ruling class, the traditional
elite.
Policy of Noninterference
The Pangkor Treaty between the British and the chiefs of
Perak, which became the model for all subsequent treaty
arrangements with the Malay states, explicitly excluded from
compulsory Residential "advice" questions touching upon "Malay
religion and custom." Only in Kelantan, Kedah, and Johore was
this formula preserved intact (in the remaining states Islam
alone was specified) , but the principle of noninterference in
custom and religion was accepted throughout and the link thus
posited between them was of profound significance. In part it
reflects British acceptance of a state of affairs that was held
to exist by the Malays themselves. In part also it signifies a
recognition that custom and religion were two institutionalized
expressions of Malay life in which interference was most likely
to arouse resentment and hence unrest.
Where custom was concerned, the principle of noninterference
was in practice reserved mainly for those ceremonial and ritual
aspects of Malay public life which least affected colonial
administration. An example of this may be seen in connection
with an incident in Pahang in 1897. The Sultan had expressed a
desire to confer titles on his two sons, the elder to be Tengku
Besar, a traditional title carrying with it a claim to be
regarded as heir apparent, and the younger to be Tengku Muda and
thus successor to his brother. The Malay political system
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required only that the granting of these titles be approved by
the major chiefs. Reporting the matter later, the Resident of
Pahang noted: "This proposal having received the sanction of the
High Commissioner, the titles were duly conferred on the two
young Rajas in the Sultan's Balai, all the forms and ceremonies
prescribed by Malay custom being rigorously observed" (Pahang
Annual Report for 1897:22). Had the rigorous observance of Malay
custom required recognition of heirs not acceptable to the
colonial power, it would have been overridden, as in fact was
accomplished in Selangor (in the face of considerable Malay
opposition) a few years later during a succession dispute.
In the same way, customs abhorrent to contemporary English
social mores or ideas of justice were not regarded as coming
within the restriction upon compulsory advice, so that debt
bondage, corvee labor, seigneur ial right, excessive punishment
for adat offenses, and the like were progressively restrained or
eradicated. The effect was to set a high premium on the formal
and ceremonial side of Malay customary life, with a corresponding
diminution in real content or relevance to the contemporary
social and political situation.
Where religion was concerned, British policy was more
genuinely and less conditionally one of noninterference. In the
absence of a distinct or organized class of ulama, there was
little fear of Muslim "fanaticism" capable of acting as an
independent focus for political discontent at rule by infidels.
British colonial officials, though sharing the prevailing view of
212
returning haj is as "leeches on the toil of their fellow men"
(Bird 1883:362), seldom thought them, as did the Dutch in 19th
century Indonesia, to be sources of serious social unrest, and
far from attempting to restrict the pilgrimage actually did much
to assist it (Bird 1883:38). Care was also taken to avoid
offending Muslim susceptibilities, by strongly discouraging
Christian mission evangelism among the Malays; and attempts were
made to render government vernacular schools more attractive to
parents (who feared a Christian bias in teaching) by arranging
for the appointment of Quran teachers, a measure which resulted
in secure employment for many village ulama (Islamic religious
specialists) .
Formalization of Islam
To say that the principle of noninterference in religious
affairs was a characteristic of British rule in the Malay states
is not to say that British rule was without its effects on Islam
in Malaya. On the contrary, the preservation and reinforcement
of the traditional bases of authority and social organization
implicit in this policy, together with greatly improved means of
communication and centralization and backed by the effective
sanctions now open to British supported sultans, combined to
produce an authoritarian form of religious administration much
beyond anything known to the Malays before. The rulers and the
traditional elite, much of whose real power had been stripped
from them, understandably turned to the only field now left to
them, religion and custom, to express what remained.
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A direct effect of colonial rule was thus to encourage the
concentration of doctrinal and administrative religious authority
in the hands of a hierarchy of officials directly dependent on
the sultans for their position and power. The introduction of an
alien system of civil and criminal law to regulate all
departments of life other than those held to come under the
description "Malay religion and custom" resulted in pressure to
establish a more formal system of Islamic law than had hitherto
existed. Islamic legislation was enacted in State Councils,
courts and legal procedures were established, and a legal
bureaucracy was created to run them. Few of these measures were
innovative in themselves; what was new was their systematic
application and the organization that lay behind it. The net
result was the formalization of a powerful alliance between the
traditional elite and "orthodox" Islam.
Kaum Tua Vs . Kaum Muda
In addition to accelerating the solidification of Islam in
Malaysia, Westernization spawned a new element in Malay Islam. A
segment of the Malay population consisting largely of the
intelligentsia sought to adapt a more universal Islam to the
challenges of the wealth and power of the British and the
economic and technological changes. The old guard of the
traditional ulama and the hereditary ruling class were now
challenged by this new, progressive, reformist group. The old
alliance of religious conservatism and the traditional elite came
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to be known as the Kaum Tua (Old Faction) in contradistinction to
the more world-minded Kaum Muda (Young Faction) .
The roots of the conflict between the Kaum Muda and the Kaum
Tua may be seen in the threat offered by the former to the very
basis of customary authority. The perfection and purification of
Islam was for the Kaum Muda not simply an end in itself but a
means for the acceleration and direction of social and economic
change for the introduction of Malays into the worldwide arena
and especially the universal Islamic community. This process was
held to be retarded by traditional Malay Islam and its
intermingling with Malay adat. A Malay student in Cairo wrote in
1928 that "In other parts of the Islamic world the Kaum Muda
become the instrument of progress, shaking the Kaum Tua out of
their senility and stupidity . . . [In Malaya] the ulama desire,
like Saint Peter of the Roman Church, to hold the only key to the
gates of heaven" (Abu Al-Murtazi 1928:3).
In attempting to wrest the key from the grasp of the
establishment, the reformists came into direct conflict with the
state religious authorities on a wide range of ritual, doctrinal,
and social questions. As fundamentalists and purists they
attacked customary and "superstitious" accretions to orthodox
Islam; as modernists they proposed rationalized reformulations of
Islamic practice which would better enable them and their co
religionists to compete in the modern world. On the one hand,
the reformists sought to purify ritual and belief from purely
local Malay ethnic innovations. On the other, they attempted to
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reformulate Islam in response to the economic and social
pressures of contemporary life.
In addition to, or it might be said as a result of, these
attacks by the Kaum Muda upon established religion, their ideas
were regarded as attacks also upon the traditional elite, who
stood behind and were involved with the religious hierarchy.
Some weight was lent to this by the continual criticisms of the
Malay rulers and traditional leaders, both for their allegedly
dissolute and self-indulgent way of life and more positively for
failing to provide a leadership that would enable their people to
strive more effectively in an alien-dominated world.
Furthermore, Kaum Muda ' s criticism of adat, and their insistence
upon a more individualistic ethic, could be seen as subversive to
the existing social, political, and religious order.
Official Islam reacted both by argument and by force.
Periodicals such as Pengasoh (The Educator) (1918-37) , a biweekly
magazine produced in Kelantan by the Council of Religion and
Malay Custom and circulated throughout the peninsula, urged
opposing viewpoints and condemned the Kaum Muda as irreligious.
The section of the Muhammadan Laws Enactment of 1904 that forbade
any persons "except in his own home, and in the presence of
members of his own family only, [to] teach any religious doctrine
unless he shall previously have obtained permission to do so from
His Highness the Sultan," enabled a certain control over
religious teaching, though it was much evaded. State judges
issued legal rulings condemning the new ideas as kafir (infidel)
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or Kadiani , and reformist leaders were refused permission to
speak in some mosques.
The Kaum Muda opposition to rural-centered Islam in the
persons of the village ulama was another aspect of the conflict.
Prior to the coming of the British, education had been entirely
in the hands of village religious teachers who, in their homes or
8 . . 9
in the surau and sometimes m the larger pondok schools, taught
the Islam with which they were familiar: uncomprehending
recitation of the Quran, some elementary exegesis of the Quran
and hadith t^'^ and Malay-Muslim ethical and behavioral precepts.
Often, particularly in more recent times, these teachers had
completed the pilgrimage, which gave them additional status and
authority, but very few could claim more than the most
7
The reference is to the adherents of the Ahmadiyya movement
founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Kadian in the Punjab. The Mirza
died in 1908, and when his son succeeded him as second Khalifa in
1914, the movement split in two, the Lahore party seceding from the
original Kadian party. The most important difference between the
two groups was that while the Kadian party regarded the Mirza as a
Prophet (a claim that, in light of the explicit Quranic description
of Muhammad as the last of the Prophets, was clearly heretical) ,
the Lahore party looked on him mainly as a reformer. The Lahore
party had some influence in Malaya among the English-educated. The
Kadian party had comparatively little influence, but for those who
were hostile to the forces of modernism and reformism, the term
"Kadiani" was used simply as the abusive term implying heresy.
A surau is a building that is not a mosque of general
assembly, but is otherwise devoted to religious purposes.
9
Literally "hut" or "shanty," but used especially with
reference to small, residential religious schools.
�"�^Tradition about the Prophet. It refers to a mass of
literature embodying for the guidance of Muslims stories about the
sayings and doings of Muhammad, and forming one of the principal
sources of Islamic jurisprudence.
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rudimentary and dogmatic knowledge of Islam, clouded in a haze of
traditional Malay spiritual beliefs. Many of the most respected
and venerated teachers belonged to, and led local manifestations
of, one or another of the Sufi mystic sects which have so colored
the practice of Islam in the Malay world. For the vast majority
of Malay peasants, the transmission of their religion, where it
existed systematically at all, was through the village ulama, and
this remained true�was indeed intensified�after the provision
of government vernacular schools in the rural areas.
In addition to their more or less formal didactic function,
the ulama were culturally important in other and pervasive ways.
As imams of village mosques, as the chief religious
functionaries at all important junctures of life concerning
birth, circumcision, marriage, and at the frequent feasts given
to mark special occasions; and as the companion to the bomoh, or
spirit doctor (and often combining the two roles) , in the
physical and spiritual crises of life, the ulama were regarded as
the arbiters of all questions of religion and much else besides.
Their relationship with the peasant community of which they were
a part was a close and complex one, not easily assailed by those
who subscribed to a different system of ideas.
Thus the village was the most important arena of the Kaum
Muda-Kaum Tua conflict. Arguments about whether it was
permissible for a Muslim to wear western dress, and whether
taking interest from post office savings banks and rural
cooperatives was lawful or not, divided people along the same
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lines as arguments about whether it was proper to pray at the
local spirit shrine or what was the correct interpretation of a
verse of the Quran. To be Kaum Muda was to espouse modernism in
any form and go against tradition; to be Kaum Tua was to favor
all that was familiar, unchanging, and secure. The conflict can
also be identified as the growing tension between an Islam
incorporating particularistic customary practices that were
symbols of Malay ethnic identity versus a more universal Islam
attempting to divorce itself from ethnic ties.
The divisions in Islam now are not so neatly drawn as the
Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua distinction, but the questions raised then
remain some of the central issues in contemporary Malay Islam.
The issue of whether the incorporation of traditional Malay
healers and mediums is acceptable within the framework of Islam
remains an ongoing controversy. Malays are likewise divided on
the question of the acceptability of pre-Islamic Malay customs
such as Malay traditional dance, martial arts, the traditional
wedding ceremony, and traditional Malay postnatal prescriptions.
Of vital importance is the question of the identification of
Malay religion and culture. Must Malay ethnicity and Islamic
religious belief necessarily go hand in hand? To understand the
Malays of today, this issue must be explored.
Islam and Ethnicity in Traditional Malay Society
Islam was introduced to Malaya gradually. This new faith,
particularly from the I5th century, became a major factor in
Malay self-identity. The role of Islam in Malay life, though.
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was limited by historical, political, and cultural constraints.
These include colonialism, Malay traditional mores and value
systems known as adat,^^ Malay feudalism and, especially in the
20th century, the strong forces of ethnic nationalism. In this
century, despite attempts by certain Muslim groups to elevate the
role of Islam in Malaysia, the influence of Islam has continued
to be checked by the strength of Malay ethnic demands in a plural
context .
As we determined in Chapter 1, the role of Melaka can hardly
be exaggerated as Islam came to the fore in the region mainly
during the period of the Melakan Empire from 1403 to 1511.
It was through Melaka that Malays made their presence felt in the
area (Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid 1964:23). Malay scholar
Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid (1964) has even suggested that
Melaka was one of the key centers from which Islam spread to
regions as far as the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines, giving
the Malays some sense of belonging to a wider Muslim world.
Islam had such a special position in the government that Muslim
scholars could with impunity criticize the sultans themselves
(Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid 1964:32).
Syed Alatas (1972) opined that Islam was crucial in the
modernization of the Malays. He argued that Islam gave new and
positive universal values to the Malays. Islam clearly shaped
Adat may be defined as "the total constellation of concepts,
rules and codes of behaviour which are conceived as legitimate or
right, appropriate or necessary" (Wazir 1992:14).
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the definition of "Malayness." Previously known for their blind
loyalty to their rulers� "pantang Melayu menderhaka I " ("it is un-
Malay to rebel!")�once Islamicized, the Malays made their
obedience conditional. Thus, the proverb was transformed to:
"raja adii raja disemhah, raja zalim raja desanggahl" ("a just
king is obeyed, an unjust one is challenged!"). Islam provided a
vehicle of dissent against the excesses of the rulers and the
Malay feudal system. Moreover, Islam introduced radical changes
to the Malay social system by contributing Islamic values (along
with new vocabulary) such as adil (just) and amanah
(trustworthiness) (Kassim 1968). Islam's influence was such that
since its arrival, and especially since the days of Melakan
glory, the literature of the Malays was written in the Perso-
Arabic script.
From its arrival to the region, though, Islam had to wrestle
with practices and conventions (commonly referred to as adat)
already well entrenched in Malay culture. We recall, moreover,
that prior to the coming of Islam, the Malays were practitioners
of ancient primal religion, as well as long-time Hindus. Given
its significance, it is necessary to explore the nature of pre-
Islamic Malay society. Without going into unnecessary detail,
adat included social-political practices, for instance, in
matters involving inheritance, succession, divorce and family law
(Gullick 1965) which were either non-Islamic or anti-Islamic.
These restrictions were especially pronounced in the political
realm. Gullick (1965) demonstrated that the Malay political
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system was rigid and strictly regulated, and afforded tremendous
12
powers to the rulers. Muzaffar (1977) concluded that the
central aim of the Malay ruling class has always been the
preservation of its power. The rulers employed a mythology of
their own invincibility to bolster their status and power. The
Sultan's legitimacy and perpetuation of rule were reinforced by
the practice of ascribing to him magic powers and the threat of
retribution (Gullick 1965, Milner 1977) . To challenge the Sultan
was an act of high treason.
Even after the advent of Islam into Malaya, Malays continued
to adhere strictly to the adat norms, while at the same time
13
arguing their complementarity with Islamic principles. Symbols
of Malay authority and legitimacy�such as the kris, yellow
attire reserved only for the royal family, and the Malay headgear
symbolizing authority�demonstrate the prominence of Malayness
over Islam in the pre-colonial period at least.
Malay respect for the adat traditions and symbols of
Malayness, and their reluctance to surrender them to Islamic
influence is expressed well by the popular proverb: "Biar mati
For another detailed analysis of the importance of adat in
traditional Malay society, see Milner (1977) .
^�^A Malay saying goes:
Adat bersendi hukum, hukum bersendi kitabullah;
Kuat adat tak gaduh hukum, kuat hukum tak gaduh adat.
Customary law is based on religious law, religious law is based on
the book of Allah.
If custom is strong it does not upset religion, if religion is
strong it does not upset custom.
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anak, jangan mati adat I" ("Let the child die but not the adat I") .
The strength and persistence of these non-Islamic and even anti-
Islamic elements in Malay culture are such that even now they
cannot be neglected without serious concerns from the community.
Despite the occurrence of modern Islamic resurgence, and
increasing government-sponsored Islamization, in Mutalib's
estimation (1990:14) "this strong Malay attachment to non-Islamic
values before the advent of colonialism has not undergone any
epochal or radical change."
The Effect of Colonial Rule
on Malay Ethnic Identity
By way of review, from 1511-1641, the Portuguese policy in
Melaka (then the religio-political center of the peninsula) was
to check the spread of Islam and Muslim trading enterprise.
Possibly because of the continuous resistance of the Malays to
the Portuguese occupation, the Dutch, who overthrew the
Portuguese in 1641, tolerated traditional Malay rulers, who, at
the time were weakened by competing state rivalries (Andaya and
Andaya 1982) . The Dutch, though, were economically controlling
and exploitative of Malayan resources. In short, the Portuguese
and Dutch rules served only to rally the Malays against the
outside aggressors.
The British took over Melaka in 1795, and in 1824, under the
terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, England and the Netherlands
demarcated their spheres of influence in the region. In the 1874
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Pangkor Treaty, the British promised not to interfere in Malay
religion and custom.
Thus began British occupation, an occupation, as we have
seen, which greatly influenced the shape of Islam and Malay
ethnic identity. As Britain's involvement escalated, and the
sultans' powers became stripped of all but symbolic content,
British officials were placed in positions in which their roles
were no longer restricted to advice and consultation but included
decision making affecting all matters, including, in practice,
Islam and Malay culture (Andaya and Andaya 1982:154-155).
The vast British governmental administration that developed
in Malaya unavoidably infringed upon all aspects of Malay life.
Thus the declared non-involvement in cultural and religious
matters proved impossible to uphold in practice. We will now
consider the impact of British rule on Malay ethnic identity.
Probably the most significant outcome of British rule in
Malaya was the emergence of a "plural society," the result of
non-Malays, primarily Chinese and Indian, being brought into
Malaya in large numbers to serve British economic interests.
Possibly because the British saw these immigrant workers as
temporary residents, they were not integrated into Malay society,
but were separated from the Malays by residence and type of work.
Emerson (1937) , Sadka (1968) , and Amin (1977) believe the
approach highlighted inter-ethnic rivalries. The immigrant
population swelled to the point that in the 1921 census, Malays
became a minority in their own country, constituting less than
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half of the total population (Mills 1942:25). The Malays found
themselves competing for power and resources with, not only the
British, but also the immigrant communities, especially the more
highly educated Chinese, who were gaining control of the business
sector of Malayan society. In addition to all of this, the
British system sustained dialect differences and rival state
loyalties among the Malays themselves (Mutalib 1990:15). For
ethnic survival, Malays were pitted against all others, including
Indian and Arab Muslim immigrants. The result was that local
Malay differences were guarded and reinforced in opposition to a
wider pan-Malayan Muslim unity.
The British policy on Malay education also profoundly
affected the Malay religio-cultural climate. Before the coming
of the British, Malay formal education was primarily religious,
conducted at local mosques and Islamic boarding schools which
were also called Quran schools (Winzeler 1975) . The British
added a new dimension which perpetuated and accentuated the
already existing cultural schism between the Malay aristocracy
and the general populace. This new element was a policy of
differential education - a policy regarded by some Malays as
elitist and exclusive (Mutalib 1990:16). While the majority of
Malays were afforded no more than the most basic primary
education (mainly learning by rote and unthinking recitation of
the Quran) , sons of royalty were given opportunities to acquire
secular English education all the way through tertiary education
in Britain (Wilier 1975) . For instance, in 1938 only 239 out of
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a total of 9,939 Malays enrolled in all schools in Melaka
attended British secular schools (Mutalib 1990:16, citing Khoo
1980:98). The British discouraged the ordinary Malays from
leaving their traditional vocations of farming and fishing. It
is on record that Frank Swettenham, who held the positions of
Resident-General, Governor, and High Commissioner, and George
Maxwell, the Chief Secretary, viewed education of the Malays as a
means of preparing them to fit into their proper place (i.e.,
what was most productive for Britain) in colonial society.
Another area in which Britain effected the Malay religio-
cultural situation was in the colonial government's relation to
Islam. We have already noted how the British strengthened the
position of Islam through the legitimization of Muslim offices
and institutions, and through the discouragement or eradication
of certain pre-Islamic religious practices. We will now consider
how the British administration curtailed Islamic development.
First of all, it is significant that the Islam that Britain
sanctioned was that of the traditional ruling elite. It was the
old guard, non-reformist Islam that is often contrary to the
principles of universal Islam and the Islamic resurgence that is
challenging the Malays today. While the government provided a
structure through which Islam could function, the very extent of
Federated Malay States Annual Report of 1920, cited in
Bedlington (1978:52), "The System of Education" (1905:9), and
Swettenham (1891:16, and 1906:258).
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the British administrative control meant that Islamic law
{Shari'ah) was allowed only very restricted real power.
Islam is believed by many to have been, in effect,
controlled by British officials in that the decisions of the
Islamic courts and the implementation of Islamic law were subject
to the approval of the British Resident (Wilier 1975, and Yegar
1976) . British law limited the powers of the ^cadi (Islamic
judge/magistrate) by setting the maximum penalty for each
particular crime (Andaya and Andaya 1982:171). In addition,
British civil magistrates understandably based their decisions on
the precedents of British statutory law (with which they were
familiar) rather than those of Shari'ah or adat laws (Sadka
1968:156). Furthermore, the decisions of the Islamic courts were
overruled by the civil courts whenever the British government
thought appropriate. For example, children declared illegitimate
by Islamic courts were made legitimate by British judges, and
decisions by Islamic courts granting the custody of children to
the father were overturned. Even Malay judges typically favored
British over Islamic law. This was only natural since all the
senior judges were appointed by the Resident General. Moreover,
those Malays who did become judges arose from the ranks of the
elite minority educated in the secular English system, and
received their law degrees from Great Britain.
In short, the British influence on Islam was to legitimize
the role of the sultans as the heads of Islam, thus enforcing the
aristocracy versus masses class distinction, while denying Islam
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any real power to implement change. The Malay aristocracy, in
turn, used Islam as a symbol to reinforce its own authority and
as a means of "sanctifying" traditional Malay customary law which
itself bolstered the old class divisions.
Hence, if Malayan leaders and administrators continued to
neglect Islamic principles in governing the state after
colonialism ended, or if the confidence of Malay masses in
the feasibility of Islamic principles in guiding their lives
was lacking, part of the reason for such neglect, or the
preference for the secular alternative, may be attributed to
British rule. (Mutalib 1990:17)
We demonstrated earlier that during British rule ethnic
divisions in Malaya were maintained and even accentuated. Not
only were the races kept separate (by division of labor and
socio-economic status) , but under the British, the Malays fared
badly relative to the Chinese and Indians. The reverse was true
during the Japanese occupation of Malaya between 1941 and 1945
(Miller 1966:155-156). The Japanese treated the Malays favorably
compared to the Chinese and Indians. As British policy had
proven detrimental to Malay-nonMalay relations, so the Japanese
preferential treatment of the Malays contributed to inter-ethnic
rivalry.
�'�^
The above factors were also detrimental to Malay acceptance
of universal, as opposed to parochial, Islam. This was because
the British and Japanese both regarded Malays as an ethnic
Because of the enmity between Japan and China, the Chinese in
Malaya suffered badly under the Japanese, while the Malays were
usually spared any hardship. The Chinese resented the Malays for
not joining the mainly Chinese guerilla forces that resisted
Japanese occupation. Many of the Malays actually collaborated with
the Japanese.
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category distinct from all non-Malays. Thus, Malays were pitted
against, rather than identified with, non-Malay Muslims. In
support of this contention, Mutalib (1990:17) points out that the
two major Islamic conferences which were held during the Japanese
occupation, turned out to be strictly Malay affairs which
discussed the problem of Malay unity instead of issues involving
the wider Muslim community.
Islamic Reformism and Malay Ethnic Nationalism
We have concluded that the colonial policies did much to
fortify the Malay awareness of themselves as an ethnic group vis
a-vis others. We now consider the impact of the worldwide
Islamic reform movement on Malay ethnic identity. Islamic
reformism sprang from the contrast between the glory days of
Islam from the 8th to the 16th centuries, and the decline of
Islam in the 19th century in the face of Western military and
economic domination. The result was the formation of a pan-
Islamism with a message that called for a search within Islam for
principles and means to equip Muslims for the challenges of the
modern world, as well as a call for the expunging of accretions
(folk practices) from Islam. Reformers sought a worldwide unity
of Muslims to oust colonial imperialism, and placed a high value
on science and reason. Especially relevant to the Malayan
situation, the reformers branded the conservative ulama
(religious specialists) "enemies of Islam" (Donohue and Esposito
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1982:19). Islam had to be purged of impure elements, restored to
its pristine form, and become progressive again.
'''^
The winds of reform blew strongly in Malaya. The hub of the
reform movement was Al-Azhar University in Cairo. It should be
remembered that Malay scholars had been going to Mecca or Cairo
since Islam first arrived in Malaya, while many otbers had
performed the pilgrimage.
The key reformers in Malaya were Malayans of Arabic or
Indian descent who had studied in Cairo and Mecca. Their
influence spread mainly through the publication of journals and
newspapers. The most significant and most radical such
publication was al-Imam. founded in 1906 by al-Hadi, a leading
reformer (Roff 1967:57). Al-Imam castigated the ulama (religious
leaders) for allowing Malayan Islam to be adulterated by
impurities from adat and other religions. The traditional elite
were criticized for their consumption of alcohol and their
participation in dancing (Mutalib 1990:20). They were chastised
for their perpetuation of Malay decadence, when their
responsibility was to be role models. Their very authority was
questioned, as for over three decades al-Imam called for the
practice of ijtihad (informed independent investigation) of the
Quran and hadith, rather than taklid buta (blind acceptance of
intermediate authority) (Roff 1967:58). In addition to the call
For discussions of the reformist movement and its key
proponents, see Donohue and Esposito (1982), Esposito (1983b), Gibb
(1971), Haddad (1983), Hunter (1988), and Peacock (1978).
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for a cleansing within Malayan Islam, to inculcate a sense of
identification with worldwide and especially Middle Eastern
Islam, al-Imam devoted regular attention to news from other
Muslim countries. The main concern of another major reform-
minded newspaper, Neracha (Balance) (1911), was the eradication
of the heavy accretions of folk Islam (Mutalib (1990:20).
The tremendous call for reform, coupled with the exposure to
the issues and challenges of the world Islamic cause, has been
described as the dropping of "a bombshell on the quiet Malayan
scene of Islam" (Tan S.H. 1961:10).
From the point of view of the Muslim reformers, though, the
influence of Islamic reformism in Malaya did not have the
explosive effect intended. Perhaps we could say that the
detonation reached the minds but not the hearts of the Malays.
For one thing, the vehicle through which reform ideas spread was
the printed word. The ideas came to the Malay world, a world
comprised largely of non-literate villagers, in the form of
philosophically oriented articles written by Arabic educated
intellectuals. The articles were written, furthermore, in a
style much influenced by Arabic, and which presupposed some
familiarity with Arabic (Roff 1967:65). Such language and style
was difficult even for the Malays who could read. It is not
surprising, then that such writers could not touch the typical
Malay anywhere near to the degree to which the village ulama, who
were intimately integral to the rural community, could (of.
pp. 215-216). Roff (1967:65) suggests that the readership of the
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reformist literature came from the intellectual elite, whose
education had already predisposed them to a more universal Islam.
It was primarily a matter of preaching to the converted.
Another major factor which checked the influence of Islamic
reform in Malaya was the ethnic, communal orientation of Malays
vis-a-vis non-Malays that we have already discussed. We have
seen that the colonial polices had conditioned the Malays to
defend their own interests against those of other ethnic groups,
even if Muslim.
The earliest and most vocal of the reformers were Muslims of
Indian or Arabic descent. These were the founders and primary
contributors to the reformist publications. Those championing
the Malay cause from the turn of the century through the 19 3 0s
were, paradoxically, non-Malays. Many Malay leaders came to
resent this. In fact, the first political parties in Singapore
and Malaya, the Singapore Malay Association (1925) and the Malay
Youth Association (1937), were formed partly to resist non-Malay
leadership in Malay affairs (Andaya and Andaya 1982:249). The
climax of Malay antagonism towards non-Malay Muslims came in the
form of conferences for Malays only, convened in 1938 and 1940 to
discuss Malay problems (Mutalib 1990:21). Around this time,
Abdul Rahim Kajai, considered the most influential Malay
journalist of his day, coined the derogatory and popularly used
terms for the Indian and Arab Muslims�the DKK {Darah Keturunan
Keling-Indian Blood) and DKA {Darah Keturunan Arab-Arab Blood)
(Roff 1967) .
The telling blow to the Muslim reformist movement came when
Malay leadership was assumed by Malays with a strong ethnic
nationalist tendency, under the auspices of the United Malay
National Organization (UMNO), since 1946. UMNO was formed
specifically in opposition to the British "Malayan Union"
proposal'^^ (Simandjuntak 1969:33-34).
It is unmistakably clear that UMNO was formed out of Malay
as distinct from Islamic considerations (Miller 1966:164-171). A
number of points establish this. Its declared reason for being
was the safeguarding of Malay communal interests (Mutalib
1990:21-22). The party's slogan and battle cry� "Hidup Melayu"
("Long live the Malays") speaks for itself. The party's very
founder, Onn Ja'afar (whose father was Arabic) was not only
dethroned, but booted from the party when he proposed to include
non-Malay Muslims in the party. UMNO's identification with Malay
ethnic nationalism as opposed to universal Islam was underscored
by the overwhelming opposition to the proposal that UMNO should
seek to establish an Islamic state (Funston 1980:92).
UMNO's secular leanings alienated Islamic-oriented Malay
leaders. Consequently, the first Islamic party in the country,
�""^The Malayan Union (which lasted only two years, 194 6-1948,
and was never fully implemented due to rigorous Malay opposition) ,
proposed to end the sovereignty of the sultans over their
respective states, uniting the states under a British Governor with
full executive powers. Moreover, it called for the extension of
equal citizenship rights to all who could claim Malaya as their
homeland (defined as anyone with five years of continuous residence
or ten years of total residence) . To the Malays, this meant the
stripping of their own control, and the granting of unwarranted
political power to the Chinese (Miller 1966:165).
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the Hizbul Muslimin (HAMIM) or Islamic Party, was formed in 1948.
It's goals were to fight for Malayan independence and then build
an Islamic state based on Islamic principles (Mutalib 1990:22).
The party was shortlived but reborn in spirit in 1951 when a
splinter group broke off from UMNO to form the Pan Malayan
Islamic Party (PMIP) . Rejecting UMNO's secular-nationalist bent,
the PMIP [later renamed Partai Al-Islam Se-Malaysia (the Islamic
Party of Malaysia) , better known as PAS] called for (as it does
still) the implementation of the Shari'ah (Islamic law) with the
ultimate goal of transforming Malaya into an Islamic state.
To secure its legitimacy in the eyes of the Malay-Muslims,
and understanding the integral nature of Islam to Malay identity,
UMNO made the spread of Islam one of its primary objectives.
Yet, the Islamic cause was always subservient to strengthening
the Malay position. For PAS, it was the other way around.
The fact that of the two Malay political parties, UMNO has
always had the ascendancy, and has been without serious threat
from PAS except in minor pockets of Malay society, is a vivid
reminder that politically, Malay ethnic ideals have been stronger
than Islamic ideals for the majority of the Malays.
Thus, it was this Malay ethnic nationalism�as opposed
to an Islamic orientation�coupled with opposition from the
ruling establishment (Malay Sultans, conservative ulama, or
the Kaum Tua, as well as colonialist) �and . . . the forces
of tradition or adat�that, for the most part, checked the
growth of Islamic religio-political influence in Malaya.
(Mutalib 1990:22)
Upon Independence in 1957, Islam was not given a significant
role in the government of the newly-formed Federation of Malaya.
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The fact that the Constitution was given a secular ethnic-
nationalist tilt has had an enormous influence on the shape of
Malay society over the succeeding decades. Islam was named the
religion of the Federation, but other religions were made room
for (Means 1976:163-167). As if to ensure that this was not to
be interpreted as a doorway to Islamic control, the framers of
the Constitution included the sentiment that the fact that Islam
was to be the state religion did not imply that the state was not
secular. Following this understanding, the first Malay Chief
Justice concluded that the constitutional reference to Islam
meant that Islam's role was "primarily for ceremonial purposes,
for instance, to enable prayers to be offered in the Islamic way
on official public occasions such as the installation or the
birthday of the yang diPertuan Agong (king) " (quoted in Mutalib
1990:23) .
Thus, we see that Islam was relegated to the same place that
it had before the British came. It was primarily a ceremonial
showpiece to lend sanctity to public office. In this capacity,
moreover, it contributed to Malay ethnic exclusivism. In that by
far most Malayan Muslims were Malay, and that virtually no
Chinese (the only community large enough to pose a political
threat) were Muslims, Islam's place in the government was little
more than a highly visible expression of the association of
political authority with Malayness.
In actual political practice, Islam had its hands tied.
Although in principle the sultans of each state were given charge
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over Islamic affairs in their respective states, the Federal
Parliament had power to overrule any decision based on Islamic
law. Moreover, all laws in conflict with Federal law were
declared automatically null and void (Mutalib 1990:24). To
reiterate, the Constitution reinforced the prominence of Malay
ethnicity over Islamic identity in Malay society.
The above discussion of the Malay Constitution speaks to the
issue of Islamic political power. To say that this was severely
curtailed is not the same as saying that Islam did not have a
powerful influence on the individual Malays and their corporate
culture. Moreover, the events since Malaysian Independence have
thrust Islam into a position of prominence unknown in the history
of the Malays. We now trace briefly these developments to bring
ourselves up to date on the current state of affairs in the
ongoing tension between Malay ethnic and Islamic identity.
The question "Who is a Malay?" is foundational to the
Malaysian nation. The Constitution designates language, custom,
and religion as the criteria of Malayness. The Malay political
parties emphasized their own criteria. UMNO emphasized race,
language, and custom. PAS stressed Islam, race, and language
(Nash 1991:703). Its very name declared its commitment to Islam
as its first priority. Its continuing commitment to Islam is
reflected in its 1973 name change. With a view toward
embarrassing its rival, UMNO, for having only an English-language
name, it became Partai Al-Islam Se-Malayai (the Islamic Party of
Malaysia) , better known as PAS.
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In attempting to unite Muslims, and especially to unite
Malays as Muslims, the PMIP/PAS sought to avoid the old division
between Kaum Muda (Young Faction) and Kaum Tua (Old Faction) . It
did this by excluding Indian Muslims from its hierarchy and by
attempting to be reformist while making room for traditionalists
(Peacock 1978:178). It was reformist in that it called for
Malays to govern themselves based on the Quran and Hadith. Yet,
it opened the door to traditionalists by allowing some latitude
for the rulings of traditional Muslim teachers. PMIP/PAS 's
challenge to UMNO has always brought to the fore the question of
which ethnic Malay party best speaks for the Malays. Is it the
conspicuously Islamic one? Or is it the one oriented to Malay
sovereignty? At the national, political level, it has been the
latter, UMNO, which consistently won out. But this was
accomplished only through a coalition with the two main non-Malay
ethnically based parties, the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) . This
coalition, which was known as the Alliance, was a delicate
balance of often conflicting interests.
The eventual collapse of this balance precipitated communal
riots in May of 1969. From 1957 to 1969 competing interests
among the ethnic groups were quietly negotiated among the leaders
of the Alliance's three ethnic parties. An understanding existed
that the Malays, by virtue of their indigenous status and
numerical superiority, would enjoy political primacy in Malaysia.
This would be expressed by Malays holding the top political
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offices; by preferential opportunities for Malays in the civil
service, education, and in the licensing of businesses; by the
recognition of Islam as the official religion; and by the gradual
implementation of Malay as the official language (Mauzy 1983:22).
Non-Malays, in turn, would be allowed substantial freedom from
restriction in business ventures, vernacular primary schools, an
equitable justice system based on secular British law, and
freedom of religion.
By May 1969 this delicately constructed inter-ethnic edifice
was crumbling. After a divisive campaign centering on concerns
over the increasing concentration of power in the hands of ethnic
Malays, the Alliance coalition suffered a fatal blow, losing its
ruling majority in Parliament to a smattering of diverse small
parties, including the PMIP/PAS, the Democratic Action Party
(DAP) �a primarily Chinese party seeking democratic reform, and
several leftist parties. The opposition victory was the catalyst
of two weeks of bloody race riots, in which seething animosity
between Malays and non-Malays erupted into violence.
A National Operations Council (NOC) , a form of martial law
under the Malay Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, governed
the country until parliamentary rule was restored in 1971. By
dissolving political groups opposing Malay sovereignty, by
reconfirming Malay as the national language, and by the launching
of the New Economic Policy (a plan to raise the socioeconomic
level of the Malays relative to the non-Malays) , the NOC
buttressed the special status of the Malays.
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When the smoke cleared, and normal politics resumed, the
Malays emerged with the preeminent position in Malaysian
political life. The old Alliance coalition was replaced by a new
and broader one called Barison Nasional (the National Front) . In
addition to the original three parties, with UMNO remaining the
senior partner, it included two former opponents, the DAP and the
PMIP/PAS. The Barison Nasional has since dominated Malaysian
politics, though it has been challenged by the withdrawal of PAS
in 1977 and the rise of Islamic revival movements, known as
dakwah. Both PAS and dakwah represent large sectors of Malay
society which are dissatisfied with UMNO's secular, ethnic-
nationalistic, as opposed to a more universal Islamic, basis.
The Rise of Malay Dakwah
ABIM
The modern Islamic resurgence sprang from student activism
of the tumultuous period of the late 60s and early 70s. Anwar
Ibrahim, currently the Deputy Prime Minister (second in command)
in Malaysia, but then a student at the University of Malaya,
founded the foremost dakwah (revivalist) organization, the
Angkatan Bella Islam Malaysia (ABIM, the Muslim Youth Movement of
Malaysia) . Under his charismatic leadership the movement began
with broadly social and nationalistic activism. Disillusioned
with the government leadership, Ibrahim said:
The leaders were condemning corruption, but they were
enriching themselves. They talked about Malay nationalism
but were alienated from the Malay masses. They were
obsessed by the West. They were too accommodating to non-
Malay sentiments. They were extremely slow in implementing
national polices in education and language. We were
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impatient and angry about the plight of the Malays, their
education, rural development, rural health. There was this
huge University Hospital, but no clinics in the rural areas.
There were schools with no laboratories, no libraries and no
qualified teachers. We were very angry, disgusted and
critical of the government. There seemed to be no moral
foundation and no spiritual guidance. We turned to Islam to
fill this vacuum and to look for solutions, (quoted in
Anwar 1987:12-13)
The Islamic direction to the already existing Malay student
activism was the result of the worldwide Islamic resurgence
spurred by the oil boom of the early 1970s and the rise of the
oil producing states in relationship to the industrial West. The
Islamic revolution in Iran under Khomeini contributed to the
prestige of the dakwah movement.
In Malaysia itself, another phenomenon further connected
Islam with Malay nationalistic activism. Reeling from the 1969
riots, the Malaysian government in 1971 imposed great
restrictions on students' rights to hold public meetings or
demonstrations. Student membership in political parties was
disallowed. Religious gatherings were, however, not restricted.
Consequently, Islam became a natural channel through which Malay
public activism could be expressed.
The Malay students focused more and more on Islam as a
vehicle for change. Leading world idealogues of Islamic
revivalism gave the movement an appreciation of the
comprehensiveness of Islam as a way of life. In seeking guiding
principles for change, and in defining themselves, the ABIM
increasingly found its Malayness in Islam. Again, in the words
of Anwar Ibrahim (quoted in Anwar 1987:13): "There was a very
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strong sense of brotherhood, of the need to fight against
corruption, exploitation and oppression. We were still very
concerned about Malay issues, but we were equally committed to
Islam. "
The ABIM began in 1971 at the University of Malaya, but was
established as a permanent organization outside the university so
that its leaders could continue to exert their influence beyond
graduation. The ABIM opened chapters throughout Malaysia, and
was the foremost voice of dakwah.
The goal of ABIM was primarily the advancement of the
Malays, especially regarding economic development. The hallmark
of their early activism was vocational training in rural
Malaysia. A growing disillusionment with the secular rationale
behind UMNO leadership prompted a turn toward Islam as the
vehicle through which an activism associated with the wider world
of Islam could meet the needs of the Malays. ABIM was less
chauvinistic than the other leading dakwah groups. It did not
call for an Islamic state. Instead it promoted individual piety
and the expression of faith through communal activism. Still, it
had strong pro-Malay and anti-Chinese agenda.
ABIM was successful in wedding the seemingly contradictory
elements of universal Islam and Malay ethnic exclusivism.
Islamic principles of, for example, justice and equality, were
employed to advance the Malay struggle to carve out an
unchallenged position of leadership and economic control against
the conflicting interests of other Malaysian ethnic groups.
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Darul Arqam
Another significant revival group is Darul Arqam, "House of
Arqam" (after Arqam who was one of the friends and protectors of
18
Muhammed) . Its trademark is its Islamic communities modeled
after 7th century Arabic lifestyle. Largely apolitical, Darul
Arqam seeks to increase Malay religiosity by building support on
the grass roots level. Members practice an austere communal
life. There is total segregation of the sexes, and followers eat
and sleep together in crowded dormitories. The women cover all
but their eyes in Middle Eastern-style purdah, and the men were
green robes (green being the color of Islam) and turbans. While
the group does want to see an Islamic government in Malaysia,
this is only a long-range objective (Anwar 1987:37). They see
this as possible only from the ground up. The priority is
Islamization of the individual and family, and through this
process they seek gradually to extend Islamization to the whole
Malay society.
A paradoxical twist here is that while Darul Arqam has
adopted a dress code modeled after Iran, and attempts to
approximate the pristine lifestyle of the glory days of early
Arabic Islam, it is known for its distinctive Malay chauvinism
and desire for a life independent of Chinese and foreign control.
In effect, Darul Arqam wants to adopt universal Islamic form.
For a thorough treatment of the leading Islamic revival
organizations in Malaysia, see Nagata (1984:81-130), Anwar (1987:9-
57), and Jomo and Cheek (1992:79-106).
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but for Malays only. It is another case of an attempt at joining
universal Islam with specifically Malay interests.
The Malay reaction to Darul Arqam is varied. Many more
secular-minded Malays look down on Arqam members as extremists.
Others feel that Arqam members assume an air of superiority, as
if they are the only Malays who are "doing" Islam right. Still
others respect the Darul Arqam for their total commitment to an
Islamic lifestyle. However they are perceived, Darul Arqam
members are a visible and constant reminder that the Islamic
revolution has hit Malaysia.
Jamaat Tahliqh
The Jamaat Tabligh (the Missionary Society) is a Delhi-based
missionary organization that is the most philosophically oriented
and least structured of the dakwah groups. It is an informal,
unregistered missionary movement which relies entirely on the
work of volunteer missionaries. Though not chauvinistic, it
focuses on Malays (particularly rural Malays) , attempting through
personal contact and example to foster personal commitment to
Islam (Nagata 1984:116-122). The emphasis is on emulation of
Muhammed 's lifestyle, the performance of Islamic pillars, and
each individual's responsibility to spread the faith (Jomo and
Cheek 1992:81). Both Tabligh and Arqam encourage spiritual
lifestyles which emphasize other worldliness, but neither
emphasize the establishment of an Islamic state, nor pose a
threat to Malay ethnic nationalism.
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The Islamic Republic
The most recent and revolutionary organized expression of
dakwah is a student group known as the Islamic Republic (IR) .
The IR calls for the immediate imposition of an Islamic state
upon the ethnically and religiously diverse population of
Malaysia.
Closely allied with PAS, the Islamic opposition party, the
Islamic Republic wrested control of the Islamic Student
Society (PMIUM�Persatuan Mahassiwa Islam Universiti
Malaya) , the most influential student organization for
Islamic and dakwah activities, from the ABIM in 1983 and has
brought a more militant tone to that organization. (Nash
1991:712)
Conclusions About Malay Dakwah
It is clear from this brief sketch of the major Malaysian
dakwah (revivalist) organizations that they have rather diverse
makeups and emphases. Malaysian dakwah is distinct from Islamic
resurgence in places like Iran, Turkey, or Pakistan in that, in
Malaysia, the turn toward Islam grew from a drive to stake a
claim in the power struggle between competing ethnic groups. It
is important to note that Islamic resurgence began over Malay
issues .
Clearly, though, the ensuing changes brought a new awareness
of the comprehensiveness of Islam, and yes, of the universal
Islamic community (Anwar 1987:3). Zainah Anwar (1987:4) goes so
far as to claim that Malaysian dakwah has transcended Malay
particularism:
the movement is not dominated by the reformist attitude of
earlier revivalism. The West is no longer a source of
emulation or the fount of solutions for Malay backwardness,
even if couched in Islamic terminology. Islam now holds all
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the solutions to society's ills . . . there is no element
of Malay nationalism at all in this current revivalism. The
present-day dakwah people do not call for the improvement of
the lot of the Malays. In fact, they oppose the New
Economic Policy as it is based on race instead of religion.
Nationalism which recognizes the artificially imposed man-
made national boundaries is also considered unlslamic as it
opposes the Islamic concept of the universality of the
ummah .
While it is difficult to overstate the significance of
Islamic revivalism on the Malay consciousness, it is an
overstatement to say that Malaysian dakwah is devoid of Malay
nationalism. What the Islamic revival has done is place Islam so
much in the forefront that no Malay organization, political
party, or candidate for office can hope to succeed without flying
the Islamic banner. Every candidate must now give at least lip
service to enthusiastic support of Islamization, and present
himself or herself as a devout, observant Muslim.
While PAS or the dakwah organizations never succeeded in
mounting the support of large enough segments of the Malay
population to dethrone UMNO or even implement their agendas on a
wide scale, they were indirectly responsible for promoting far
reaching government-sponsored Islamization.
To keep peace in the ethnically and religiously diverse
Malaysian spectrum, UMNO has always found it necessary to pursue
an accommodationist policy. In so doing, UMNO had to walk a
tightrope between the interests of non-Malays, and those Malays
who considered UMNO's conciliatory posture a betrayal of Malay
interests. The Islamic resurgence added fuel to this already
volatile situation. It gave UMNO's Malay rivals a new tack.
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UMNO's accommodationist stance was now stigmatized as anti-
Islamic. As Islam itself cannot be challenged, policies of
Islamization could not be attacked frontally.
UMNO countered by denouncing certain groups as extremist,
and thus antithetical to true Islam. Fearing the growing power
of dakwah, the government looked for technicalities to block
speeches by dakwah leaders, and even to imprison some of them.
The most effective counter to dakwah, however, was neither
criticism nor intimidation. The most effective government
counter to its dakwah opponents was to embrace dakwah itself (at
least in word), thus diffusing the main contention of UMNO's
Malay opponents.
The clincher for UMNO in this was the coopting of Anwar
Ibrahim, the popular president of the ABIM, and former UMNO
critic. After Mahathir's 1982 ascendance to the position of
chief executive, Anwar was wooed over to UMNO with promises of
leadership positions and the machinery with which to further his
goals for Islamization. Anwar skyrocketed up the political
ladder with successive appointments as Deputy Minister, UMNO
Youth President, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, and
Agriculture Minister, before being appointed to the senior
governmental post of Education Minister in 1986, and then his
election as Deputy Prime Minister in 1993. With Anwar's "born-
again Muslim" UMNO, PAS was placed on the defensive (Jomo and
Cheek 1992:97). UMNO formed the Islamic Welfare and Missionary
Association {Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia, or PERKIM) ,
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which conducts missionary activity among the Chinese and orang
asli (aboriginal peoples) . UMNO further defanged its opponents
with the creation of an Islamic bank and an Islamic university.
How are we to interpret these changes? It is probably at
least partly the case that the co-option of Anwar Ibrahim was
part of a tradition of accommodating Islamic demands in order to
defeat the government's religiously oriented political opponents.
As previous prime minister Datuk Hussein Onn intimated, "You may
wonder why we spend so much money on Islam. If we don't Parti
Islam will get us. The Party will and does claim that we are not
religious and the people will lose faith" (quoted in Milner
1986:64). The current prime minister, Mahathir, unlike his
predecessor, may not be merely bowing to political expediency.
It is difficult to portray the appointment to high office of a
religious figure of Anwar Ibrahim's stature and evident
sincerity, as nothing more than a clever political outmaneuvering
of the opposition, especially when combined with the Mahathir
administration's unprecedented Islamization projects.
Effects of Islamization
Whatever the admixture of sincerity and politics, the
Islamization of Malaysia is having a very real impact on Malay
traditional culture. When the Malays began to adopt Islam in the
14th and 15th centuries, the rajas who accepted the new religion
were quick to see it as a means to bolster their dignity and
authority. Quranic verses were found to justify their special
status as the "Shadows of God on Earth" (Milner 1981a:70).
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Whatever their reasons for adopting Islam as an essential
component of Malayness, the Malay rulers, who inherited primal
religious and Indian traditions of leadership, did not see Islam
as a threat to their position. Islam gave divine sanctity to
age-old customs, and when the Western powers threatened, it
proved a rallying point around which to unite the Malays. But
the Islam to which the Malays opened their gates would prove down
the road to be "a 'Trojan horse', which, once it had entered
Malaydom, would eventually challenge some of the essential tenets
of Malay life" (Milner 1986:52).
While the bywords of early Malay Islamic activism were
nationalism and Malay economic development, the focus has shifted
from the Malay race to the international�or non-national�
Islamic community.
The dakwah, or Islamic missionary, movement is a highly
visible aspect of a growing religious tension within the
Malay community. Until a decade or so ago most accounts of
the Malay community presented Islam as synonymous with
Malayness. To convert to Islam, it was often observed, was
described as masuk Melayu, or "entering Malayness." Today
even the legendary "casual observer" has become aware of the
existence within Malay society of a core of religious-
opinion leaders who, in the name of Islamic authenticity,
criticize the style of life of their fellow Malays. They
criticize their customs, their dress, their behaviour, and
the political and legal institutions under which they live.
The religious leaders demand adherence to God's word, to the
shari'a or sacred law of Islam. (Milner 1986:50)
The Malays are in a battle to determine the character of their
identity as Malays and as Muslims. Thus far, the fundamentalist
version of Islam has not come to dominate (Nash 1991:713).
Still, "in Malaysia during the last decade it has become more and
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more difficult to portray Islam as an ingredient of nationalism.
Shari ' a-mindedness offers a sharp critique of Malayness" (Milner
1986: 65) .
A common denominator of most of the Malay dakwah has been a
challenge to eradicate syncretistic elements from Islam.
Traditional cultural practices which have their roots in
spiritism or Hinduism are called into question. These include
traditional healers, traditional dance and drama, the Malay
wedding ceremony, and even the very Sultanate.
The extent to which the old guard of traditional authority
is being replaced is seen most dramatically in a 1993 amendment
to the Constitution which stripped the sultans of their immunity
from legal prosecution. Since the sultans' functions are largely
ceremonial, the new laws do not significantly alter the Malaysian
legislative machinery. Yet, the move is nothing short of epochal
in its symbolic import. Though their powers had been being
systematically eroded since constitutional government hit
Malaysia, this was the first officially declared "demythicisation
of the royals" ("A Monarchy Thus Updated" 1993) . The keepers of
all that stood for traditional Malayness and an Islam that
legitimized such a system, were now symbolically dethroned from
their lofty position. To borrow Niel Armstrong's phraseology,
this was one small step for the equal position of all under the
law, but one giant leap for the "new guard" Malays.
Unquestionably, Malay Islam has ceased from being merely a
religious legitimizer of the traditional Malay aristocracy- As
such, Malays are more attuned to the worldwide Islamic community,
and to seeing Islam as a coherent system which has bearings on
every facet of individual and social life.
Malay Ethnic Identity
Islam
To say that Malay traditional leadership is no longer the
guardian and interpreter of Malay Islam is not to say that
Islam has ceased to be a Malay ethnic identifier. Non-Malay
Malaysians clearly do not see the Islamic resurgence as a portent
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of justice and equal opportunity of all. Most non-Malays have
felt ignored, if not threatened by what they see as increasingly
powerful, assertive and intolerant Islamic movements which
challenge the rights of all who do not submit to Islamic
prescriptions .
While some non-Muslims in the ruling coalition may
reluctantly accept the government's Islamisation campaign as
necessary to deal with the supposed threat posed by PAS in
particular and the Islamic resurgence in general, most
others view it as yet another confirmation of the secondary
status of the non-Malays. (Jomo and Cheek 1992:104)
It may be argued, in fact, that Islam (albeit articulated in
a more universal, orthodox form) is the chief ethnic boundary
marker for the Malays. As we have stated, the Malaysian
A case in point is that non-Malay Muslims in Malaysia, and
especially those who are Chinese, are not afforded the same status
and privileges as Malays (Nagata 1974:41-46). Another example is
the complaints of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (an ecumenical council of non-
Muslim religions in Malaysia that serves as a watchdog agency
against encroachment of their religious freedoms by the Malaysian
government-sponsored Islamization programs) , who have experienced
Islamization as a serious threat to their religious freedoms.
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Constitution defines a Malay as one who habitually speaks the
Malay language, conforms to Malay culture, and practices Islam.
The first of these identifiers has always been blurry. The
social category "Malay" does not coincide with the linguistic
category of Malay speakers. What do we do with Indonesian
speakers of Malay, or Malays whose first language is not Malay
(e.g., Javanese)? The aggressive national language policy in
Malaysia, which has made Malay the language of habitual use of
millions of non-Malays, is making the linguistic distinction
increasingly meaningless.
Likewise, the Malay cultural tag is losing its significance.
The rise of an urban Malay middle class is causing cultural
sameness .
Being "middle class" in the diffuse western sense means
being part of a status group defined largely by a
generalized bureaucratic lifestyle based on consumerism,
which effectively eclipses more subtle and meaningful
distinctions between the Malays and non-Malays and, with it,
some of their identity. (Nagata 1984:71)
From the other direction, as non-Malays increasingly speak Malay
and advance through the national education system, a convergence
is taking place. On the surface, at least, Malays and non-Malays
coalesce in the homogenized suburban housing complexes and city
highrises that resemble their middle class counterparts
throughout the world.
Traditional Malay Culture
The one remaining ethnic distinctive of the Malays is Islam.
Again, this is a somewhat fuzzy boundary marker, but given the
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fact that few non-Malay Malaysians are Muslim, and virtually no
Malays are not Muslim, it remains the most workable distinction
of the three traditional Malay ethnic identifiers.
The term ethnic refers to the existence of objective markers
of human difference, and the social recognition of these markers
(Kahn 1992:159). Anthony Smith argues that without cultural
differentiation, ethnic identity lapses. "An ethnic group cannot
shed all its cultural dimensions of 'signs' and retain this sense
of identity intact" (Smith 1981:66).
Raymond Lee (1986c: 28-29) sees ethnic relations as the
interaction between groups competing for resources and status.
With the constitutional arrangements, and the policies to
strengthen the Malay position after the Malay 1969 racial riots
(which were precipitated by the gains made by the non-Malay
opposition parties in the election campaign and the victory
parades to rub their gains in the Malays' faces), the resources,
or we may say power, issue has more or less been settled. The
ethnic group rankings, though, in the status hierarchy are still
up for grabs. Basically, the British passed the power baton to
the Malays. The British social prestige could not so easily be
transferred. The British were outsiders who had always been in a
position of control over the Malays and non-Malays. The Malays
were merely fellow colonial subjects with the non-Malays. With
the prestige-giver (the British) removed from the scene, there
was no consensus about which ethnic group should provide the
model of status aspiration (Lee 1986c: 35). In the ensuing
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jockeying for position in the status pecking order, each group
resorted to the rhetoric of cultural superiority to shore up its
claims. This was especially true of the Malays, who sought to
raise their status to a level commensurate with their power.
Malay cultural elements were used to define the boundaries of
Malayness for the specific purpose of status enhancement. They
became in Raymond Lee's words "symbols of separatism" (Lee
1986c:28) .
As we have said, the rapid rise of an urban Malay middle
class, which has an outward lifestyle basically indistinct from
the urban middle class Chinese and others, increased the need for
ethnic identity markers (Nagata 1984:72). The new Malay middle
class is currently digging deeply to find its identification
roots in "traditional Malay culture." Any visitor to Malaysia
cannot but be deluged by the flood of symbolism of "traditional
Malay culture." It has become a powerful force in shaping the
values of the national culture.
In a bold and penetrating analysis of this current
phenomenon, Joel Kahn (1992:172-173) postulates that many of the
"existing notions of Malayness are constructions, and not mere
reflections of a Malay culture which has always existed out there
in the world." "The makers of these images, as well as the
consumers, are overwhelmingly part of a growing Malay middle
class of civil servants, educators and professionals" who are
searching for convenient markers of identity (Kahn 1992:164).
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The result is that a "neo-traditionalist" Malay culture is in the
process of being created. "We are not here dealing with a simple
recognition in ethnic discourse of a pre-existing set of cultural
traits and markers. Malay culture itself is what is being
constructed" (Kahn 1992:170).
This contemporary Malay culture, moreover, is being created
in the context of disillusionment with the West and with certain
elements of modernity, amidst an unprecedented urbanization and
technological boom. The resultant portrait of Malay culture is
the very antithesis of modern society.
Where the latter is urban, impersonal and rushed, the former
is rural, personalised and contemplative. The peaceful
rural setting of the activities of the artisan is contrasted
explicitly with the noise and bustle of Kuala Lumpur. The
social and ecological adaptations of the traditional Malay
house stands in sharp contrast to the hot and noisy urban
high rise. (Kahn 1992:165)
While the ancient Malay lifestyle was certainly rural,
agrarian, rustic, and simple, it was for most Malays hardly
idyllic. It was typically comprised of the burdensome drudgery
of corvee labor, interspersed with bitter internecine warfare
between rival chiefdoms. In the spiritual realm, a thoroughgoing
spiritism made for a "religion" of manipulation and fear. The
only Malays who enjoyed the leisure to recline, sipping coconut
milk, and enjoy traditional entertainment were the elite few in
the royal court.
Kahn notes further that it is the well educated upper-middle
class, urban Malay "haves" who are touting "traditional Malay
culture," and not the under educated, rural "have nots," who are
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trying to narrow the gulf between themselves and their urban
counterparts .
Ironically, the revived interest in a traditional, rural-
based Malay culture is taking place in a social setting
characterised by a massive decline in what is considered to
be traditional Malay peasant community. This produces some
fascinating paradoxes. The images generated by this culture
industry in travel brochures, museums, newspapers,
magazines, books and films depict Malay villagers as
philosophical players of Malay games and fliers of kites,
who like nothing better than watching dance dramas depicting
the life of the Malay court. In my time in a Malay village
in the mid 197 0s I never once saw anyone flying a kite or
playing congkak (a game resembling backgammon currently
being revived by a Kuala Lumpur firm) . And the villagers I
knew had little interest in the performances of
"traditional" Malay dance drama currently being staged in
luxury hotels in Kuala Lumpur, preferring instead to watch
Dallas and The Professionals on television. Traditional
Malay wedding gear, a favoured display at local cultural
centres was rejected by village brides who favoured platform
shoes and blue taffeta. (Kahn 1992:164)
In the effort to carve out a distinctive Malay identity,
the old values of kampung (village) and religion are being
resurrected, and, according to Nagata (1984:72), they are
propelling Malays into two different ard seemingly contradictory
directions. One is toward a revitalized Islam, evidenced through
the far-reaching effects of the revival movements since the early
seventies. Along with this comes the ideology of the universal
community of Islam that supersedes ethnic, class, or racial
distinctions. The other is toward a more militantly Bumi Malay
(Malays as the indigenous and thus rightful heirs to the land)
stance. In this position, the preferences of Malays for the
Constitution and the priorities given Malays in economic
development are aggressively upheld. Like the feudal loyalty of
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the ancient Malays, which brought material rewards and social
identity, loyalty to the modern Malay elite confers similar
advantages. It perpetuates the Malay dominion along the old
Melakan pattern in which absolute loyalty is exchanged for
protection and favors. The "Malay traditional culture" theme we
have just discussed feeds this second response.
The neo-traditionalist construction that is shaping Malay
identity is evident in a broad range of symbols. Paradoxically,
alongside the most aggressive Islamization Malay society has ever
experienced, traditional and exclusively Malay cultural symbols
(most of which have no Islamic connection, and many of which are
counter to Islamic teaching) are paraded before Malaysia and the
world.
The most obvious expression of what might be called the
schizophrenic Malay cultural personality, is seen in the work of
the government Ministry of Culture, Arts and Tourism. Clearly,
the image of Malaysia that the government wants to sell to the
world is of a culturally diverse and open society, with beautiful
beaches and a rich heritage of traditional crafts and performing
arts. In browsing through the "Visit Malaysia Year '94: The
Traveller's Guide to Malaysia's Fascinating Treasures" booklet,
or any of the many other Malaysian tourism publications, one
would never guess that extensive Islamization had ever come close
to Malaysia. In the hundreds of photographs printed in the more
than a dozen current brochures I have collected, I had to look
hard to find one or two small pictures of Malay women wearing the
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Islamic head covering called the mini telekang (prayer shawl) ,
more commonly known as the tudung (cover) . My guess is that,
particularly in the cities, the tudung is worn by a majority of
Malay women. Of the 65 Malay women I interviewed in the study of
international students, 31 wore the head covering. One can
hardly go anywhere frequented by Malays and not see Malay women
wearing tudungs . I am convinced the Malaysian tourism
photographers intentionally went out of their way to exclude
Malays in tudungs from their pictures. Instead of Islamic dress,
the brochures are full of Malays in two settings. Malays are
pictured either in traditional dress engaged in traditional
dance, music or craftsmanship, or they are in Western dress
lounging in five-star hotels or browsing in the new ultra-modern
shopping complexes. Even the brochures for the staunchly Muslim
peninsular east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu depict
Malays exclusively in terms of the traditional fishing economy
and traditional entertainment. Such stylized ritual dance and
drama was actually directly associated with spirit appeasement
and even spirit possession. The title of a Terengganu brochure
is "Terengganu: Cultural Splendour."
The only thing Islamic that figures prominently in the
travel brochures in the Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Mosque in
Shah Alam, Selangor, which is an enormous and beautifully
impressive blue-domed mosque with four towering minarets. This
architectural jewel which dominates the surroundings, is seen by
non-Malays at least as much as a symbol of Malay dominance as it
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is a representation of Islam. In line with this, non-Malays have
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sarcastically dubbed the mosque the "Taj Melayu" (after the Taj
Mahal) , identifying it as an extravagant showpiece of Malay, in
distinction from general Islamic, rule.
Interestingly, specifically Islamic institutions, and
especially those of a more universal or transcultural nature, are
excluded from tourist information. In the world Islamic
community, Malaysia boasts the internationally acclaimed
International Islamic University, a leading Islamic Study Center,
a complex dedicated to preparation of pilgrims for the haj, and
several self-sufficient Islamic communal settlements. Yet, Islam
receives only the most scant attention in the tourism promotional
material. The limited representations of Islam are all mosgues,
notable for their architectural and/or historic interest rather
than their Islamic influence.
The Malay culture identity does not just target
international tourists. Most tourists spots are, in fact,
visited mainly by Malaysians themselves. The Malay professional
class seems to be the primary target of tourism campaigns. Mini
Malaysia in Ayer Kerch (near Melaka town) is one of many, many
attractions geared for the cultural edification of Malaysian
(especially Malay) tourists. It consists of reconstructions of
traditional Malay houses based on the regional architecture of
each particular state. There is also an open theater where
"Melayu" is the Malay language word for "Malay."
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traditional Malay dance is performed, and a hall for the
demonstration of traditional Malay games such as top spinning.
Mini Malaysia also includes a souvenir shop selling Malay
handicrafts .
Melaka and Seremban each have museums constructed in
traditional Malay architectural style, and containing exhibits of
the objects and history of Malay royalty. The National Museum in
Kuala Lumpur also features royal Malay history, and like the
aforementioned museums, puts the legends and heros of the pre-
colonial Malay aristocracy in a favorable, if not glorious,
light. These cultural displays are of the old Malay system in
which Islam became a tool for the legitimization of royal status
and authority- This representation of Malayness is at odds with
the principles of Islamization.
Besides the permanent "Malay culture" attractions, Malaysia
sponsors periodic "Culture Fests" for the preservation and
propagation of Malaysian culture. These are affairs in which
traditional dances are performed in major halls and hotel
ballrooms throughout the major cities. These typically feature
Malay dancers in historic garb, performing dances that, again,
are rooted in Malay primal religion and/or the royal court. Both
of these elements (pre-Islamic spiritism and traditional Malay
adat) run counter to the aims of the forces of Islamization.
Such cultural shows are well-attended by Malays.
Traditional, non-Islamic, Malay ethnic identifiers are
ubiquitous in Malaysian society- One small example is that
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explicitly Malay customary practices and history figure much more
prominently on postage stamps than do any expressions of Islam.
I found another example in the pictures in Malay children's
books. I have two Malay-English children's picture dictionaries
published in 1986. These are primary school texts. Both books
show scenes such as "in the kitchen," "in the classroom," "in the
grocery store," or "at the beach." There are scenes depicting
Malay village life, including traditional Malay drama. There are
no scenes of anything specifically Islamic, such as "at the
mosque," or "celebrating the breaking of the fast." Each item in
the pictures is identified by its Malay and English names. In
one of the books, there are a total of 16 pictures of women who
could positively be identified as Malays. Of these 16 women,
none of them are wearing the tudung, the Islamic head covering -
The other picture dictionary has a total of approximately 60
adult women of any race. In this book, only one woman is shown
wearing the head covering, and this is because in that particular
picture, a picture identifying various articles of clothing,
the head covering is one of the words being singled out for
definition.
I have scanned several other Malay children's books and have
found the same phenomenon. The pictures show Malays in either
the most modern and progressive settings, such as white collar
offices, high tech industry, and glitzy shopping malls, or they
show Malays in rural settings, playing traditional games or
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working in the fields. The Islamic element is conspicuously
absent.
Yet another example shows an identification of Islam with
Malayness. The greatest Muslim holiday is the celebration of the
ending of the fasting month. Borrowing the custom of sending
Christmas cards, the Malays exchange Hari Raya (the Big Day)
cards. While it is a religious holiday, I observed that many, if
not most, of the Hari Raya cards have pictures of symbols of
Malay ethnic identity rather than anything explicitly Islamic.
There are pictures of special Malay foods, families dressed in
traditional costume, and of symbols of Malay royalty, such as the
kris. The cards suggest that Hari Raya is something that Malays,
rather than Muslims in general, celebrate. Here, an Islamic
holiday is used to promote Malay ethnic solidarity.
Perhaps the most telling example of the recent push for
Malay traditional culture is the 1990 design change for Malaysian
coins. Whereas the Malaysian coins of each value were previously
all minted with the same exact design�the Parliament building
juxtaposed with the Islamic star and crescent�the newer coins
have a different design for each value, each design depicting a
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particular article of traditional Malay life. This is
extremely significant for the statement it makes. Not only are a
The Malaysian one cent coin has a drum; the five cent a top;
the ten cent a traditional game; the twenty cent some paraphernalia
of the ancient royal court; the fifty cent a kite; and the dollar
coin a kris (Malay knife associated with royalty) .
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general governmental symbol (Parliament�representing equally all
Malaysians) and a symbol of Islam (the star and crescent -
representing equally all Muslims) replaced by symbols of
traditional life, but the new symbols are exclusively Malay,
giving the impression that non-Malays (even non-Malay Muslims)
are second class citizens in their own country. Truly the Malays
are attempting to put forth "traditional Malay culture" as the
epitome of social status in Malaysia.
Mixed Messages
The simultaneous promotion of traditional Malay ethnic
identity and universal Islam, is indeed causing tension. Malay
students are taught through intensive Islamic education that
public dance is inappropriate, that women's dress should cover
everything except their face and hands, and that traditional
ceremonies and practices derived from Hinduism or spiritism
should be abolished.
Malay society is sending mixed messages about Malay
identity, and the result is a cognitive dissonance. When I
taught English to Malays in a government technical institute in
Malaysia (1986-1990, the students had mandatory Islamic studies
classes. Western dress was forbidden for Malay women (they had
to wear loose-fitting floor-length dresses) , and there was social
pressure for them to wear the head covering. Many of the women
who came to the program not wearing the head covering, adopted it
during the course of their stay at the institute. Yet, when some
U.S dignitaries came to observe the program, the Malay students
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hosted a night of traditional Malay entertainment in honor of the
foreign guests. The Malays performed traditional music and dance
dressed in traditional outfits. On another occasion, at a
graduation awards banquet, the students performed a traditional
dance, did a short drama about the life of a famous Malay
princess, and gave a fashion show of the traditional Malay
costumes of each particular state. None of the entertainment on
either night was acceptable from an orthodox Islamic standpoint.
Yet, it was performed proudly and publicly to show off the
beauty of Malay culture.
The inconsistency of the two conflicting expressions of
Malayness hit me most strikingly when I attended the 1992
Malaysia Cultural Night at the University of Kentucky (UK) just a
week or so after I had completed my Malay student interviews. I
was surprised to see that some of the very students who had
expressed to me the certain conviction that traditional Malay
customs are incompatible with Islam, were on stage publicly
demonstrating these very customs. Once again, most of what was
performed was not only non-Islamic, but anti-Islamic. None of
the women wore a head covering. In one song sung by a male and
female duet, I caught the words "I'm young and free and full of
desire" -hardly inspiring Islamic contemplation.
Actually, there were three responses to the cultural show.
Several Malays participated in the performances. Most of the
others attended the event. Some of these had convictions against
actually performing the traditional entertainment, but had no
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qualms about watching it, and even advertizing it. Only a
handful of Malay students boycotted the event for religious
reasons. As we shall see when we discuss the interview results,
the Malays disapprove of in theory many activities that they do
in practice.
There is another point of note concerning the Malaysia
Cultural Night. It was sponsored by the Malaysian Student
Association. This organization is comprised of all the Malaysian
students at UK, and not just the Malays. Chinese Malaysians, in
fact, outnumbered Malays at UK at the time by more than two to
one. Yet, apart from a Kung Fu demonstration, and two
contemporary Chinese songs, the entire evening was devoted to
Malay entertainment, giving the impression, as in the case with
Malaysian coins, that Malay traditional culture is the true
representation of Malaysian culture.
In October of 1993, several Malay students performed
traditional Malay songs and dance at the Lexington Children's
Museum. I found myself asking how Malays could present
themselves as such while at the same time unquestioningly
accepting and defending Islamic teaching.
Islamic Pull Vs. Ethnic Pull
There is indeed simultaneously both an Islamic pull and an
ethnic pull on Malay identity. Some argue that the Islamic pull
is itself a manifestation of "a closing of ranks against non-
Malays" (Nagata 1984:234), and is thus actually pulling in the
same direction as the ethnic pull. Certainly Malays have found a
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unifying quality in Islam, as well as a rallying point against
opponents, and have used Islam to express their own
distinctiveness and even superiority over others. Still, there
are enough tensions in the Malay-Islam relationship to regard
them as oppositional. The following from Mutalib (1992:158)
clearly spells out the issues at stake.
Examples of Tensions and Contradictions in the Malay-Islam
Relationship (Malayness/ethnicity versus Islamicity)
1. Adat (e.g. animistic and Hindu elements) vs. Shar'iah.
2. Communal identity (ethnic nationalism) vs. Universalism.
3. Special bumiputra (indigenous) rights and privileges vs.
Protection and justice for all.
4. Strong feudal element in leader-led relationships (e.g.
Sultanate) vs. Leader is 'khalif*; a vicegerent of God, and
leader within Islamic law and tradition.
5. Malay territorial individual state boundaries vs. Umma, an
ideological community transcending political and geographical
boundaries .
6. Emphasis on 'Malay Muslim' (as opposed to non-Malay Muslim)
vs. Non-racist creed.
7. 'Malay (si) a belongs to the Malays' (an early PAS slogan) vs.
'Malay (si) a belongs to all citizens', irrespective of racial
and religious affiliation.
8. 'Politics and religion should be separate' (statement by
Tunku, the first prime minister) vs. Islam is 'al-din',
encompassing politics and other pursuits in life.
9. 'Masuk Melayu' (non-Malay converts to Islam become Malays)
vs. 'Masuk Islam' (joining a universal 'umma').
10. 'Hidup Melayu' ('Long live the Malays' - UMNO slogan) vs.
'Hiduplah keadilan' ('Long live justice for all').
11. 'Malaysia's national culture must be based on Malay culture'
(Prime Minister Mahathir's statement) vs. All cultures
allowed to flourish side by side with Islamic culture.
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12. Malay Sultans cannot be prosecuted in courts vs. Nobody is
above the law.
As to the question of which force is tugging harder at the
hearts of Malays, I will reserve my own conclusion until after we
have examined the Malay student interview data. The student
responses will be crucial to our understanding of the ethnic
versus Islamic dynamic.
Zainah Anwar (1989) conducted a study of Islamic revivalism
among students. She based part of her work on interviews of
Malay students in universities in Malaysia and England. The
issues she addresses and her findings provide a backdrop for some
of the questions in my own interviews.
Anwar found the Malay students bitterly divided among
themselves along the Malay ethnic versus Islamic lines. Two
girls who lived in the same dormitory at the University of Malaya
exemplify the expanding gulf. Hamidah, who immersed herself in
an Islamic revivalist organization, had this to say upon
completion of an intensive course on the fundamentals of Islam:
I realized that I had so many wrongs that needed to be
corrected. ... I feel I have changed. I have confidence
to be an imam (leader) , to be an example to the juniors. I
can talk to them and discuss issues. If I say something is
forbidden, I know why. For example, there are Malay customs
that are against Islam like the bersanding (a part of the
wedding ceremony where the newly-wed couple sits on a
specially raised dais in glittering finery) . Now I tell
others it is unlslamic and an unnecessary tradition because
it dates from Hindu influence and has nothing to do with
Islam. Or music. Whenever I go back to the village there
are always weddings with such loud music. I tell the people
it's sinful because music lulls the mind, taking our
concentration away from God. I was also against the
Sudirman (Malay pop singer) concert. It's against Islam.
You get carried away by music when you have so many other
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important things to do like reading religious books to
increase your knowledge, (quoted in Anwar 1987:50-51)
Norsiah, who considers herself a good Muslim, spoke in a
completely different tone about the campus Islamic movements: "I
don't see myself like the surau (prayer hall) people. They're
the 'no-no' faces, no funfair, no friendship nights, no band.
Everything is one big 'NO.' They're so narrow-minded�so, so
narrow" (quoted in Anwar 1989:49). "They're the 'no-no' faces
who have made Islam into a 'no-no' religion" (quoted in Anwar
1989:52) .
Norsiah 's continual exposure to revivalist Islam, and the
social ostracism she felt as one outside the community of the
faithful, eventually led her to feel that it was her duty to give
up the old lifestyle that she loved (She had been the lead singer
in a pop band and an organizer of Malay cultural events) . "I
knew I had to wear the telekang (head covering) . Why? Well, you
don't ask questions like that. Like you don't ask questions why
you should pray" (quoted in Anwar 1989:65).
Norsiah is one who seems to have "converted " more from
external social pressure than from inner conviction. Her
statements reveal a conflicted soul. "I don't regret becoming a
dakwah, but I do miss my old life. When I see nice clothes I
feel frustrated that I can't wear them" (quoted in Anwar
1989:66). "Let me tell you honestly. The dakwah movement's most
distinctive characteristic is that it always tells you what to
do, or rather what not to do" (quoted in Anwar 1989:66-67).
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An interesting phenomenon that Norsiah brings up is that
when she was a non-dakwah member, she was regarded as a pariah by
the dakwah girls. When she subsequently switched camps, her
former non-dakwah Malay friends would have nothing to do with
her. She notes, interestingly, that her non-Malay friends
accepted her either way. According to Anwar (1989:89), less
devout Malay Muslims relate better to non-Muslims than they do to
more devout Malay Muslims.
It appears that Islam is acting as both a unifying and
dividing agent in Malay society. As we have seen earlier, it is
a unifying element in rallying all Malays around a single
identity marker. As Anwar's students interviewees indicated, it
is a divider, separating the "pure" from the "impure" Malay
Muslims. In other words, the Muslim versus infidel dichotomy no
longer separates just the Malays from the non-Malays, it has
entered the Malay community itself.
Another theme that figured prominently in Anwar's interviews
is that the dakwah Malays are critical of the Malaysian
government inspite of its Islamization policy. In fact,
government Islamization is considered a ploy to pacify Malays so
that they won't pursue "real" Islamization. As one dakwah woman
put it:
We're anti-government. This system is unlslamic. They say
we can't have Islamic law because it is a plural society.
But it was a plural society, too, during Prophet Muhammad's
time and there was still Islamic law- But this government
says there are other laws better than God's law for this
society. Man-made laws are better? Something's wrong with
them. We have to correct them. They are unlslamic.
The government's Islamization programme is only aimed at
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restraining the rise of Islam, not at implementing Islam.
The government may have set up an Islamic bank, but then why
allow those Western banks to operate? They should slowly be
converted into the Islamic banking system. If the
government were to implement Islamic law, automatically
people will change. Instead this government paints a bad
picture of Islam being inappropriate for a plural society.
It is the responsibility of every Muslim to uphold the
syariah. Then our salvation is guaranteed, (quoted in Anwar
1987:69-70)
Another student expressed similar sentiments:
But the government's Islamisation policy is a load of
rubbish. It is a political manoeuvre on the part of UMNO in
the face of Islamic revivalism and the PAS challenge. The
government is not sincere. The government doesn't even
accept Islam as the basis of authority. They're always
talking about making use of the positive aspects of Islam.
What they're implying is that some aspects of Islam are bad!
If they can't implement Islam because Muslims do not form an
overwhelming majority, why do they implement British laws?
The British do not form the majority in this country.
(quoted in Anwar 1987:75)
The overall thrust of Anwar's interview findings is that the
Islamic resurgence movement is making Islam a divisive issue
among the Malays. Whereas before, any minimal commitment to keep
the pillars of Islam, regardless of one's relationship to
traditional spiritism or modern secularism, was sufficient to
include a Malay in the Islamic fold. Islamic revivalism has drawn
a line in the sand, demanding every Malay to expose his or her
true colors.
Concluding Comments and Questions
If a wedge is in fact being driven into Malay society, it
may be a hopeful sign for Malay evangelism. A couple of Anwar's
Malay interviewees shared that they were closer to non-Malays
than they were to Malays they regarded as Muslim extremists.
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Perhaps the belief that to be Malay means necessarily to be
Muslim is breaking down. Moreover, while the Islamic
fundamentalists in Malaysia are more vehemently anti-Christian
than Malays have ever been before, and are imposing ever stricter
limitations on Christian evangelism in Malaysia, the Islam they
espouse is also more universal and less tied narrowly to Malay
ethnic identity than has ever been the case in Malaysia. In
other words, however controlling Islam in Malaysia may become,
and however restrictive it may be of other religions, the tight
identification of ethnicity with religion may be loosening,
potentially allowing more latitude for crossovers from one
religion to another. This is a matter that we will address in
the conclusion, again after having the benefit of the results of
my own student interviews.
By way of a preliminary response to this Malay ethnic versus
Islamic question, we need to realize that the very recognition
that such a divide is occurring or not is a matter dividing
Malays. Noted Malay scholar Chandra Muzaffar sees no separation
between Malay ethnicity and Islam. In fact, he views Malaysian
Islamization as a powerful means of reinforcing Malay ethnic
boundary maintenance (Muzaffar 1987:26-27). Muzaffar understands
this to be the result of rural Malays moving to the cities and
universities. Before the modern Islamic revivalist movement,
which began around 1970, the large majority of Malays lived in
small towns and villages populated almost exclusively by Malays.
In such environs, Malay identity was not an issue. When the
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Malays moved into pluralistic environments, they defensively
clung to Islam as the last distinguishing Malay ethnic identity
marker, since Malay language was now shared by non-Malays, and
Malay rural culture was being assimilated into the generic urban
subculture (Muzaffar 1987:26).
Thus, the Malay "country bumpkin" leaving the secure
confines of his/her safe, homogeneous environment, enters the
big, wide urban or university world and
becomes acutely conscious of his own ethnic identity because
the atmosphere is ethnically alien. This is especially true
of the newly-arrived migrant. In his village where almost
everyone shared the same religion and language, he would not
have had to think of his identity. In the city, however, he
has to begin to define his position vis-a-vis the others.
Given the prevailing ethnic dichotomies and the government's
pervasive ethnic rhetoric, the migrant slips easily into an
ethnic response to his new situation. He begins to express
his ethnic consciousness through Islam since by adhering to
its rituals and forms, he can develop an exclusive identity
that does not require him to establish contact and
communication with the non-Muslim inhabitants of the city.
In other words, what he does in reality is to build an
ethnic cocoon around himself but rationalized and
legitimized in the name of Islam. Ethnic identity then is
protected by a veneer of religion. (Muzaffar 1987:26)
The question raised by Muzaffar 's argument is if Islam is a
universal religion that transcends ethnic boundaries and opposes
factionalism, how then do we account for the alleged reality that
Malaysian Islamization is more sharply dividing Malays and non-
Malays and even erecting walls between Malays themselves?
Muzaffar hypothesizes that Islamic revivalists, like most people
who live in an ethnically diverse society, are subconsciously
pushed toward an identity consciousness. But instead of
expressing itself in ethnic-cultural terms, it is expressed
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through religion. Hence, the Malay non-Malay dichotomy now
becomes the Muslim non-Muslim dichotomy- But given the fact that
practically all Malays are Muslims and the overwhelming majority
of Chinese and Indians are non-Muslims, "it still boils down to a
deep attachment to an exclusive conception of identity" (Muzaffar
1987:26-27) .
Our study of Malay students in the U.S. deals with the
Malay-ethnic vs. Islamic question. We want to discover if Malays
see themselves as Malays who are Muslims or as Muslims who are
Malays. A major goal of the interviews was to ascertain the
Malays' level of commitment to Islamization and the concomitant
effect it has on their view of traditional Malay culture and on
inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia. We also want to see how the
Malays responded to their entry into the United States, a
pluralistic society in which, unlike Malaysia, by race and
religion they are a small minority- Moreover, did an extended
sojourn outside of Malaysia change their views about themselves,
their government, Islam and other religions? We now focus our
attention more specifically on Malay international students.
CHAPTER 4
International Student Adjustment to Change
"I shall soon be stepping into an unknown world
in a foreign country after two years in this
college. I am wondering what this world into
which I shall be venturing has in store for me.
How shall I behave among the people there?
Shall I be myself or shall I change?"
�a male Malay student just prior to his going to the
United States to complete his university training.
The Malay student profile is based on personal interviews of
a select group of Malay students who were enrolled in American
universities in the fall of 1992. The interviews have a twofold
purpose. One is to add to our picture of who the Malays are,
especially concerning their views of the interplay between Islam
and Malay culture. The other is to note any changes that may
have occurred in their beliefs or practices as a result of their
overseas sojourn. The findings are helpful in discovering how we
may be able to present a positive Christian witness to this group
of Malays who are so influential in shaping their society. With
this in mind, it is important to examine the field of
international student adjustment to change.
Results of Cross-cultural Contact
Contact Leads to Positive Attitudes
toward Americans
One of the earlier comprehensive studies is the so-called
Gardner Report, issued in 1963 in two forms, one as a report to
Congress (Gardner 1963a) and the other as a publication for
general distribution, (Gardner 19 63b) . The study was undertaken
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under the auspices of the United States Advisory Commission on
Education and Cultural Affairs. Some 2,969 former grantees from
20 countries who had studied in the U.S. between 1949 and 1960
completed questionnaires, and their opinions were compared to
those of 1,116 non-grantee leaders in the same countries. The
survey concluded that while study in the United States does not
bring about a uniformly favorable point of view on all aspects of
the American scene, it is particularly successful in promoting
mutual understanding and in helping to dispel many misconceptions
and ugly stereotypes about American people held by international
visitors (Gardner 1963b: 37). Although the returned grantees were
exclusively those who had studied in the U.S. under State
Department-sponsored programs, the results of the early study
bear remarkable similarity to those of many other studies of
international students in general.
Pool (1965:123) affirms that cross-cultural contact results
in "reduction of stereotyping�the shifting of the traveler's
images from simple black and white perceptions to more qualified
perceptions of the foreign reality." This statement is
consistent with the findings of George Coelho (1958:111) and
Selltiz, et al. (1963:78) that with time internationals develop a
more complex perception and more differentiated attitudes toward
Americans and American institutions.
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Some studies, especially those on racial prejudice, have viewed
exposure as the critical factor in attitude change."'' Studies of
attitudes have found that experience with objects, people, or
events tends to lead to more permissive appraisal and less
stereotyped attitudes (Frenkel-Brunswick 1958:645). In line with
this, James Orr, Jr.'s extensive review of completed follow-up
research on international students who studied in American
colleges and universities, found that former students considered
themselves to have become more flexible in their thinking as a
result of their sojourn (Orr 1971:125).
Scores of programs promoting cross-national contact begin
with the assumption that contact per se will enhance the
favorableness of attitudes toward the nations visited (Salter and
Teger 1975:213). One major problem in many of these studies may
be the failure to take into consideration the difference between
genuine and superficial contact. Allport (1954:2 64) notes that
"only the type of contact that leads people to do things together
is likely to result in changed attitudes." This type of
"genuine" contact should be distinguished from superficial
contact, in which other persons are physically present although
the subject does not actively interact with them (Basu and Ames
1970:7) .
The classic study in this regard is Morton Duetsch and Mary
Evans Collins, International Housing (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1951) .
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Along these lines, Selltiz and Cook (1962) found that simply
the amount of time spent in another country had little effect on
the international attitudes of visitors; however, the proportion
of free time which had been spent with the host nationals
correlated with how favorable the attitudes towards them were.
Unfortunately, in the Selltiz and Cook study there was no
pretest; so it was impossible to determine whether more
interpersonal contact led to more favorable attitudes, or vice
versa. Kumagai (1977:44) tested this exact question with regard
to Japanese students in the U.S. Her findings clearly indicate
that interaction with Americans influences favorability toward
Americans more than favorability towards Americans influences
interaction with Americans.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that openness toward
American values, flexibility in thinking, and adjustment to the
U.S. are positively related to the amount of personal involvement
with Americans. None of the studies focus specifically on Malay
students, but the fact that there is such broad support for this
finding, and the indication that similarities between groups of
international students outweigh the differences (Spaulding and
Flack 1976:74), allow us to assume that the same is true for
Malays .
Sewell and Davidson (1956:17) developed a scale of contact
of international students with members of the host country.
Using this scale in a study of Scandinavian students in the
United States, they discovered that the extent of contact with
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people in the United States positively contributed to favorable
attitudes toward their host country. Gandhi (1974:36), studying
Indian students at the University of Minnesota, concluded that
those who had more social and cultural contacts with Americans
adopted more of the Western lifestyle. Triandis and Vassilou
(1967:326) studied maximum, medium, and minimal contact groups,
and found a positive correlation between contact and favorability
for Greeks in the U.S. In a similar study involving Irish and
British students in the United States in 1972, James Davis
(1973:69) found that the greater the involvement with Americans,
the more positive the students' attitudes toward Americans.
Students who reported the least involvement with Americans were
the most likely to reinforce or create critical attitudes. Chang
(1973:75) found that Chinese international students' attitudes
toward the U.S. are positively associated with contact with
Americans. Similarly, Basu and Ames (1970:14) found that the
formation of attitudes potsitive to the United States by
international students in the U.S. is inversely related to the
degree of felt alienation from the mainstream of American
culture.
In an early study of interpersonal relations of
international students conducted by the Institute of
International Education in 1952 (An Analysis of First Reports
from Foreign Exchange Students. Academic Year 1951-1952: 1953) ,
it was concluded that having good interpersonal relations with
members of the host country is the most important factor
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contributing to the process of attitude formation toward the
United States. Altbach and Wang's review (1989:113) of several
studies, which interviewed a total of 969 students, supports the
above findings. Those with close American friends felt more
satisfied with regard to their U.S. university, and also held the
most favorable opinion of the American people.
Contact Leads to Openness
More important for our purposes are the findings that
suggest that contact with Americans helps international students
become more flexible in their thinking and more open to
innovation. Kelman (1962:86) found that friendly interchange
between international students and Americans "creates a powerful
potential for attitude change in the recipients." It provides
the motivation and openness for examining and accepting new
information. Likewise, Niyekewa-Howard (1970:72) found that
individuals who associate closely with people of the host culture
increase their cognitive flexibility and creativity. Sharma and
Jung (1985:38) demonstrated that the more a particular group of
international students related with Americans, the more they
demonstrated cultural pluralism and world-mindedness . Finally,
in a study of Malaysian students (not differentiated in terms of
race) in New Zealand, it was determined that the biggest factor
affecting their flexibility of attitude was their level of
participation in the host country (Hamid 1979:270).
Although it is reasonable to hypothesize that genuine
contact leads to attitude enhancement, the positive or negative
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aspects of the contact experiences are also important. Miller
and Bugelski (1948) and Razran (1954), for example, reported that
positive and negative experiences can cause corresponding
attitude change toward objects having no direct connection with
the experience, apparently through a generalization of affect.
Thus, under negative conditions, contact might be expected to
result in negative attitude change, even if the contact is
genuine. Applying the work of Miller and Bugelski, and Razran to
international students' experience in the U.S., Salter and Teger
(1975:221) came up with results which are consonant with the
theory of generalization of affect. Rather than responding in a
dimensionally specific way, students generalized their feelings
about those dimensions with which they had come into contact to
other dimensions with which they had not come into contact.
Thus, for example, students who adjusted well to the U.S. and who
did not feel isolated from American culture, reported favorable
attitudes toward American religious practices, whether or not
they had any direct exposure to them, and vice versa (Salter and
Teger 1975:218) .
Contact Leads to Better Adjustment
A closely related aspect of international students'
attitudes toward the U.S. is the degree of the students'
adaptation and adjustment to the American culture (Sewell and
Davidson 1956:10). Again, we find that a key ingredient here is
relationship with Americans. Surdam and Collins (1984:243) note
that one of the main factors in successful adaptation of
279
international students in the U.S. is the amount of leisure time
spent with Americans. Deutsch and Won (1963:119) report a
relationship between satisfied international students and
frequency of social contact with Americans. Similarly, Hull
(1978:126) reports that international students who reported
broader and more frequent contact with Americans were also more
likely to indicate more general satisfaction with their sojourn
experience both academically and nonacademically . In a study of
356 international students at Iowa State University from a broad
spectrum of countries, Swatakipong (1979:211) found that the
level of participation with Americans was closely associated with
adjustment. Vaz (1984:131) found that greater international
student contact with Americans led to less stress and anxiety in
the students. Mickle (1984:176) found that for students from
Hong Kong in certain Canadian universities, adaptation is
positively correlated to the number of Canadian friends and
participation in activities with Canadians. These results were
confirmed by Mickle and Chan (1986:33) in a similar study of
students from Hong Kong at other Canadian universities. Ramos De
Perez (1985:161) found that the two greatest factors affecting
the adjustment of Spanish-speaking international students at the
University of Cincinnati is their English language proficiency
and their social contact with Americans. Meloni (1986:3) reports
that students who participate with host families and study-buddy
programs (programs in which international students are teamed up
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with American student partners) report less adjustment problems
than students who do not.
We have seen that interaction with Americans is important
for the formation of positive attitudes toward America, social
adjustment, and flexibility of thought. Those international
students who reported broad and frequent contact with Americans
were the most likely to indicate general satisfaction with their
sojourn experience both academically and nonacademically.
It is worth mentioning here that when two phenomena are
significantly related, that in itself does not indicate which is
the cause and which is the effect. There is always the
possibility that, in this case, both the amount and nature of
contact with Americans, on the one hand, and the dissatisfaction
or satisfaction with the experience in general, on the other, are
due to something that might best be referred to as the
"personality" of the individual international students. Certain
types of people may be more ready to make contacts, more
successful at it, and also more inclined to look on the bright
side of what they experience. It is beyond the scope of this
study to attempt to evaluate this possibility. Nevertheless, it
seems clear that contact with Americans is related to a positive
sojourn experience. Contact in itself may in fact be one of the
most crucial variables influencing an international student's
sojourn experience in the United States.
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Friendship Factors
Internationals Often Find it Difficult
to Befriend Americans
Not only is contact with Americans important for attitude
transformation and openness to religious innovation, but
international students in general report a desire for American
friendships (Altbach and Wang 1989:150). The sad truth is that
many find it difficult to befriend Americans and to gain
acceptance by them. Meloni (1986:4) reports that among the most
common social problems of international students are
understanding American social customs, and making friends and
acceptance in social groups. Similarly, Amoh (1984:150) found
loneliness and negative remarks and attitudes from some American
students to be among the major reported social problems of 64
randomly selected newly arrived international students. In a
comparative study of Chinese students in universities in the
U.S., American students in universities in the U.S., and Chinese
students in universities in China, Hsu (1983:112) discovered that
international students felt significantly more socially isolated
loneliness compared to both American students and students in
their native country. Lozada (1970) found that about one-fourth
of the international students at Purdue University in 1969 felt
dissociated from the mainstream of American life, and general
dissatisfaction was expressed with the strength and nature of
friendships formed with Americans. Jarrahi-Zadeh and Eichman
(197 0) report that Middle Eastern and Indian students at the
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University of North Carolina felt that American students showed
little interest in them. The findings of Miller, et al.
(1971:130), based on questionnaires and interviews with East
Asian students at the University of Wisconsin and American
students in East Asia, revealed that: 1) international students'
warm intimate contacts are almost exclusively limited to their
co-national group; 2) their relations with host-country nationals
rarely go beyond superficial pleasantries; 3) they are
discouraged about any prospects for deep cross-cultural
friendships.
Many Internationals Prefer Co-nationals
over Americans
Interestingly, while many international students report a
desire for American friendships, in actual practice, many of
those same students seem to prefer co-nationals as friends
(Altbach and Wang 1989:150). In a study (Furnham and Alibhai
1985:718) of the friendship networks of 140 international
students from each continent, the data revealed that the students
showed a strong preference for co-national friends first, other
internationals second, and host nationals last. Leong and
Sedlacek (1986:427) discovered that international students are
more likely than students from the U.S. to prefer faculty members
and counselors and less likely to prefer American classmates for
help with all kinds of problems. Shankar (1987:139) reports
similar findings in a study of internationals at four American
universities. The majority of international students go mainly
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to two support groups: their professors and/or to the students
who come from their own countries. Very few seek help from
American students. Bochner (1985:691) reveals that even
international students living at international houses with
students from their country as well as with students from the
host country, overwhelmingly choose co-nationals as friends.
Studies show that international students from Western
industrialized countries tend to socialize more with Americans
than do students from non-Western and less-industrialized
countries (Tanner 1968:34). Supporting this general conclusion
are studies by Antler (1970:51), who finds that international
medical residents have more intense social contacts with
compatriots than with host country nationals. Klein, Alexander,
and Tseng (1971:83) found that more than half of the Asian
students studied had not established significant social
relationships with Americans during their stay; and those who did
not do so considered Americans insincere, superficial, and
incapable of real friendship. Some of Klein's student subjects
reported no American friends, and some reported themselves to
have become "more Asian" as a result of their time in the U.S.
Miller, et al. (1971:129) discovered that international students
may go so far as to reject co-nationals who form close ties with
Americans .
For international students, the choosing of compatriots over
Americans, while reporting a desire for American friendships, may
reflect a discrepancy between their ideals and their behavior in
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actual practice. Preference for co-nationals may, on the other
hand, be the reaction to perceived rejection and difficulty in
forming friendships with Americans. In either case, the result
is that for the majority of international students in the U.S.,
relationships with Americans are peripheral.
International Students Are Influenced
Little by Americans
Furthermore, international students are influenced little by
the lives of individual Americans. In a study of the judgment of
others on the self -concept of international students, Lee
(1984:131) found that the students perceived the image of
themselves held by friends in their home countries as the most
important, that held by American students as least important, and
that held by others ranking between the two. Mowlana and
Mclaughlin (1969:512) found that international students develop
attitudes about the U.S. primarily from aural media such as radio
and television, then from U.S. and foreign publications, and only
lastly from personal communication. Basu and Ames (1970:11)
support this finding. They report that after-arrival information
about the U.S. obtained by international students comes mainly
through the mass media: television, newspapers, radio, and
movies. Sixty-four percent of the Indian students interviewed
reported going to a movie at least once every two weeks, yet, the
students' contact with American families was found to be minimal.
285
International Students Form Ethnic Enclaves
for Mutual Support
Whether it is easier to rely on the familiar, or whether it
is the result of unwillingness or perceived unwillingness on the
part of Americans to extend themselves to internationals, many,
perhaps the large majority, of international students in the U.S.
form their own ethnic enclaves. Spaulding and Flack (1976:75)
report that one technique much used by international students in
coping with adjustment to a strange social milieu is the co-
national group. The research shows that such groups offer many
positive benefits in helping the international student to cope
with the new environment and to keep alive traditional values
which later may assist in re-entry into the home culture. It
would be interesting to know whether international students are
encouraged to rely on co-nationals because their American peers
cannot offer friendship of sufficient depth, or whether, having
invested their emotional energy in a co-national group,
international students have little left over for American
friendships. Such groups may be contributing to the frequently
mentioned lack of contact between international students and the
American community (Spaulding and Flack 1976:74).
Niyekewa-Howard (1970:74), suggests that internationals form
co-national groups/cultural sub-communities as a coping behavior
utilized to establish emotional security within a culture
distinct from their own. She suggests also that such communities
discourage contact with Americans. Kang (1971:2) discovered that
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eighty percent of the Chinese students at the University of
Minnesota create their own small communities, a major function of
which is to maintain traditional values and belief systems.
Indian students reveal the same tendency to congregate together.
Ninety percent of those studied by Gandhi (1974:35), also at the
University of Minnesota, lived with or near other Indians.
Becker's study (1971:471) of international students from
numerous countries, found that many students consciously withdraw
into a "safe" environment in an attempt to guard against over-
"Americanization. " Such withdrawal typically includes the making
of invidious moral comparisons between the cultural patterns of
the two societies in favor of one's own cultural values.
Others see the phenomenon as a reaction to perceived
discrimination. Sable's study (1975:72) of internationals at
eight Kentucky universities found that the students felt
discriminated against, causing them to retreat into ethnic
enclaves. Suzuki (1979:378) proposed that international students
behave like minority groups, and as such, strengthen their own
ethnic identity in their struggle to survive in the wider
society- Carey and Mariam (1980:129) developed this notion
further. They too emphasized that the tendency of international
students to withdraw into their own small communities and
associate with their own compatriots can be partially attributed
to the constant conflict (real and perceived) of values and
beliefs to which internationals are exposed by virtue of their
minority status.
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Similarly, Hendricks and Skinner (1977:124-127) see the
ethnic-enclave syndrome as an adaptive social pattern stemming
from the legal and social status of the international student as
that of an outsider. In attempting to cope with their financial,
legal, and social situations in the U.S., international students
must operate from the position of the legal and social statuses
ascribed to them and over which they have little control. The
legal classification "alien" is supportive of the notion
prevalent among Americans that foreign students belong elsewhere,
that they are extrinsic to the social system in which Americans
are involved, and that they are transients to the U.S. society
(Hendricks and Skinner 1977:124-125).
In fact, because much of the international student
population resides in university dormitories and because they are
largely restricted to on-campus employment, the international
student in many ways is more intrinsic to the university than are
many American students who live and work off campus. Coupled
with this is the fact that many international students are in the
United States at enormous personal and familial sacrifice, often
taking maximum course loads to reduce cost by staying in the U.S.
as short as possible. For many American students, conversely,
their university experience is not nearly the intensely focused
period that it is for international students. Thus, the
individual international student tends to operate within a
limited social field, which primarily includes people who play
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instrumental roles in the student's strategy for coping
(Hendricks and Skinner 1977:125).
Size of School Variable
One variable that may affect this process is the size of the
school. Selltiz, Hopson, and Cook (1956:51) found that
international students in small colleges and towns had greater
opportunities for contact and interaction with Americans than did
students in large towns and universities. Hagey (1968:158) found
that the smaller the school the better the student's adjustment.
A more recent study conducted by Baldassare and Katz (1987:44)
(which may be a reflection of a change in American society since
the earlier study) appears to contradict the findings of Selltiz,
et al. The study suggests that even for international students
attending universities located in small towns, there was very
little interaction between international students and
townspeople. Fewer than one in three international students
surveyed knew at least "some" town residents by name. More than
half the international students did not recollect either pleasant
or unpleasant encounters with townspeople. Moreover, townspeople
were generally unaware of the presence of the international
students. The majority of contacts that were made were business-
related. What makes the Baldassare and Katz study incomparable
with those of Selltiz, et al., and Hagey is that Baldassare and
Katz looked only at small town settings, regardless of how large
the university itself may have been.
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Duration of Soiourn Variable
An important aspect of international student adjustment and
patterns of behavior is the duration of sojourn variable. Some
studies (most notably Mickle 1984, and Kumagai 1977) indicate
that international student relations with Americans improve over
time. Becker (1971:477), on the other hand, found that the
longer students are in the U.S., the more likely they are to
withdraw into congenial social niches and live with compatriots
rather than with foreigners. How, then, if at all, does time of
stay in the United States affect international students'
attitudes and perceptions?
U-Curve Phenomenon
The reader of sociological and educational literature
devoted to the issue of international students in the U. S. is
bound to come across the notion of the U-curve pattern of
adjustment and attitudinal changes. First described by Lysgaard
(1955:45-51), several subsequent studies critique and expand the
hypothesis. In its original version, this hypothesis proposed a
sequence of periods and types of experiences common to many
international students. The first period, immediately upon
arrival, is marked by high expectations, a friendly reception,
and the pleasure of discovery, but is soon followed by a period
of increasing difficulties during which the student has to cope
with a multitude of emerging problems. This low point in the
curve ultimately yields to a third period, as departure for home
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approaches, in which the student has learned how to function in
the host country and thus exhibits a more positive attitude
toward the society and environment. Often this more positive
stage is reached only during the second year of the sojourn so
that many students on shorter courses of study leave at periods
of considerable adaptational distress. Day (1968) studied three
groups of internationals at Oklahoma State University: those who
had been in the U.S. (1) 1-10 months, (2) 11-21 months, and (3)
22+ months. Consistent with the U-curve hypothesis, the middle
group reported the least favorable view of the United States
(p. 112). Chang (1973:73) got the same results for Chinese
students, though his time periods differed slightly: (1) 3 months
or less, (2) 7-18 months, and (3) 2 5+ months. It is noteworthy
for our interests that Day (1968:112) found his middle group to
be the most concerned with religious practice. In a related
study, Altbach and Wang (1989:150) found that the students in the
middle time period had the least favorable opinion of the
American people. Altbach 's time divisions were: (1) less than 1
year, (2) 1-2 years, and (3) 2+ years.
Among other studies that generally confirm Lysgaard 's
hypothesis are those by Heath (1970:66), who found that the U-
curve proposition generally applied to students residing in the
Berkeley International House, and by Selby and Woods (1966:143),
who reported an angular V-curve whereby non-Europeans showed a
sharply dropping morale during the early months and a more
gradually rising morale in later months of a one-year stay.
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Tanner (1968:7) found a U-curve progression operating in
friendship patterns. At first international students would make
friends with other nationalities, then contact and associate with
compatriots, and toward the end of their stay begin to have
friends among other nationalities again.
In a comparative study of Indians, Israelis, and Europeans
at UCLA, Becker (1968:435) found that the U-curve operated in
reverse for students from semi-or underdeveloped countries.
Students from these arrived with greater anxieties and exhibited
hostile attitudes early and late in their visits, but developed
more favorable attitudes toward the middle periods of their
sojourn. Becker also discovered that "psychological time," the
overall percentage of sojourn elapsed, was more important than
actual time, number of months or years, in examining the U-curve
phenomenon. Clements (19 67:8) in a very limited study of nine
students in a summer program, noted marked changes in attitudes
toward the U.S. and toward Americans shortly after arrival, but
much less change subsequently. Finally, Le Castre (1987:212), in
a study of students throughout the State University of New York
system, found no support for the reputed U-curve hypothesis.
In summary, with regard to the U-curve hypothesis, recent
studies are inconclusive. It has been found to operate in
several situations, but not in others, suggesting that it is by
no means universally applicable and needs to be further tested
with a variety of carefully defined independent variables.
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Thus far we have found that close contact with Americans
fosters adaptability, cognitive flexibility, and openness to
change in international students. We have also found that many
such students do not develop close contacts with Americans, but
instead cloister themselves into ethnic enclaves. Furthermore,
we have determined that duration of stay studies are
inconclusive, but that attitude fluctuations are likely to occur
through time.
Attitude toward Home Country
We will now consider attitude toward the home country-
Although Becker (1971:480) suggests that longer term students
(over two years) show less patriotism and nationalistic fervor,
most studies show no long-range decline in patriotism. To the
contrary. Pool (1965:124) declares that "in many cases the most
profound effect of their stay in a strange land is a better
appreciation and understanding of their home country - a firmer
attachment to its values." He does mention "a minority of cases
in which travel alienates the traveler from his homeland," but he
concludes that "these conditions of disaffection are far less
often realized for the traveler than are the conditions of
patriotic reinforcement. Renewed attachment to the homeland is
the normal effect of travel." Alsawad's study (1991:123) of
United Arab Emirates students revealed that greater exposure to
American culture is related to less agreement with traditional
values, but that most students revert to observing traditional
customs when they return to the United Arab Emirates. Kumagai
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(1977:46) found that Japanese students' sojourn experience served
to increase their appreciation of American culture and society,
but not at the expense of a lowered appreciation of their own
culture. The overall findings of such studies align with
Markham's report (1967:193) that international students' images
of peoples and political leaders in their homelands change only
slightly during their stay and, if anything, students become more
positive toward their home country.
Change in Religious Perspective
Regarding change in religious perspective specifically, a
number of studies offer insight. Wuthnow (1978:2 0-2 3) found
religious experimentation to be positively related, among other
things, to exposure to new ideas, and the opportunity to freely
accept new ideas. Religious innovation has also been positively
correlated to absence of co-religionist friends (Lofland and
Stark 1965:872) and absence of group participation in the
previously held religion (Volkart 1964:355).
Concerning international students, of the attitudes which
they bring with them upon arrival in the U.S., those pertaining
to basic cultural and religious values are the most resistant to
change (Spaulding and Flack 1976:35). This is confirmed by Barry
(1966:35), whose study of Thai students revealed that religious
beliefs and values were the least subject to change over time.
Hull (1978:143) though, found a slight increase in change in
religious attitude over time spent in the United States. Victor
Coelho (1972:74), studying a small group of Indian students in
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the Chicago area, found that the longer the students were in the
U.S., the less regular and consistent their religious observance
became. Gandhi (1974:37) found that Indian students staying in
the U.S. for less than two years tend to maintain traditional
lifestyles. After four years in the U.S., traditional lifestyles
(religion included) decline.
Jewish Israeli students in the United States display some
loosening of religious ritual practice, but there is no revolt
against the "old way of life" (Kedem and Bar-Lev 1983:387).
Egyptians studied by Hegazy (19 68:167) revealed greater changes
in dress and food habits than in religious and sexual mores,
though Antler (1970:26) found that Thai students, while generally
maintaining religious beliefs, developed greater freedom in the
relationship between the sexes. Becker (1971:480) confirms these
trends and suggests that the preservation of basic religious and
cultural values safeguards the likelihood of successful re
adjustment upon return.
Focusing on Malays specifically, Von der Mehden (1987:185),
as we have seen, concludes that the threat of a pluralistic
society, coupled with the influence of a radical, fundamentalist
Islam, causes Malay students to become more committed to Islam.
Moreover, their international experience and university-acquired
skills give them greater sophistication in their ability to
propagate Islam back in Malaysia (Von der Mehden 1987:185-186).
Concerning Muslims in general, Haddad and Lummis (1987:22)
note that many Muslims in North America develop an enhanced
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religious identity. Their Islam is no longer simply an
uncritical identification with the wider society, as it may have
been for them in their home countries. To strengthen the Islam
of Muslim students in the United States, and to promote Islam in
the West, the Muslim Student Association (MSA) was founded in
1963 at the University of Illinois, Urbana (Poston 1991:131).
Well-funded, highly organized and efficient, this organization
has mushroomed to the point where there are now local chapters in
every major U.S. campus (Gutbi 1991:14). The MSA establishes
mosques, student houses. Islamic service organizations, and
publishing houses, and sponsors annual conventions featuring
notable Islamic speakers from around the world. Among the many
offshoots of the MSA are the American Muslim Scientists and
Engineers (AMSE) , the American Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) ,
and the Islamic Medical Association (IMA) . There is even a
Malaysian Islamic Study Group (MISG) (Gutbi 1991:16). The goal
of the MSA and its affiliates is to integrate Islam with all
aspects of life and to see Islam override every other affiliation
(Gutbi 1991:14). It also advocates an emphasis on the values of
international Islam as opposed to particular local forms of Islam
(Poston 1991: 130) .
The lofty ideals of groups like the MSA notwithstanding, a
considerable number of Muslims in the U.S. become more staunchly
Islamic as the result of a specific reaction to the cultural and
environmental situation (Poston 1991:126). Poston (1991:126)
believes that "these reactions are often not grounded in a
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clearly defined Islamic ethos," and that "this occasionally
results in a confusion between particular, ethnic, and
nationalistic considerations and what may be considered truly
Islamic matters." Moreover, Poston (1991:126) contends that most
have not been able to "think in terms of a supracultural form of
Islam not identified with any specific ethnic background."
Some additional comments remain to be made concerning the
likelihood (or unlikelihood) of religious change in Malay
students in the United States. The first is that studies
indicate that those who major in social sciences are more change-
oriented in general than those who major in the natural sciences
and engineering fields (Spaulding and Flack 1976:52). Moreover,
attitude change has been found to be inversely related to the
degree of authoritarianism (defined as a personality trait
characterized by a passive acceptance of authority) (Basu and
Ames 1970:5). In Hamid's comparative study (1979:270), it was
found that Malaysian students in New Zealand were much more
likely to fit the authoritarian character than were their New
Zealand counterparts. Matheny (1981:5-6) discovered that Arab
Muslims in times of transition are far more receptive to
religious innovation than are those not in a state of transition.
While Matheny 's subjects were not Malays and were not in the
United States, there are common elements in that our subjects,
like Matheny' s, are Muslims in a transitional period. Finally,
it is known that education in and of itself tends to foster a
sense of openness to new ideas.
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Interview Data Collection
The Students
The research methodology for the semi-structured interview
of Malay university students requires some detail since it is an
empirical study. Although Malay students currently enrolled in
American universities come from a cross-section of Malay society,
their intensive two-year program in preparation for their U.S.
sojourn, and certainly, their U.S. experience itself, make them a
distinct class of Malays. While their backgrounds are typical of
most Malay youth, their university degrees and international
exposure will place them in positions of responsibility and
leadership in Malay society upon their return. The interviews
will enable us to judge the influence of Malay history, culture,
ethnicity, and religion on this important group of Malays. Their
firsthand accounts of their beliefs and practices are an
invaluable contribution to the findings of the previous chapters.
The interview data dovetail that of the religio-cultural
analysis in that they probe the relationship between Malay
traditional culture and Islam. They also explore the degree to
which contemporary Malay students cling to an exclusivistic Malay
ethnic identity and/or orthodox Islam.
The interviews also enable us to examine the extent to which
Malay international students change their views as a result of
their sojourn in the United States. Specifically, we will see
whether their adherence to Islam becomes either strengthened or
weakened as a result of their freedom from some of the social
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constraints of their home and their exposure to a broader range
of ideas. The degree to which they maintain, fortify, or relax
their Malay ethnic identity will also be explored. The very fact
that they change or do not change in any given area is
significant for our understanding of the effects of their cross-
cultural sojourn. Also, the cultural, ethnic, and religious
factors behind why they change or don't change, and how they
change if they do, can provide helpful insights into why they are
and have been so resistant to gospel presentations.
To accomplish this, I have interviewed Malay university
students at three universities: The University of Kentucky in
Lexington, Indiana University in Bloomington, and The University
of Missouri, St. Louis. To enable me to observe any changes in
beliefs or practices through time, I chose to interview a minimum
2
of 3 0 students from each of three categories: those m the U.S.
for six weeks or less; those who had been in the States for eight
to thirteen months; and those who had been here for at least two
years and who would shortly return to Malaysia. These categories
correspond to the U-curve writings, which study students at the
beginning, middle, and ending of their foreign sojourn. This
particular aspect of the research may reveal whether there is any
waxing or waning of receptivity during Malay students ' time in
the U.S., and if, in conjunction with other factors, there are
^
Thirty is the commonly understood standard minimum group
size for reliability when looking at differences between and among
groups .
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specific points in time in which they are more or less resistant
to change.
Besides the length-of-stay categories, I also divided the
students into men, women without a head covering, and women with
a head covering. The distinction between men and women tests
whether men and women are different in their views and practices.
The further breakdown of the women into two categories is meant
to check for differences between less devout and more devout
Malay Muslims (for women at least) . The head covering worn by
many Malay women is the most immediately noticeable identifier of
the more devout or fundamentalist Malay women (Anwar 1987:61-71).
The men are not likewise divided because there is no widespread
corresponding physical marker of Malay men's conformity to Islam.
I personally interviewed 98 Malay university students and
received mail-in questionnaires from ten additional students.
Because the students who sent me the mail-in guestionnaires
enabled me to reach the critical number of 3 0 for each of the
three categories (students at roughly the beginning, middle, and
ending of their stay) , and because the questions they answered
were identical to those I asked in the personal interviews, I
decided to include their responses with the data I collected from
the interviews, giving a total of 108 responses to the
questionnaire .
^
^
For a complete breakdown of the respondents, see Appendix D.
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The Malays I interviewed were typical of many, if not most,
of the Malay students in the United States. They had come to the
U.S. after already having completed an associates degree in
Malaysia at one of several government-sponsored university-level
institutes geared to prepare students for transfer to
universities overseas. Such students are sent abroad to complete
degrees primarily in the various branches of computer science and
information systems, business and economics, and engineering^�
areas in which Malaysia is particularly interested in developing
expertise, and in which opportunities for higher education are as
yet relatively limited in Malaysia itself.
The government keeps the students in Malaysia for the first
two university years ostensibly to save money. While cost is
certainly a factor in opting to keep the students in Malaysia for
their associates degrees, the two-year wait is also seen as an
important time for the students to mature, hone English and study
skills, and to receive strong indoctrination in Islamic teaching.
This last factor. Islamic indoctrination, is deemed
essential to prevent slackening of religious observance in the
United States, as well as to provide the students with a
"^We have already seen that Spaulding and Flack (1976:52) found
that students who major in the natural sciences and engineering
fields are less change-oriented in general than those in the social
sciences. This may be one contributor in the makeup of Malay
students that makes them more resistant to change.
Yet, the Malay students had little choice in the range of
majors if they wanted to keep their scholarships. Consequently,
some who study to be engineers or computer scientists could quite
possibly have the inner qualities more typically possessed by those
in the humanities.
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grounding against Christian "proselytizers, " especially those who
target international students on university campuses. The
Malaysian government views Christian witness to international
students as an opportunistic preying upon those who are among the
most lonely and vulnerable. For this reason. Christian
proclamation couched in gestures of hospitality is regarded as
especially reprehensible. In line with this, students are sent
to various universities in large groups (usually 3 0 or more a
year) . While this is due to contractual agreements and
relationships with particular universities, it is also done
intentionally to provide a mutual support and accountability
network against undesirable outside influences, whether they be
temptations to throw off Malay moral constraints, or, as we are
more directly concerned about, to respond to Christian overtures.
The students I interviewed were government scholarship
students from all regions and socioeconomic strata of Malay
society. Only the Jbumiputera (Malays and aboriginals) qualify
for government scholarships. There are many Malaysian Chinese
studying in the U.S., but they all come at their own initiative
and at their own expense. The common denominator of the Malay
students is academic success in secondary school.
The Interview Process
The interviews took place between late August and early
October of 1992. The first group consisted of 36 students who
had been in the U.S. for six weeks or less. These were students
who were beginning their American university career with the fai:
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semester of 1992. The second group, those at the middle of their
sojourn, consisted of 41 students who had come to the United
States in either August of 1991 (for the start of the fall
semester) or in January of 1992 (for the spring semester), and
thus had been in the U.S. from eight to thirteen months at the
time I talked with them. The last group consisted of 31 students
who had been in the U.S. for two years or more. Because I was
looking for students who were toward the end of their time in
America, I was especially interested in those who would be
graduating in December of 1992, and returning to Malaysia
thereafter. Many, but not all of this group, were planning to
graduate in December of 1992.
The means by which I contacted the students for interviews
was based on interpersonal relationships and accomplished through
friendship networks among the Malays. The process by which I
scheduled interviews appears haphazard, but it proved effective.
Initially, I obtained from the University of Kentucky the
names and phone numbers of the Malaysian students enrolled for
the 1992-1993 academic year. From this list of 200 or so names,
I identified approximately 60 Malay names. My plan was to
telephone students, explain my project, and ask for an interview
at whatever time or place they preferred. There were a handful
of students whom I had taught in Malaysia when I was an English
teacher in one of the government preparatory programs.
Naturally, I tried to find these familiar students first, to see
if they could help me gain the confidence of the others.
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Unfortunately, I couldn't locate those few students I had known.
When I called some other students cold, their responses were less
than helpful. They would say, "I'm sorry. I'd like to help you,
but I'm too busy. Why don't you try so and so?" When I called
"so and so," I'd get the same response.
At this point I thought that I might not be able to get
enough personal interviews, and in desperation sent out some of
my questionnaires through the mail to see if that approach would
be more successful. I mailed 30 questionnaires, including a
letter of introduction and self-addressed return envelopes with
postage, to a Malay woman I knew who was a student at Indiana
University in Pennsylvania. I asked her if she would distribute
the questionnaires to Malay students she knew. She wrote back to
inform me that she had distributed them, and sent back a
questionnaire she had completed herself. To my dismay, only a
couple of questionnaires returned shortly. I wont back to
pursuing personal interviews. Eventually, e total of ten
questionnaires trickled in, and as I have noted, were included
with the rest of the data.
My next approach was to just go to the University of
Kentucky (UK) and hang out where I thought Malay students might
freguent. As I approached the King Library at UK, I saw a Malay
young woman, easily identified by her head covering, sitting on a
bench opposite the library entrance. I prayed, took a deep
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breath, and introduced myself and my project. Khadijah^ was
polite. She seemed to appreciate the fact that my family had
lived in her country and that I had not only heard of her small
home town, but knew where it was. Right there on the spot in the
hot late August sun, I queried her for nearly an hour. During
the course of our conversation, two of her friends wandered by,
agreed to be questioned, and were interviewed successively
immediately after I finished talking with Khadijah.
The remaining respondents at UK were interviewed during the
course of the next month. Some of these interviews were arranged
by students I had already interviewed. The others were "chance"
meetings. I just went to the campus, prayerfully seeking to meet
a Malay I hadn't yet interviewed. With God's help and the
cooperation of the Malays at UK, by the end of September I had
interviewed 41 of the 60 or 65 Malays who were at UK at the time.
The remaining (not-interviewed) Malay students were those whom I
could not locate or who were not willing to meet with me. All
the UK interviews were conducted in or just outside the UK
library.
With the UK pool of Malay students exhausted, I sought to go
elsewhere for additional interviews. A Malay from UK gave me the
telephone numbers of three women I had taught in Malaysia who
were now studying at the University of Missouri, St. Louis
(UMSL) . I was told that there were approximately one hundred
^All names are pseudonymous to protect the anonymity of the
respondents .
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Malays at UMSL, so there would be plenty of other potential
interviewees. When I tried calling my three former students,
only two were still at UMSL, and they both indicated through
their excuses that they didn't want to be interviewed. One of
these Malays gave me the number of some Malay young men to call.
I don't know whether she thought they would really agree to be
interviewed or whether she was just passing the buck, but these
men, like the women, hemmed and hawed and eventually declined,
indicating that they were not interested.
Having had no success over the phone, and apprehensive about
calling Malays I didn't know to ask them to do what was, for them
as Muslims, suspicious (answer questions about religion from a
seminary student working on some kind of Christian project) , I
decided to initiate my UMSL contacts in the same manner that I
had done at UK - just go there and find someone.
Accompanied by my older daughter, who was four at the time,
I drove to St. Louis and checked into a hotel that was close to
the UMSL campus. The bringing of my daughter was primarily to
enable the two of us to spend time together. It was also
purposefully related to my project. Malays are family oriented
and typically adore children. I trusted that my daughter, who
was born in Malaysia, would serve as an icebreaker.
When we reached the campus, like I had done at UK, we made
our way to the library. If the campus had one hundred Malay
students, I thought it likely that at least one of them would be
using the library on a weekday in the evening. We found the
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library and scoured it for Malays, but there were none.
Bewildered, and on our way out to return to our hotel for the
night, I saw a Malay young man who must have entered the library
while we were looking around. He looked familiar, like a former
student of mine in Malaysia. Before I could make out whether I
knew him or not, he noticed me staring at him, immediately
recognized me, and hurried to greet me. It was Zul, the student
I thought it might be. Zul was surprised to see me and genuinely
interested in why I was in St. Louis. I had not known that Zul
was at UMSL, only that he was at one of the 9 0 some American
universities approved for Malays by the Malaysian government.
Zul was most helpful. He informed me that half of the Malay
students had graduated in the spring and that for some reason,
incoming Malay students were not being sent to UMSL. Thus, there
were only about 50 Malays left at UMSL, but that didn't matter.
He gave me phone numbers and called people himself to set up
times for me to meet with people. The Malay web of relations
took over from there. In three days I had interviewed 3 6 of the
53 Malay students at UMSL.
Having my daughter proved to be an asset, especially in one
instance in which I interviewed five Malay women in a rental
house occupied exclusively by women. My daughter was a tension
diffuser in what could have been seen as inappropriate had I, as
a male, entered the house alone.
The Malay students at UMSL were exceedingly gracious, giving
us meals in their apartments and houses. As they congregated
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together, I was finding it difficult to pull students aside to
interview them individually. Besides, time was a factor, and
since many of the Malays were quite talkative, some of the
interviews were exceeding an hour. The best I could do in some
cases was to allow two or three together while I asked the
questions. I realized that this compromised the anonymity, and
thus possibly the honesty, of the responses. My misgivings were
allayed, though, by the responses I received in the small groups.
The students did not all parrot the same pat answers, but
disagreed with each other, freely challenging one another's
positions. What may have been lost by removing students from the
safety of being able to answer questions without their peers
knowing what they were saying, was gained, in my assessment, by
the discussions generated in the small group dynamic. One
student's answer would spark a thought in another student, and so
on. While the tabulation of neat answers to specific questions
was made more difficult, the data I collected in small group
settings was sometimes a case of the whole being more than the
sum of the individual parts. More information was generated, I
believe, by two or three students together, than would have been
by the combined information from the same students separately -
The last place in which I conducted interviews was at
Indiana University (lU) in Bloomington. The fact that lU was the
closest university to me that really did have over one hundred
Malay students was an important factor in choosing lU. The
clincher was that the Malay woman at Indiana University of
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Pennsylvania to whom I had written recommended Indiana
University, Bloomington, stating that she had a close Malay
friend named Nora who was a teacher at the university and who
could put me in touch with many of the Malays. Reluctant to call
a friend of an acquaintance about a potentially sensitive favor,
^
and with a measure of confidence from the Lord's assistance so
far, I decided to go to lU without calling Nora. If when I got
there I couldn't arrange enough interviews, I could always call
her.
My plan was to do exactly what I had done at UMSL. After
praying that the Lord would go ahead of me to prearrange meetings
and prepare Malays to be open to being interviewed, I would go to
the library to find Malay students. I would have those Malays
introduce me to others, who would, in turn, put me in contact
with still others. I would also bring one of my children - this
time my son.
Unfamiliar with the campus, I parked my car on the outskirts
of Indiana University and asked where the library was. It was
far from where I had parked, but that was fine, because now we
could possibly spy a Malay on our walk across campus toward the
^I had to be careful as to exactly what to tell the students
was the purpose of the interviews. I had to be specific enough to
satisfy their curiosity and right to know what the information was
to be used for. I told them the truth�that I was interested in
learning what Malay students believe and practice and how this may
change during their two-year sojourn in the U.S. When they were
assured that their responses would be kept confidential, most were
happy to cooperate. Those who weren't comfortable with me or my
project, or who simply didn't want to be bothered, weren't
pressured to talk with me.
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library. When my son and I saw no one remotely resembling a
Malay, I was becoming more and more discouraged with each step.
I thought to myself that I never should have come this far
without a more definite lead. I could always call Nora, but what
if she were not home? I couldn't afford to stay more than a
couple of days.
When we entered the hall of the main floor of the library,
there at a large table sat a Malay women and six or eight Malay
men. Always nervous about approaching students I didn't know,
but pleased at my find, I introduced myself to the Malays and
told of my interests. It turned out that the Malay woman was, of
all people, Nora! She was tutoring the others. When the
instruction ended, Nora urged her students to cooperate with me
and to bring me to their dormitory to get more interviews for me.
They dutifully complied.
These all happened to be new students who were all residing
in one particular dormitory. They took turns being interviewed
in their dorm lobby. As a student finished being interviewed, he
or she would go upstairs to send down the next student. In this
manner, my last 21 interviews were completed in one weekend.
The weeks of interviews showed God's hand at work in
superintending events and providentially arranging meetings. For
this I am humbly grateful. The interviews were harder to get and
more spread out at UK, when I had more time and easy
accessibility. When I needed many interviews in a short amount
of time, as at UMSL and lU, the interviews were there.
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I am also indebted to the 108 Malays who took time to answer
my questions. I was impressed with their maturity and their high
level of English proficiency. The latter compensated for my
inability to do what would have been better�conduct the
interviews in their own language. Moreover, I appreciate the
thoughtfulness and candor with which they responded.
I have called the interviews "semi-structured." By that I
mean that I followed an interview schedule (see Appendix E) that
I had in front of me, but did not always go through the list of
questions in order. I did not want the students to feel like
they were being grilled or tested. Nor did I want the students
to feel like they were each mechanically supplying one piece of
information to be compiled and spit out as a statistic. Instead,
I strove for informality, wanting each encounter to be
conversational. As students answered questions, I hastily
sketched down notes, encouraging then to expand on points of
interest. Later, I would fill in my notes.
Questionnaire Research Questions
The questionnaire itself appears in Appendix E. The major
topics covered (though not the actual questions asked) in the
questionnaire are expressed here in research questions (RQ's) and
operational questions (OQ's). They are outlined as follows:
RQl What are their Muslim beliefs, and how, if at all, have they
changed during the two years of study?
OQl.l What are their beliefs about propriety in male-female
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relationships, and how, if at all, have these beliefs
changed?
0Q1.2 What are their beliefs about the extent to which
Muslims should emulate the example of the prophet
Muhammad {Sunnah) , and how, if at all, have these
beliefs changed.
RQ2 What are their Muslim practices, and how, if at all, have
they changed during the two years of study?
0Q2 . 1 How often do they perform the daily prayers {salat)?
0Q2 . 2 How often do they perform the daily prayers {salat) at
the mosque?
0Q2 . 3 How often do they attend the Friday {Jumaat) prayers?
0Q2 . 4 How strictly do they observe the fast during Ramadan?
0Q2 . 5 How carefully do they observe the Islamic food
regulations {halal)7
RQ3 What are their views about relations with the state, and
how, if at all, have they changed during the two years of
study?
0Q3.1 What are their opinions about the Islamic nature of
the Malaysian government, and how, if at all, have
they changed?
0Q3 . 2 What are their views about the role of the state in
enforcing Islamic order {Shari'ah), and how, if at
all, have they changed?
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0Q3 . 3 What are their views of the role of the government in
promoting Islam in Malaysia and elsewhere, and how, if
at all, have they changed?
RQ4 What are their views of their Malay identity in relation to
Islamic identity, and how, if at all, have these views
changed during the two years of study?
0Q4 . 1 What is their awareness of the distinction between
traditional Malaysian Islamic practice and universal
or normative Islamic practice, and how, if at all, has
this awareness changed?
0Q4 . 2 What are their views of the role of the Malay language
in Muslim identity, and how, if at all, have these
views changed?
0Q4 . 3 What are their views of the identity of non-Malay
converts to Islam, and how, if at all, have these
views changed?
OQ4.4 What are their views of the identity of Malays who
convert to other religions, and how, if at all, have
these views changed?
RQ5 What are their views of the relation between Islam and other
religions, and how, if at all, have these views changed
during their two years of study?
0Q5.1 What are their views regarding the obligation of
Muslims to convert non-Muslims to Islam, and how, if
at all, have these views changed?
OQ5.2 What are their views regarding the right of non-
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Muslims to convert Muslims, and how, if at all, have
these views changed?
OQ5.3 What are their views regarding the government
restrictions on granting missionary visas, and how, if
at all, have these views changed?
OQ5.4 What are their views regarding whether or not
it is preferable for non-Muslims to be Christians or
Jews rather than followers of other religions, and
how, if at all, have these views changed?
0Q5.5 What are their views regarding whether or not
it is better for non-Muslims to practice another
religion than to practice no religion, and how, if at
all, have these views changed?
OQ5.6 What are their views regarding whether or not
non-Muslims should be required to live according to
Islamic religious law {Shari'ah), and how, if at all,
have these views changed?
Regarding research questions one and two, we are not trying
to assess the level of belief in the tenets of orthodox Islam.
In Malaysian Islam this is a non-issue. All Muslims will ascribe
to the belief that God is one and Muhammad is his prophet, that
Muslims are required by God to perform certain prescribed
prayers, fast the month of Ramadan, give a portion of their
resources to the cause of Islam, and make the pilgrimage to Mecca
at least once in their lifetime if they are able. Furthermore,
virtually no Malaysian Muslim will deny that the Quran is the
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actual word of God, received by Muhammad through the angel
Gabriel.
Unlike American Christianity, in Islam, the question of
religious fundamentalism^ is not a matter of belief, but a matter
of practice. Virtually all Malaysian Muslims adhere to the
central core of Islamic doctrine. Those who are labelled
fundamentalists are those who (1) strive to integrate Islam into
every aspect of life, and/or (2) strive to emulate as closely as
possible the lifestyle of the prophet Muhammad, and/or (3) strive
to spread Islam to less observant Muslims and to non-Muslims.
Another way to classify Muslims is to use Allport 's
intrinsic/extrinsic scale (1960:33, discussed in Stark and Clock
1968:18). Those whose religious beliefs and practices are for
their own sake, have an intrinsic type of religiousness. Those
whose beliefs and practices are for the sake of some non-
religious benefit have an extrinsic type of religiousness. In
the Malaysian context, extrinsic Muslims are those whose inner
commitment to Islam may not be well-developed or personally owned
7
Some scholars reject the use of the terms
"fundamentalism" /"fundamentalist" as catchall words with multiple
meanings. They note that Islam has no overall organizational
structure or universally agreed upon creedal statement, and that
devout Muslims express their Islam diversely (e.g., some
politically; others through propagation of Islamic teaching; still
others through personal holiness) (Denny 1987:117-118). Yet, there
is a discernable pattern of belief and practice that justifies the
use of the terms "fundamentalism" / "fundamentalist . " These elements
include belief in the absolute and holistic authority of the Quran,
Muhammad's example, and the Shari'ah, and that their "creedal and
ethical dictates. . .be publicly recognized and legally enforced"
(Lawrence 1989:27, see also Denny 1987:117).
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as distinct from the social and legal pressures for Malays to
abide by Islamic law and custom. Immersed in an Islamic
environment, there may have been no personal choice in regard to
their Islamic faith. In practical reality, there was likely no
alternative.
We turn now to the actual interview data.
CHAPTER 5
Interview Data and Interpretation
"God help me. . . . Guide me as I step into this
new, wide, unknown, strange and foreign country, U.S.A."
�a Malay student just prior to his going to the U.S.
to complete his university training
Relationship with Americans
The first subject in the questionnaire is relationship with
Americans.^ One of the very few points of consensus of the many
international student studies is that students who associate most
closely with nationals of the host country become more open to
change in their thinking and practice. We are here presented
with two tasks. The first is to determine the degree to which
the Malay students are exposed/ expose themselves to Americans.
The follow-up task is to see if there are any significant
differences between those Malays who maintain a tight ethnic
enclave mentality, and those who venture out more into the world
of Americans.
The responses to the first item, "It is easy to become
friends with Americans," give only the Malay perception of the
friendliness of Americans toward Malays. They do not indicate
actual friendships, or the Malay desirability, or lack thereof,
of friendship with Americans. To put the responses on a
measurable scale, I assigned four points to the answer category
"Strongly Agree," three points to "Agree," two points to
"Uncertain," one point to "Disagree," and zero points to
^See Appendix F for the response data to most of the
questionnaire items.
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"Strongly Disagree." The number scores for each response were
added and then divided by the number of responses to give an
average or mean response. So, a 2.0 response is exactly even,
neither on the friendly nor unfriendly side.
The overall score was 2.24, slightly on the agree side.
Only two students each strongly agreed or strongly disagreed with
the statement that it is easy to befriend Americans. The
overwhelming majority see Americans as neither very friendly nor
very unfriendly. There are some important fine distinctions
between respondent categories, though. One is that men perceived
2
Americans as easier to befriend than did women. This may
reflect Muslim culture, in which it is more acceptable for men to
become involved in society. Another possibility is that because
many Malay women dress unlike their American counterparts, this
"strangeness" may make American women reluctant to approach the
Malay women.
Another distinction in respondent categories is a possible
U-curve phenomenon. The Malays least likely to report Americans
as friendly were those who had been in the United States for one
year. Those most likely to perceive Americans as friendly,
though barely more likely than the two-year group, were the new
students (new 2.36, one-year 2.15, two-year 2.32). This may
represent an idealistic image of Americans that is subsequently
shattered upon actual contact. Lest we make too much of the
2
~~
The mean score for men was 2.35; for women who do not wear a
head covering it was 2.17, and for those who do, it was 2.13.
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difference here, we must note that there is not much difference
between any of the three length-of-stay groups.
The widest gap was not between men and women or between new
and one or two-year students. The most significant difference
here was between the individual universities as a whole. The lU
responses average 2.62; PA 2.56; UMSL 2.17; and UK 2.05. What do
these differences mean? The lU students were all new students
who lived in a dormitory. Four of the ten PA respondents to this
question lived in on-campus apartments. None of the UMSL or UK
students lived on campus. This leads us to question whether
living on campus causes Malays to perceive Americans as more
friendly than living off campus does. Isolating the 25
respondents who lived on campus at the time of the interviews, we
get an average of 2.76 for those who lived on campus, compared to
2.12 for the 82 respondents who lived off-campus. The indication
here is that those who live on campus may mingle more with
Americans, while those who live off-campus may be retreating into
a Malay-only world. They live isolated from contact with
Americans, and then come to perceive Americans as difficult to
befriend. Of course, it could be the other way around. Those
who live off campus may have chosen to do so partly because they
perceive Americans to be unfriendly.
A problem with these findings is that due to the fact that a
large percentage of the new students were from lU, and most of
the on-campus students were these same lU students, it is not
possible to determine assuredly whether it is the fact that they
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were new students or that they lived in the dormitory, or a
combination of both, that led them to perceive Americans as
friendlier than did the other Malays.
As will be the case for much of the interview data, the
students' personal comments about the subject of discussion are
more revealing than the discrete answers to the questions. Many
of the Malays said that Americans are friendly, but that the
Malays must make the first move. Several said that Americans are
friendly in class, when contact is unavoidable, but that they are
unfriendly outside of class. The Malays reported that Americans
don't show any prejudice against Malays; most are simply not
interested in knowing them.
It was universally held that it is easier for Malays to
befriend other internationals, particularly Asians, than
Americans. They said that Americans were close to other
Americans, but didn't extend themselves to internationals. A few
commented that Americans just don't quite know how to relate to
internationals because of the cultural differences. Some noted
that the difference in dress, especially of Malay women who wear
a head covering, may scare off Americans.
American indifference saddens some Malay students. One
woman said that she repeatedly tries to initiate friendships with
American classmates. She sits next to them in class, but they
never sit next to her, and they don't talk to her.
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A much more typical response, and one which runs counter to
the prevailing picture of internationals in America, is that the
Malays themselves are not interested in befriending Americans.
One woman commented, accordingly, that "Americans prefer their
own kind, but so do we Malays." A young man who said he has no
American friends stated outright that it was because he was not
interested in knowing Americans. Another said, "We don't want to
speak to Americans unless we have to." This student went on to
say that there is no reason to want American friends. Malays,
after all, have each other. Still another Malay said that the
only time he wants to speak to an American is if there is a
utilitarian reason to do so, like studying together for a class
in which he is the only Malay. When I asked one student if she
would like to get to know an American family and spend time in
their home, she stated frankly, "To be polite, I would go to an
American home if invited, but I don't really care."
Their answers to questionnaire questions eight through ten,
(which asked who their best friends in America are, how many
Americans they regularly do things with, and how many times
they've been in an American home), give concrete evidence of the
degree of interaction between the Malay students and Americans.
There were 71 one- and two-year students who responded to the
questions. Of those 71, 60 listed only Malays as their five best
friends in America. Eight of the 11 students who listed at least
one non-Malay among their top five friends included one or more
Americans among their five closest friends here. All but one of
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the 11 listed non-Malay international students as among their
best friends. Three of the 11 had one or more non-Malay
international students as a best friend, but no American best
friends. Finally, there were three Malays who actually included
no Malays in their top five friends in America.
Of the 355 persons listed as best friends in America (5 X 71
responses) , only 36 were non-Malays, and only 11 of these 36 were
Americans. The 25 non-American, non-Malay best friends were
other international students. Of these 25, 14 were presumably
non-Muslims, including Chinese Malaysians, Singaporean Chinese,
Thais, Vietnamese, mainland Chinese, and Japanese. It is
noteworthy that these are all Asians. In fact, nine of the 14
were from Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam) . Eleven of the 2 5 non-American, non-Malays were likely
Muslims, from various Muslim countries. Of these, five were
Indonesian. Looking at it another way, 19 of the 25
international students mentioned as among the closest friends of
some of the Malays, were from Southeast or East Asia.
Thus, our findings indicate that Malay students in the
United States overwhelmingly choose other Malays as friends. The
few non-Malay friendships they may make are from their part of
the world. Furthermore, a Malay is much more likely to befriend
a non-Muslim Asian than a Muslim non-Asian. So, ethnic and
national ties are stronger than the worldwide Islamic tie.
A highly significant find is that ten of the 11 Americans
listed as best friends, and 3 3 of the 3 5 total non-Malay best
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friends were best friends of students who were attending one or
another of the Pennsylvania universities. None of the
Pennsylvania schools had more than a handful of Malay students.
This indicates that Malay students in American universities
typically form non-Malay friendships only when there is not a
sizeable Malay community in place from which to establish
relationships. Again, 31 of the 32 one and two-year UK Malays,
and 29 of the 30 one and two-year UMSL Malays, had only Malays
for their five closest friends in the United States. Only two of
these 62 students had a non-Malay best friend.
Related to the previous question is the one which asks how
many American friends they have with whom they do things together
on a regular basis. Fifty four of the 71 respondents said that
there are no Americans with whom they do things regularly. Eight
of the 17 who stated that they do things together with one or
more Americans, were from the nine Malay respondents from the
Pennsylvania schools. This supports our contention that Malays
tend to socialize outside of their own group only when there is
no large Malay group available. Four of the eight UMSL
respondents who said that they do things with Americans regularly
mentioned their jobs as the only context in which such
interaction occurs, suggesting again, that relationships with
Americans often transpire only when the situation makes such
interaction practically unavoidable.
It is significant that two-year students (11 of 31) were
more likely than one-year students (6 of 40) to report
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involvement with Americans. Apparently, there is some increase
in involvement with Americans over time.
The responses to question ten (times in an American home)
further support our conclusions. Malay students do not generally
have many opportunities and do not avail themselves of
opportunities to go to American homes. Thirty-five of the 71
respondents said that they had never been in an American home; 54
had been in an American home one time or less; and 60 had been in
an American home two times or less. Only one student had been in
an American home more than four times. Two-year students were
slightly more likely to have been in an American home during the
past year than were one-year students.
The size of the Malay community again proved to be the most
important variable. Five of the 11 students who had been in an
American home three or more times during the previous year were
students from the Pennsylvania schools (schools with few Malay
students) . Put another way, 34 of the 62 UK and UMSL students
(students living off -campus and attending schools with large
Malay communities) , had never been in an American home, while
only one of the nine Pennsylvania students had never been in an
American home.
The responses from the students at Pennsylvania universities
(e.g., five of nine Pennsylvania students had been in an American
home three or more times in the previous year, compared to six of
62 UK and UMSL students) , show that opportunities to associate
with American families may be present. I suspect that most
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Malays can find American friends and even be welcomed into
American homes if Malays pursue this. My own experience verifies
this. In the fall of 1992 my family signed up with the UK
international student office to be a host family for an
international student. A host family is assigned a student to
befriend throughout the school year, and families are encouraged
to have their guest student over for dinner, and to include their
student in family outings and holiday celebrations. We requested
a Malay student, but were given a Chinese Malaysian as a second
choice because no Malays had indicated that they even wanted an
American host family. There were not enough host families
available, though, for all the Chinese Malaysians who requested a
host family. I was unable to obtain statistics of Malay and
other international student involvement in similar programs in
other universities, but I strongly suspect that the Malay non-
participation in the host family program is atypical of
international students. I attended UK-sponsored host family
gatherings such as a picnic and a square dance, and observed the
participation of international students from many countries, but
never saw a Malay, although Malays are one the largest groups of
internationals at the University of Kentucky.
Questionnaire item 11 is also revealing. Not a single one
of the 107 respondents to this question was living with a non-
Malay. Only one student was living alone. The rest were living
with one or more other Malays.
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This all supports the findings that Malays university
students in the United States have a strong ethnic enclave
mentality and thus form their support networks among themselves.
When a Malay community is in place, they do not seek to associate
with outsiders.
Several students explained to me that the vast majority of
Malay students in American universities are at schools which have
a Malay population of 3 5 or 4 0 or more. Several universities
have upwards of one hundred Malays. This is mostly because of
Malaysian government contracts and relationships with various
U.S. universities, but there is more to it than that. I was told
that the Malaysian government does not like to place Malays in
universities where there will be only a few Malays. The
government wants them to maintain their identity as Malay
Muslims, and thus is reluctant to trust them to go it on their
own. Furthermore, the students themselves want the security of
living with their fellow Malays. They informed me of several
Malays who were relatively isolated from other Malays and who
were unhappy as such and transferred to universities where there
were more Malays.
Not only do Malay international students generally not
pursue relationships with non-Malays, but the evidence suggests
that there is pressure for them not to socialize outside the
group. The Malay housing situation at UMSL most clearly
demonstrates the ethnic enclave mentality. UMSL has no on-campus
housing. All the Malay students live in apartments and rental
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houses. On one particular residential street, Malay students
were occupying five houses (three of them in a row) on a single
block. More than a third of the Malays at UMSL were living on
that one block. They shared meals communally, and had converted
the basement of one of the houses into a prayer hall. Such were
the close Malay ties on that particular block that it was
affectionately dubbed "Kampung Melayu" (the Malay Village) . One
particular student, Zul, confided that he had moved away from
that street to get out from under the stifling watchful eye of
the residents. He was not free to come and go without his every
move being scrutinized. Zul, who is one of the Malays who mixes
with Americans more than most, explicitly complained of the fact
that the other Malays want to know with whom he associates.
In regard to relationship with Americans, there was no
significant difference between men and women, or between women
who cover their head and those who don't. I had expected to find
that women who cover their head would be more reluctant to
3
associate with westerners.
Also, as we will discuss later, I did not observe the
animosity I anticipated between Malay women who wear Western dress
and those who don't. Zainah Anwar's findings (1987:60-70) suggest
that there is a wide rift between these two segments of Malay
students, and that friendships do not occur across these lines.
Although the Malay women I interviewed associate most intimately
with others like themselves, there was considerable social
interchange between the two groups. I found that the overall Malay
group identity overrides individual differences.
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Religious Observance
We move now to the question of religious observance. The
international student literature'* shows that although there is
usually no major revolt against their home religion,
international students typically exhibit a lessening of religious
observance in the United States. The reverse is often the case,
however, for Muslims, especially for those who come from an area
of the world in which Islamic orthodoxy may be obscured by folk
Islam. Anwar (1987:25, 71-74) found that a number of Malay
university students in England became more devout Muslims when
exposed to the international Islamic community.
As for the United States, Poston (1991:131-132) calls
attention to the aggressive Muslim Student Association, and its
offshoots, that target universities to challenge and assist
Muslims to become more orthodox and consistent in religious
practice. Furthermore, in that immigrants are likely to be
university graduates, the overall Islamic community in North
America is now the most educated per capita in all the Muslim
world, and is therefore less likely to maintain folk accretions
to Islam (Haddad and Lummis 1987:5).
Poston (1991:126) and Haddad and Lummis (1987:22) state also
that many Muslims in the United States become more strictly
^See Hull 1978:143; Coelho 1972:74; Gandhi 1974:37; Kedem and
Bar-Lev 1983:387; Hegazy 1968:167; Antler 1970:26; and Becker
1971:480.
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observant as a result of a reaction to a cultural or
environmental situation. Thrust into a strange and open society
in which Muslims represent less than two percent of the total
population, they entrench themselves in Islam as a security
blanket and identity marker. In a survey of the entire
population of Muslims in the U.S. conducted by Haddad and Lummis
(1987:32), 45 percent reported to have become more religious in
the last four years. Only 12 percent said that they had become
less religious. This reflects, to a degree, the general
worldwide Islamic resurgence of recent years. More particularly,
though, it demonstrates that the United States is an environment
which fosters, rather than hinders. Islamic observance among
international Muslims. Consequently, I had anticipated that from
orthodox Islamic teaching and/or from ethnic boundary
maintenance, Malay university students in the U.S. might report
becoming more religious in the past year.
My findings were quite unlike the Haddad and Lummis survey
of American Muslims, or the Anwar interview responses of Malays
in England (1987). Only eight of the 72 students (11%) I
interviewed who had been in the United States a year or more
claimed to have become more religious in the last year. Only one
student said that he became less religious in the previous year.
A full 87.5% reported no change. So, by and large, Malay
students fit into neither the general Muslim category of
internationals, in which many report becoming more religious in
the United States, nor the overall international student
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category, in which many become less religious away from their
home.
Somewhat surprised by this response, I considered the
background of these students, and probed one step into their past
by adding question number 15 to see if their preparatory program
(in preparation for coming to the U.S.) in Malaysia yielded
different results. This time, significantly, 30 of 83 total
respondents (36%) answered that they became more religious when
in their two-year associates degree preparatory program in
Malaysia. None of the 8 3 said that they became less religious at
that time. Moreover, a few students who said that they did not
become more religious in either the United States or in their
preparatory program, volunteered that they had become more
religious at a secondary school boarding school.
The two-year university-level programs designed to prepare
Malays for transference to American universities are tightly
controlled environments in which one of the express purposes is
to solidify the students' Islamic knowledge and commitment before
they are released to the United States. Along with English and
the subjects related to their majors, each student had mandatory
f ive-days-a-week Islamic studies classes throughout their entire
associates degree program. Students live together in hostels,
curfews are in place, and passes must be obtained for any travel.
The five daily prayers and mosque attendance for the men are
strictly enforced. In addition, a dress code is observed which
specifies hair length for men and requires women to wear loose-
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fitting, floor-length dresses. Head coverings are encouraged,
though not required.
The end result is that if Malay international students are
going to adopt a more strict observance of Islam, it will likely
take place before they ever get to the United States. Another
important point is that the newly adopted commitment to Islam
sticks throughout these students' stay in the United States.
Either their Islam is sufficiently intrinsic (internally
motivated) to withstand the outward pull from the many and
conflicting ideologies and lifestyles available in an American
university, or the social pressure (inward pull) from the Malay
community in the U.S. is strong enough to prevent Malays from
relaxing their Islamic observance, or a combination of both.
Questions 17 and 18 asked about frequency of attendance at
mosques or prayer services. Question 17 applies primarily to
men, since weekly mosque attendance is obligatory for men only.
Women usually pray at home or together in prayer rooms designated
for such use, and devout women frequently join usra groups
(Islamic cell groups) for mutual accountability. Question 18 was
designed for women only. To include the frequency of public
religious observance for both men and women, I combined these
questions in tabulating the data.
As expected, men were more regular in mosque attendance than
were women in usra attendance. This is because women are not
required to attend public prayer gatherings, while weekly mosque
attendance is obligatory for men. One interesting find is that
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women who wear a tudung were only slightly more regular at group
prayer services than were women who don't cover their hair.
There was virtually no difference at all between one and two-year
students. Students who had been in the U.S. for two years or
more were neither more nor less regular in prayer service
attendance than those who had been in the United States for a
year.
Comparing the new students (who reported on their last year
in Malaysia) and the one and two-year students, we learn that
there is decidedly less public or group observance of Islam among
Malays in America than there is for Malay students in the year
before coming to the United States. Thirty five of the 3 6 new
students reported to have attended a service at least once a week
during the past year, compared to 39 of the 72 students who had
been in the United States a year or more.
There is an apparent discrepancy between this response and
that of their assessment of whether they became more religious,
remained the same, or became less religious in the previous year.
Malay students in America clearly attend religious services less
frequently than they do in the year prior to coming to the United
States, yet only one of 72 students who had been in the United
States a year or more claimed to have become less religious in
the previous year, and eight students said that they had become
more religious. Two of those who said that they became more
religious in the past year were actually among those who attended
absolutely no religious services in that same year.
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In answer to these findings, it must be noted that the new
students' consistency in attending prayer services in the year
prior to their coming to the United States, probably reflects
more the strict surveillance in the preparatory programs than it
does the religious observance of Malays in general in Malaysia.
The two students who reported becoming more religious while
attending no public prayer gatherings were women who also stated
that there was no usra (cell group) functioning at their
university. In fact, a number of students volunteered that their
attendance at religious gatherings had slipped since coming to
the U.S. because there is simply less availability of such
services here.
While some students complained of social constraints to be
strictly observant Muslims in the United States, more expressed
that they felt less social pressure in the U.S. than in Malaysia
to attend the Friday services at the mosque. In Malaysia the
muezzin's call to prayer is broadcast for all to hear, and Muslim
businesses and schools stop. Particularly in all-Malay rural
areas, a Malay man in Malaysia has nowhere to go on a Friday
afternoon but to the mosque.
What I think we find in the United States is that, for some
Malay students at least, their Islam is becoming more
internalized. Without stating it in so many words, some students
indicated as much. Several said that living in a country in
which Muslims are a small minority has caused them consciously to
examine who they are. In Malaysia, many of the women, for
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example, would stand out if they did not dress conservatively.
Here in the U.S., they are conspicuous (especially in the summer)
if they do. Whereas what formerly made them blend into the crowd
(e.g., wearing a head covering), is precisely what makes them
different in the United States. So, covering one's hair now
becomes much more a conscious choice.
In Malaysia, Islamic dress shows ethnicity� it identifies
one as a Malay, as opposed to a Chinese or Indian. In the United
States, Islamic dress shows religion� it identifies one as a
Muslim, as opposed to a non-Muslim. To belabor the point, the
typical American who sees a Malay student wearing a head covering
will think "there goes a Muslim," not "there goes a Malay."
While we will discuss this more when we get to the subject of
appropriate Islamic dress, many women said that they feel that
wearing a head covering carries with it a big responsibility here
to represent Islam well.
The next gauge of religious observance is the salaat , the
mandatory five daily prayer times. Here, again, the new students
prayed considerably more consistently during their last year in
Malaysia before coming to America than did the one and two-year
students in the previous year in the United States. Twenty-seven
of the 3 6 new students (75%) prayed five or more times a day in
Malaysia, while only 36 of the 72 non-new students (50%) prayed
five or more times a day in the United States. There was also a
drop between the students' first and second years in the United
States. None of the 41 one-year students, but six of the 31 two-
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year students, prayed less than once a day. The most consistent
prayers were the women who cover their hair. Here there is a
clear difference between women who wear a tudung and those who do
not. Less than half of the women who don't wear a tudung (14 of
34 - 41%) performed the mandatory five daily prayers, while a
full 94% (29 of 31) of those who wear the tudung prayed five or
more times a day. Men prayed with about the same regularity as
the women who don't wear the tudung. In that these prayers are a
relatively private matter, the women who wear head coverings may
have a more intrinsically motivated Islam than do the others.
The overall level of observance of the five daily prayers of
Malay internationals in the United States is rather impressive.
As we have seen, a full half of them go through the great
inconvenience of praying the five mandatory prayers (each of
which must be performed at a prescribed time) in a society that
doesn't make room for the prayer times. To do so, students must
fit class, work, and meal schedules around the prayer times.
Fifty eight of the 72 non-new students (81%) reported praying
more than once a day, and, surprisingly, only six (8%) said they
prayed less than once a day.
The results of the question about the fast of Ramadan
(question 20) are quite enlightening. All but one student
reported to have observed the most recent Ramadan strictly. It
turns out that the keeping of the fast is the bottom line
indicator of whether one is identifying oneself as a Muslim or
not. Approximately half of the Malays in the United States do
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not pray five times a day, and about half do not attend a public
Islamic gathering every week, and, as we soon shall see, not all
abide by the halal dietary prescriptions. Yet, virtually all
keep Ramadan strictly. The only student who did not observe
Ramadan, answered letter "d", indicating that he paid little
attention to keeping the fast. In other words, he did not even
make an attempt to identify with the fast. This student is a
young man who by his own admission was not living a Muslim
lifestyle by any stretch of the imagination. He was not trying
to fool anyone.
Ramadan functions the same way in Malaysia itself.
Observing the fast is the minimum expected of all observant
Muslims. It is the one pillar of Islam in Malaysia for which
Muslims are commonly arrested for not keeping. This is not to
say that all Malays in Malaysia fast during Ramadan, but it is
the one prescription that they dare not openly defy.
In Ramadan observance we have the perfect blend of Islam and
Malay ethnic identity. The fast is a very public and sensory
object lesson of the separateness of Malays from the non-Malays.
The observing of the fast, the communal meals at the breaking of
the fast each evening, and the joyous celebration of the ending
of the fasting month, unite virtually all Malays, whatever their
religious commitment otherwise. In fact, Hari Raya (the Big
Day) , the holiday celebrating the ending of the fast, is the
Malay Christmas, the time when extended families spare no expense
to decorate their homes, exchange gifts, and enjoy special
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holiday foods. In many ways, Malay Muslim and ethnic identity
are mutually reinforced in and around Ramadan.
The daily prayer times also serve as public Malay
identifiers. The calls to prayer fill the air. Malay factory
workers are released from the ranks at designated times to pray
together in prayer rooms. Yet, there is generally not the Malay
societal compulsion to pray that there is to keep the fast. To
pray or not is left to personal conviction. The fast, on the
other hand, is treated as a time when the Malays display a united
front of their common Islamic faith. The fast is Malay Islamic
communal solidarity in its fullest expression.^
A final question of religious observance is the Islamic
prescriptions on what is permissible for consumption. The Malay
word for this, borrowed from the Arabic, is halal. The most
obvious prohibitions are intoxicants, and pork and its by
products. Rodents, reptiles, insects, and animals with claws or
fangs are also not permissible. What makes it hard for a strict
Muslim to accept meals from Americans is that even acceptable
meat, such as poultry or beef, must be bled and slaughtered in a
certain manner. The most strict Muslims will not even eat
The way Malays observe Ramadan in the United States
reinforces Malay solidarity at least as much as it does their
commitment to Islam. From what I was told, the students break the
fast together each evening with other Malays, and not with the
Islamic community in general. Hari Raya Puasa (the Big Day of the
Fast - celebrating the conclusion of Ramadan) is celebrated more as
a Malay holiday than a Muslim holiday. Malays gather in each
other's homes to socialize and enjoy special Malay holiday foods.
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anything that has been prepared in utensils that have ever been
used to cook non-halal food.
The keeping of halal regulations is an area in which the
students demonstrated a fairly high level of commitment. Fifty
five of the 72 students (76%) who had been in the States a year
or more reported to have eaten only halal food during the past
year. Women who wear a tudung were clearly the most strict
observers of halal, while women who don't cover their head were
the least observant.
There was a significant drop in keeping of halal through
time. Virtually all the new students kept halal in the year
before coming to the United States. There was some lessening in
halal observance during the students' first year in the U.S., and
even less careful observance of halal regulations during their
second year in America. While it is clear that Malay
international students in the United States do not maintain halal
observance qui.te as strictly as they do in Malaysia, it is not
clear that there is any lessening over time while they are in the
U.S. The difference between the one and two-year students is
likely explained by the fact that only five of the 31 two-year
students interviewed were women who cover their head, compared to
20 of the 41 one-year students. The more careful observance by
one-year students may, therefore, be just another reflection of
the strictness of women who cover their head.
The major determinant of the students' level of observance
of halal food regulations is accessibility. The students take a
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pragmatic approach. When halal food is easily available, Malays
maintain a strictly halal diet. When it is not, they follow a
diet that most closely approximates halal stipulations. This was
borne out by the markedly distinct findings for each of the three
universities at which I conducted interviews. The students at
the University of Missouri in St. Louis were quite strict about
eating halal. They made it clear that except for a very few who
had gone "wild" in America and were not even attempting to give
the appearance of living as Muslims, they all ate only halal
foods. They explained that they did their grocery shopping at a
Pakistani store in town, and that they also made regular trips to
Chicago to get the right foods.
Their strictness was evidenced also in their responses to my
asking them what they would do if they were invited to an
American home for dinner. The majority response was that they
would not accept such an invitation, or that they would go to
visit, but not to eat. Some were less rigid, stating that they
would eat non-halal food in an American home in order not to
offend their hosts. One such respondent allowed that "once in a
while its OK not to eat halal." One student sought to reconcile
his convictions about what to eat with his desire not to offend,
by saying that if an American family invited him for a meal, he
would tell them in advance what he could not eat.
Unlike the UMSL students, those at Indiana University in
Bloomington were not keeping halal in the United States. As we
recall, the lU Malays interviewed were new students who were
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living in a dormitory. They reported to have observed a strict
halal diet in Malaysia, but now, in that they were on university
cafeteria meal plans, it was more or less impossible to keep
halal, short of going completely vegetarian. They noted that a
very few did observe halal rather strictly, putting up with the
inconvenience and expense of getting meat from the one halal
shop, which was "too expensive" and far from their dormitory.
The rest, giving up on eating halal in the cafeteria, at least
abstained from pork and alcohol.
The University of Kentucky Malays generally fell in the
middle between the UMSL Malays' and the lU Malays' keeping of
halal. Again, students took a pragmatic approach. Some said
that when they're at home in Lexington, they eat halal, but they
don't bother when they're travelling. One man said that he never
knowingly eats non-halal food, but if he's served something, he
doesn't check it out. Others expressed that its hard here in
America. They do their best, even reading ingredients on food
products, but "you can't always know, so you just eat." One
woman said that during her first eight months in the United
States she was very particular, but got tired of it, and now eats
anything that is not pork or alcohol. A couple of others were
also content to limit their dietary restrictions to the
minimalist approach of not consuming pork or alcohol. Even the
few students who have thrown off Islamic constraints, at least
refuse to eat pork. Even the one student who did not observe
Ramadan, and said he never prays, would not consume pork or
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alcohol. Finally, there were several of the UK Malays who kept
halal strictly. For this reason, they would never accept an
invitation to dinner at an American home.
Obviously, one wishing to befriend Malays will have to be
sensitive to their convictions about diet. Cities and
universities with sizable Muslim populations will have places
where halal food is sold. For the strictest Malays, a family may
need to purchase new cooking utensils to be used exclusively for
non-halal cooking.^
Questions 22 and 2 3 ask about the necessity of mosques in
Islam. My goal here was to see how critical the actual physical
structure of the mosque is to Malay internationals. Inherent in
this question is the importance of corporate prayer and worship
for Malay men. I was also interested in discovering if an
extended sojourn in a non-Muslim society would cause some Malays
to lessen their identification of Islam with its corporate,
societal, or "institutional" nature. Without all of the Islamic
structures (mosques, prayer halls. Islamic schools, calls to
prayer, and governmentally-sanctioned prayer times) supplied in
Malaysia, would Malays in the United States change their
Though not mentioned in the interviews, dog ownership by
Americans may also prevent Malays from accepting hospitality from a
person or family. Malays view dogs as spiritually unclean. Some
Malays will tolerate dogs in their presence but will not touch the
dogs. Others put up with situations in which dogs are kept out of
sight or out of doors. Strict Muslims may be uncomfortable in a
room in which a dog has been present, even if the dog is not there
at the time. Sensitive Christians wishing to befriend Malays,
must, of course, keep this consideration in mind.
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understanding or practice of Islam? Would the lack of societal
facilitation of Islamic practice cause them to be less observant
in the United States? Or, might the reduction in structures and
the decrease in opportunity for corporate worship cause some to
internalize a faith that might have been based on external
conformity to societal expectation?
I received 99 responses to this question. Seventy four said
that mosques are very important in keeping Muslims in the Islamic
faith; 2 3 said that mosques are quite important; and 2 said that
mosques are somewhat important. No one said that mosques are of
little or no importance.
There was a change from year to year. Thirty one of the 35
new students (89%) said that mosques are very important in
keeping Muslims in the Islamic faith, compared to 25 of 33 one-
year students (76%) and 18 of 31 two-year students (58%) . Women
with a head covering showed the greatest shift over time. Still,
this does not represent a dramatic shift in thinking, for
virtually all the students said that mosques were at least quite
important for keeping Muslims in the Islamic faith. Many
students qualified their answers by saying that mosques are
essential for men, but not for women.
Can a Muslim man be a good Muslim without attending a
mosque? Here again, there was a change through time. Only 11 of
the 3 6 new students (31%) either agreed or strongly agreed that
it is possible for a Muslim man to be a good Muslim without
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attending a mosque. Fifteen of 33 one-year students (45%) , and
22 of 31 two-year students (71%) agreed or strongly agreed.
In that Islam is not identified with or mediated through the
society in which they now find themselves, and that Islamic
observance cannot as easily be enforced here as in Malaysia,
Malay students may for the first time be faced with non-
observance of Islam as a realistic option. A few, in fact,
abandon Islamic observance (though, as we shall see, not Islamic
belief) . Most maintain their level of commitment to Islam, with,
perhaps, less consistency in practice, due primarily to the
difficulties of observing Islamic prescriptions strictly (e.g.,
eating halal food) in many places in the United States. Some,
though, faced with less societal demands to enforce Islam, and
fewer opportunities for corporate expression of Islam, become
more personally or individually devoted to Islam. It becomes
more internalized. This may explain why students increasingly
see mosque attendance as not absolutely essential.
Breaking down the responses between men, women who wear a
head covering, and women who don't, it is surprising to find that
it is the women who wear a head covering who are most likely to
allow for the fact that a Muslim man can be a good Muslim without
attending a mosque (see App. F, p. 52 6, Q#23) . Nineteen of the 31
women who wear a head covering (61%) agreed or strongly agreed
that this was possible. Only seven (23%) indicated that mosques
are essential. Conversely, 19 of 37 men (51%), and 12 of 32
women who don't wear a tudung (38%), consider that one cannot be
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a good Muslim without attending a mosque. This one finding may
indicate that those who submit to the external dress
requirements, rather than having an extrinsic motivation to
adhere to Islam, have a more personal, intrinsic faith. They do
not see Islam as necessarily mediated through the mosque. It's
not that they see the mosque as unimportant. To the contrary,
Malay women who cover their head were by far the most likely to
answer "a" (Very Important) to question 22 ("How important do you
think mosques are in keeping Muslims in the Islamic faith?") .
Though they see mosques as very important, they recognize that
the bottom line is one's personal devotion to God.
The students' comments indicate that one's motivation is the
critical factor. Several students stressed that heart attitude
is all important. They explained that some people go to the
mosque to be seen, or to impress, or out of obligation, but that
such people receive no spiritual benefit. The general feeling
was that, yes, a person could be a good Muslim without attending
a mosque, but that the very fact that a man would choose not to
attend a mosque, would indicate that he was not a good Muslim.
In other words, going to mosque won't make one righteous, but no
righteous man would not go to mosque.
The students stressed that mosque attendance is "required,"
"compulsory," "a must," and that although it is possible, it is
very difficult to be a good Muslim without the corporate prayer
and teaching of the mosque. Interestingly, some students felt
that in the United States, they need mosques all the more. They
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actually said that mosque attendance is less crucial in Malaysia
than it is in the United States. That is because mosques are
important for the maintenance of faith. The United States has
more distractions and temptations to lure one away from religious
observance. Thus, mosques are especially critical here.
One point of tension for the students that came out again
and again in the interviews was the students' insistence that
many things were "required" or "obligatory," but that there is no
"compulsion" in Islam. It was first stated with regard to mosque
attendance. A student who caught himself saying that Friday
mosque attendance is "compulsory," changed the word to
"required," so that he could remind me that there is "no
compulsion" in Islam. Many of the students who told me that one
thing or another was required, immediately came back with "but
there is absolutely no compulsion in Islam." One student who
expressed that Malays must be Muslims, turned around with the
line that there is no compulsion in Islam. When I pressed them
on this, they were never able to explain this double talk. It is
clear that in Malay Islam, there is in fact "compulsion" (Why
else would Malays be arrested for breaking the fast, or beaten
for changing faiths?) . Their insistence that Islam has no
compulsion came across as unvarnished propaganda in an attempt to
dissuade themselves and outsiders from believing the obvious.
Interview item 24 asked if Islam should be observed
strictly, moderately, or adjusted to the surroundings. Here, the
men were most likely to say that Islam should be observed
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Strictly (37 of 43�86%) . There was no significant difference
between the groups of women, though one might expect the women
who generally observe Islam less strictly (those who don't cover
their head) to be less likely to say that Islam should be
observed strictly. Here we discover, as will be reinforced in
later findings, that Malays basically all believe in (or at least
say they believe in) the tenets of Islam. As we mentioned
earlier, fundamentalism in Islam, unlike in Christianity, is a
matter of practice and not belief. Malays who don't practice
Islam strictly, even those who don't observe any of its
prescriptions, do so for various reasons, but not because they
question the Quran or the authority of Muhammad.
The responses to interview item 24, when broken down into
length-of-stay categories, suggest a degree of the U-curve
phenomenon, in which students near the beginning and end of their
stay exhibit like qualities which are distinguished from the
characteristics they demonstrate during the middle of the
sojourn. Why, then, might some Malays view the strict observance
of Islam as important at the beginning and end of their stay, but
less so during the middle? I suggest that this is so because at
both the beginning and end they are responding to the
expectations of Malaysian society. At the beginning, they are
expressing the feelings of the world they just left, and at the
end of their stay they are psychologically adjusting to reentry
into that society. At these two times, they see themselves as
indistinguishable from Malay Muslim society in Malaysia. In the
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middle, they are Malays, and they are Muslims, but they are
functioning in a vastly different, non-Muslim, pluralistic world.
It is not surprising, then, that one-year students were the most
likely to say that the observance of Islam should be adapted to
its surroundings.
The students thoughts on this subject, again emphasized
heart attitude and motive. Furthermore, though the pillars of
Islam emphasize external compliance with a specified form, many
do not feel constrained to adopt one standard Islamic lifestyle.
Some representative student comments are as follows: "Islam must
be flexible. It must change with the times and circumstances."
"We are free to adjust our relationships (referring to social
intermingling of the sexes) , but must fulfill our individual
responsibility to pray, fast, etc." "We must adapt to the
environment. We don't want to be seen as weird." Several noted
that extremes are bad. This is a typically Malaysian attitude,
where years of adjustment to the close contact between Muslims,
Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs, have led to a fear of
anything that may rock the boat, and have raised tolerance to the
supreme virtue.
Along these lines, many of the Malay students hold lofty
ideals for worldwide Islamic expansion, but in practice, the
bottom line is pragmatism. Not recognizing the contradiction
between their "theory" and practice, some who foresee an eventual
Islamic world Utopia, do not advocate Malaysia becoming an
Islamic state because that would be insensitive to the non-
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Muslims in Malaysia, and cause unnecessary tension. After all,
one has to give and take to make a religiously diverse country
operate smoothly.
Going back to an earlier observation, several who admitted
that they do not observe Islam strictly, emphasized that they are
aware that they are at fault for not doing so. None verbalized
the slightest tinge of doubt of the teachings of Islam, or even
hinted that the requirements of Islam are unreasonable. Whenever
their practices were at variance with the teachings of Islam,
there was no question as to which needed changing. One young man
who had given up praying and all other means of identification
with Islam, and had gone "wild" by identifying with the American
rock culture (earrings, skull T-shirt, long hair, and all) , said,
"I know I'm wrong in not following Islam, but I'm not perfect
yet. Maybe when I'm older and have children, I'll become
faithful." A young woman with similar "wayward" ways told me
that Islam should be observed strictly. "I know this, but I'm
not strong enough. It must come from the heart or it's not
valid. I don't want to be hypocritical."
Those who answered that Islam should be observed moderately,
typically said that religious observance should be up to the
individual. They said that every Malay Muslim must be fully
educated about Islam, so they can adopt a style of Islam that is
based on knowledge, but fits their personality and circumstances.
In other words, everyone must be educated in Islamic truth, but
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each person's particular application of that truth is an
individual matter.
On the matter of Islamic observance in the United States,
several students, particularly women, said they felt more
conscious of their Islam here because they are different. This
goes along with our suggestion that the removal from the Islamic
environs of Malaysia, causes some to more personally, consciously
identify with Islam. In Malaysia, they are like the fish who
can't see the ocean for the water.
This is not to say that in the United States there is no
social control for Malays to observe Islam. Some, at least, have
found it ironically the opposite. A former student of mine who
was at the University of Missouri, confided that in Malaysia it
was easier to get lost in the crowd. Here he is expected by his
government and peers to represent Islam. Using the fish analogy
once more, in Malaysia he was just one of an ocean of fish. At
St. Louis, the Malay community is a much smaller, self-contained
fish bowl. In the U.S., he has no anonymity, and he feels like
the Malays are always keeping tabs on each other, to make sure
that no one leaves the flock, (or should we say "school", as in
school of fish?) , or misrepresents Islam. Another student
expressed the same sentiments. "In Malaysia, I could date
anyone. Here, they scrutinize every move. I'm not supposed to
date here. They (the other Malays) are so strict." We are
reminded here of the student who moved from the Malay street for
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the very purpose of getting out from under what he perceived as
stifling surveillance.
To summarize Malay religious observance on the United
States, we begin by recounting that most Malays do not become
significantly less or more religious in America than they were in
Malaysia. The relatively few who do change are likely to become
more religious. There may be some decrease in actual religious
observance, but that is due more to the practical difficulties in
the United States of strictly adhering to Islamic prescriptions,
than to any lessening of belief. Speaking of belief, the
comparatively limited opportunities for corporate religious
expression of Islam in the United States, and the relaxing of
societal pressures to conform, cause some Malays, at least, more
consciously and personally to accept the teaching of Islam. A
twist to this last observation is that even though there is no
societal or legal compulsion for Malays in America to conform to
Islamic practice, there is strong peer-group pressure for them to
conform (possibly to compensate for the fact that societal
pressures are removed) , as well as an ethnic enclave mentality
that causes some to retreat into the safe and familiar confines
of Islam as a means of shielding themselves from the temptations
and conflicting ideologies of the broader American society.
The minimally acceptable level of identification with Islam
is the keeping of the fast of Ramadan. Prayers and mosque
attendance vary, but virtually everyone observes Ramadan. The
communal nature of the events surrounding Ramadan serves as a
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Malay ethnic reinforcer. Furthermore, while there is
considerable variation among Malay students in level of
observance of Islam, belief in the "truth" of Islam is a
constant, regardless of one's discipline or resoluteness in
living according to such teaching.
Islamic Orthodoxy
Proceeding to the subject of Islamic orthodoxy, interview
questions 25-27 address the question of the Malays' adherence to
basic standards of Islamic sexual propriety. Question 25 relates
to relations between the opposite sex for all who are not related
either by marriage or by a mahrem ("prohibited" degree of
relationship, i.e., near blood relatives with whom marriage is
prohibited) relationship. Men and women are enjoined to avoid
any unnecessary mixing. Men are "not to look deliberately and
with interest at women's attractions, to be 'friendly' with them,
or to have any physical contact with them whatsoever, but to keep
the interaction strictly straight-forward and direct" (Haneef
1985:155). Men and women alike are to behave with "shyness,
reserve and modesty" in each other's presence (Haneef 1985:157).
Moreover, attention from any member of the opposite sex other
than one's spouse in the form of free talk, compliments,
playfulness, suggestive comments, touching in any form (including
handshaking and patting on the back) ... is insulting,
degrading and very much disliked" (Haneef 1985:158).
The Malay international students are well aware of this
teaching. A powerful counterbalance is in operation, though, in
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that in traditional Malay society, women enjoyed great power and
autonomy, and were active and visible in all social settings.
Karim (1992:5) states that "the most obvious characteristic of
adat is its overall pervasive norm of ' bilaterality ' of reducing
hierarchical differences based on gender." Karim believes that
the Islamic teaching on the separation of the sexes (which she
believes functions to exclude women from positions of status) was
merely the reinforcement of the pre-existing Middle Eastern
patriarchal social order in which women were already markedly
subordinate (Karim 1992:225). Malay standards for women's
socialization with men should be seen against the wider
historical and cultural background of Malay society. The
introduction of Islam to Malaya did not alter the social pattern.
"In early Malay history, the Islamization of the Malay states did
not reduce women's power in any significant way and indeed in
colonial history appeared to be a source of power for women by
granting them an intellectual base for political activity" (Karim
1992 :xiii) .
With the tension between traditional Malay social norms and
the teaching of Islam in mind, we return now to questionnaire
item 25. The responses fell heavily on the side of Islamic
teaching (see App. F, p. 527, Q#25) . Ninety five of the 108
students (88%) strongly agreed that non-related Muslims of the
opposite sex should not be alone together. Adding the four who
responded with "agree," 99 of 108 (92%) either agreed or strongly
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agreed. None strongly disagreed with the statement in number 25,
and only seven (6.48%) disagreed.
There was little difference between the responses of the men
or either category of women, though men showed a slightly higher
percentage of agreement with the statement. A significant
difference was found between the new and non-new students. Every
last one of the 3 6 new students strongly agreed with the
statement in item 25 ("A Muslim man and woman who are not related
to one another should not be alone together") . The one and two-
year students were a little more tentative, with a few students
in each group stating that it is all right for men and women to
be alone together. Evidently, for some Malay students, time in
the United States causes them to question the teaching that it is
always wrong for men and women who are not related to be alone
together .
Islam teaches that humans are weak and that the sexual drive
is an extremely powerful urge that will "naturally seek to
express itself freely" when given the chance (Haneef 1985:158).
Nine students conveyed this belief to me through the apparently
popular Islamic axiom that if a man and a woman are alone
together, there is automatically a third party present in the
person of Satan. A number of students who strongly agreed that
men and women should not be alone together confessed that
sometimes they break the rule. "After all," they exclaimed, "I
am only human." One man complained that "it's hard to follow
this rule always in modern times."
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Several students agreed with this rule in principle, but
offered exceptions, such as it's all right to be alone together
if you are studying together. Several others said that it's all
right "if you can control yourself." Similarly, others qualified
the rule by stating that it depends on each individual. For some
couples it is wrong to be alone together; for others it is not.
A revealing phenomenon was uncovered starting with the
responses to item 25. Some students would speak the Islamic
viewpoint on a particular issue by stating that "as a Muslim, I
believe . . .", and then step aside from that and say something
like, "but, in my opinion ..." For example, a young woman from
the University of Kentucky said that "I know it is wrong for guys
and girls to be alone together, but, in my opinion, it depends on
what you're doing. If you have self-control, it's OK." In spite
of the fact that most of the students will at least say that they
agree with what Islam teaches, when those teachings cut against
the traditional social grain, there is, in fact, ambivalence
about how to conduct oneself.
The variety of responses to and interpretations of
straightforward Islamic teaching is evidenced in the responses to
items 26 and 27 of the questionnaire, which pertain to Islamic
dress codes, particularly for women. Suzanne Haneef (1985:169)
spells out the rules for Islamic dress:
7
Item 26 reads, "Muslim women should not go out on the streets
unless their hair and arms are covered and their skirts are well
below their knees." Item 27 asks, "What constitutes appropriate
dress for Islamic men and women?"
354
What is required is that a woman should be completely
covered except for her hands and face (although the face may
also be covered for greater modesty if desired) , and that
her dress should conceal her form, be loose and non-
transparent, and not of a kind to attract attention by its
beauty; moreover, cosmetics, perfume and jewelry (with the
exception of what ordinarily shows such as a ring) are not
to be worn in public.
For men, "modesty requires that the area between the navel and
the knees not be exposed in front of anyone, including other
males, excepting one's wife. The clothing of men should not be
tight or sexually provocative, nor should it resemble the dress
of women" (Haneef 1985:171).
Nagata (1984:83) observed that the most immediately
identifiable sign of dakwah (revivalist) Islam is clothing style,
particularly for women. A Malay student interviewed by Anwar
(1987:62) noted that when she wore Western dress, she was a
"pariah" to the devout Muslims. When she donned the mini-
telekung (prayer shawl) , popularly known as the tudung, she
"immediately became 'holy' and belonged to the group." Anwar
sees the head covering as the shibboleth that distinguishes
members of one group of Malay women from those of the other.
She, in fact, found strong enmity between the two camps. Those
who conformed to the Islamic dress code condemned the others as
wantonly spurning God's commands by fraternizing with the evils
of Western society. On the other side, those who did not follow
the Islamic code, labeled those who did as self-righteous,
hypocritical kill- joys.
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With this in mind, expecting to find a mutual antagonism
betwe the two groups of women, I approached this topic with
special interest. Surprisingly, there was virtually no
difference in the responses of the two groups. The women who do
not cover their hair, overwhelmingly acknowledged that Muslim
women should not go out in public without long skirts and their
hair and arms covered. Though not statistically significant,
there was actually a higher percentage of women who don't wear a
head covering who either agreed or strongly agreed with the
strict interpretation of the Islamic dress code (94%) , than there
was of those who do cover their hair (90%) . Overall, 92 of the
108 students strongly agreed and ten agreed with the statement in
item 26, while only three disagreed.
Looking at this from the length-of stay divisions, there is
no demonstrated progression toward or away from the strict Muslim
position. If anything, there is a slight U-curve phenomenon,
with one-year students showing a little greater likelihood of
8
veering from a strict interpretation of the Islamic code.
As with much of the interview data, the students' personal
interjections on the subject proved most enlightening. That this
is an especially "hot" topic was shown in the fact that items
A "mere" 90% of the one year students agreed with the
statement in item 26 (Muslim women should not go out unless their
hair and arms are covered and their skirts are well below their
knees) , compared with 97% of both the new and two-year students.
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number 26 and 27 (which ask about appropriate dress) , generated
the most response of any subject in the questionnaire.
We have noted that most of the students answered that they
strongly agreed that Muslim women should not appear in public
with any part of themselves exposed except for face and hands.
Some students added that this is the only acceptable position for
one who claims to believe in the words of the Quran. Yet, such a
rigid stance was exceptional. Many of the students, though not
daring to question the rules, qualify them to such an extent as
to make the rules, in effect, superfluous. Furthermore, there
was much less legalism than I had anticipated, and less
uniformity of thought.
With a few notable exceptions, most of those who don't cover
their hair said they felt no animosity from those who do. Most
of those who do cover their hair showed no disdain towards those
who don't. A few expressed that the non-complying women are
responsible to conform to what they know to be right (i.e., dress
according to Islamic prescriptions) , but most who comply with the
Islamic standard stressed that it was something that each woman
had to decide for herself. As one woman put it, "I can't judge
those who don't wear it (the tudung) . Another woman who wears a
tudung said, "It's OK for some women to go out with their hair
uncovered. It depends on the personal convictions of the
individual . "
It was some of the men who tended to be more legalistic on
the question of dress. It was, after all, the men who were most
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likely to agree that women should not go out without full Islamic
attire. A few criticized the women who don't follow the
guidelines strictly. The women's reaction to this was an "easy
for you to say." For them to comply fully with the Islamic dress
code in the United States is immediately to mark themselves as
different, even strange, in their classes. The men have only not
to expose themselves between their navels and their knees.
Otherwise, anything goes. One basically non-observant bright
young Malay woman who met me for an interview in a sleeveless
blouse, said that "the girls (those who are observant) are more
accepting (of her) . The guys are sometimes more rejecting.
Maybe that's because the girls understand better what I'm going
through . "
In most cases the less-observant women not only reported no
ill-will from the women who conformed more closely to the Islamic
dress code, but said they respected and even admired such women.
The big question remains, then, as to why those who don't cover
their hair, dress as such when they themselves agree that Islam
requires them to do so, and some even say that they admire those
who do. The nearly universal response of the women who don't
wear a tudung is that it is better to do so, but that they aren't
quite ready yet.
The head covering for women (my rough estimate is that about
half of the Malay women I've seen in the United States cover
their head) is recognized by the Malays as the point of no return
for entering into an Islamic lifestyle. To decide to cover one's
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head in the Islamic fashion is to make an unmistakable statement.
It is the rubicon that when crossed commits a person to an
irrevocable course of action. As one woman commented, "If I
start to wear a tudung, I can't turn back. I will wear it
forever." Another said, "I'm not ready to accept the
responsibility. When I'm ready, I will (wear a tudung)." An
attractive Malay woman with black leather jacket, tight jeans,
black boots, and flowing black hair (who strongly agreed with the
Islamic dress code) stated that some day she will be more strict.
Another non-observant Muslim young woman assured me that one day
she will wear a tudung, but, again, she's not ready. Still
another explained further that wearing a tudung is supposed to be
accompanied by not only changed behavior, but a changed attitude.
"Those who wear it are expected to live an exemplary life. If
you can't live up to it, you shouldn't disgrace Islam." In
nearly identical language, as if parroting a script, a different
woman said, "The tudung represents an example. If you can't live
up to it, you shouldn't disgrace Islam." Another young woman who
shared this viewpoint, said that after she is married, and
especially by the time she has children, she will wear a tudung.
She will then be responsible to be an example and teacher to her
children. One woman I interviewed confided that she was at that
very time in inner turmoil over this issue. She said that she
knew that she must wear a tudung, and that she was considering
doing so. She also knew that it would mean shifting to a
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different company of friends, and she wasn't sure if she could
fit in with them and their lifestyle.
My impression of these responses was that some of the women
were genuinely and humbly wrestling with the seriousness of the
issue. Some of these had parents who prefer that they not cover
themselves, and by so doing become "fanatical." For others, the
words "I'm not yet spiritual enough," rang out a false humility
that was more a pious-sounding excuse for their unwillingness to
remain within the confines of women's Islamic social propriety.
As one woman (who follows strict Islamic dress requirements) put
it, "Nobody is expecting anyone to be perfect, but they know the
rules. "
Again, nearly all the women say they agree with the Islamic
dress code. Those who don't abide by it say that one must first
reach a certain level of spiritual or religious maturity before
one dresses the part. To do otherwise is to disgrace the dignity
of the standard. Those who wear the tudung look at it
differently. They do not claim to have "attained" any more than
anyone else. Their approach is that one's duty is simply,
immediately, and unquestioningly to obey, and then do one's best
to live up to the standard that one has assumed. One woman said
that to dress properly actually helps one to have the right
behavior and attitudes.
A common thread spoken of by many is motive or heart
attitude. Malays recognize this as the core issue, and are quick
to point out that external compliance in and of itself is
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meaningless. As one person remarked, "If a girl doesn't want to
wear a tudung, there's no reason to. It does no good if worn
with the wrong attitude." Similarly, a woman who dresses
according to the letter of the law, said, "Some who wear it are
not sincere; it is just for show." Still another said, "If you
don't wear it (the head covering) for the right reason, it's
wrong . "
A young woman who makes no attempt to abide by the Islamic
standard of dress, opined that the Malay women she respects the
most are those who wear a tudung, and who are "totally committed
to Islam." Those she respects the least are, interestingly, also
women who wear a tudung, but they are those who wear it to put on
airs of religiosity, or to fit into a certain crowd. A different
young woman said that many wear a head covering out of pressure,
or fear of shame and embarrassment, and would rather not wear
one. For such women, the strict observance does them no
spiritual good.
Another viewpoint was that if one wants to be a good Muslim
woman, wearing a head covering is necessary, but not sufficient.
By this understanding, to be a faithful Muslim, a woman must
cover her hair and have the right heart attitude. External
compliance is necessary, but it must be accompanied by proper
motive.
The responses, overall, bring to light again the tension
between the Islamic path that Malays know to follow, and cultural
Malay Islam which does not walk the "straight and narrow" road.
361
The result is that many Malays have become artful dodgers of a
law the absolute truth of which they adamantly affirm. Islamic
fundamentalism has made it impossible to challenge directly the
tenets of Islamic revivalism. Yet, even many of the most devout
Muslim Malays aren't willing to write off their less observant
compatriots. Several students who strongly affirmed the Islamic
dress code, said that in the end it's up to each individual to
dress as she or he pleases. One young woman expressed this
contradiction and ambivalence in response to my questioning her
on whether or not she was under obligation to abide by the
Islamic code. Her exact words were, "A Muslim woman must wear a
head covering." And then, after a brief pause, she added, "But
it's really up to you." Likewise, another student said, "Islam
teaches that it (covering one's hair) is required, but it's the
individual's prerogative. It's a must, but Islam doesn't force."
A woman who does not wear a tudung emphasized, "It's definitely
not OK for me not to wear a veil, but I'm still a Muslim because
outside of the five pillars there is leeway in Islam."
A few of the women, independent of each other, volunteered
that Islam teaches that for every hair a woman exposes, Satan
builds a house in hell for her mother. "Do you really believe
this?", I asked one without a tudung. "Yes," she responded.
"Are you actually condemning your mother to extra time in hell?"
"Yes." What does your mother think about this?" "She
doesn't
care. She's even less strict than I am."
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The Malays affirm a standard to which they don't abide.
Verbal commitment to Islamic teaching is absolutely critical;
adherence to such teaching is a matter of individual choice.
Many of the Malay women I interviewed, confessed when we got to
this topic that they were technically dressed improperly. They
knew it, but it wasn't any big deal. Others offered their own
version of the dress code. Some said that the critical element
was to wear a long, loose-fitting dress. Some said the essential
part was covering their hair. With this rule satisfied, many
wore jeans and blouses, or form-fitting, brightly colored floor-
length dresses. Expressing a typical Malay pragmatism, one young
man said regarding Malay dress, "We have to be flexible. This is
American society. We have to try to fit in. We don't want Islam
to be seen as weird."
Overall, there is not a uniformity of thought regarding
interpretation of Islamic requirements. There is general
agreement as to the "truth" of Islamic teaching, but ample room
is left for Malay cultural expressions of Islam that do not align
with a strict, fundamentalist-style Islam.
Knowledge of Islamic Orthodoxy
The items under the heading "Knowledge of Islamic Orthodoxy"
were designed to test if pre-Islamic elements that traditionally
have been practiced within Malay Islam are, in fact, recognized
by the students as extra-orthodox, and if they are, if the
students accept such practices as legitimate for them as Muslims.
These questions, thus, also address the issue of whether Malay
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Islam is continuing to make room for Malay expressions of Islam
that run counter to strict Islamic orthodoxy.
The first item we will consider is the bersanding (the
public sitting together of bride and groom on a raised dais)
portion of the traditional Malay wedding ceremony. The student
responses indicate that they clearly understand that this is not
Islamic (see App. F, p. 528, Q#28) . Moreover, contrary to Anwar's
findings (1987:25,71-74),^ the Malay students do not gain a more
orthodox understanding of Islam as a result of their American
experience and resultant contact with fundamentalist Middle
Eastern Muslims. The incoming students came with a full
understanding that the bersanding has pre-Islamic roots. In
fact, the new students were the ones most convinced that the
bersanding is non-Islamic.
The eye-opener here is that while nearly all the students
believe the bersanding is non-Islamic (most, in fact, recognize
it as of Hindu origin) , a majority of the students do not object
to the practice (see App. F, p. 529, Q#29) . Those least likely by
far to object to it are women who don't wear a head covering.
The most likely to object to it are the women who do. This
indicates that women who don't feel compelled to obey the Islamic
dress regulations, are more likely to allow for non-Islamic and
even anti-Islamic elements under the Islamic umbrella.
^See also Poston 1991:126, and Haddad and Lummis 1987:22).
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Although the majority (57%) do not object to the bersanding,
a full 39% do object to it, and the remaining few are undecided.
The fact that 39% object to the bersanding is significant in
light of the fact that as recently as 1971, we have record that
the traditional Malay wedding ceremony, though replete with Hindu
symbolism, was unquestioningly and universally observed by the
Malays (Ryan 1971:52).
The fundamentalist Islamic resurgence is asserting itself
strongly. Those who object to the bersanding object to it for
different reasons, but all on Islamic grounds. Some see its
Hindu roots as incompatible with Islam. Others reject its
showiness and "wasteful spending" as contrary to Islamic prudence
and moderation. The most common objection to the traditional
Malay wedding, though, is that it "exposes" the bride's beauty to
the public, and allows for the improper mixing of the sexes.
Quite a few students suggested compromises that would allow
for the continuance of the bersanding , but in more Islamically
palatable forms. Some believed the ceremony would be acceptable
if specifically Hindu elements were excised. The problem of
ostentation and expense could be assuaged, according to some, if
spending were kept to "reasonable limits." Finally, several of
those who objected to the bersanding on the grounds of non-
Islamic dress and inappropriate mixing of the sexes, suggested
that the bersanding could properly be observed for relatives
only, or at least, that the bride wear Islamic dress instead of
the traditional wedding outfit. The point is that most of those
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who object to the bersanding, don't want to part with a beloved
Malay ceremony if they can help it, but would prefer to remove
from it whatever they deem makes it objectionable.
Anymore, the full-blown traditional Malay wedding ceremony
is rare.^� Modernization and urbanization are threatening the
rural Malay, communal lifestyle, and, of course, Islamization is
challenging pre-Islamic cultural practices. Yet, with regard to
the wedding ceremony at least, family ties and Malay tradition
are surviving the challenge. Several of the students who
objected to the bersanding said that they would, nevertheless,
agree to one if their families wanted it. One very devout Muslim
young woman put it this way, "It's not good, but it has been a
custom in our society. So, in order not to hurt my parents'
feelings I will have a (traditional) wedding ceremony." One
student expressed that although the bersanding contains non-
Islamic elements, it is right to observe it if one's family wants
it. The bersanding is a lesser evil than that of countering
one's family. A number of students suggested that it is
unlslamic to go against the wishes of one's family. Following
this understanding, "it's good to have a bersanding to honor and
please your family." Four others valued the ceremony because it
reinforces community ties. Thus, "Strictly speaking it's wrong,
but it's not bad because it is a community tradition."
Years ago weddings lasted up to a week. Now they are often
conducted within a single day.
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Still others, who are guided by Islamic teaching to believe
that if Islam is against it, it simply cannot have redeeming
qualities, are willing to buck Islam on this matter. "I want a
bersanding. I know it's not right, but it's only once in a
lifetime." Of those convinced the ceremony is wrong, a majority
said that they would do it, either to please family, or simply
because they want their moment of glory.
There is a clear tension here between age-old customs and a
new style of Islam that is seeking to uproot many such customs.
Yati and her boyfriend Ismail pensively and openly expressed the
difficulty they were having in reconciling things they feel are
harmless (like Ismail's earring) or even beautiful (like the
bersanding or Malay traditional dance) with Islamic r\iles that
say these things are wrong. Speaking of the bersanding , Yati
sighed, "I know it's wrong, but it's such a beautiful tradition."
It is an indication of the unchallenged position of Islam that
Yati and Ismail don't at all question that Islam is right. They
believe it is displeasing to God to dress as they do and to
desire a traditional wedding. On earth they "don't see the big
picture," and accept that God's reasons must be as good as they
are inscrutable. Many thus live with the cognitive and emotional
dissonance of believing themselves to be displeasing God, but
lacking the willpower or discipline to do otherwise.
Item 3 0 asks about the relatively minor practice of staining
a bride's fingertips with henna. The practice originated in pre-
Islamic Malay Hinduism as a means of protecting from evil
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spirits. Most students (74 of 87) recognize that this practice
does not come from Islam, though two students believed it is of
both Hindu and Islamic origin, and five students felt that it
does come from Islam. Six students said they had no idea whether
it was of Islamic origin or not. Although most of the students
understood that the henna staining ceremony is not from Islam,
only a few students knew of its Hindu roots. Some of the
students knew so little about this practice that they had no
opinion, indicated by the 22 responses (25%) of "Undecided" as to
whether or not they object to the ceremony.
The seven students (8%) who did object to the ceremony did
so because of its meaning of seeking protection from a source
other than God, or because, in their opinion, it is better to
exclude extraneous, "showy" or "fancy" elements from Islam.
Fifty eight students (67%) did not object to the ceremony. Most
of these felt it was neutral, neither bad nor good. As one
student said, "It's not haram (forbidden); it's just cultural."
A few believed that it is a good thing to do because henna is
good for one's nails, and a few believed that the ceremony is
good because, as one put it, "It has long been a custom in our
society. "
The responses indicate that traditional practices are losing
their meaning and importance. Relatively few of the individuals
cared one way or the other about the henna staining ceremony.
Most had no idea why it was done, and some stated that it is not
as common as it once was. The rest were either opposed to it on
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religious grounds, or else in favor of it because they believe it
is good to maintain societal customs, expressing again the Malay
culture versus universalistic Islam tension. One more
observation of note is that, as with the traditional wedding
ceremony, the Malay women who don't wear a tudung had the least
objections to this non-Islamic practice, while those women who
wear a head covering were the most likely to object.
All 108 students responded to the question (item 32) about
the direction in which a dead Muslim is to be placed in the
grave. Only one student did not know the Islamic teaching on
this matter. All of the rest knew that a dead body is to be
buried with its face turned toward Mecca.
Items number 34 and 35 concern the Malay practice of
"confinement" in which mothers remain inside the home for rest
and recuperation for approximately 4 0 days after the birth of
each of their children. It is not of Islamic origin, but stems
rather from ancient Asian custom. In spite of this, six students
strongly agreed and another six agreed that Islam prescribes a
confinement period. Fifteen said that some, but not all of the
elements of the confinement are mandated by Islam. Thus, about a
fourth of the students (26 of 107 respondents to this question)
felt that the confinement comes from Islam at least in part. An
additional ten were uncertain as to whether or not the
confinement period is called for by Islam. This is interesting
in that it reveals that a sizable proportion of Malay students
may be so associating their culture with Islam that they
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automatically assume that whatever is Malay and is not counter to
Islam must be of Islamic origin.
The new students were clearly the most likely to view the
confinement period as extra-Islamic, contradicting as before, the
findings that Malay students become more orthodox as a result of
their stay in the United States (see App.F. p. 531, Q#34) .
In this case, of the divisions of sex and head covering, it
was the women without head coverings who understood best that the
confinement is non-Islamic. This bolsters my belief that the
less observant women are not less knowledgeable than their more
observant counterparts .
As a whole, the students did not object to the observance of
a confinement period (see App. F, p. 531, Q#35) . The few who were
against it took the purist view that if Islam doesn't commend it,
it shouldn't be done. By far the majority opinion, though, was
that if Islam doesn't condemn it, it is acceptable. Most felt
that a confinement period is at best healthy, and at worst
harmless. A few mentioned that although a time of confinement is
good, some Malays incorporate primal religious practices, such as
putting leaves of a certain kind on the womb to ward off evil
spirits. That such practices are unacceptable does not call into
question the confinement itself. Only one respondent felt that
keeping tradition for the sake of tradition is wrong. The more
popular view is that tradition is good if not explicitly contrary
to Islam.
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We move on to the office of bomoh, or spirit
doctor /herbalist/medicine man. No other subject deals more
directly with the issue of universal Islam versus a traditional
Malay Islam which wedded religion and custom. The person of the
Jbomoh is the very embodiment of the old-school Malay Islam.
Along with the use of herbs, bomohs employed divination and
magical incantations in their curative processes. Such practices
are clearly outside Islamic orthodoxy, but until recently were
unquestioned by Malay Muslims. The bomoh historically enjoyed a
high status in Malay society, and at the village level was a
close companion to the ulama (religious specialists) . So closely
was Islam tied with traditional Malay spirit religion that the
roles of Jbomoh and of the imam of the village mosque were often
assumed by one and the same person. As Islam advanced in the
Malay peninsula, bomohs incorporated Islamic prayers and Quranic
verses in their incantations.
The students' response to questionnaire items 36 and 37 show
that orthodox Islam has made enormous strides in challenging the
old belief system, but that, at the same time, many Malays give
credence to the realm of divination in which Islam prohibits
involvement.
To the question of whether bomohs help to promote true
Islam, over half of the students answered that some do and some
don't, depending on whether or not they use the Quran in their
healing procedures. These students said that there are good and
bad bomohs. The bad ones summon jinn (spirits) to get
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information, and deal in black magic. The good ones use the
Quran, believing certain verses have power, for example, to heal
disease, cure infertility, or ward off evil spirits. One
curative technique is to dissolve the ink from a Quranic verse in
water, and then have the patient drink the water. For a majority
of the students, such magical use of the Quran is not considered
heterodox. Furthermore, although there was disagreement, most
students believe that there are more non-Islamic or bad bomohs
than there are good ones, but that more and more bomohs are using
the Quran, and thus becoming Muslims in good standing.
Only seven students answered with an ungualified "Agree"
that bomohs promote true Islam, and none responded with "Strongly
Agree" (see App. F, p. 532, Q#36) . Eight were undecided, 27
disagreed, and ten strongly disagreed that bomohs promote true
Islam. The interesting thing is that this apparently doesn't
matter, for 51 students either agreed or strongly agreed that
bomohs are a benefit to society (see App.F, p. 532, Q#37).^^
Bomohs are practitioners, and for many students, the source of
their (the bomoh' s) power and their religious allegiance are
irrelevant. Consequently, there were students who believe that
bomohs do not promote true Islam, but are, nevertheless, a
benefit to society. In general, the students felt that bomohs
are a benefit to society. The 20 students who did not believe
bomohs are beneficial, did not all believe bomohs are harmful. A
�'��'"Women who wear a tudung stood out as having a more
unfavorable view of bomohs than did Malays in general.
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few of these, influenced by western naturalism, simply disbelieve
in the spirit realm, and thus see the bomoh ' s methods as
ineffective, except for the power of suggestion. One young woman
commented as such, "Bomohs always work for my grandmother because
she believes in all that kind of stuff." Most of those who think
bomohs are not beneficial, however, believe them to be harmful,
because, according to them, they cause people to look for help to
sources other than God.
The most revealing find is not what the students say they
believe about bomohs, but what they actually "do" about them.
Not one of the students I interviewed had ever gone to a bomoh.
Bomohs are not a relevant part of the world represented by the
students I questioned. They gave stories of grandparents or
great aunts who solicited help from bomohs. One student had a
great grandparent who had been a bomoh. None had personal
experience with bomohs, or even had a friend who had been to a
bomoh. When I asked a young man who said bomohs do good, if he
would ever go to a bomoh, his response (which was typical of many
others) was, "I wouldn't want to mess with that spiritism stuff."
As recently as 1971, Ryan (1971:71) wrote that the
traditional healers such as the bomohs, though fast losing their
influence, were still the medical practitioners of first resort.
Islamic orthodoxy, and, in this case, especially secularism, have
joined forces to squelch centuries-old traditional Malay beliefs
and practices. Most of the students, in fact, gave information
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about bomohs quite tentatively, freely admitting a general
ignorance of these matters.
The students were on even more unfamiliar territory when it
came to the question of spirits and of a soul substance or vital
life force (items 38-40 on the questionnaire) . For millennia,
the peoples of Malaya have believed that all objects, whether
animate or inanimate, have a semangat (soul or vital force) . The
coming of Islam did not alter this belief. At least as late as
1970 (Endicott 1970:50), it appears that it was virtually
universally accepted by Malays that all objects have semangat.
Von der Mehden (1987:183) reported in 1987 that, although Islam
taught against it, a substantial portion of the rural population
as well as less educated urban migrant Malays maintained this
belief .
As we have mentioned, the Malays believed in an elaborate
network of spirits: good, bad, and neutral, which had to be
placated to ensure benefit and avoid disaster. Islam teaches the
. . 12
existence of angels and jmn, but generally denies the
existence of the innumerable spirits, specters, fiends, demons,
vampires, ghosts and were-tigers of traditional Malay folklore.
Traditional Malay primal religion taught that unusually shaped
trees, rocks, and other such objects held a high concentration of
semangat (vital force) and were thus the locus of various
12
Jmn are intelligent spirit beings who, endowed with freedom
of choice, can be either good or bad. Evil or kafir (infidel) jinn
try to lure human beings away from submission and obedience to God.
Good (Muslim) jinn do the opposite.
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spirits. Places of mystery, like swamps, jungles, caves, and
mountains were believed to be the habitation of spirits, and
prayers and/or offerings had to be offered to the spirits when
one crossed into their territory. This brings us to items 38 and
39 of the questionnaire.
Do younger generation Malays still believe that spirits
reside in various places, such as swamps and jungles? The answer
is mostly "yes" (see App. F, p. 533, Q#38) . Sixty respondents
strongly agreed that spirits do reside in various places.
Twenty-one others responded with "Agree." Another 11 were
undecided, ten disagreed, and six strongly disagreed that spirits
inhabit various places.
Women without a head covering were the most agreeable to the
notion of spirits residing in certain locations. They were also
the ones who were most likely to believe that special care must
be taken not to offend these spirits. For some Malays, their
reluctance to adopt the orthodox Islamic lifestyle is possibly
due in part to a clinging to an old belief system that is at odds
with orthodox Islam.
A few decades ago, hardly a Malay would have questioned the
existence of territorial spirits. That a full fourth of the
respondents were at best unsure that such spirits exist indicates
that a monumental worldview change is taking place. Furthermore,
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a majority of those who do believe in the spirits, do not believe
special care must be taken not to offend them."""^
This is not to say that belief in the spirit realm is a
thing of the past in Malay culture. To say that there is no need
to try not to offend the spirits, is not the same as saying that
some Malays do not, therefore, make special efforts to appease
the spirits. As one Malay put it, "We're not supposed to give
the spirits a second thought. Allah will take care of them. But
it's automatically on our minds. We're conditioned to be worried
about spirits." Another student said that there is no need to
make special offerings to try to appease the spirits, but people
do it just in case.
There is, as the questionnaire responses indicate, a general
acceptance of the realm of the spirits, though this is for most
of the students a matter of intellectual ascent rather than
personal experience. Thus, most of the Malay students believe in
spirits, but don't bother with them or think about them enough to
feel that they need to be attended to. For nearly all of the
students I interviewed, the spirit realm is simply not of vital
concern. For those who are more secular minded, the spirit realm
is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. "Most people aren't
�'��^As for the question of whether territorial spirits exist,
the most common response was "Strongly Agree," followed in
descending order by "Agree," "Uncertain," "Disagree," and "Strongly
Disagree." The response was completely inverted for the question
that special care must be taken not to offend these spirits. Here
the most common response was "Strongly Disagree," followed by
"Disagree," "Uncertain," "Agree," and "Strongly Agree" (see App.F,
p533, Q's#38,39) .
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afraid that spirits will hurt them. Most don't think about them.
People believe they exist, that's all." For the more devout
Muslim Malays, their strong belief in the sovereignty of God has
removed from them as well the daily burden of dealing with the
spirits. Thus, "If you are strong in religion, there is no need
to think about the spirits." Similarly, "There are other beings
created by God, but we aren't to bother with them. They can't
harm us unless God wills."
The question as to whether or not all things, animate and
inanimate, possess a soul-substance or vital life force,
addresses again the issue of the degree to which orthodox Islamic
teaching is supplanting traditional Malay beliefs. It is in
regard to this very belief about the nature of the world, the
fundamental primal religious belief that all things are energized
or "alive" with a special life force, that we see the greatest
change in the direction of orthodox Islamic belief. How much of
the change is due to the recent influence of secular naturalism
is unclear, but certainly belief in Islamic orthodoxy is gaining
ground. That this is the case is signified by the fact that many
of the students were caught off-guard by this subject, stating
that they had never really thought about it. The very word
semangat has lost its meaning for some. They said that it means
only "spirit" or "enthusiasm," as in "team spirit." Others
suggested alternative words for the concept of soul. For all,
their thinking on this subject was fuzzy. Thirty-one students
had no opinion on this matter and were thus labeled "Undecided."
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Only four students believed that all objects have semangat (see
App.F, p. 534, Q#40) .^^
There was about an even number of students who completely
dismissed the idea of semangat for non-humans as there were
students who supposed that semangat inhabits non-humans, but that
inanimate objects cannot possess it. Of these latter, about half
believed semangat was confined to humans and animals, while
another half allowed that semangat extended to plants as well.
With regard to the concept of semangat , a worldview wedge
has clearly been driven into the minds of younger generation,
well-educated Malays at least. Some expressed that old folks and
villagers in particular believe in semangat very strongly- Yet,
for the Malay students in the United States, like the world of
the spirits, the belief in semangat is at best irrelevant to
their daily concerns. One student summed it up as follows, "It's
God's business. We don't concern ourselves with these things."
None of the students who believed all objects have semangat
were new students, suggesting that students do not develop more
orthodox beliefs while in the United States. If anything, it is
the other way around. (The fact that none of the new students
believed all objects have semangat may be an indication that
Islamic teaching in Malaysia is making headway year by year. The
new, younger students had been exposed most recently to Malaysian
Islamic teaching.) The one-year students were the most likely to
accept the concept of semangat, indicating a possible U-curve
phenomenon in which students in the middle of a sojourn, and thus
psychologically the most distant from Malaysia, are more likely to
veer from an orthodox position. In this case, the disproportionate
amount of one-year students who wear a veil was not a factor
because neither group of women was less or more likely to believe
in the concept of semangat.
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Universal Islam Vs. Malay Nationalism
and Tradition in Malaysia
We move now to the practical, nitty gritty outworkings in
society on Malay Muslim belief. Their lofty rhetoric of the
absolute "rightness" of Islam aside, how willing are they to call
for the full implementation of Islam when Malaysian inter-ethnic
relations, Malay tradition, and Malay ethnic exclusiveness are at
stake? To begin with, do Malay students agree that to restore
God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order. Western-
inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is
the only acceptable blueprint for Muslim society (item 41 of the
questionnaire)? Malays are polarized on the question of the
importance of Malaysia becoming a Muslim state. Items 41 and 42,
the two that deal the most specifically with this issue, got the
largest number of responses in both the "Strongly Agree" and
"Strongly Disagree" choices (see App. F, pp. 534-535, Q's#41,42).
Actually, many more strongly disagreed (66) than strongly
agreed (18) that Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by
Islamic law. There were three times as many students who thought
it not necessary to replace Western-style governments, as there
were who believed Western civil codes must be replaced by Islamic
law.
More students also believed that Malaysia should not become
an Islamic state, though here the majority was much smaller (see
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App. F, p. 535, Q#42).^^ Evidently, there are those who want
Malaysia to become an Islamic state, but who do not believe it is
necessary to do away with Western-inspired civil codes for this
to happen.
The students on both sides of the issue showed a sensitivity
to the pluralistic context of Malaysia. They understand that the
immediate implementation of Islamic law would set off the inter-
ethnic powder keg. Consequently, those in favor of establishing
a new Islamic order, cautioned that it must be done slowly and
incrementally. One woman said, "Malaysia is on the way (to
becoming an Islamic state), and that's good, but it will be a
long, gradual process."
Those who do not want to see Malaysia become an Islamic
state, the majority of the respondents, believe it would be bad
for a religiously pluralistic country like Malaysia. Some said
that they don't like what they see happening in the state of
Kelantan, where PAS (the Islamic Party of Malaysia) �dominated
fundamentalists are beginning to enforce strict Islamic law on
everyone. A number were actually so bold as to express opinions
which they understood to be contrary to Islam. One man said that
he believes that Islam requires that Muslim citizens work for the
establishment of an Islamic government, but that he doesn't want
that because it would be bad for Malaysia. Likewise, a woman
�^^Fifty eight answered "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" that
Malaysia should not become an Islamic state. Thirty six answered
"Strongly Disagree" or "Disagree," indicating that they do think
that Malaysia should become an Islamic state.
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said that she knows that Islam requires the implementation of
Islamic law whenever Muslims are in the ascendancy (as they are
in Malaysia) , but she believes that if Malaysia became an Islamic
state, people of other religions would suffer. I questioned the
woman on this point to make sure we both understood what she was
saying. "Are you saying that something that Islam calls for
would actually be a bad thing?" She answered, "Yes." I followed
up on this by asking, "Wouldn't it be true, according to your
understanding of Islam, that if the Chinese and Indians in
Malaysia lived under Islamic law, they would really be better
off, though they may not see it that way." Unhesitatingly, she
answered that it would not.
This woman's forthright willingness to challenge Islam is
nothing short of amazing. It shows that the Malays are not all
cookie cutter replicas of the same exact Islamic mold. Her open
criticism of Islamic policy is clearly exceptional. Yet, the
student answers as a whole reveal that when it comes down to a
choice between the official Islamic party line and expediency, a
majority of the Malays opt for expediency. As one young man put
it, "Western legal systems should be replaced by Islamic ones,
but it depends on the situation."
Item 4 3 seeks to determine how far the fundamentalist Malays
are willing to push Islam on all Malaysians. Some, in fact, call
for all Malaysians to live according to the Shari'ah (see App. F,
p. 535, Q#43) . The majority of the students, though, even of
those desirous of an Islamic state in Malaysia, believe that non-
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Muslims should not be required to adhere to the Shari'ah.
Betraying a contradictory sort of logic, one young man said that
Muslims are required to obey the Shari'ah laws, but that non-
Muslims should not be, because "there is no force in Islam."
Item number 44, which asks whether the Shari'ah law should
be left as is, or if it should be more strictly or less strictly
enforced, is designed to see which is the stronger force among
the Malay students, the fundamentalist faction, or the more
moderate Malays. Here, in contrast to the two former items, the
more strict Islamic answer, the one calling for a stricter
enforcement of Islamic law, was the majority response (see App.
F, p. 536, Q#44) . Seventy students said the Shari'ah should be
more strictly enforced, compared to 3 8 who said that it should be
left as is. None said that the Shari'ah should be less strictly
enforced.
A tying together of questionnaire items number 41 through
44, those concerning the implementation of Islamic law in
Malaysia, shows that, although there is considerable polarization
of opinion, a majority of the students do not want to see Islamic
law replace civil law in Malaysia. Congruent with this, a
majority of the students do not believe that Shari'ah law should
be forced upon non-Muslims. On a more personal level, most of
the Malays believed the Shari'ah should be more strictly enforced
among Muslims. The overall effect of the responses appears to be
that the students are calling for a limited Islamic resurgence.
They want the Malay Muslims to practice Islam more devoutly, but
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they do not want Islam forcibly to cross the line into the non-
Muslim peoples and thus upset the delicate inter-ethnic relations
in Malaysia.
�'^^
Another way of looking at this is to see it as the Malays
pulling the draw strings tighter around themselves, reinforcing
Malay ethnic identity and exclusivism by enforcing Islam for
Malays only. This Malay-equals-Islam-and-Islam-equals-Malay
mentality makes it hard for outsiders to get into the Malay
world, and it also makes commitment to Islam all the more
important for Malays.
The next topic (questionnaire item 45) , participation in
17
traditional cultural practices, was another, along with the
issues of appropriate dress and the traditional wedding ceremony,
which was of pressing interest to the students and thus generated
much response. The general, overall response is that Malays
In all four questions related to the implementation of
Islamic law, Malay women who wear a head covering took the
strictest Islamic position, while those women who do not wear a
head covering took the least fundamentalist position. This
indicates that the obvious is true; those who wear Islamic dress
are more likely to support implementation of Islam, and those who
dress more Western are less likely to be in favor of strict
enforcement of Islamic law.
"""^The practices mentioned in the questionnaire include the
makyong play, the joget dance, and the main pantai festival. The
makyong play is a form of drama which includes music, dancing and
narrative. Its roots are in Hindu tales brought directly from
India or by way of Java. The joget, also of Hindu origin, is
danced to music similar to the South American rumba or samba and is
full of improvisations. The main pantai (beach play) festival is
a beach festival that marks the beginning of the fishing season.
The original intent of the festival was to make offerings to the
spirits of the sea so that they will protect and aid the fishermen.
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should not participate in such practices (see App. F, p. 536,
Q#45) . This is interesting in light of the Malaysian Tourism
Department's current promotion of just such practices and the
resultant revival of traditional dance especially. It shows the
far reaching impact of Islamic teaching on the lifestyle of
younger generation Malays.
The Islamic influence, which has been strong enough to
challenge the legitimacy of centuries-old, traditional practices,
has taught younger generation Malays what they must believe, but
it has by no means changed the way many of them actually feel
about certain Malay traditions. The students' responses,
overall, reveal a cerebral commitment to Islam, while maintaining
an emotional attachment to much that has long been a part of
Malay culture.
This attitude is exemplified by three Malay young women who
all agreed unhesitatingly that a good Muslim would not
participate in or condone traditional Malay dance. Yet, they
each had something more to say. Haslina restated her
understanding that "Islam says it's wrong," but then confided.
Ironically, women who don't wear a head covering were more
likely to say they oppose participation in traditional cultural
practices than were their counterparts who do cover their hair (see
App.F, p. 536, Q#45) . This is even stranger considering that the
women who actually perform such practices come from the ranks of
those who do not observe the Islamic dress code. The student
interviews revealed that many of those who participate in
traditional forms of cultural expression actually believe such
practices to be wrong for Muslims. This underscores my contention
that less observant Malay Muslims are often not less knowledgeable
of Islamic teaching or less committed to the "truth" and
"rightness" of Islam.
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"Personally, i see nothing wrong with it." Fatimah, though
acknowledging that, according to Islam, such practices should be
ended, stated that it would be a tragedy if these things did die.
After all, it is good to preserve culture. Min considered Malay
dance to be beautiful, and admitted that she was confused that
some "good" things are forbidden by Islam. None of the three
young women could articulate why Malay dance is harmless and even
good, yet forbidden. They all fumbled for words to try to
reconcile this. They could not solve the dilemma or explain
their viewpoint to my satisfaction.
Others had a definite understanding of why certain practices
are forbidden. For some, association with religious spiritism is
what marks some practices as off-limits. This is especially true
of Malay festivals, which are, in the words of one student,
"concerned with spirits, not with God." This contention is
meaningless to some Malays, for whom such traditional practices
have long since lost their association with the spirit world, and
are practiced instead as a modern-day revitalization of what is
perceived to be the traditional Malay culture. Such practices
now serve mainly as Malay identity markers in the midst of a
rapidly modernizing society in which rural ways are eroding. In
either case, the Islamic purists see such practices as inimical
to the implementation of an Islamic lifestyle.
Others reject traditional Malay practices for the reason
that they often involve an inappropriate display of women (as in
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dance) . Similarly, some believe traditional cultural practices
are wrong because they lead one away from concentration on
19
God. One woman said that "all these are a waste of time, and
promote hedonism."
A recurrent theme running throughout the student responses
was that humans are weak, frail, and easily subdued by
temptation. They expect to fail often. In their minds, fleshly
desires will always run wild if given half a chance. ^� Anizah,
an extremely devout Muslim woman, confessed, after stating that
dancing is wrong, "I like to watch it. I can't control my
desire. No one is perfect. Only Muhammad is perfect."
Likewise, another strictly observant woman said that she too
likes to watch Malay dance and drama. After all, "no one can
devote oneself to Islam thoroughly. We are all weak humans."
Still another, claiming to speak for the majority of Malays,
said: "It (traditional dance) is against Islam, and we know we
can't mix cultural practices with Islam. But we're only human,
and so we like it." A not-so-observant Muslim young woman said
that if she were more "spiritually prepared" she would be against
At this point, several volunteered that it is the music
itself that is dangerous. They stated that whenever one gets
caught up or lost in music, it is wrong.
^�In Islam, there is no sanctif ication, no becoming holy, no
overcoming the human bent toward sin (though "sin" is defined as
human weakness rather than as a character flaw or as rebellion
against God) . In Islam, human weakness is corrected by submissive
obedience and by right guidance, not by regeneration or Spirit
empowerment .
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traditional dance. She added that the very fact that it's
forbidden makes it more appealing.
This same young woman said that Islam teaches that
traditional dance is wrong, but that she believes it is
acceptable to do it on occasion because "we need to be light-
hearted and have fun once in a while." This quote introduces
what I call the Malay relativization of Islamic commands. Many
of the Malays state that Islam's laws are absolute, and then go
on to make individual exceptions to the rule. In effect, they
say that as a general rule, such and such is required or
forbidden, but then make the rule relative to each particular
situation. Many of the students who categorically denied that
traditional cultural practices are acceptable, went on to state
cases in which such practices are permitted, or at least
excusable. Thus, traditional dance is wrong unless done among
one's family. Or, it is all right if one doesn't "get carried
away." Alternatively, it is acceptable if it promotes tourism
and thus boosts the economy. Another example is that traditional
dance is wrong, except when done to celebrate special occasions.
Others, in a similar vein, seek to privatize what in Islam
is meant to be binding on the whole community and expressed
through the group collectively. We are reminded here that the
majority of students desire greater personal spiritual
discipline, but do not want to see Islamic law implemented in
Malaysia. Back to our discussion of traditional dance, a few
students said that Malay dance is wrong for them, but that they
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would hesitate to say that it is wrong for all Malays.
Conversely, there were those who said that dancing is wrong in
general, but that since it doesn't distract them from their
faith, for them it is all right.
The next item for discussion, silat (questionnaire items 4 6
through 48) , the traditional Malay martial art, is related to the
above discussion in that it is a cultural practice that pre-dates
Islam. Silat is distinct from the others mentioned in that the
most popular form incorporates Islamic elements and consciously
identifies itself as Islamic. Yet, silat is meant to go far
beyond physical skills to include ilmu kebatinan (spiritual
knowledge) . Even today, the more advanced stages of self-defense
and combat involve the evocation of a pantheon of spirits. Such
helping spirits are effectively integrated with Islam by the use
of opening and closing silat events with verses from the Quran.
The following citation shows that spiritism is the underlying
force beneath even the so-called Islamic silat:
All forms of ilmu kebatinan (spiritual knowledge)
require the use of jampi or magical spells derived from
animist and Hindu sources, with or without the use of sacred
verses from the Koran. These Koranic verses usually serve
as a kind of symbolic reinforcement of the magical
technique of evocating (seru) spirits. They exist as
introductions and endings to the spells, symbolically
integrating and legitimizing a forbidden (haram) system of
ideas with the orthodoxy of Islam. The evocation of spirits
revolves around the notion that the souls (semangat , roh)
of famous warriors of the past may be transferred into
present human life forms, thereby enabling the person to
obtain the sameextraordinary qualities of physical/spiritual
excellence of the dead warrior. (Rashid 1990:75)
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I wanted to find out if the Malay students associate silat
with Islam, and if so, whether or not they think it promotes
"true" Islam. If the use of Quranic verses as magic formulas, as
employed by silat, is considered a proper use of the Quran, and
thus congruent with Islamic orthodoxy as they understand it, then
the students are clinging to an adat (custom) -based, syncretistic
Islam.
Nearly two-thirds of the respondents did, in fact, believe
that silat supports or promotes Islam (see App. F, p. 538,
2 1
Q#48) . Most of the rest were undecided. The few who disagreed
that silat supports Islam did not all believe that it is anti-
Islam. Most of these believed it to be no more than a physical
discipline. The very few who contended that silat and Islam are
at odds, did so on the grounds that silat often involves women in
unholy proximity to men, and immodestly clothed. For this
reason, women with head coverings were generally less in favor of
silat than were the other groups, while women without a head
covering had the least objection to silat.
For the reasons already mentioned, a few were against the
participation of women in silat. No one was opposed to men
practicing silat. "What could possibly be wrong with silat?",
they asked in surprise. It promotes physical conditioning, self-
discipline, and self-defense, all regarded as praiseworthy in
2 1
Because I added this item after I was well into the
interviews, only 45 students were asked if silat supports Islam.
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Islam, according to them. If that weren't enough, the use of the
Quran is its official imprimatur .^^
We have been dealing with the Malay students' understanding
of the compatibility of certain specific cultural practices with
Islam. We now consider the question of Malay culture as a whole
(questionnaire item number 56) . Has universal Islam advanced
enough in Malaysia for Malay students actually to question their
very cultural identity? Put simply, do the students believe that
Malay culture is against true Islam? Only one student stated
that Malay culture is categorically incompatible with Islam (see
App. F, p. 542, Q#56) . Five students answered that they agreed,
but did not strongly agree that this was the case. On the other
side of the spectrum, none strongly disagreed and only two
disagreed with the statement that Malay culture is against Islam.
The remaining one hundred students were somewhere in between.
As we have observed, Malaysian society is sending mixed
messages about the importance of Malay traditional ethnic
identity. The Islamic resurgence movement brings with it an
ideology that condemns ethnic particularism. Yet, the
Islamization campaigns have helped spur reactionary religious
There are many devout Malay Muslims who seek to abide by the
Quran and Hadith. Yet, the Quran is more adored than it is read
and studied. (Very few Malays understand Arabic, though they
pronounce the characters) . The uncomprehending recitation of the
Quran can produce a spiritual high, and is believed to be
meritorious. Even the most observant Malay Muslims accept the use
of the Quran as a kind of talisman (though they wouldn't articulate
it as such) , by which spells may be counteracted, diseases cured,
enemies weakened, and spiritual powers gained.
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revivalism among all the major Malaysian religions (Ackerman and
Lee 1988:55-60). Such religious fervor is fueled in part by an
effort by Malaysia's non-Muslim minorities to bolster their own
cultural and religious identities, which they perceive as being
threatened by a Malay religious onslaught. The result is a
vicious circle of defensive entrenchment in ethnic-empowered and
empowering religion. Add to this the fact that "Malay
traditional culture" and the Islamic religion are competing for
the position of supreme Malay identity marker in a rapidly
industrializing and urbanizing society.
Twenty five students (23%) admitted that they had never
given the topic much thought, and were basically clueless as to
the compatibility of Malay culture and Islam. Many students
responded by giving percentages of what is acceptable and what is
not. For example, a student might say that Malay culture is 70%
all right and 30% bad. Twenty nine students (27%) believed Malay
culture to be divided about fifty-fifty between acceptable and
non-acceptable elements. Thirty two students (30%) said that
most of Malay culture is fine, compared to 14 (13%) who said that
most is not compatible with Islam. Taking all the responses into
account, approximately one-fifth of the students think that Malay
culture is mostly incompatible with Islam; one-half are unsure or
believe it is half good and half bad; and one-third think that
Malay culture is mostly compatible with Islam.
The student responses reveal a striking ambivalence on this
issue. There is clearly no consensus .
^"^
One woman commented
that "Much of Malay culture is unacceptable. That's why it's
hard for Malays to fully accept Islam." Until the matter is
resolved in the minds of Malays, Islam will be used both to
threaten and establish Malay identity.^*
Malays are divided, even confused, as to whether Malay
culture is against true Islam. What about nationalism? Do Malay
students believe that the spirit of universal Islamic community
calls for a weakening of nationalistic interests? Here again,
the Malays are polarized, but far more likely to believe that
Evidently identifying culture as specific external forms,
women who wear a head covering were markedly more likely than any
other group, to believe Malay culture is incompatible with Islam.
It is also the case that new students were less inclined than one-
and two-year students to view their culture as antithetical to
Islam.
24
Most of the Malay students interpreted culture as thc>.
external elements, such as dress, traditional dance, drama, and
ceremonial functions, things that might be exhibited at a cultural
show for tourists. If this is what they see as Malay culture, then
Islam will always be at odds with their understanding of their
culture. There will always be those who hold on to these
traditional practices as sacrosanct and view their demise as the
loss of Malay ethnic distinctives vis-a-vis the faceless mass of
industrialized, urbanized humanity. The more orthodox Malays will
jettison such cultural trappings, believing that the world Islamic
community calls them to forego ethnic particularities.
Culture in the broader sense of the total framework of a given
people cannot be erased so easily. Malay culture, in the form of
values, family and sexual roles, social relations, and worldview,
is not threatened by Islam. Although Islam demands conformity to
an external system (times and mode of prayer, fasting, dress, and
mental assent to certain basic theological tenets) , in order for it
to thrive in any society, it must, in fact, adopt to the deeper
level cultural patterns. Therefore, Islam can bend to fit Malay
culture, leaving the essentials of Malay culture fully intact.
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nationalism does not oppose Islam (see App. F, p. 538. Q#49) . In
fact, 57 of the 98 responses to the statement "Nationalism (rasa
kebangsaan) is opposed to the spirit of Islam" were "Strongly
Disagree," and another 21 were "Disagree." On the other side of
the issue, only ten students responded with "Strongly Agree," and
two with "Agree. "^^ Eight were undecided.
It is noteworthy that all twelve of the "Strongly Agree" and
"Agree" responses were from women who wear a head covering. All
who believed that nationalistic interests are inimical to the
goals of Islam were women who wear conservative. Islamic dress.
There is a type of devout, fundamentalist Malay Muslim who is not
interested in promoting Malay welfare as such, but is truly
impartial in its Islamization goals. Why none of the equally
devout men interviewed responded with this block is a mystery.
Perhaps there are more Malay women than men whose Islam is
intrinsically motivated to the point that Malay concerns are
truly subservient and even contrary to the interests of worldwide
Islam. Or perhaps this reflects the fact that women do not hold
high political posts in Malaysia, and thus are less inclined to
have nationalistic interests.
Islamic lifestyle and standards of dress are by no means,
however, indicative of one's stance on this matter. There were
many tudung-clad women who strongly agreed, but even more who
25
This means that approximately 80% of the students do not
believe that nationalism opposes Islam, compared to only about 12%
who do.
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strongly disagreed with the assertion that nationalism opposes
Islam. Many felt that Islam promotes nationalism. Some went so
far as to say that nationalism "goes hand in hand with Islam,"
meaning that Islam operates and carries out its purposes through
the vehicle of the nation state.
Some believed that nationalism is good to the degree that
the country is Islamic. They cautioned that love for one's
nation must never supersede one's love for Islam. Islam must be
one's primary allegiance. Others, who earlier stated that
Malaysia should not become an Islamic state, also believed that
nationalism is supported by Islam. For them, Islam encourages
any people to have pride in their country- They see pride in
their Malayness, regardless of its relationship to Islam, as good
and Islam-approved.
The issue of nationalism (rasa kebangsaan� literally, love
of nation/country) led some students to bring up the related, but
not identical, concept of "rasa kemelayuan" (love of Malayness,
2 6
or ethnic pride) . Whereas a large majority of the Malays were
in favor of nationalism, they were evenly divided on the issue of
ethnic pride. Both sides use Islam to back up their position.
In fact, they both appeal to Muhammad and Arabic culture. Those
who see Malay ethnic pride as supported by Islam, argue that
Muhammad's sentiments that he was proud to be an Arab and loved
the Arabic language and culture are an example for all that love
2 6
After learning of rasa kemelayuan, I questioned the
remaining 26 interviewees on this subject.
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of one's own people and language are appropriate. The opposite
view is that Muhammad was mandating that the Arabic-Islamic
culture is to be emulated by Muslims everywhere, and that
individual cultural peculiarities should be set aside in favor of
worldwide Islamic unity and even uniformity.
In a nutshell, some link nationalism with ethnic pride and
reject both as opposed to the spread of universal Islam. Others
see nationalism as supportive of Islam, but ethnic pride as
counter to Islam. Still others accept both nationalism and
ethnic pride as fully compatible with Islamic principles.
A major force in explaining the role of Islam is the
interactive relationship between religion and ethnicity to most
Malays. According to the Constitution, "Malay means a person who
professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the Malay
language, conforms to Malay custom" (Malaysian Constitutional
Documents 1962:124). At this point, it is important to note the
general and sturdy acceptance among Malays of the concept of the
identity of Islam with being Malay. Observers over the decades
have regularly commented on this relationship. Writing of
literary responses, T.S. Chee (1975:87) states, "Religion or the
belief in Islam is not the end result of rational analysis, but a
symbol of Malayness." Sharon Siddique (1972:27) wrote that to
become a Malay and to become a Muslim are inseparable, and
Manning Nash (1974:253) said of the rural Malay, "Religion in the
context of Kelantan is an interesting cognitive term. For
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Malays, it is not separable from ethnic identity or cultural
heritage. In Kelantan, Malay equals Muslim."
Has the resurgence movement of the past two decades changed
this thinking by emphasizing the universal community of Islam
that transcends ethnic and nationalistic distinctives? For
Malays now, does Malay still equal Muslim? Also, does an
extended stay in the U.S. contribute to a "de-ethnicizing" of
Islam in Malaysia?
The answer to the first question (based on the student
responses to item number 50 of the questionnaire) is that it
appears that a wedge is being driven between Malayness and Islam,
separating the two at least in theory in the minds of most Malay
students. Eighty seven of the 108 students (81%) either agreed
or strongly agreed that it is possible to be a Malay and not be a
Muslim (see App. F, p. 539, Q#50) . In fact, the "Strongly Agree"
choice, which was chosen 74 times, was by far the most popular
response. Many students followed up their answer by saying that
Islam is a religion; Malay is a race, putting Malayness and Islam
in clearly separate categories.
Although most of the students believed that with a very few
exceptions, all Malays are Muslims (Some believed there were no
non-Muslim Malays) , one Malay ventured that almost 1% of Malays
are not Muslim. A couple of the more devout students opined
^^As small a percentage as 1% is, it is a gross overestimation
of the number of Malays who do not claim to be Muslim. Certain
fundamentalist Muslims in Malaysia greatly exaggerate the success,
and thus the threat of Christian evangelism among Muslims, in order
to stir the populace against Christianity.
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that not even all Malays who say they are Muslims are really
Muslims. God alone knows who are the truly faithful from among
the Malays who identify themselves as Muslim. So, fundamentalist
Islam has brought the believer versus unbeliever distinction
right inside the Malay Muslim camp.
There remains still the hard-line minority who insist that
Malayness and Islam are inseparable. These claim that Malays who
convert to another religion cease to be Malays. Two students
went so far as to claim that the biggest sin for a Muslim is to
2 8
convert .
What factors influence Malay students' thinking on this
matter? Does an American sojourn make Malays less likely to
correlate Islam with Malayness? The students' responses indicate
that this does not happen at all. It was the new students who
had the highest percentage (86%) of respondents who believed it
is possible for a Malay not to be a Muslim. Next were the one-
year students (80%) . The two-year students were the least likely
to agree (74%) that a Malay could be a non-Muslim and still be a
Malay. For the students I interviewed, in general, the less time
they were in America, the more universal their Islam. Thus, it
was not something they learned in the United States. If
anything, the U.S. sojourn causes Malays to become increasingly
entrenched in an ethnic enclave mentality that guards Malayness
This is counter to Islamic theology, which declares that the
supreme sin is shirk (idolatry, the association of anything with
God) .
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at all costs, and associates Islam with Malay ethnic identity and
interests. The new students' response may indicate an opposite
trend in Islamic teaching in Malaysia.
Another twist to this subject is that women who wear a veil
(placing them among the most observant Malay Muslims) , were
clearly less agreeable than the students overall to the notion
that one could be a Malay but not be a Muslim. This tells us
that the most fundamentalist Malays do not necessarily adopt a
more universal, less ethnicity-bound, Islam. It may well be that
the reverse is more often the case.
Having established that most of the Malay students admit
that it is possible to be a Malay and not be a Muslim, we
discover that there is not such widespread agreement that Malays
should then be free to choose whatever religion they wish.
Questionnaire item number 51 addresses this issue.
The students' responses were strongly polarized. Forty
students chose the "Strongly Agree" response to the statement
that a Malay should be free to choose whatever religion she or he
wishes. The next most common response was "Strongly Disagree,"
chosen by 32 students (see App. F, p. 539, Q#51) . The student
length-of-stay divisions, and the sex and head covering divisions
responded in the exact pattern that they did for the previous
question. The longer the students were in the United States, the
less likely they were to believe that Malays should be free to
^^This is, to me, a surprisingly large number of students to
state that the religious options for Malays should be open.
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choose their religion. Also, the women who wear a head covering
were less likely than average to believe Malays should be free to
choose .
Many of those on the "should-not-be-free-to-choose" side
stated simply that a Muslim cannot change religion. Others,
holding a more ethnic-based position, said that Malays were meant
to be Muslims because they were born Muslims. One student,
following similar logic, said, "Malays must be Muslims because
we're Muslims traditionally . ""^�'"
A majority of the students stated that Malays should be free
to choose their religion. After all, as I heard time and again,
"there is no compulsion in Islam." This finding should not be
interpreted, though, to mean that Malays are in fact free to opt
out of Islam, or even that these Malay students themselves would
even allow for such an occurrence in actual practice. Though the
students are convinced, or, at least, intend to give the
impression, that Islam affords them total freedom, they qualified
their answers to this question to such an extent as to deny
32
conversion from Islam as a live option.
Many of these same students drop this line of reasoning when
it comes to those of other faiths. Those born into a strong non-
Muslim religious tradition are not justified in remaining so when
presented with the option to convert to Islam.
^�'"This student conveniently ignored the fact that Malays
remained predominantly Hindu for eight centuries after Mxihammad,
and have a non-Muslim religious heritage that is much longer than
their Islamic one.
"^^A couple who said that Malays are free to choose and that
there is no compulsion in Islam, went on to explain that when a
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Some said that Malays have free choice, but that it would be
"very wrong" to leave Islam. Several who conceded that, in
theory, a Malay could or should be free to change religions,
stated that it is absolutely absurd to think that a Malay would
ever even consider doing so. It's possible, but unthinkable.
When I asked students what they would do if one of them ever left
the Islamic fold, they stated emphatically, after assuring me
that it would never happen, that they would not and could not
tolerate such apostasy. Such a person would be an outcast, and
subject to verbal and physical "correction" until the person came
to his or her senses and re-embraced the true path. Thus, it is
obvious that, even for those who opt for choice, there is no
freedom allowed.
It is clear then that there is no leeway for Malays in
religion. There is an assumed connection, in fact if not in
theory, between Malay identity and Islam. In Malaysia itself,
this connection is largely in tact, for with relatively few
exceptions, the Islamic population is coterminous with the Malay
population.
Do the Malays desire to guard this exclusive identification
of Malay ethnicity with Islam, or do they seek a more inclusive,
universal Islam which would extend itself to engulf other
peoples? Questionnaire item 52 asks whether they think Islam
should be propagated so that it becomes as much the faith of the
Malay marries a non-Muslim, the Malay cannot convert, and the non-
Muslim must convert.
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Chinese and Indians as it has been for the Malays. In the most
general terms, most any Malay would idealistically say that Islam
eventually will spread throughout all the nations of the earth.
Malays, moreover, pride themselves in being full-fledged and
active members of the worldwide Islamic community. Getting down
to the nitty-gritty of face-to-face ethnic relations in Malaysia,
though, Malays aren't quite so sure that they want to embrace
their Chinese and Indian compatriots. The student responses
demonstrate that there is no Malay consensus here (see App. F,
p. 540, Q#52) . Malays are, as a group, divided over this very
issue. The largest response, 50 (46%) , actually disagreed that
Malays should "evangelize" the Chinese and Indians in their
midst. Yet, 2 8 (26%) strongly agreed that such propagation of
Islam is essential, and another ten responded with the less
33
emphatic "Agree". Seventeen students were undecided on this
question, indicating, again, a high degree of ambivalence. One
quite devout young iran embodied the Malay position by saying, in
response to the question of whether Islam must be propagated to
Here, as in several other responses, the women who wear a
head covering were the most committed to a strict implementation of
Islam (in this case, the propagation of Islam to others) , and the
women without a head covering were the least strict. This does not
necessarily mean that the women without a head covering have a more
exclusive, ethnic-based Islam. It is more likely that the less
observant Malays are less committed to the spread of Islam simply
because Islam is not as important to them as it is to those who are
more devout.
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the Chinese and Indians, ""Religiously speaking, yes. Socially
and culturally, it is not a good idea."-^"*
Another point is that all the students, regardless of their
answer to this item, expressed a cultural sensitivity,
conditioned as they are by long-standing inter-ethnic relations.
Even the most adamant about the necessity of the spread of Islam
to the Chinese and Indians, cautioned that it must take place
gradually, through time, and that conversion to Islam must be
preceded by teaching, based on understanding, and never
coerced.
We have just seen that Malays are divided on the importance
of extending Islam to the non-Malays in Malaysia. What of non-
Malays who do become Muslims? Are they then considered Malays?
The historically close connection in Malaysia between being Malay
and being Muslim is seen in the fact that Muslim converts were
said to "masuk Melayu" ("enter Malayhood") . Are Malay ethnicity
and religion still so inseparably linked? The answer (based on
item 53 of the questionnaire) is a resounding "no." Only seven
students (6%) believed that converts become Malays, compared to
99 (92%) who did not believe so. There were only two undecided
students (see App. F, p. 540, Q#53) . All seven of the students
^'*It is amazing, even shocking, that a Malay Muslim, and a
devout one at that, would suggest that what Islam calls for (its
propagation to all people) would be less than ideal in actual
practice.
"^^The Malays held a general assumption that the truths of
Islam are so self-evident and compelling that no rational person
would reject Islam if she or he understood it well.
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who believed Muslim converts become Malays, and one of the two
undecided, were two-year students. On the other end of the
spectrum, all 3 6 of the new students answered "Strongly Disagree"
to the proposition that non-Malay converts to Islam become Malay.
This suggests, as we have found before, that Malay university
students in the United States do not develop a more universal,
less narrowly ethnic-based Islam as a result of their overseas
experience. If anything, it works the other way around.
"^^
Back to the initial question of identification of ethnicity
with religion, the vast majority of students responded to item 53
by saying, "Of course not. Islam is a religion; Malay is a
race." One perceptive student, who understands that ethnicity
and religion are separate, said that in reality, Malaysian
converts to Islam do ultimately become Malay. She explained by
pointing out that a Chinese convert, for example, will marry a
Malay (because converts must marry Muslims and nearly all Muslims
are Malays) , and subsequently adopt a Malay lifestyle.
Eventually the convert will become more Malay than Chinese, and
will be identified as one within the Malay community. So, in
actual practice, for many in Malaysia, conversion to Islam does
still mean to "masuk Melayu" ("enter Malayhood") . Yet, the Malay
students' conscious separation between ethnicity and religion is
a dramatic shift from Malay thought a generation or so ago.
3 6
Regarding the sex and head covering divisions, there was no
major difference in response between these three groups of
students .
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A related issue is the question of whether or not Malaysian
converts to Islam should receive bumiputera benefits. Bumiputera
(literally "sons/princes of the soil") is the designation given
aborigines and Malays, and connotes indigenous status. Those
labeled bumiputera are eligible for educational scholarships,
university and civil service positions, and low-interest loans
that are not available to other Malaysians. The question here is
whether the Malay students want special status to be granted to
all Muslims equally, regardless of race or ethnicity, or whether
they wish to preserve Malayness as uniquely special. Here, most
opt for the latter, though a sizable minority believe that
converts to Islam should, indeed, receive bumiputera benefits
(see App. F, p. 541, Q#54) .
There are two possible interpretations of this data. One is
that the Malays are putting their ethnic interests above all else
and do not want anyone else, including non-Malay Muslims,
entitled to the status that has long been the domain of the
Malays. The other possible interpretation is that the Malays are
again demonstrating that they know that ethnic and religious
referents are independent, and as such, do not believe religion
should be a factor in determining benefits offered on the basis
of ethnicity. In line with this reasoning, several students
suggested that if Chinese converts were to be given special
privileges, it would be unfair to the rest of the Chinese.
Whatever the motives for denying bumiputera status to non-Malay
Muslims, the bottom line is that Malayness, rather than Islam per
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se, remains the criterion for most-favored government status in
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Malaysia.
Another matter concerning the relationship of Malay with
Islam is the question of whether the Malay students believe non-
Muslim religions should not use Bahasa Malaysia (the Malay
language) in their religious publications. The background to
this question relates to the Malaysian national language policy.
In the late 1960 's, the Malaysian government began replacing
English with Bahasa Malaysia as the medium of instruction in the
public school system, and as the language of use in the civil
service and judicial system. The non-Malay population balked at
the implementation of the Malay language, but pro-Malay forces
prevailed and the Malay language has steadily gained ground to
replace English as the language of wider communication.
While the use of Bahasa Malaysia was encouraged and even
enforced in nearly all sectors of society, in recent years the
government has begun placing restrictions on its use in non-
Muslim religious publications. As a means of protection against
the alleged propagation of non-Islamic religions among Muslims,
the sale and distribution of the Alkitab (the Malay Bible) have
been greatly restricted, and certain states have enacted laws
Nagata (1974:340) demonstrates that Islam at times cuts
across ethnic divisions, but has never been able to span the
Chinese-Malay gulf. Similarly, Lee (1986a: 72) shows that the
government agencies responsible for Malay welfare adopt strategies
to differentiate non-Malay Muslims from Malay Muslims (Such as
making it illegal for non-Malays to take Malay or Arabic names) in
order to control non-Malay access to Malay privileges.
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prohibiting the use of various Arabic-based religious words by
non-Muslims. These words, which Christians point out were used
prior to the time of Muhammad, and are thus not the product or
exclusive domain of Islam, include, among many others, such words
as Allah (God) , Injil (Gospel) , iman (strong belief /trust) , nabi
(prophet), rasul (apostle, disciple,messenger of God), and wahyu
(revelation through a vision or dream) .
What this boils down to is an attempt to screen out all non-
Muslim associations from religious expressions commonly used by
Malays. In business, education, government, etc., non-Malays are
forced to adopt the Malay language; in religion alone they are
forced not to. This applies as well to Christian indigenes and
other non-Muslim, non-Malays whose primary language is Malay.
These are being asked to use a language other than their heart
language (Malay) to express concepts closest to their hearts
(religion) .
Do our Malay university students believe that the Malay
language should be, among the Malaysian religions, the exclusive
domain of Islam? The answer here is that nearly all of the
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students do not believe so (see App. F, p. 541, Q#55) . Most, in
fact, were unaware that there are any restrictions on the use of
As in several other responses, the women who cover thexr
head took the most hard-line Islamic position, and were thus the
most inclined to believe that non-Muslims should not use Bahasa
Malaysia for religious purposes. The more western-dressed women
were the least likely to suggest that Bahasa Malaysia should be
used only by the Islamic religion. Therefore, the more devout
Malays, as expected, are the most likely to guard Muslims against
non-Islamic religious encroachment.
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the Malay language. They said things like, "It's good for them
(those of other religions) to use it {Bahasa Malaysia) and "The
government encourages the use of Bahasa Malaysia in all
instances." Only two students suggested that, although it is the
right of all peoples of any religion to use the Malay language,
some Malays would not like it if Malay was used by non-Muslims in
religious contexts. In short, the Malay students do not seem
threatened by the use of Malay in non-Muslim religious
expression. This shows that most of them do not side with the
Islamic fundamentalists on this issue. The segment of the Malay
population represented by our interviewees, young Malays with a
high level of English education and international exposure,
appears to be open-minded on the question of Malay language use.
The next two items on the questionnaire also test the degree
to which the Malay university students I interviewed align with
the more fundamentalist Islamic faction in Malaysia. The first
of these questions (item 57) asks if the students think that UMNO
(The United Malay National Organization) , the Malay ruling party,
should try to make the Malaysian government more Islamic.
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy. There are Islamic courts,
but they remain subservient to British-based civil law. In that
Islam calls for no separation of "church" and state, and that
Islam in Malaysia is considered to be above being challenged, it
is not surprising that a majority of the students said that UMNO
should try to implement an Islamic government, or at least make
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the current system more Islamic (see App. F, p. 542, Q#57) ."^^
What is perhaps more telling is that a full quarter of the
respondents strongly disagreed, disagreed, or were uncertain as
to whether UMNO should promote Islam.
The following question (item 58) asked if the students are
satisfied with UMNO's level of commitment to promoting Islam.
Being the ruling party through the tumultuous first decades after
Malaysian independence, UMNO had of necessity to walk a tightrope
between non-Malay demands and Islamic extremists. Consequently,
UMNO historically has been viewed as the Malay party of
accommodation, in contrast to PAS (the Islamic Party of
Malaysia) , which has wholeheartedly pressed for the full
Islamization of the Malaysian government.
PAS criticizes UMNO for being too compromising and secular.
UMNO, in turn, portrays PAS as extremist and out of touch with
the realities of a pluralistic society. Recent government
Islamization campaigns have diffused some of PAS's criticism of
UMNO and have made the parties less polarized. Yet, government
critics contend that UMNO's move in the Islamic direction is no
more than a politically motivated concession to the challenges of
PAS. In general, then, those satisfied with UMNO's level of
commitment to promoting Islam will tend to be more moderate
Not surprisingly, the women who wear a head covering were
the biggest proponents of government implementation of
Islamization. Length of stay had no apparent effect on student
views of this issue.
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Muslims, while more fundamentalist Malay Muslims will be
dissatisfied with UMNO in this regard.
The student responses show a great deal of diversity of
opinion and uncertainty concerning the students' assessment of
UMNO. Of the 71 responses to this question, the most common
answer, picked by 25 students (35%), was "Uncertain" (see App. F,
p. 543, Q#58) . Those satisfied with UMNO and those dissatisfied
with UMNO were exactly equally divided with 23 students each.
Also equally represented were comments that UMNO's recent moves
in the direction of Islamization were sincere on the one hand,
and politically motivated on the other.
The students expressed a marked cynicism about Malaysian
politics and its interplay with Islam. In their view,
politicians of every persuasion are tainted by the thirst for
power, and use Islam for their own ends. PAS leaders, though
more radical Muslims, are regarded as no more pure than the rest.
One student spoke for many when he said, "Is UMNO sincere? I
don't know. I don't care. What do you expect from politicians?
The end result is what is important."
The students, in summary, are positioned on every point
along the spectrum of whether or not they are satisfied with
government Islamization. Many want Islamic reform. At the same
time, many do not want the inter-ethnic tension that such reform
would arouse. When it comes to their own multi-ethnic, multi-
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religious society, a majority favor the more moderate,
accommodationist UMNO-style Islam to the more radical PAS.'*^
Proselytization
The next general topic covered in the interviews is
proselytization. How committed to the spread of Islam are the
Malay university students? On the other side of the coin, how
tolerant are they of other religions' efforts to spread their
faiths? Do the students think missionaries should be allowed in
Malaysia, and do they believe the Malaysian government freely
grants missionary visas?
They were first asked if Muslims should try to inform non-
Muslims about Islam, and then asked if they should try to convert
non-Muslims to Islam. As for the first and more moderate
proposition, the students were in virtually universal agreement
(83 "Strongly Agree", 24 "Agree", one "Undecided") that Muslims
should inform non-Muslims about Islam. The new students were the
most emphatic about this (34 "Strongly Agree", 2 "Agree"),
followed by the one-year students (31 "Strongly Agree", 10
"Agree"), and lastly, the two-year students (18 "Strongly Agree",
12 "Agree", one "Undecided"). The two-year students were also
slightly more tentative than the others in the assertion that
Muslims should try to convert non-Muslims to Islam. Possibly the
U.S. sojourn has some effect in causing Malays to be less
aggressive in imposing Islam on others. By and large, though,
*�There were no significant differences among the student
divisions regarding UMNO's implementation of Islam.
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the students were united in their belief that Islam should be
taught to non-Muslims. The students contended that Islam is the
most misunderstood religion in the world, and that westerners
especially have misconceptions about Islam.
Though there is also overall agreement that Muslims should
try to convert non-Muslims to Islam, some dissent was expressed
(see App. F, p. 544, Q#60) . Surprisingly, six persons actually
disagreed and one person strongly disagreed with the statement
that Muslims should try to convert non-Muslims to Islam. Perhaps
trying to live down the Muslim jihad image, the students
cautioned against extremism. No less than 20 students who were
in favor of Muslims attempting to convert non-Muslims, added
immediately that there must be no force. Some students included
that they do not want to feel pressure on their side either;
i.e., they do not want to be expected themselves to try to
convert non-Muslims.
As with so many issues, the Malays are simultaneously being
pulled in opposite directions. Islam has coached them to seek to
spread Islam. Tenuous and often tense relations with the
Malaysian Chinese have coached them to be tolerant and seek
harmony in order to preserve national unity. One student
Von der Mehden (1983:18-31) has demonstrated that Americans
are, in fact, largely ignorant of Islam. The worldwide Islamic
movement is preempted by militant extremists insofar as the media
are concerned and so the militants tend to define the Islamic
resurgence for the American people. "Certainly, the movement in
Indonesia and Malaysia is totally unknown outside the academic and
corporate communities" (Von der Mehden 1983:28).
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expressed the Malay ambivalence by saying that religiously
speaking, Malays should try to convert the Malaysian non-Muslims
to Islam, but that socially speaking, they should not.^^
Another student, with blatant inconsistency, said at one point
that Islam must and will be spread throughout the whole world,
but later that it should not be propagated among the Chinese and
Indians of Malaysia. As a general principle, a large majority of
the students state unreservedly that Islam should be spread, but
when it comes to face-to-face relations with their non-Muslim
compatriots, some have a different story.
Moving to a more sensitive subject, we consider the
students ' views on whether or not it is acceptable for non-
Muslims to convert Muslims to their faiths (questionnaire item
61) . In a surprising display of tolerance, many more of the
Malay students agreed than disagreed that it is acceptable for
non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims (see App. F, p. 544, Q#61) .
There were as many "Strongly Disagree" as "Strongly Agree"
responses (31 each) , showing sizable proportions of the students
on opposite poles of opinion regarding this question, but there
were, overall, 68 on the agree side of the continuum, compared to
43
only 38 on the disagree side.
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Here, again, we see a startling admission that what Islam
calls for would not be the best solution in the Malaysian setting.
43
Of the head covering and sex divisions, only women wearing a
tudung (head covering) were more likely to disagree than agree that
it is acceptable for non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims. Among
the length-of-stay divisions, only the two-year students leaned
more toward believing non-Muslims must not try to convert Muslims.
This is consistent with their stance on the previous two items, in
412
The belief by many that non-Muslims may try to convert
Muslims does not signify an openness to Muslim conversions.
Muslim converts, in the students' own estimation, would be social
pariahs. To abandon Islam would be to commit the most heinous
offense imaginable against the Malay community. The students who
grant non-Muslims the right to try to convert Muslims, do so with
the belief that such efforts would be fruitless, for "No Muslim
who has a strong belief and a clear understanding of Islam will
convert." The truth of Islam is so incomparably superior to all
competing truth claims that no one who understands Islam would
ever accept anything so comparatively inferior. The students,
echoing their Islam teachers, state that Muslims are encouraged
to consider counter truth claims because they help Muslims see
the "Truth" more clearly when contrasted with the error inherent
in all other religions. Moreover, the students claim that they
are encouraged to learn about other religions so that they can
understand others better.
The above claims of Malay Muslim openness are, in my
opinion, so patently false in reality that it borders on the
absurd that even the Malays could take such contrived claims
which they were less enthusiastic than new and one-year students
about Muslims informing others of Islam and converting them to
Islam. Maybe the time in the United States caused some to be all
the more cautious about rocking the interreligious boat, regardless
of the direction of persuasion. Possibly the American aversion to
evangelism (brought on by the view that religion is confined to the
realm of values or personal opinion, and as such, all positions
must be tolerated, but none claimed as True in an absolute sense) ,
particularly as evidenced in American academia, has rubbed-off on
the university-educated Malays.
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seriously. Malays are guarded from religious interaction with
non-Muslims (especially Christians) with stark paranoia. Malay
inquirers of Christianity are so hounded by their peers as to
squelch all contact with Christians. Malay university students
in the United States have even been transferred by their
government to different schools precisely to avoid the kind of
contact with Christians that involves open inquiry. It is true
that Malays study non-Muslim religions, but they are permitted
only to learn from Muslim teachers and through Islamic filters.
Such "learning for understanding" is strictly to provide pat
answers to questions raised by other belief systems, in order for
the Malays to know exactly why they, as Muslims, are right.
Despite the above, the fact that a majority of our students
believed that Muslims are legitimate targets of proselytization,
is in itself significant, and places many of the students outside
the camp of the most hard line fundamentalists who seek to stifle
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all non-Muslim religious expression.
Questionnaire item 63 tests Malay religious tolerance by
asking whether non-Muslim missionaries should be allowed to
propagate their faith in Malaysia. The students responded along
the same lines as they had on the question of whether non-Muslims
may try to convert Muslims, with approximately two-thirds
There is, to be sure, a double standard. As we have seen,
Malays believe Muslims may try to convert non-Muslims. They are
equally accepting of non-Muslims proselytizing non-Muslims. Yet,
more than a third of the students stated that it is strictly
unacceptable for non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims.
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believing missionaries should be allowed, and one-third believing
they should not (see App. F, p. 545, Q#63) .
Many who stated that missionaries should be accepted,
qualified their response by saying that they should not be
allowed to approach Muslims. Such a large qualification makes
the Malay students, again, change their position when it comes to
their own specific situation. They're willing to concede, as a
general principle, that non-Muslims have a right to proselytize
Muslims, but, restrict that right when it comes to non-Muslims
approaching them.
The next question was designed to see if the Malay students
are aware of the fact that their government, with a few token
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exceptions, no longer grants missionary visas. Malay
university students in the United States, exposed as they are to
English and international relations, are in a position to be more
attuned to Malaysian government policies regarding non-Malaysians
than would be the average Malay.
The question (item 64) asks, "Does Malaysia freely allow
such people (missionaries) to come to Malaysia?" Thirty-two
students gave a very confident "yes", and an additional ten said
For years the Malaysian government has taken an increasingly
restrictive stance on the admission of missionaries into Malaysia.
Since independence, missionary quotas have been steadily lessened,
and maximum lengths of stay have been imposed. As a rule,
missionaries were not expelled. Rather, as visas expired and
veteran missionaries left Malaysia, they were not allowed to be
replaced. Gradually, the missionary force shrank to practically
nothing.
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"yes, except in Kelantan."*^ (see App. F, p. 546, Q#64) . These
students stressed, mistakenly, that there is complete freedom of
religion in Malaysia. Peering through rosy, government-
propaganda-filtered glasses, they're oblivious to the actual
state of affairs. Thirteen students, with a clearer view of
reality, understood that Malaysia does not freely accept
missionaries. The remaining 53 students said that they did not
know. Five of these guessed that Malaysia does allow
missionaries, and eleven guessed that Malaysia does not. Thirty-
seven simply had no idea.
One might expect that the students who have been in the
United States for a while would, perhaps through contact with
Christians, have picked up on the fact that .Malaysia restricts
Christian work in Malaysia. This, it turns out, is not the case.
Actually, the two-year students were the least aware of what is
true. The American sojourn does not appear to provide the Malay
students with a more informed view.
Overall, then, most of the Malay students believe their
government imposes little if any restrictions on missionaries.
However, it is not a matter about which they are deeply concerned
or have given much thought. In general, they believe non-Muslims
should be free to proselytize, but when it comes to themselves,
many believe Malays should be off-limits.
Kelantan is the northeast Peninsular Malaysian state that is
largely controlled by fundamentalist Muslims.
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Basic Knowledge of Other Religions
We have also seen that the Malay students maintain that they
are encouraged to study other religions and consider for
themselves their truth claims. This next section seeks to
determine just how knowledgeable the Malay students are of the
basics of the major non-Muslim religions in Malaysia. We are
especially interested in their understanding of Christianity and
if their stay in the United States results in greater
understanding of what Christianity actually teaches.
The students were asked four questions about Hinduism
(Numbers 65-68) , three about Christianity (69-71) , and two about
Buddhism (72-73) . I was interested not in what they do and do
not know about Hinduism and Buddhism, but only if they know
significantly less or more about Christianity than about the
other religions.
I wanted to find out what they know about basic Christian
understanding of the Trinity, salvation, and the person of Jesus.
In this case, I was especially interested in learning whether
their knowledge of these subjects grows through their American
experience. Does their exposure to American society, in which
Christians and Christian information are readily accessible, help
the Malay students to correct previously held misconceptions
about what Christians believe?
The questions were too few and the sample too small to draw
anything more than the most tentative conclusions from the data.
The students had very nearly the same percentage of correct
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answers for the questions relating to each of the three
religions. Overall, the women who wear a head covering
(signifying that they are devout Muslims) , were the most well-
informed about the beliefs of other religions, while women who
dress more Western, and who thus tend to be on the more moderate
end of the Muslim continuum, were the least knowledgeable.
Regarding Christianity specifically, the Western-dressed women
were still the least well-informed, but the men were as
knowledgeable as the more devout women.
Keeping in mind the tentative nature of our findings, as for
the question of correcting misconceptions, the new students,
ironically, had the highest percentage of correct responses to
the questions about Christianity. There are too many variables
to pin down a hard conclusion, but it seems evident that the time
in the States does not contribute to a greater understanding of
Christian belief.
Let us now look at the specific points under question. The
first item asked the students to identify the persons of the
Trinity from the following options: a) God, Mary, and Jesus, b)
God, Mary, and the Holy Spirit, c) God, the Holy Spirit, and
Jesus, and d) don't know. Nearly half of the students chose
option "a", believing the Trinity to consist of God, Mary, and
Jesus. The most correct answer was the next most commonly
chosen, followed by "don't know", and lastly by choice "b" (God,
Mary, and the Holy Spirit), (see App. F, p. 546, Q#69) .
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Ten of the 23 women wearing a head covering who responded to
this item, correctly identified the Trinity. That was the best
record. The least informed were the women who do not wear a head
covering. Only three of 24 such women could identify the persons
of the Trinity. In total, 56 of the 77 students who answered
this question, could not correctly identify the persons of the
Christian Trinity.
Did length of stay in the United States make a difference
here? It may have. Thirty percent of the one- and two-year
students answered correctly, compared to only 2 3 percent of the
new students. A point of caution here is that the one-year
students, who were the best informed on this issue, had a
disproportionately high percentage of women who wear a head
covering, and so the results of the one-year students may well be
more a reflection of the knowledge of the more devout Muslims
than they are of length of stay.
Of the three questions on basic Christian belief, the Malays
were the most knowledgeable about who Christians believe Jesus to
be. Questionnaire item 70 asks, "According to Christians, Jesus:
a) was a great prophet, but not God, b) was born when God
procreated with a woman, c) was God in human form, d) don't
know." Forty-one of 76 students chose correctly. Twenty-two
students said they didn't know; eight chose "a"; and five chose
"b" (see App. F, p. 547, Q#70) . Here, it was the men who were the
most likely to answer correctly. The responses of the two women
groups were virtually identical. As for the length-of-stay
419
variable, it was the new students who had the highest percentage
of correct answers.
The last question about what Christians believe, proved to
be the most difficult for the Malay students. Questionnaire item
71 says, "According to Christians, salvation/paradise is gained
through: a) belief in Jesus' death on the cross as a sacrifice
for sin, b) doing more good things than bad things/ trying to be
a good person, c) reciting the words of Jesus, d) attending
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church, e) don't know." The most chosen answer was "e" (don't
know) , followed by "b" (doing more good things than bad
things/trying to be a good person) (see App. F, p. 547, Q#71) .
Only 16 of 87 students understood that Christians believe that
salvation is gained through Jesus' death on the cross. Eleven
students said Christians believe salvation comes from church
attendance. Lastly, five students thought Christians believe
that reciting the words of Jesus leads to salvation. As with the
question about the Trinity, women wearing a head covering had the
most correct answers, while women without a head covering were
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the most misinformed. As was the case in the question about
The Malays, interestingly, did not understand the word
"salvation," and so I usually had to substitute the word "paradise"
in its place. The Christian concept of sin, and therefore the need
for salvation, was foreign to the students I interviewed.
Generally, then, the students were clueless as to the heart of the
gospel message.
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Overall, for the three questions, the more devout Muslims
knew more of what Christians believe than did those who are less
devout .
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Jesus, the new students actually were the most well-informed, and
the one-year students the least.
For all of their talk of Islam encouraging Muslims to
understand the religious beliefs of non-Muslims, it is eye-
opening to discover that only 16 of 87 students, students with
English education and exposure to the West, had picked up that
Christians believe Jesus' death on the cross is central to
salvation. Malay international students are more likely to think
that Christians believe that salvation is earned by doing good
works. Such a student is also likely to believe that Christians
believe the Trinity is made up of God, Mary, and Jesus.
The truth is that living in the United States apparently
does nothing to correct these misconceptions. For the combined
three questions about what Christians believe, the new students
were right 39% of the time; one-year students were right 25% of
the time; and two-year students answered correctly 32% of the
time. I reiterate that the student sample is too small and the
variables are too many to make hard conclusions, but it seems
clear that Malay students in the United States are not availing
themselves of opportunities to learn about Christianity, and
Christians are not penetrating into the world of the Malays.
Religious Preferences
The next section concerns not what the Malays know about
non-Muslim religions, but what they think about them. Because I
am interested in Christian evangelism of the Malays, I wanted to
know how the Malay students regard Christianity relative to other
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religious options. At one point, the Quran states that
Christians are nearest in affection to the faithful, and that God
will count them among the righteous (Sura 5:82-85).*^ Do the
Malays regard Christianity as better than other non-Muslim
religions because Christianity and Islam share Abrahamic roots
and because Christianity is monotheistic? Alternatively, do
Malays regard Christianity as worse than other religions because
of the historic conflict between Christianity and Islam, and/or
the pro-Israel stance taken by many Christians, and/or the fact
that, in Malaysia at least, Christianity has been much more
aggressive in evangelism than have been the other non-Muslim
religions? Also, do Malay students get a greater or lesser
appreciation of Christianity as a result of their stay in the
United States, or do their religious preferences remain
unchanged?
In the students' ranking, Christianity fared quite well
relative to the other non-Muslim religions in Malaysia.
Christianity was ranked first overall, followed in order by a
tie between Hinduism and Buddhism, then Judaism, Sikhism,
traditional spirit religion, and no religion. There were 22
different combinations of student rankings of the order of
personal preference of the religions (see App. F, p. 548, Q#80) .
The most common response, chosen by 31 of the students, was that
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This must be balanced, of course, with verses such as Sura
5:51, which labels Christians as wrongdoers and warns Muslims
against taking them as friends, and which Muslims generally believe
abrogates the sentiments in 5:82-85.
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all religions are the same and that it is only bad to have no
religion. Only two students stated that, of the options given,
it is best to have no religion. This is because, according to
them, a person with no religion has a clear mind and can more
easily accept the truth of Islam. Such a person has less false
teaching to reprogram.
Many more students were of the opinion that if one is not a
Muslim it is still better to have religious belief than not to.
Several students, in fact, made surprisingly open-minded
statements about the good in all religions, some even implying
that non-Muslim religions fill the role for non-Muslims that
Islam does for Muslims. As one student said, "All religions are
the same. Every religion is a guideline that limits passions and
controls improper desires." Similarly, another student
interjected, "I think all religions teach people to be better
persons. It is just up to the individual to choose."
The students, as a whole, ranked "no religion" as the worst
option. Malaysian traditional spirit religion (primal religion) ,
though usually considered better than no religion, was far behind
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the other religions in the students' preference. Fifteen
students did consider traditional spirit religion as bad as
having no religion, and five students actually felt that
Seven students considered primal religion as better than no
religion, but not on par with the "universal" religions.
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practicing primal religion was worse than having no religion at
all.^^
As mentioned, a majority of the students answered that, with
the exception of primal religion for many, all religions are
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basically equal. By far, the majority of these indicated that
all religions are good and benefit those who adhere to their
teachings. Only a handful of students made a point of stating
that all the non-Muslim religions are the same in that they are
equally in error for rejecting the truth of Islam. According to
these students, Islam alone fulfills human need and prepares its
followers for paradise.
I was surprised that more Malays did not capitalize on this
opportunity to contrast Islam favorably with other religions.
Thirteen students, though, declined to rate the non-Muslim
religions. This may be interpreted to mean that 13 students did
not want to give the non-Muslim religions the dignity of putting
This is because, as these students observed, primal religion
is amoral, and the manipulation of power is sometimes used for
harmful ends.
52 . .
Sixty-eight of the 95 students (72%) who responded to this
question, indicated that all the options were the same, or that all
were the same with the exception of no religion and/or traditional
spirit religion.
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Two students said that early Judaism was true, and an
additional couple of students said that both early Judaism and
early Christianity were true. These students believe that Judaism
and Christianity today are in error, along with all other non-
Muslim religions, because they reject Muhammad as the final
prophet .
them in any order of "preference." These students expressed
discomfort at even discussing other religions.
Very few students gave Christianity a low ranking relative
to the other options. In fact, a couple of students opined that,
apart from Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, there are no belief
systems that fit into the category of religion. Of the 95
responses, Christianity was considered equal to or better than
the other options 89 times.
Significantly, all six of the persons who rated Christianity
second or worse, were women who wear a tudung. Of these, three
women placed Christianity, along with Judaism, as the worst
option, and one woman ranked it above only no religion and primal
religion. The v?oman in this last case said that her ranking was
based on the level of devotion and commitment of the devotees to
their religion. Christians, she felt, are half-hearted in their
dedication.
Although sharing the same affinities with Islam that
Christianity does, Judaism was not linked with Christianity.
Overall, it was ranked beneath Christianity, Hinduism, and
Buddhism, and superior to only Sikhism, traditional spirit
religion, and no religion. The students' low ranking of Judaism
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Others expressed bewilderment at the number of Christians
who put little into their faith. While some of this is a
misperception based on the misconception that Christianity's lack
of regimented external expression means a lack of religious zeal,
there is enough genuine lack of practice of spiritual disciplines
by many American Christians to make these students' observations an
indictment against and challenge to the church to live in such a
manner that others take notice of our love and good deeds.
is a direct reflection of the Malays' identification with the
Arab Muslim world and its antipathy toward Israel.
Through time, the students' view of Christianity did not
change. Christianity was the most favored religion by both the
new students and those who had been in the United States a year
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or more.
These findings confirm our previous conclusion that, for
most Malay students, an extended American sojourn does little if
anything to change their knowledge of or attitude towards
Christianity. Furthermore, if they make any distinction between
non-Muslim religions, they are likely to say they prefer
Christianity above the others. The history of Christian-Muslim
relations in Malaysia, as well as my own experience with Malay
university students, dictate that this is not due to sympathetic
understanding of Christianity, or goodwill and affection toward
Christians compared to persons of other religions. The high
rating of Christianity stems from the fact that Malays understand
Christianity in its ideal or pristine form (in their estimation)
to be closer to Islam than is any other religion.
As I have said, this does not make Muslims relatively fond
of Christianity, but makes some of them particularly dislike
Christianity because they view it as a reprehensible perversion
^^The only change over time was that the students tended to
have a higher view of Judaism the longer they stayed in the United
States. My guess is that, being removed from the strongly anti-
Israel bias of the Malaysian media causes some Malay students to
see the Jews as less of an enemy.
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of the truth, much as Christians view cults which have a
Christian face.
What is even more important in shaping the Malays ' view of
Christianity is that they see Christian-Muslim relations as
clearly adversarial. Here is where the legacy of the early
colonial Christian crusading mentality continues. Moreover, the
Malay students are conscious of the worldwide competition between
Christianity and Islam. In their minds, the battle lines are
drawn between precisely these two religions. This came up
repeatedly in student comments and examples. When I would ask
someone, "What would you think if your friend changed
religions?", invariably the student would reply, "If my friend
became a Christian ..." When I asked whether they thought it
was acceptable for a non-Muslim to try to convert a Muslim, they
automatically thought in terms of Christian proselytization.
When I talked about expatriate missionaries, they mentioned only
Christians. Buddhism and Hinduism, though larger in Malaysia
than is Christianity, do not represent the challenge that
Christianity does.
Christianity and the United States
The last paragraph leads naturally to the question of
whether the Malay students believe Christians are against Islam
and the Muslim world (questionnaire item 84) . The student
responses show that they do indeed believe that Christians are
against Islam (see App. F, p. 551, Q#84) . Of the 103 respondents
to this question, only four did not think that Christians are
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^J^ti-Islamic. With ten undecided, the remainder were equally
divided between responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree."
The survey results indicate a change through time in the
students' view on this matter. The new students were much more
decided than were the two-year students in their belief that
Christians are against Islam. Even though Malay students in
the United States as a whole do not, as we have determined,
venture out much from their Malay ethnic enclaves, their exposure
to Christians and/or Christian institutions is sufficient to
alter there view of Christians, if not their understanding of
Christian teaching. If such superficial interaction with
American Christians results in a slightly more benign view toward
Christians, it seems justifiable to surmise that if American
Christians were more intentional in befriending Malay students,
Malays would likely be even less inclined to see Christians as
adversaries.
Two related questions were whether the Malays believe Jews
are against Islam and whether they believe there is a Judeo-
Christian conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world. The
Malays believe that Jews, even more so than Christians, are
against Islam (see App. F, p. 551, Q#85) . As for the question of
a Judeo-Christian conspiracy against the Muslim world, there is
no consensus among the Malay students. Most, however, either
^^The same was true of the Malays' view toward Jews. Exposure
to American society appeared to soften the Malay position that Jews
are against Islam.
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claim not to know, or lean toward doubting that Jews and
Christians, though both against Islam, are deliberately working
together to undermine the Muslim world (see App. F, p. 552, Q#86) .
Seeking to identify with the Arab world in its conflict with
Israel, the Malays carry an animosity toward Jews that they don't
towards Christians. Generally, the Malay students believe that
Christians are against Muslims in that both are competing for the
hearts of millions worldwide. Malays believe that Christians
view Muslims as their rivals, but that they usually do not
dislike individual Muslims per se. "Jews, on the other hand,
"are totally against Muslims." Another student said that it is
obvious that Jews and Christians are against Islam, but that Jews
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are more so.
A couple of students used this question of Christian-Muslim
relations to upbraid Christianity for its "high pressure"
tactics. One Malay young woman, whom I will call Norli, told of
a Muslim girl who "lost her mind" as a result of going to a
The irony here is that the average Malay will never meet a
Jewish person, and that even most Malay international students in
the United States cannot recognize Jewish surnames or distinguish
American Jews from non-Jews.
^�A few expressed consternation at what they consider to be a
Jewish-inspired, United States bias against the Arab world, and an
uncritical loyalty to the nation of Israel. Christians desiring to
befriend Malays and to build bridges of understanding between
Malays and themselves, must carefully work through their stance on
the Jews and the modern nation-state of Israel.
church in Kentucky- Norli reported that the girl did not want to
convert, but gave in to the relentless pressure from a nun.^^
To save her soul, the convert was then tirelessly "assisted"
to renounce Christianity and return to the Islamic fold. Norli 's
final comment was a vehement accusation against Christians for
using force, especially considering the fact, in Norli 's
insistence, that Muslims never use force. ^�
Related to the issue of relations with the Muslim world is
the question of whether the Malay students see the United States
as a Christian country, and thus regard the foreign relations and
domestic problems of the United States as the direct outworkings
of Christian influence (see questionnaire items 81-83) . Does the
inextricable bond between Islam and the state in Islamic
countries cloud the Malays from making distinctions between what
Norli 's mention of a "nun" in a church that was not, as it
turns out, Roman Catholic, betrays her less than complete
understanding of the situation. Norli is typical of Malays in that
she cannot distinguish between even the most clear divisions within
Christianity, such as that between Protestantism and Catholicism.
Many assume all church services to be of the nature of a liturgical
Roman Catholic mass. This is because, for many, the only Christian
service they have witnessed is a nationally televised Roman
Catholic Christmas high mass at a cathedral in Kuala Lumpur (the
only Christian telecast in the entire year) .
^�0f course it never crossed Norli 's mind that the tireless
"assistance" in restoring the convert to Islam, was a form of
coercion likely unmatched by any Christian attempts at
proselytization of Malay university students. Furthermore, the
equating of Christian conversion with "losing one's mind," coupled
with the immediate and extreme measures to prevent any converts
from following through with their decision, make it difficult to
believe that even the Malays themselves can believe their own
emphatic statements that Malays have complete religious freedom,
and that there is no coercion in Islam.
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is and is not influenced by the church in American society? In
other words, do the students regard American culture and
Christianity as roughly synonymous?
A majority of the students were, in fact, able to
distinguish between Christianity and the dealings of the United
States (see App. F, pp. 549-550, Q's#81-83). Yet, nearly a third
of them did believe that the United States is a Christian
country. Interestingly, less of them (20 out of 103, or 19%)
believed that Christian teaching strongly influences the United
States. The same percentage attributed the moral weaknesses of
the United States to Christianity.
The students' comments, which fleshed out the bare-bones
survey responses, revealed surprisingly positive sentiments
toward Christianity. We must not forget, though, the sizable
minority who do hold Christianity accountable for the flaws in
the American system. A number of students maintained that the
moral weakness of the United States is one evidence that
Christianity is weak. Christianity, in their view, suffers from
an inherent inability to instill and enforce moral character in
its adherents.
It was considerably more common, however, for the Malays to
blame the moral shortcomings of American society, not on
Christianity itself, but on a lack of serious commitment to
Christianity by Christians. As one woman put it, "The moral
weakness (of the United States) is not due to a lack in
Christianity, but to a lack of Christianity." After all, said
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one woman, "It's not the fault of the religion if its followers
do not uphold it teachings." Furthermore, said another, "The
reason the U.S. has moral problems is because Christians don't
practice their religion." One young man, with an Islamic
"church"-state mind-set, said that the problem with the United
States is that the United States government fails to enforce
Christian morals.
One thing some of the Malay students said they learned from
their time in America is that there are more Christians in the
United States than they had previously thought, but that
Christianity is apparently a very small part of their lives.
Aniza, a devout Muslim young woman, stated that before she
came to America, she thought that most Americans don't believe in
God. This she reasoned from what she believed to be the low
moral standards of the United States, evidenced in part by the
subject matter that dominates much of the American media,
particularly television and films. No country with a sizable
percentage of God-fearing individuals, she explained, would
promote such "trash" worldwide. She has since been surprised to
discover that most Americans do believe in God. She finds it
almost inconceivable that so many can call themselves Christians,
and not go to church, or otherwise demonstrate their faith.
Aniza 's criticism of American Christianity is partly unfair,
based as it is on the Muslim understanding that religion is
primarily public. Where she is right is her observation that
American Christians too often equate personal faith with
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privatized faith. While the Malay students consider Christianity
to be beneficial because of its moral code, they blame individual
Christians for not living up to their own code. It's a shame
that Christians themselves haven't made a better impression on
the Malays, and that the Malays did not encounter Christians who
represented well their own faith to the Malays.
Summary
We have found that, unlike most internationals, Malay
students do not generally desire American friendships, but prefer
rather to retreat into an ethnic enclave. Malay students in
America are also atypical of many Muslim students in that they
typically neither loosen nor strengthen their commitment to Islam
while in the States. All maintain strict orthodox Islamic
belief, while, due to the limited opportunities in the United
States, many observe Islamic prescriptions somewhat less
thoroughly than they did in Malaysia. Their position in a
society that does not enforce Islamic rules, though, often causes
them more personally to internalize their Islam. Furthermore,
the influences of orthodox Islam coupled with modern secularism
have caused the students to abandon much of the adat-based pre-
Islamic accretions inherent in traditional Malay folk Islam.
The students live with a tension between Malay ethnic
exclusivism and universal Islam. While, in general terms, they
applaud the ideals of world Islam, when it comes to practical
down home issues, they opt for preserving ethnic distinctives.
Finally, the Malay students know little of the beliefs of non-
Malay religions, and do not appear to learn about Christianity,
or be influenced by it during their stay in the United States.
CHAPTER 6
Summary, Conclusions, and Suggestions
How can we tie this all together? What can we learn from
the history of Christian-Malay relations, the interplay of Malay
ethnicity and religion, and the interviews with Malay university
students that will help us in attempts at evangelizing the
Malays?
Negative Christian Legacy
The history of the colonization of Malaysia and the church's
involvement therein have left a firmly grounded legacy that
continues to mitigate against positive Christian witness. At
first glance, this may not seem to be the case. To check my
hypothesis about the negative effects of past Christian-Malay
relations, especially in regard to the church's close association
with colonial policies, I asked several of the Malays I had
interviewed what they thought of the successive colonizers.
Surprisingly, the students knew few of the specifics of the past
occupations, and claimed not to give thought to the past.
Currently, the Malays are, to be sure, exceedingly forward
looking as they advance toward their much publicized Wawasan 2020
(2020 Vision) mutual goal of full industrialization by the year
2020 ("Entering a New Era" 1993).""" What the students do
articulate is that the British record was mixed, but that
Young, business-oriented politicians are fast replacing old-
guard traditionalists.
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overall, it was negative because it opened Pandora's box of
destructive Western moral influences, and left rural Malays (who
were most of the Malays) in a backward position relative to the
immigrant communities.
Christianity's Identification With Colonialism
While the Malay students express only vague notions of past
colonial rule, and some even claim that since it is past, it no
longer colors their thinking, beneath the surface, the Christian
colonial legacy dictates attitudes toward Christianity. The
history of Christian-Malay relations left an indelible mark in
the following ways: (1) Through its identification with Western
colonialism, Christianity became associated with the West; (2)
Christianity was seen as adversarial to Islam in general and to
Malay interests in particular; (3) Christianity was identified
with immigrant peoples, especially the Chinese; and (4) Ethnic
distinctions were promoted, pitting for their very survival, the
Malays and Islam against the immigrant people groups and their
imported religions.
The first legacy, the identification of Christianity as
Western, is a stigma that increasingly works against the
likelihood of the church being seen in a favorable light.
Malaysia, just 37 years an independent nation, is seeking to
forge its own identity in the world community. As such it is
looking to traditional Malay values (more accurately, its
selective interpretation or "invention" of the ideal Malay past) ,
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as well as to East Asian models of development (most notably
Japan) , to serve as the bases for development (Tsuruoka
1991:53)
The Malay ideal past includes above all else the conviction
that Malay society grew to greatness on the foundation of Islam,
and that Malay greatness now and in the future must proceed from
Islam. It is significant that the golden age of the Malays was
the 15th century Muslim Melakan Sultanate, and that the event
that ended this glorious era was the coming of the cross-bearing
Portuguese Christian crusader-traders. Thus began, in the
Malays' eyes, four and a half centuries of Malay subservience at
the hands of Christian imperialists."^ Only now, Malays are
crawling out from underneath such a burden, and are in no
disposition to include Western symbols (Christianity included) as
symbols of the dawning of the new golden age of the Malays.
Few Asian states have embraced Japanese investment as openly
as Malaysia. The initiator of this relationship is Prime Minister
Mahathir, whose "Look East" policy, first expressed in 1981, urged
Malaysians to adopt the example of their East Asian neighbors as a
model for development.
^Malay writers are loathe to concede the benefits brought by
British rule, and the security British civil authority brought to a
Malay world fraught with continual internecine warfare between
rival Malay chiefdoms. Nor do they give due credit to the
infrastructure the British built, including improved sewage,
sanitation, water purification, medical treatment, transportation,
communications, judicial system, and education. What is important
here is that current Malay historians judge the successive colonial
rules as one-sidedly exploitative, resulting in the Malays being on
the short end of land and resource allocation relative to the
immigrant communities, and the wresting of rightful Malays
leadership form Malay hands.
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Rather, Islam is touted as a healthy counterbalance to the
shallow materialism and anxieties of Western industrial consumer
economics (Vatikiotis 1993b:23).
In short, Christianity has to live down a legacy of
imperialism. Western identity, opposition to Islam, and
association with immigrant communities in competition with Malays
for limited resources and power. Thus, when a Christian cross-
cultural witness encounters Malays, she or he is not merely
starting with a blank slate, but with a great debit to be
overcome .
Insufficient Christian Witness
The history of Christian-Malay relations also reveals that,
although Christian missionaries have lived in Malaysia at least
since the 16th century, there has never been a large-scale,
sustained effort to evangelize the Malays. Furthermore, in the
rare instances when Malays were thoughtfully approached with the
gospel over a period of time, there was always at least some
favorable response (as in the work of Thomsen, the Keasberrys,
Shellabear, and the Blasdells) . Whenever the Malays have been or
are exposed to loving and respectful presentations of Christ from
a trusted Christian witness, there has been and is evidence of
receptivity. The problem is not hardness of heart, but gaining a
hearing through the defensive walls of Malay social cohesion.
Once this can be accomplished, the real problem then will not be
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evangelism, but creating a sense of identity as followers of
Jesus without losing their ethnic identity.^
Malav Identity; Ethnic Exclusivism
Vs. Universal Islam
Just what does Malay identity entail, anyway? Where are
they on the ethnic-Malay versus universal Islam continuum, and
where is the trajectory pointing? Mutalib (1990:153) postulates
that Malayness is characterized by a subconscious dialectical
tension between two mutually interdependent terms of identity for
Malays�their close-knit Malay ethnic community on the one hand,
and their membership in the universal, non-ethnic Islamic
community on the other. Though these may be at times
contradictory, they both ultimately serve to unite the Malays and
function as rallying points in moments of perceived non-Malay
threat. Although Islamic teaching decries ethnic exclusivism,
the ethnic and religious divisions in Malaysia are such that
Islam is employed to emphasize Malay distinctiveness over against
other peoples and faiths. Thus, Malays are championing a Malay
ethnic exclusivity and an Islamic identity simultaneously.
Although, as we will observe later, Malay exclusivity may be
subsiding due to common Malaysian international economic goals,
and Islamic revivalism has leveled off, there is no indication
4 ', ',
This IS, of course, due to Christianity's association with
everything deemed inimical to Malay welfare. It is compounded by
the fact that Malaysian Christianity has assumed completely Western
forms that have been unintentionally tailored not to fit Malays.
439
that either Malay ethnic exclusiveness or Islamic identity will
weaken substantially. Certainly, Islam, though not of a
fundamentalist variety, is seen as part and parcel of Malayness.
Colonial Rule Set the Tone for Malav Islam
The fact that Islam has emerged as the primary Malay
identity marker, and the type of Islam promoted by the
government, also have their roots in the colonial legacy. As we
have seen, the imposition of colonial rule removed Malay leaders
from the actual corridors of power, despite British
legitimization of their traditional titles. This process
encouraged Malay leaders to assume increasingly enhanced and
centralized roles in Islamic affairs because Islam was one of the
few spheres in which Malays were left with a measure of autonomy.
The Malay elite were afforded a modern. Western education.
Their secular education, coupled with their exposure to
nationalistic Islamic developments in Egypt and other regions of
the Islamic world, had the effect in Malaya of promoting Islamic
nationalism and reform couched in appeals made in the name of
science, progress, advancement, and secular education. Reformers
spoke of the virtues of Islamic rationalization and the necessity
of eradicating the "backward" (i.e., pre-Islamic [primal
religious/Hindu-Buddhist]) elements of Malay culture to help in
bringing Malays and Malayan Islam into the modern era.
Colonial policies also had the effect of creating previously
unknown distinctions within the all encompassing concept of adat.
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Specifically, the British bolstered selective aspects of adat
(such as legal matters of proprietorship and inheritance) and
prohibited or ignored others.
The relegating of certain dimensions of Malay culture to
secondary status was due in large part to a single 1910 monograph
written by two British civil servants, C.W.C. Parr and W.H.
Mackray, entitled Rembau; One of the Nine States; Its Historv.
Constitution, and Customs (Peletz 1993; 70). The book was
commissioned by the British government to understand local
customs relating to land tenure, marriage, divorce, and
inheritance. The authors sought to elucidate what they
understood Malay adat to be (i.e., customary law).
Unfortunately, they failed to understand that customary law is
just one aspect of adat, which includes all of Malay culture,
from food gathering and preparation, to house building, to social
etiquette, to religious ritual, magic, mythology, shamanism, and
healing.
The limited scope of Parr and Mackray 's treatment of adat is
consistent with the colonial British interest in the political
and administrative domains. Anything to do with religious
matters, whether Islamic or pre-Islamic rituals, healing arts and
divination, was excluded from the authors' rather detailed and
"authoritative" discussion of adat (Peletz 1993:72). It's not
that these non-jural aspects of adat were beyond the scope of
British concern. They were, in fact, of great interest to
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colonial scholars but were regarded as outside the realm of
custom, that is, customary law. They were usually described
separately under magic or religion�or relegated to appendices�
rather than in books on Malay custom.
Religious and other non-jural dimensions of adat gradually
acquired inferior status (contributing to the secularization and
eventual separation of adat from religion) , partly because Parr
and Mackray 's book came to be regarded by colonial officials,
indigenous leaders, and villagers alike as the definitive work on
adat. Parr and Mackray 's book and other such texts were
disseminated widely and assumed the status of holy writ, to the
extent that a high ranking Malay official recently stressed,
"It's not adat if it's not in that book"! (Peletz 1993:73). What
is included in the text has come to be defined as adat and what
is left out of the text (ritual, religion, mythology) is excluded
from, or marginalized within, the concept of adat (Peletz
1993:73) .
This is extremely significant when one realizes the moral
force and social relevance of adat as a unifying, broadly
hegemonic construct. The removal of the spirit realm from adat,
an enormously prominent part of pre-British adat, has helped to
strip the realm of spirits (the "excluded middle"^) from modern
5Paul Hiebert (1982) introduced the term "excluded middle" to
refer to the realm of supernatural but this-wordly beings. It is
excluded in that it has been neglected in Western theological
study .
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Malay notions of Islam. Thus we find a predominantly
rationalistic, "secular" Islam in Malaysia.
The colonial legacy also unwittingly helped create a
national consciousness based on Islam. The British narrowed the
adat concept to be more secular than ever before, but ironically,
they also made adat more in keeping with orthodox Islam,
for many previously sacrosanct dimensions of adat� for
example, essentially pre-Islamic rituals associated with
shamanism and various types of local spirit cults�have been
relegated, by some villagers at least, to the dust bins of
history and culture by being reclassified as kepercayaan
("[mere] belief", "superstition"). (Peletz 1993:77)
Consequently, many younger generation Malays see adat as an
archaic collection of beliefs and practices that are irrelevant
at best and inimical to modernization and Islamic development at
worst.
The empowering of state-controlled Islamic administrative
hierarchies that began under colonial rule led to more
centralized and rationalized implementation of Islamic religious
law. Colonial rule (as seen in Chapter 2) also more clearly
demarcated ethnic divisions and heightened ethnic antagonisms
which divided people groups along religious and economic lines.
Development strategies of the post-colonial government (e.g., the
New Economic Policy [NEP] implemented in 1971) only exacerbated
ethnic distinctions by making ethnicity�whether one is a Malay
or a non-Malay�the criterion for allocating government loans and
subsidies and other limited commodities such as university
scholarships and contractor's licenses (Peletz 1993:80). These
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policies, which have highlighted the distinctions between Malays
and non-Malays, have likewise heightened religious differences.
The NEP also caused class antagonisms within the Malay
community, by creating a Malay middle class and enriching a few,
yet leaving many Malays even worse off then before.
Disillusionment with the government's commitment to
modernization through capitalism and Western modes of development
helped fuel the Islamic resurgence throughout Malaysia of the
late 1960s and the 1970s. Islamic revivalists claimed that the
Malay ruling party had sold out to local Chinese and Indians, as
well as foreign capitalists, and to a courting of westernization
(following colonial patterns) which had contributed to
Malaysia's underdevelopment, continued dependence on foreign
markets, and to its decadence and spiritual bankruptcy (Kessler
1980; Milner 1986) .
Islam as a Vehicle of Dissent
This sketch helps us begin to understand that the Malaysian
Islamic revival was as much political as it was spiritual.
Reacting to a Western-styled Malay leadership, faltering in the
aftermath of the devastating race riots of 1969, young reformers
found in Islam the major ideology of dissent. Islam, as
sacrosanct, and thus not subject to attack, was the perfect
vehicle through which to promote reform. Revivalist (dakwah)
organizations of all varieties sprang up, with the common
denominator of being anti-West. Islamic ideals of justice and
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equity were appealed to to bolster the Malays' position vis-a-vis
the other Malaysian ethnic communities (Mutalib 1990:21).
Moreover, the sharp religious delineation between Muslim and
kafir (infidel) made it a moral responsibility for the Malays
(those who are ethnically and spiritually fit) to rule their own
nation, for only the rightly guided could guide rightly.
This is not to imply that genuine Islamic revival had not
occurred. Religious resurgence can be measured in increased
mosque attendance and participation in daily prayers, as well as
in the popularity of conservative Islamic dress, especially the
head covering donned by many Malay women. Yet, much of this
Islamic activity can be attributed at least in part to the
cataclysmic sociological upheaval of the Malays in rapidly
shifting from a millennia-old village lifestyle to a multi
ethnic, industrialized urban world. As Malay woman journalist
Suhaini Aznan (1991a: 18) points out;
Not everyone took the purdah (veil) for religious reasons
alone. Some young women, living on their own for the first
time, wore it to discourage male attention. Others gave in
to peer pressure. And subsequently, many recent migrants to
the city joined the dakwah movement as a mark of Malay
solidarity against the unfamiliar, aggressive multi-ethnic
milieu the found themselves in.
Malay academic Rahman Said (1993:21) concurs that the
Islamic revival was fundamentally a vehicle for political reform
aimed at uniting Malay interest in upgrading the position of the
Malays relative to the other Malaysian peoples. Said contends
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that in the 1970s "Islam was a good horse to ride," but that now
its usefulness has been spent.
World Islam, with its renewed image of success, gave the
Malays an identity of which to be proud, a moral code with which
to fill the void left by secular materialism, and a vision and
ballast with which to navigate the Malays into a new, post-
colonial golden age of greatness.^ The revivalist (dakwah)
movements left a heightened standard of Islamic belief and
practice, as well as an ideology of universal, supra-ethnic
Islam. Yet, as Malaysian sociologist Ackerman and Lee (1988:45)
emphasize, Malay Islamic consensus was primarily cultivated to
promote Malay ethnic distinctives. Above all else, Islam
provides a symbol of unity for all Malays (Ackerman and Lee
1988:43) .
Not Fundamentalist Islam
A number of factors reveal that Malaysia is not moving in
the direction of Islamic fundamentalism. Malay leaders who
formerly bowed to peer pressure, have in the past few years
returned to more secular ways. "Muslims seem to have reverted to
what used to be a more familiar expression of the religion�a
comfortable, Malay village-style approach to Islam, rather than a
zealous, fist-waving Middle-Eastern display. Islam here was
never, in any case, militant" (Aznam 1991a: 18).
^Malaysia is, in fact, cultivating world Islamic ties. This
is evident in its acceptance of Bosnian Muslim refugees, and its
welcoming of Iraqi oil officials and Bangladeshi laborers.
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Aznam (1991a: 18) observes that the trappings of a modern,
"decadent" West, are no longer considered un-Islamic: "Not since
the early 1980s has anyone been heard to have tossed out the TV
set, living room furniture and fine china in favour of sitting on
the floor and eating in groups of five or more from a large dish
heaped with food, Arab-style."
The government itself has discouraged the swing in the
direction of organized Islam. While the government, dominated by
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) , protects the
status of Islam and promotes its teaching and practice, its
appeal is to the individual consciousness rather than to
obligatory Islamization.
The Malay leadership is consumed with present and future
economic growth and internal development. The current economic
boom is of incomparable significance to all of Malaysian life.
It is bringing unprecedented change to the Malay world. Having
7
joined the ranks of the so-called "Super Seven," Malaysia is no
longer the sleepy little low-income, low-production-cost
developing country many imagine it to be. "It has, for example,
become the world's leading exporter of computer chips and is the
third largest producer of semi-conductors after Japan and the
U.S. " (Suter 1993 : 302) .
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand,
and Malaysia are all nations that have transformed themselves in
recent years from Third World status by setting international
records for economic growth.
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The United Nations Development Program publishes a Human
Development Report, in which human development is measured in
terms of longevity, knowledge, and living standards. The 1991
edition listed Malaysia among the 53 nations ranked as having
attained high human development. Even more significant is the
survey of changes in the Human Development Index over time, which
evaluates national progress between 1970 and 1985. Malaysia
ranked number two of the 160 nations studied. Economically, 1994
was the seventh consecutive year of 8% or higher growth (Tanzer
1994:60) .
Malaysia is charging forward toward its goal that by the
year 2 020, in the words of Prime Minister Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad :
Malaysia can be a united nation, with a confident Malaysian
society, infused by strong moral and ethical values, living
in a society that is democratic, liberal and tolerant,
caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and
prosperous, and in full possession of an economy that is
competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient, (quoted in Suter
1993:302)
These words are not those of a fundamentalist Islamic
autocrat, but rather emphasize openness and material prosperity.
Indeed, Datuk Ismail Ibrahim, former Arabic language lecturer and
director of a new Islamic think-tank, the Malaysian Institute for
Islamic Understanding (known as IKIM after its Malay acronym) ,
has been charged with molding an Islamic work ethic that pays as
much attention to material success in the present world as to
spiritual rewards in the next (Vatikiotis 1993c:32).
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IKIM is ostensibly responsible for fostering understanding
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet, many observers see the
institute mainly as "A new and bold attempt by the government to
combat resistance to progressive economic thinking among the
seven million Malaysian Muslims" (Vatikiotis 1993c: 32).
University of Malaya economist Jomo K. Sundaram believes Mahathir
needs IKIM to justify his agenda of social and political
modernization within his own Malay-Muslim constituency. "'He
needs to provide Islamic legitimacy for what he wants'" (quoted
in Vatikiotis 1992c:32). Specifically, he needs to deflect the
criticism from elements within Malay Islam which shun modern
thinking as Western, and therefore not compatible with Islamic
principles .
Prime Minister Mahathir ' s track record reveals that he
consistently courts Islam just enough to diffuse criticism from
his more devout Muslim detractors, but is ultimately concerned
more with political than spiritual gain. It appears that IKIM is
his vehicle for staying within the bounds of Islamic orthodoxy by
reinterpreting that orthodoxy- For example, citing the Quran to
argue the case for a better work ethic, IKIM has explained that
hard work can be defined as jihad or holy war in the Islamic
context (Vatikiotis 1993c:32).
Mahathir is moving incrementally away from a conservative
Islamic position. In the past, Mahathir echoed conservative
Islamic views to counter opposition from PAS, the Islamic party.
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He established the Islamic Affairs Department, which, in turn,
initiated Islamic banking, and aggressive Islamic education
campaigns. Under Mahathir's administration, Malaysian
Islamization has advanced remarkably, absorbing much of the PAS
agenda and thus effectively crippling PAS politically by removing
its main reason for being. Now it appears that the Islamic
Affairs Department, Mahathir's own creation, has itself become
too conservative for Mahathir. IKIM can thus be seen as the new
alternative to the existing Islamic Affairs Department. In the
name of Malaysian progress and participation in world economics,
Mahathir has for the first time been so bold as to say that for
Islam to keep up with modern times, it may be necessary to
question orthodox views (Vatikiotis 1993c:32).
Mahathir's position is not hard to determine. As an aging
long-term politician, he is a known figure. What of the next
generation of Malay leadership?
UMNO has increasingly couched its ambitions in the rhetoric
of the need to cling to religious values. Non-Muslim Malaysians
are concerned that the present emphasis on spiritual values could
in the future prove to be an emphasis on Islam alone. Stoking
these fears is the knowledge that the deputy president of UMNO,
Anwar Ibrahim, a former leading radical Muslim activist, is
almost certain to become Malaysia's next prime minister.
Seeking to allay such concerns. Said (1993:21), himself a
Malay Muslim, places Anwar Ibrahim in the "liberal modern Muslim"
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camp, stating that Anwar is not excessively religious. Said
believes that in former days Anwar tapped into the high tide of
Islamic resurgence to promote his pro-Malay agenda. Several
analysts, Said included, feel that the revivalist Islamic surge
has since subsided, and, that being the case, revivalist Islam
will no longer be Anwar's vehicle for conveying his interests.
It is noteworthy here that current observers no longer refer to
Anwar as a radical Muslim, but, uniformly speak of him as
essentially pragmatic (Said 1993:21; Mitton 1993:23; "A New
Generation" 1993:29).
Anwar Ibrahim's own statements show that he is intentionally
positioning himself outside the radical dakwah camp. He has
criticized fundamentalist Muslim governments for disallowing
public debate and self-criticism (Bowring 1991:56). He has
expressed public disagreement with Iran's treatment of Salmon
Rushdie (though he covered himself by assuring that he personally
believes Rushdie to be in the wrong) (Mitton 1993:22-23). (Here,
again, we find the trend toward making Islam a matter of personal
conscience not to be blanketly imposed.) Though some of it may
be dismissed as merely conciliatory pre-election rhetoric,
Ibrahim stresses the importance of freedom of expression and the
need for tolerance of all peoples and religions. He has made
statements that distance him from Malay-Muslim extremists, such
as his announcement that it is insensitive to build mosques in
predominantly non-Muslim areas, or his belief that special
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benefits given to people by virtue of their being Malay, will
eventually need to stop so that Malays can learn to compete on
equal footing (Mitton 1993:23). Ultimately, Anwar is forward
looking and internationally-minded. He understands that total
Malaysian development must go beyond the homogenous Malay
community. For Anwar and the new generation of young Malay
8
political leaders, economic progress and development override
exclusively ethnic concerns.
There are even hints that UMNO may relax its Malay ethnic
bias. The popular chief minister of Penang state and member of
UMNO's 25-member Supreme Council, Ibrahim Saad, speaks of
welcoming into UMNO currently ineligible groups with historical
roots in the country, such as the Melaka Portuguese, suggesting
that UMNO might eventually become the United Malaysian National
Organization ("A New Generation" 1993:27). While it is unlikely
that such a move is in the foreseeable future, the very fact that
it was articulated is amazing. Such statements, says academic
Rustam Sani, "would never have been uttered even five years ago"
("A New Generation" 1993:27).
In response to a question about his views on the proper mix
of Islam and Malaysian politics, Anwar Ibrahim commented, "While
Q
Riding Anwar's coat-tails, three young Malay rising stars and
Anwar supporters, swept the three seats for UMNO vice president in
the November 1993 election (Said 1993:19). Together they epitomize
today's highly educated and articulate, outward looking Malays
("Two Men and Their Party" 1993:29). Malaysia is undergoing a
rapid changing of the guard, in which the old guard traditionalists
are being replaced with young blood.
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we believe that Malaysia should be seen as a successful, vibrant,
active Muslim community, we should not be in any way forced into
thinking in terms of the narrow confines of religiosity
subscribed to by many extremist groups" (Mitton 1993:23).
Before further prognosticating about the future face of
Malaysia, let us take note of other signs that the revivalist
movement has peaked and that Malays are opting for a moderate
form of Islam.
Although the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s witnessed the
dawning of the donning of Arab-style women's headdress,^ in the
mid-1980s the Malaysian government actually banned the full
purdah (clothing covering the entire face) from use in all
schools and civil service arenas. A celebrated case in which a
government clerk sued the government for firing her for wearing
the purdah to work (she was a fundamentalist Muslim for whom it
was against her religious and moral convictions to appear in
public uncovered), upheld the government's bar on the purdah.
The justice, himself a Muslim, ruled that the government can
enforce a dress code even at the expense of restricting the
religious practice of some of its officers ("Behind the Black
Veil" 1992:33). What is even more telling is that the verdict
was applauded by a top Malay mufti (religious counsel) , as well
9
The telekung or tudung (head scarf) adopted by many Malay
women in the wake of the revival is not a traditional Malay piece
of clothing. Women covering their head was not a return to a
previously popular conservative Muslim style of dress. Rather, it
represented a new level of Islamic conservatism in Malaysia.
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as by the dean of the Islamic Faculty at the National University
of Malaysia ("Behind the Black Veil" 1992:33), indicating the
moderate position taken by leading Malay Muslim authorities.
An obvious blemish on any image the Malaysian government may
portray of Islamic piety is the fact that Malaysia operates a
multi-billion dollar legalized gambling business. Gambling is so
vibrant, in fact, that the Malaysian stock exchange's gaming
sector more than quadrupled from 1990 to 1993 (Tanzer 1994:58).
Considering that gambling is taboo under Islamic teaching,
it is curious that it is allowed in a country in which a Muslim
majority dominates the government. The Malays have found a way
to keep their noses clean and yet benefit from the gambling.
Rather than outlaw gambling (and lose its profits) or operate it
itself, the Malay-dominated government privatized gambling and
taxes it heavily. This transfers a good portion of the wealth
from the Chinese, who dominate gambling, to the majority Malays.
The point here is that for the Malay policy makers, money talks
louder than strict Islamic scruples.
Speaking of money, Malay critics of UMNO say that current
Malay leaders are obsessed with enriching themselves and the
country at the expense of fidelity to Malay values. Some even
contend that Malay politicians' chief interest in Islam lies in
the links it provides in the hope of becoming a major force in
Middle Eastern markets (Tsuruoka 1993a: 62). In Malaysia's dash
for economic growth, UMNO is worried that fundamentalist Islam
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could damage Malaysia's international image^� (Vatikiotis
1992a:29; Suter 1993:303).
The fundamentalist revival has indeed made an indelible
mark, calling all Malays to a higher standard of ethical and
moral purity. As we have found in the student interviews, the
revival has resulted in Malay Muslims becoming more knowledgeable
of Islamic orthodoxy and feeling more personally aware of and
accountable for their own spiritual state. It has not resulted,
though, in a general push to replace civil law with Islamic law.
Comparing my student interviews (conducted in 1992) with
Zainah Anwar's (1987) interview data, which ranges from the mid-
1970s to the early 1980s, we see a dramatic change with respect
to the dakwah issue. Anwar reports (1987:60-76) great animosity
There is still a sizeable conservative Muslim minority,
represented politically by PAS (The Islamic Party) . In fact, the
government has not obstructed the introduction of hudud (Islamic
criminal law) in Kelantan, the only state PAS controls. Mahathir's
concession to the Kelantan state government is interpreted as a
political ploy to give PAS just enough rope to hang themselves
(Vatikiotis 1992a: 28-29) . Two other political parties, the DAP
(the Chinese dominated Democratic Action Party) , and Semangat 46 (a
breakaway faction of the mainstream United Malay National
Organization) , have forged an uneasy alliance with PAS in hopes of
countering UMNO. Since both the DAP and Semangat 46 espouse
multiracial policies, the actual implementation of strict Islamic
criminal law may be frightening enough to force them to break with
PAS, and thus scatter the opposition alliance.
While there may be good political reasons for Mahathir to
allow this suppression of the constitutional guarantee of the
freedom of religion and its commitment to Malaysia as a secular
state, some UMNO leaders are concerned about the image it conveys
to Malaysia's current and potential business partners. As one
leading UMNO official said, "The problem is the world doesn't know
the difference between Kelantan and the rest of Malaysia" (quoted
in Vatikiotis 1992a: 29).
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between dakwah and more liberal Malay Muslims. An intra-ethnic
cultural war was taking place among the Malays. Enemy lines were
drawn over whether or not one covered one's hair.
Having read Zainah 's findings, I anticipated similar
response from my interviewees. To that end I asked pointed
questions, for example, about what conservatively clad Malay
women thought about their more secular cousins' exposing of heads
and limbs. To my surprise, I uncovered no such animosity, but
rather a mutually respecting live-and-let-live attitude. Anwar
(1987:62) had reported that Western dressed Malays made friends
more readily with non-Malays than with Malays who wore Islamic
dress. My students, however, did not follow this pattern.
Anwar's Malays broke friendship over differing views of Malaysian
Islamization. The politics of "mosque"-state relations was an
explosive issue. My students, overall, had barely given the
subject a thought. When pressed for an opinion, most of the
students I interviewed supposed that Malaysia would actually be
worse off under the full implementation of Islamic law. Most are
toward the more moderate or liberal end of the Muslim spectrum.
The dakwah movement is no longer an issue for them. To be a
dakwah (revivalist Muslim) or not, used to have political and
social implications. Now it just tells how religious one is.
As a whole, the Malays are not moving toward stricter
Islamization. In fact, the Mahathir administration seems intent
on keeping religion out of politics. As if to broadcast this
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from the highest minaret, Malaysia recently banned the ultra-
conservative Al Arqam sect and arrested its leader, Mr. Ashaari
Muhammed. It is equally significant that the administration
reportedly received merely "facile censure" for the crackdown
("Pre-Emptive Strike" 1994:26). Decrying Iran as economically
backward and diplomatically isolated, UMNO wants to keep Islam at
arms length from the actual machinery of government operations .
Malaysia wants to appear tolerant and open-minded, and is seeking
to downplay its Muslim side in order to sell itself to the world
Malays are adopting higher personal standards of Islamic
orthodoxy, but are not pushing for the creation of an Islamic
state.
We reiterate that in Malaysia there is an increase in
universalistic Islam, but that such Islamic awareness,
paradoxically, also serves to strengthen Malay ethnic
exclusiveness .
Identification with Worldwide Islam
The former is demonstrated in Malaysia's proud
identification with worldwide Islam in its eschewing of Western
colonial influences. Malays share with their Islamic allies a
�""^While it is true that the Malaysian government is not moving
toward the implementation of Islamic law, we must not take this to
mean that Islam's influence is declining. Quite to the contrary,
Islam is increasing de facto by virtue of its association with the
ever increasing dominance of the Malay people. For example, a
recent zoning plan for an area of Malaysia which is 65% non-Muslim
calls for 677 new centers of Muslim worship as compared to 235 new
centers of non-Muslim worship by the year 2010 (NECF Prayer Digest
1994) .
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sense of destiny. They feel their Islamic dream is happening.
An example of Malay gut-level identification with fellow Muslims
is the fact that during the Gulf War, even though the Malaysian
government officially supported the United Nations-sanctioned
12
coalition against Iraq, the Malay people felt compelled as
Muslims to sympathize with their Muslim Iraqi brothers fighting a
secular power (Vatikiotis and Aznam 1991:20). Another example is
that the Malays automatically assume the Bosnian conflict is a
Western-backed conspiracy against Muslims.
Islam as a Svmbol of Malav Ethnic Identity
In fact, the success of world Islam fuels Malay
nationalistic pride. Malaysia's phenomenal economic success is
seen as an indication of the superiority of Islam, as Malays
believe their economic superstructure to be founded on Islamic
principles.
More than anything else, Islam promotes ethnic distinctions
in Malaysia by providing a symbol for Malays to rally around
against non-Malay threats to Malay hegemony. Malays unite with
other Muslims against non-Muslims, but more fundamentally, they
unite with themselves against all others.
Traditional Svmbols of Malavness Weakening
The Malays are forging a new identity. While they look to
the past for images of the ideal Malay character (hence the
�"�^The Malaysian government voted in favor of UN Resolution
678, the resolution justifying the allied action.
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recent love affair with traditional Malay art forms based on an
idyllic rural lifestyle) , the Malays are irretrievably losing the
kampung (village) world to the forces of urbanization and inter-
global telecommunications. Traditional Malay adat is a symbol
with decreasing actual substance.
The most striking example of this is the 1993 Malaysian
constitutional amendment removing the sultans' immunity from
prosecution."^"^ Although it is of relatively minor political
significance, it is of enormous symbolic importance. The
monarchy is, after all, the Malays' most visible link to their
past. The amendment represents a demythicization of the royals.
The guardianship of Malay supremacy and the protectorate of Malay
rights, religion, and language have shifted from the monarchy to
UMNO ("A Monarchy Thus Updated" 1993:1). The state is becoming
the new arbiter of the Malay conscience.
Another example of the triumph of pragmatism over symbolism
is the government's recent reintroduction of English in tertiary
education (Vatikiotis 1993a:18). For over two decades, Malaysia
Malaysia's sultans had damaged their venerability by
spendthrift habits and a proclivity for gambling, drinking, and
other vices. The Malaysian Sultan of Johore 's fatal assault on
one or more hapless attendants provided an opportunity for Mahathir
to press for limiting the monarchy's powers (Tasker, Vatikiotis,
and Delfs 1993:20) .
The erosion of the status of the Malay royalty is seen in the
fact that a decade ago Mahathir failed to rally the public behind a
move to limit royal power, but enjoyed popular support for the 1993
amendment (Vatikiotis 1992a: 16).
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has promoted Malay as the national language. For the
politically dominant but culturally sensitive Malay community,
the Malay language has long been one of the leading symbols
(second only to Islam) of Malay ethnic and national identity,
while English is popularly associated with colonial rule
(Vatikiotis 1993f:38).
The Malay literati strongly oppose any concessions to
English, regarding it as a sell-out to the Chinese and Indian
Malaysians ("Speaking of English" 1992:41). The government
counters that the Malay-only policy has caused a decline in
English language proficiency among the Malays, which is
resulting, in turn, in a loss of Malay competitiveness in the
private sector. Here, again, in the contest between Malay ethnic
nationalism and pragmatism, pragmatism wins.
In fact, the Malay political leadership is championing the
reintroduction of English. Prime Minister Mahathir has even
labeled the Malays who are calling for more use of Malay at the
expense of English, "fanatics" who risk undermining the nation's
development prospects (Vatikiotis 1992c:31). For the forward-
looking Malay leadership caught up in the heady vision of full
industrialization, money talks louder than Malay.
Under the Constitution, Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) is the
official national language. The last batch of Malaysian secondary
students schooled in English graduated in 1981. Since 1969, Malay
has been the medium of instruction in all grade schools except a
fraction that are Mandarin or Tamil.
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Societal Upheaval
What is especially noteworthy about Malaysia's economic
success is "the speed and brashness of its transformation of the
exotic into the modern and materially chic" (Vatikiotis
1992d:27). Malaysia is industrializing, urbanizing, and
economically homogenizing at a breathtaking pace. One observer
has referred to the rapid transformation as a disconcerting and
"indiscriminate shedding of tradition" (Vatikiotis 1992d:27).
The Aliran monthly, a social-consciousness publication, wrote an
article entitled "The Ugly Malaysian," describing the predominant
ideology of Malaysia as a "crass pragmatism" based on a "me
first" attitude.
Journalist and social commentator Michael Vatikiotis
(1992d:27) believes that, ironically, it is precisely these
traits that are holding Malaysia's plural society together. The
various ethnic groups are setting aside traditional boundary
markers ;.n pursuit of the higher, common goal of national
prosperity. Says Vatikiotis (1992d:27), "It is a form of
collective selfishness."
Together Malaysians aspire to the Malaysian dream,
a
suburban house and two cars. What worries the more reflective
Malaysians is the reverse implications of the 2020 Vision�
what
Malaysia will not be in the meantime. It is troubling
that many
Malaysians no longer vote for political ideals. The issue
of
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human rights has taken a back seat to the glittering prospect of
long-term economic growth.
Increasingly Authoritarian Government
Malaysia's non-Malays are justifiably concerned over the
increasingly authoritarian trend of UMNO, the Malay ruling
party.
�'�^
Recent examples include Prime Minister Mahathir's
willingness to detain opponents under the Internal Security Act
(A measure enacted in 1960 to contain communist insurgents, the
ISA allows for imprisonment of up to two years without trial).
"""^
Mahathir is not adverse to invoking the Official Secrets Act,
which proscribes the unauthorized publication of government
information, and the Sedition Act, which prohibits the discussion
of issues which could "promote feelings of ill-will and hostility
between different races or classes of the population of Malaysia"
(Sedition Act, Article 3) .
A loose interpretation of the Sedition Act enabled UMNO to
suspend for several months of 1987 the Star, a major English-
medium newspaper which gives prominence to Chinese concerns and
which is occasionally critical of the government. Also suspended
15
See Crouch 1992:21-30 for a history of UMNO's reliance on
authoritarian means of control.
""^^In October and November of 1987, 106 people were arrested
under the guise of their being a threat to national security.
Among those arrested were leaders of opposition political parties,
leaders of Chinese educational bodies, government critics, members
of environmental groups opposed to Malaysia's aggressive
deforestation and displacement of indigenes, and Christian social
welfare activists.
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were an independent-minded Malay weekly, and a Chinese newspaper.
The Act is so loosely defined as to inhibit critics from raising
issues which may then be interpreted as within the scope of the
Act.
Criticism from without is also silenced as issues of foreign
publications (such as the Asian Wall Street Journal and the Far
Eastern Economic Review) which contain editorials critical of
Malay leadership are withheld from circulation.
Most information is filtered through the UMNO controlled
media. The leading English-medium and Malay-medium newspapers
are owned by an UMNO-owned group of companies (Gomez 1990:61-69),
and all three Malaysian television stations are either directly
or indirectly controlled by UMNO.
Following a series of court judgments unfavorable to the
government, and triggered by a court order for the release of a
Mahathir political opponent detained under the ISA on the grounds
that the detention was made without just cause, Mahathir
succeeded in cajoling the ruling Sultan to have the Lord
President (Chief Justice) of the Supreme Court dismissed on
trumped up charges of "gross misconduct." Dr. Mahathir went on
to engineer an amendment to the Constitution in March 1988 which
limits the powers of the judiciary (Crouch 1992:26). Mahathir
was able to team up with the sultans in their mutual dislike for
the probing arm of the justice system. Mahathir later turned
around and (as we have seen) successfully pushed for limitations
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on royal authority- The net result is that UMNO and the Prime
Minister have emerged with even weaker checks and balances on
their power.
Allegations of government misconduct lead not to
investigations of the charges, but to a punishment of the
accusers. A case in point is the Malaysian government's
announcement in February 1994 that it will no longer award
contracts to British companies because of allegations by British
journalists that Prime Minister Mahathir had accepted bribes
("Malaysia May Bar Journalists" 1994:A4).
Mahathir is particularly incensed by criticism from the West
regarding charges of human rights abuses and restrictions of
personal freedom. He has unmistakenly asserted that Western
concepts of democracy and human rights do not fit the Asian
context ("Entering a New Era" 1993:21; Crovitz 1994:20). In
addition, in the interest of political stability and inter-
communal harmony, he has expressed his desire for more
centralization of power ("Entering a New Era" 1993:23).
It is just such unchecked power, coupled with increased
control over dissent that concerns non-Malays in Malaysia. They
are also unhappy about the Malays' desire to exclude non-Malay
17
elements from Malay culture.
For example, plans for a Chinese cultural center were
blocked by UMNO, which took it as a challenge to Malay dominance
(Aznam 1991b: 16) .
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If nothing else, Malaysian demographics are pointed toward
ever increasing Malay dominance. The Malay percentage of the
total population has climbed from about 45% in 1961 to
approximately 58% today. Furthermore, as Malays are still having
large families, and the other Malaysians are limiting themselves
to one or two children per couple, there is every indication that
the Malay majority will grow larger.
Prime Minister Mahathir views his society as becoming more
Malay and more Muslim (Vatikiotis 1993b:23). Although Mahathir
and his protege, Anwar Ibrahim, note that religious toleration is
basic to Islam and will be upheld by the government, there is
little recourse for Christians or other non-Muslims who feel
their free expression is being curtailed in the name of societal
stability. Not strong enough to change things on their own, the
non-Muslims' only trump card is international opinion. Malaysian
tourism is based on the image of a carefree tropical paradise,
not an oppressive Muslim regime. The same :.s true for
international business relations.
In short, the successes of worldwide Islam and of the Malays
are combining to strengthen Malay ethnic pride. Moreover,
although there is some crossing of ethnic boundaries in the
common urban mix, and in the national cooperation for
international economic prowess, the Malays have come out with
increased power to strengthen their position vis-a-vis competing
ethnic groups. We have also observed that fundamentalist Muslims
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form no more than a vocal minority in Malaysia. The Malay
leadership, and the majority of the Malay populace, prefer a more
relaxed, live-and-let-live Islam. The Malay Islamic consensus is
being utilized not for the implementation of an Islamic state,
but as a symbol of Malay unity and identity, and as a preserver
and promoter of Malay ethnic distinctives.
Prospects for Malav Evangelism
The Malays' tight identification with Islam, and their
increasing control over all spheres of Muslim life, do not bode
well for prospects of Malay evangelism. Since the state (ethnic
Malayness) and religion (Islam) are mutually validating, is it
even conceivable from a Malay's perspective for a Malay to be a
Christian?
Social Change Increases Openness
One might argue that the Malays are not as yet a ripe
harvest field. Perhaps we should direct our attention to more
fertile soil. True, the landscape looks bleak, but there is
another picture. The aforementioned technological and economic
gains are affecting phenomenal social changes touching every
corner of Malay life. The Malays' international thrust, and
especially the proliferation of international media brought on by
technological advances, have opened the Malays to an electronic
information and entertainment explosion, which is exposing the
Malays to outside influences to a degree far surpassing anything
in colonial times. Just one example is that in 1993 rap music
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dominated the Malaysian popular music scene (Cheah 1993:20).
Despite government efforts to dissuade Malaysian youth from
"emulating decadent Western culture," rap music pulsates through
shopping malls, night spots, and innumerable walkman headsets,
while government-promoted traditional music finds little audience
beyond the confines of tourist-infested cultural shows
(Vatikiotis 1993d:32).
Everything from education to living conditions to
occupations is changing overnight. The age-old Malay kampung
(village) world in which relationships are extremely tight and
interconnected, is being metamorphosed into a city world of
disconnected individuals. The clearly defined roles and strictly
prescribed behavior of the kampung are being exchanged for
anomie. Serious crime and drug abuse are new to the Malays.
Now is the first time the Malays have experienced a sharp
discontinuity from the past. Never before was it common to hear,
as it is now, rueful expressions such as: "A few years ago it
wasn't like this."
For prospects of Christian evangelism of Malays in Malaysia,
the societal upheaval is a big positive. It is common knowledge
that times of transition are the most conducive to receptivity to
�"�^Yusof (1976) reported that urban environments provide an
anonymity that makes it easy to escape the influences of religious
leaders. If that was the case in 1976, when Kuala Lumpur had
barely 500,000 people, it seems all the more likely that it is the
case now that Kuala Lumpur is climbing into the millions.
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new ideas (Spaulding and Flack 1976:35, Matheny 1981:5-6).
Surely God's Spirit is moving in and through this social change.
Hindrance to Openness
Yet, Malays display not just apathy, but active resistance
to Christian witness. Our student interviews revealed that Malay
students are generally not interested in befriending any
Americans, let alone Christians. In fact, there are numerous
accounts of individual Malays being physically prohibited from
meeting with Christians with whom they have engaged in religious
dialogue. So strong is the peer pressure for Malays not to
associate with anything Christian, that a campus minister who
oversees a rather large ministry to international students,
reported that the Malay students are the single one body of
international students who will not even come to purely social
events that even Muslim students from other countries attend.
Some would argue that it is evidently not God's time for the
Malays, or at least that since other people groups are
responsive, and since we have limited resources, we should invest
our energies in more receptive populations. In his classic
treatment on resistant populations, Donald McGavran (1980:262)
argued that "resistant lands should be held lightly." While I
agree with McGavran that we must be careful and courteous in
gospel presentations to such people, I am calling not for a
"light" gospel presence, but a concerted effort to evangelize the
Malays. True, we must be circumspect in our approach, but this
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does not necessitate holding back personnel and resources. This
very reasoning of responsive versus non-responsive populations is
exactly the argument used by colonial church leaders a century
ago as to why they were bypassing the Malays and concentrating on
the immigrant communities. Must the Malays wait another century
before we deem them worthy of our resources? Besides, the
research has demonstrated that sustained efforts to reach Malays
did, in fact, bare fruit. Furthermore, we have also shown that
what little gospel message most Malays ever heard was introduced
through military aggression, packaged in Western forms, encased
in colonial imperialism, sustained by economic exploitation, and
associated with peoples who were, for the most part, ungodly by
Muslim standards. The Malays have never really heard the gospel.
Any people in their position would have been resistant to the
Christian message as they witnessed it.
Perhaps it is good that the church in Malaysia has no
political clout, and is associated with no worldly power base.
Malays need to see the gospel lived out among them. They need to
see Jesus "incarnated" in selfless, loving Christians. Now is
not the time to bail out. Now is the time to stick it out until
the radiance of Jesus is reflected in Malay faces.
Malays are Not Closed People
An important point to make at this juncture is that we must
not interpret Malay receptivity by our own standards. For one
thing, Islam itself does not encourage inquiry. Islam is not to
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be investigated; it is to be believed and obeyed. That Islam
alone is true is simply to be accepted. Malays are taught that
to question religious truth is by definition to reveal a lack of
faith. Christian education, in contrast, allows for critical
questioning without accusations of abandonment of one's faith.
Malays are not free to express uncertainties about Islam or
to inquire publicly into Christianity or any other religious
belief system. Indeed, their entire academic system has
traditionally been based on rote memorization, which conditions
them not to be inquisitive (Bunge 1985:118-122). Moreover, their
close group identity, unlike American individualism, makes it
virtually unthinkable that a Malay would openly disrupt the
social cohesion by espousing ideas strongly counter to those of
the group. This all mitigates against outward dissent, but it
does not necessarily show the condition of the heart. In other
words, a particular Malay's evident lack of interest in
Christianity reveals nothing more than the fact that a Malay is
not free to express interest.
Malays must talk the party line. Yet, our student
interviews show clearly that they sometimes are not consistent
with what they say they believe. This was so prevalent in the
interviews as to make it almost axiomatic. Recall, for example,
that the students uniformly called for worldwide Islamization,
but privately balked at the thought of imposing Islamic law on
their Chinese Malaysian neighbors. They expressed full agreement
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with Islamic standards of dress, but then found excuses for why
it wasn't necessary for them to dress as such. Also, they
recognized pre-Islamic religious elements as contrary to Islamic
orthodoxy, yet allowed for such practices in certain instances.
Again, seeming Malay resistance may be due to societal pressures
to conform to the Islamic standard.
Considering the great social barriers against conversion to
Christianity, it is amazing that there are as many converts as
there are. The vulnerable position of Malay followers of Jesus
and of Christian witnesses to Malays forbids me to disclose any
specifics about their numbers or whereabouts. It will have to
suffice to say that their are substantiated reports of increasing
numbers of Malays making and holding commitments to Christ
despite family and societal ostracism, death threats, and in a
few cases, torture.
I'm not free to relay specific instances of Malay openness
and inquiry, other than to say that they are occurring. To
illustrate the fact that a measure of spiritual hunger and
dissatisfaction with Islam is there, I will say only that when an
introductory Christian correspondence lesson was mailed to a
randomly-chosen group of Malays a number of years ago, the
response far exceeded the expectations of any of those involved
in the mailing. In the privacy and secrecy of a correspondence-
course format, many Malays were interested in learning more about
who Christians believe Jesus to be.
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Going back to the student interviews, we remember again that
the Malays, unlike most internationals, felt no desire to
befriend Americans. Moreover, the prospects of an invitation to
an American home were not particularly appealing to them. They
seemed content, even intent on, keeping to themselves. My own
interaction with Malay students shows that that is only part of
the story. While Malays tend to be cautious and reserved to
outsiders, I and other Christians can testify that when one is
known and trusted by Malays, the are exceedingly gracious and
hospitable. Furthermore, while Malay international students may
not pursue relationships with Americans, when one has gained
their respect, they are more than willing to receive hospitality
from an American. One small example of this is their response to
an invitation to a Thanksgiving dinner in our home. I personally
invited three of the Malay student interviewees, telling them
that they were welcome to bring a friend. On Thanksgiving Day,
17 Malays showed up for dinner.
Lest our enthusiasm run wild, it must be noted that when
wind of any actual verbal Christian witness to Malays gets back
to the Malay group as a whole, the witness is blacklisted, and
would-be inquirers are prevented by peers and even the Malaysian
government from making any further contact with the Christian
19
Witness.
�^^This concern to shield Malays from even hearing a Christian
witness is Malaysian government supported and is found both in
Malaysia and the United States. In Malaysia, the government
threatens with arrest any individuals who encourage Muslims to
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Suggestions for Malav Evangelism
Christian Witness is Possible
Admittedly, there are formidable obstacles to witnessing to
Malays, even in the United States. Still, Christians in America
can do much more than is being done. Regrettably, very little is
being done, and it is due more to apathy than to fear of
rejection. Every year for the past dozen or more years, God has
brought thousands of Malays to our doorsteps. Yet, the Malays
themselves report that most Americans express no interest in
knowing about them. A few Malays who did try to initiate
friendships with Americans were met with coldness.
It may be that anyone identified as Christian clergy, or
anyone representing a church, campus ministry, or other Christian
organization, cannot hope to establish a friendship with a Malay
in the U.S. Even with professional Christian workers excluded,
that still leaves most of the rest of us. Christian students,
families of students, university staff, neighbors of Malays, and
workers in businesses that Malays frequent, can all extend
themselves to Malays. A friendly "Hello" is more than some
Malays ever get from Americans.
convert ("Govt. Warns of ISA Against Those Who Instigate Muslims to
Renounce Islam" 1992 :3B). Right here in the U.S., the Malaysian
government sponsors special programs for Malay students aimed at
improving their knowledge of Islam and at countering opposing truth
claims. Such programs were initiated in response to reports of
Malay conversions to Christianity ("KL to Run Religion Course for
Muslim Students Overseas" 1992 :4B).
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Most Malays will appreciate the interest shown by an
American who does simple things like remember their names, or ask
about their families or country. Americans learning and
remembering Malay holidays is also meaningful to Malays.
Many Malays will accept invitations (even if only to be
polite) to dinner or to a family outing, or to the observance of
an American or even Christian holiday if an American has shown
friendliness and kindness.
Even if one never gets beyond a casual acquaintance with a
Malay, a positive witness is made if Malays know a person to be a
Christian and yet caring. At the very least, followers of Christ
can be associated with something positive. Christians who show
respect for Malays and their religion, and who do not stereotype
Muslims will be an anomaly to Malays. The more Christians they
meet who are like this, the more their own prejudicial
stereotypes about Christians will begin to fade.
There is actually much common ground. I found that I have
much more in common spiritually with most Malays than I do with
most Americans. We share a devotion to God and a desire to
please him, as well as a commitment to a moral code that is
largely absent from American society.
It makes an indelible impression on Malays if they see
Christians as people of prayer, humility, and sincere devotion to
God. Christians who exhibit a godly joy, walk in holiness, and
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who speak of assurance of forgiveness and of an actual friendship
with God, are often the envy of their Malay Muslim friends.
In addition, Malays in the U.S. will take back to Malaysia
whatever impression they gained of Christians, good or bad, while
they are here. A Malay engineer in Malaysia spoke with the
highest regard for what he called the "real" Christians in
America. He was one of those relative few who witnessed
Christian love in action while he was a student in the United
States .
What can be said about Americans extending themselves to
Malays in the United States also applies to Americans in Malaysia
or other countries with Malays. Malays may not always allow for
a verbal witness, but if one models Christ before them, and is
20
seen as a pious person, preconceived notions of what Christians
are like will be challenged.
I believe it is important for a Christian witness to the
Malays to approximate Malay ideals of piety- Such ideals are
embodied in the person of the Malay gruru (teacher) of the
traditional Islamic schools (see Winzeler 1975:97-99). The nvimber
one characteristic of a man close to God is that he is modest (I
use masculine terminology because all Malay religious teachers are
men) . A man of God won't encourage people to come to him for
assistance. He will never promote himself. In fact, the closer he
is to God, the more he shies away from the public eye. How, then,
must certain big name Christian evangelists come across who rent
large halls and even stadiums, and who are proceeded months in
advance by promotional crews?
Somewhat akin to the Buddhist monk, the ideal Islamic holy man
has overcome material desires and leads a life of simplicity, free
from the hectic pace of modern society- Yet, he is not a hermit,
isolated in some monastery, but is integrally involved in the daily
life of the villagers he serves. This description so contrasts
with the average Christian worker in Malaysia (especially Western
cross-cultural witnesses) , that it is a wonder that Christian
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It is especially inexplicable to Malays when they confront
someone who has read the Quran and is knowledgeable about the
teachings of Islam, but who is a Christian. The Malays, as
Muslims in general, have been taught that the truth of Islam is
so self-evident that no rational, sane individual would reject it
once it is known. They don't know what to do with a devout. God
fearing Christian who knows Islam. They imagined that no such
animal could possibly exist, and now they are facing one.
I have witnessed this bewilderment from Malays as they
queried a certain individual as to why, after he had understood
Islam, he did not then decide to become a Muslim. The person's
calm, non-argumentative explanation of his faith in the supremacy
of Jesus (he did not criticize Islam or Muhammad) left the Malay
inquirers with nothing to say. His testimony was greatly
enhanced by the fact that he had won the respect of his Malay co
workers by being hardworking, dependable, and thoroughly honest.
Try Not to be Adversaries
This same Christian co-worker also sought to appreciate the
Malay perspective on issues that divide the ethnic communities in
workers are not even more misunderstood by Malays. Far too many
live above the level of the people in exclusive high-rise
condominiums or in spacious bungalows, separated physically and
socially from the average Malay. And what is the life of the
Christian leader in Malaysia if not busy and hectic?
Finally, traditional Islamic teachers were believed to possess
berkat (mystical powers) , by which they healed the sick, repelled
sorcery, and were privy to knowledge inaccessible to ordinary human
insight. This speaks of the importance of witnesses to Malays to
be Spirit-empowered individuals who are well attuned to the spirit
realm.
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Malaysia. Such an approach is necessary for a Christian witness
to Malays. Christians must strive to overcome the adversarial
relationship that exists between Christians and Malays in
Malaysia. The close association between ethnicity and religion
in Malaysia means that ethnic distinctions accentuate religious
ones.
Since, in Malaysia, Malay equals Muslim, and non-Malay
generally equals non-Muslim, any governmental concessions to
Islam are seen by non-Malays as ethnic assertivism. Resistance
to such assertiveness, in turn, appears anti-Islamic, rather than
merely anti-Malay (Barraclough 1983:972). Put another way, the
alignment of religion with ethnicity injects a highly emotive
element into communal relations.
We recall that under British colonial rule, the immigrant
Chinese and Indian populations were separated from the Malays,
rather than encouraged to intermingle and cooperate. The post-
independence Malay-dominated government has continued a course of
action that places Malays and the other ethnic groups in
competition rather than cooperation. Policies designed to raise
the socio-economic level of the Malays relative to the other
peoples have given Malays business, employment, and educational
opportunities not afforded the others. The result is that the
Chinese and Indians are in perpetual struggle to provide for
themselves benefits that are freely awarded to Malays simply by
virtue of their being Malay.
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The Malaysian Christians who are Chinese, naturally identify
with the Chinese community and support efforts to bolster Chinese
rights. Thus, at every turn, Chinese Christians find themselves
pitted against their Malay compatriots. (The same is true of the
Indian Christians and the Indian community) . There is no love
lost between the Chinese and Malays. My association with a
large, mainly Chinese church in Malaysia taught me that, sadly,
the Chinese Christians are not exceptional here. I recall a
conversation around the table of a Chinese noodle restaurant late
one morning. I and the six or eight Chinese church members at
the table had just come from a special Malaysian Independence Day
prayer service at our church. I listened as my Chinese Christian
friends one by one complained of increasingly high-handed Malay
politics and self-serving Malay politicians. When I asked if any
of them were going to go downtown for the Independence Day
festivities, they fairly bristled at the thought of joining the
Malays in celebration.
Many Malaysian Christians hide their lack of effort to
witness to Malays behind the excuse that religious
proselytization is outlawed in Malaysia. I have even heard some
confess that they would just as soon not see Malays become
Christians and enter the church. "After all," they explained,
"the church is the one sphere in which we maintain control. If
many Malays came into the church, eventually they would assume
leadership positions, and we would be subservient to them again."
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More than a few times I had fellow parishioners ask me,
knowing I taught English to Malays, if my students were, as they
expected, not very bright. As a Chinese taxi driver informed me
during my very first week in Malaysia, "Malays are born stupid."
Because of the historic enmity between Malaysia's two
largest ethnic communities, conventional wisdom has it that
Chinese Christians are not well suited to evangelize the Malays
(Livingstone 1993:79; Browne 1936:75). I take issue with such
thinking. It is true that Malays in general are not fond of the
Chinese in general, but I have known Malays who were fond of
individual Chinese people. I believe that if Malaysian Chinese
Christians would unconditionally love their Malay acquaintances,
it could be an all the more powerful testimony to the Malays of
the transforming power of Jesus.
A few concessions on the part of Malaysian Christians to
?!alay Muslim sensitivities could be an important first step
toward breaking down animosity. An obvious example, but one
virtually ignored by Christians, is the Chinese affinity for
pork. Another is the keeping of dogs as pets. Still another is
dress. Christian women in Malaysia understandably (considering
the climate) wear shorts and sleeveless dresses. Perhaps the
giving up of externals that are offensive to Muslims would make
the Christian community more approachable to Malays. Such
concessions represent major lifestyle adjustments for some. Yet,
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our cominitinent to remove all offenses to the gospel save the
cross, must supersede our personal rights or comforts.
A Need for Understanding
Getting back to our desire for Christians to be pro-, rather
than anti-, Malay, as Marmaduke Dodsworth (1928a: 67) understood
of Malay evangelism back in 1928, "sympathy for their problems
and an understanding of their thinking is absolutely necessary."
Unfortunately, the pro-Islamic Malaysian government places the
church in the position of having to fight for its very survival.
In opposing the government, the church opposes Malays. Since the
church is always fighting Malays, it's no wonder Malays see
Christians as adversaries.
Although the church cannot afford to back down on its
resistance to government restrictions on non-Muslim religious
liberties, it must develop a greater sensitivity to the concerns
of the Malays. The church needs to sympathize with the Malays
for the wrongs which the Malays suffered at the hands of Western,
"Christian" colonialists. It must understand the Malay
perspective on the real and perceived injustices done to the
Malays .
A Social Gospel Too
In seeking to be sensitive to Malay concerns, we must more
clearly articulate the sociopolitical implications of the gospel.
The societal upheaval left in the wake of Malaysia's pell-mell
race to industrialization is causing the Malays to scramble for
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spiritual values as a ballast. Understandably, they are looking
to Islam for stability and moral guidelines as Malay society
reshapes itself.
The unfortunate thing here is that Christianity is not seen
as having anything to contribute on issues of development, issues
which are of vital concern to Malay leadership. The Western
Christian tradition has so dichotomized the gospel into the "two
realms" of church and state, that Christians tend "to focus
almost exclusively on the spiritual side of the biblical message"
(Schlorff 1993:179). Christian witnesses to Muslims rightly try
to explain the revelatory nature of God, and the sinfulness of
humankind and our need of redemption, yet issues of social
justice, the environment, and people-friendly means of
development are topics about which Malays believe Christianity to
be silent. Moreover, Malays see in Islamic tradition (and in
Hinduism and Buddhism for that matter) more safeguards against
unbridled materialism than has ever been demonstrated in
21
Christianity as a whole in Malaysia.
Scratch Where It Itches
In his insightful book Diffusion of Innovations. Everett
Rogers (1983:316) points out that innovations must be client-
centered, rather than innovation-oriented, focusing on the
21
In Singapore especially, but in Malaysia as well. Christians
represent a disproportionate number of English-speaking persons
with tertiary education and well-paid employment (O'Grady 1990:47).
Christianity was and is associated with wealth, position, and
westernization .
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clients' problems. In other words, in Malay evangelism we should
not concentrate on the abstract/theological level, but on issues
of day-to-day concern. Likewise, Rogers (1983:23) informs us
that innovations are received most readily when they are not
complex. Furthermore, practical, concrete, "how-to" knowledge is
most important at the trial and decision stages (Rogers
1983:168). Thus, in Malay evangelism, we should be asking not so
much "How can I convince my friend of the superiority of Christ?"
but "What felt needs does my friend have that Christ can receive
glory through meeting?"
Unregenerate Westerners who have no particular aversion to
Christian doctrine, typically come to a personal faith in Christ
not through theological argument, but through a loving Christian
friend presenting Jesus to them at a point of need or crisis.
This being the case, how much more so must Malay Muslims, who
believe Christian teaching to be a dangerous perversion of the
truth, be approached lovingly at their points of need?
One potential area of need that surfaced in the student
interviews is for spiritual help in daily problems and in times
of crisis. Orthodox Islam, along with Western secularism, have
removed from the younger generation (in practice if not in
theory) the realm of the spirits. Whereas, a generation ago,
Malays routinely consulted mediums, employed spells and amulets,
visited shrines, prayed to saints, and invoked the assistance of
innumerable spirits, today they increasingly have nothing to turn
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to for practical day-to-day concerns. Orthodox Islam, in
discouraging the use of powers lesser than Allah, and in
presenting a God who is inscrutably unknown and unaffected, one
not "touched with the feeling of our infirmities," has created a
spiritual void in many.
I believe this is to our advantage. It calls for witnesses
who are comfortable with the spirit realm; those who can operate
in the power gifts of the Spirit. Folk Islam lends power to
Islam. Malays have not seen such power in Christianity. Hungry
for demonstrable assurance of supernatural intervention, Malays
are beginning to return to the old folk practices. Christians
22
must be spiritually prepared.
22
A handful of the Malay students I interviewed who were
basically non-observant Muslims volunteered why they were so. They
said that they believe in God's standards of behavior, but that
those standards are too high for them to attain by their own
effort. They also expressed that external conformity to rules is
nothing more than an empty shell if not accompanied by a proper
attitude. They confessed that they found in Islam no power to
enable then to reach Islam's lofty standards, and that even if they
could eventually muster the self-discipline to tow the religious
line, they would still be unchanged on the inside, though perhaps
more prideful on account of their accomplishments. This, at least,
was their perception of those Malays who did manage to uphold the
religious code.
In fairness, I must point out that the vast majority of the
Malays would take issue with the above stance, believing that the
non-observant Malays in question were using the difficulties of the
Islamic rigors as an excuse not even to try to do what they knew to
do. The majority of the Malays would argue that the obedience to
God's commands, the submission to his revealed will, was the
necessary start toward righteousness, and that the very effort put
forth was a sign of a proper attitude.
Still, the view of the handful provides a glimpse into the
spiritual power void felt by some Malays at least.
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Again, spiritual battles cannot be won by human reasoning.
In fact, I would venture that most Malays' attachment to Islam is
23
more emotional than it is cerebral. Their very being as Malays
is wrapped around the Islamic view of God and Muhammad.
Challenges to their notions of God, Muhammad, or the truth as
revealed in the Quran, are met with immediate defensiveness which
drives them deeper into their convictions (Goldsmith 1982:114-
115) .
Jason Yoder (1994:344) recounts that, as with the Christian
creeds and the doctrine of the Trinity, personal experience
always precedes theological formulation. Muslims need to see
what Jesus can do before they can begin to give him his proper
place theologically.
Along these lines, Rogers (1983:18) notes that most who
adopt an innovation base their decision on the subjective
evaluation of those who have tried it. In other words, they look
for someone to model the innovation for them. In Malay
23 . . ... . . . .
This IS exemplified in Quran recitation, which is popular
among the more devout Malays. The participants report a sense of
well-being and a spiritual high through an uncomprehending chanting
of their Arabic holy book.
Another factor that makes theological argument ineffective, no
matter how convincing, is the fact that loyalty to the Malay cause,
right or wrong, supersedes abstract truth. A famous Malay story
tells of an innocent Malay who consented to go like a lamb to the
slaughter rather than permit the taint of disloyalty to rest upon
his house (Wilkinson 1924:39). In another early tale, a man loyal
to an unjust ruler who propagated a lie is favored over one who
stands up for what he knows to be true at the expense of the
ruler's reputation. This underscores our contention that abstract
formulations of theological truth are secondary to emotional
attachment to Malay identity markers.
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evangelism, it is usually too risky to identify those Malays who
have chosen to follow Christ, if, indeed, there are any to be
found. Thus, in most instances, the Christian cross-cultural or
cross-ethnic witness must be the model.
It is also important for us to realize that the
solidification of a person's conversion experience is a process
rather than an instantaneous act (Rogers 1983:163). At every
step, we must provide teaching and close contact with those who
have proved the gospel to "work" in their lives.
A modeling of the life of Christ, and a consistent,
unconditional love for Malays over the long haul is needed.
Malay evangelism requires much sowing and watering. As a friend
of Malays once told me, "Those who succeed (in Malay evangelism)
will not be those with exceptional ability, but those who
persevere." Sadly, we are little, if at all, beyond the
condition Browne (1936:54) observed in 1936 when he said, "It is
evident that the efforts made on behalf of the Malays have not
been sufficiently intensive or continuous to give any expectation
of success."
Here is where involvement with other Malay believers in
Jesus is crucial for Malay converts. They can share their
struggles with those who understand them best and have experienced
those same struggles. They can see demonstrated concretely before
them that it is indeed possible for a Malay to be a follower of
Jesus and remain a Malay.
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Tap into the Power Source
We noted earlier that the Malays are undergoing profound
social upheaval. The supposition when dealing with people in
transition (such as Malay international students or the Malays in
the rapidly changing Malaysian society) is that they are more
open to change (Matheny 1981:5-6). We would expect people in
such situations to be more inclined to shift spiritual
allegiance�to follow Christ. Yet, this does not appear to be
the case with Malays as a whole, and it is certainly not
demonstrated by Malay students in the United States.
Conventional means of evangelizing international students (Bible
studies, discussions, talks, films, and even hospitality and
friendship) aren't penetrating the Malay wall. Necessary though
these are, such means are not sufficient to get past the
blinders. Perhaps the point of entry must be through something
other than the intellectual. To reach the Malay heart, we must
go through the realm of the spirit.
It is assumed among evangelicals that all forms of Christian
ministry, including evangelistic endeavors, must be undergirded
in prayer. Yet, beyond this awareness, front line Christian
cross-cultural witnesses to Muslims, including those who are
devoting their lives to the Malays, are increasingly calling for
an awareness of the dynamics of what has come to be known as
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spiritual warfare. Spiritual breakthroughs resulting in
heightened gospel receptivity and even Christian conversion among
Malays are attributed at least in part to clearer understanding
of the forces of evil, their influence on certain peoples and
institutions, and ways of countering such opposition.
Concomitant to this is the rediscovery that the spiritual
effectiveness of the witness depends upon the spiritual life
(i.e., holiness) of the witness. Just as actions in the physical
realm have consequences in the physical realm, spiritual actions
effect changes in the spiritual realm. For example, as a humble
apology can tear down the relational walls between two
individuals, so individual and corporate repentance can remove
2 6
barriers to the workings of the Holy Spirit. As mentioned
earlier, a facility in the operations of the spirit realm,
including an openness to the power gifts of the Spirit, is
important in Malay evangelism.
25It is beyond the scope of this writing to sort through the
issues involved in the field of spiritual warfare. An avalanche
of writing on this unresolved and controversial subject is
pouring forth. Thomas McAlpine's Facing the Powers is an
excellent short introduction to the major Christian traditions'
varying perceptions of the forces of evil. Some the of major,
more practical oriented works include Dawson 1989, Frangipane
1991, Jacobs 1991, Kraft 1994, Wagner 1991,1992, and White 1990,
1993 .
26See Dawson 1989:80, 1991:139; Harper 1988:56; Kraft
1994:60; Orr 1938:50; Silvoso 1994:238; Wagner 1992:137-138, 177;
and White 1990:118, 127-128, 168, 1994:209-210.
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Essentials for a Malay Christian Theology
When doing theology for Malay evangelism, church planting,
or discipleship, we need, of course, to address the central
themes of the Christian understanding of the nature of God,
humankind, sin, and salvation. Beyond these fundamentals,
though, there are five additional areas in which we need to apply
biblical principles to the Malay world. First, as discussed, we
need a strong theology of the spirit realm. Second, we must
speak to the issues of "development," technology, urbanization,
and how these relate to families and communities. Third, we must
be more communal and less individualistic than is typical of
Western Christianity. Fourth, we must address relations with
other peoples and other religions. Fifth, we must consider how
Malays can incorporate the history of God's people (Israel and
the church, both of which are seen as enemies of the Malays) , and
treat it as their own.
Contextualization Efforts
Contextualization can help correct Malay misunderstanding
and undo some of the harm from past misrepresentations of
Christianity. Adopting forms more akin to Malay Muslim culture
will certainly help Malay converts more naturally and
wholeheartedly express their devotion to Christ. In a thought
provoking article entitled "Dynamic Equivalent Conversion for
Tentative Muslims Believers," David Teeter (1990:306-312)
postulates that Muslims can develop a growing appreciation of
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Jesus while they remain practicing Muslims. Using a "conversion
as process" over against a "conversion as decision" model, Teeter
believes Muslims can gradually grow to a salvific knowledge of
Christ without the explosive crisis (and the attendant social
fallout) of "converting" to Christianity- In Teeter's
understanding, there can be such a thing as a "Muslim follower of
Jesus" who remains in good standing with her or his family and
Muslim community (Teeter 1990:304).
Teeter's approach is both helpful and not helpful when
applied to the Malays. Positively, it focuses our attention on a
centered set, rather than bounded set (Hiebert 1978) , framework
in which a person moving toward Christ may be closer to the
kingdom of God than a person who has made a commitment to Christ,
but is drifting away. It helps us recognize that most people's
salvation experience is better described as a gradual process
than a one-step decision. It also highlights the biblical
teachings that Christ-like actions supersede mental assent to
doctrinal formulas.
David Teeters field-tested his model, with initial success,
through a drop-in center in Bethlehem, where Christians discuss
the Bible and the Quran with Muslims curious enough or interested
enough to come (Teeters 1990:307). In the Malay situation,
unlike in Bethlehem, this approach would not get off the ground.
Any such outreach run by Christians would be seen by Malays as an
outpost for Christian proselytization. Furthermore, the approach
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Of discussing the Quran, and even using the Quran as a "bridge"
to belief in the supremacy of Jesus, would be viewed as nothing
more or less than a reprehensible ploy by Christians to deceive
the vulnerable, less-than-fully-grounded Muslims into abandoning
their faith. Moreover, any Malays who might be interested in
learning about Jesus�those inclined to go to such a drop-in
center�would likely be physically prohibited from doing so, such
is the Orwellian control Malay society has over its members.
Nor would Malays accept "Muslim followers of Jesus." Malay
Muslims would immediately call them on that. Do they believe in
the creed? Is the Quran the final authority? Is Muhammad the
last and supreme prophet of God?
Despite the difficulties, I am quite hopeful that a Malay
church can eventually thrive in Malaysia. On the question of
contextualization, the Christian gospel is actually better suited
for the Malay culture than is Islam. Unlike Islam, the gospel is
not a "touch not, taste not" system, but a proclamation of grace.
Sincere Malay Muslims live under the burden of a cognitive and
emotional dissonance. For example, as our interviews revealed,
they are told that the music and dance they love is wrong, and
that they must not allow themselves to become absorbed in it.
Malays, as are the tribal peoples of Malaysia, are musically
inclined. Malay speaking Kadazan and Iban Christians of Sabah
and Sarawak use dance naturally in worship. Forcing the Malay
psyche into the Islamic mold is, in certain spots, an
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uncomfortable fit. Another example is that much of Malay society
was matriarchal, but has had to adapt to a male-oriented Islamic
code. Malays do bend the Islamic structure to adapt to Malay
culture, but it is also necessary for Malay culture to bend to
align with Islamic form. In Christianity, the forms are fluid,
honoring any culture by expressing itself through that particular
culture's forms. A unique, tailor-made Malay church can embody
Jesus' life, and become one more expression of the multi-faceted
kingdom of God.
Other suggestions for Malay evangelism are that Christian
witness to the Malays must involve, in order of importance: (1) a
life of piety and devotion to God, (2) verbal testimony to the
lordship of Jesus, and (3) power encounter. This is predicated
on having established a relationship of trust and being a genuine
friend to the Malays. Furthermore, everything from start to
finish must be upheld in prayer, for ultimately, the battle will
be won in the spiritual realm.
The great cause for hope for the establishment of surviving
and thriving Malay churches is that persistent prayer has and is
being offered up to God on the Malays' behalf. For years, in the
early part of this century, a band of men and women in England
and Malaya known as the Malay Prayer Fellowship prayed for God to
open Malay hearts to the gospel (Browne 1936:77-78). Today,
similar groups are united in prayer for the Malays. Ongoing
prayer networks are multiplying throughout Malaysia and
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elsewhere. Some 400 intercessors from a broad spectrum of
Christian denominations attended the 2nd National Prayer and
Intercessors' Retreat in Malaysia from February 23-25, 1995.
Prayer homes (homes dedicated solely to intercessory prayer) ,
prayer chains, and prayer groups, many of which are focusing on
the Malays, are mushrooming throughout Malaysia. Furthermore, a
love for the Malays is being birthed in the Malay church,
evidenced in part by the establishment of compassionate
ministries to the poor, disadvantaged, and abused. There is a
growing realization that the Spirit of God can penetrate the
Malay heart, and many Christians are praying to that end. Their
prayers are yet to bare fruit. Surely, it is only a matter of
time before Benjamin Keasberry 's 1875 death-bed prediction comes
true as the Malays come to acknowledge and worship the Savior.
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Appendix A
Sources
(Literature Pertaining to the History and Culture of the Malays
and Their Southeast Asian Context, Particularly Related to
the Colonial Period and Including Christian-Malay Relations.)
The most thorough work on the general history of Southeast Asia
was written by D.G.H. Hall (1981) . Other important histories of
Southeast Asia are by Bastin (1967) and Bastin and Benda (1968) .
As for Malaysia in particular, the standard modern history is
by Andaya and Andaya (1982) . This provides a useful broad
background and includes limited references to Christianity.
Another significant history of Malaysia is by C. Mary Turnbull
(1981), who has a special interest in 19th century Malaysia, which
is the critical time period for the early missions which were
established under British colonial rule. Of smaller scope
(as the title indicates), but highly readable, is Miller's A Short
History of Malaysia (1966) . Though he ignores Christianity
entirely. Miller writes concisely and gives useful summaries.
Finally, the articles in Wang (1964) by Lamb, Bassett, and Turnbull
provide insightful sketches of Malay history.
As we narrow our focus to the history of Christianity in
Malaysia, we start with volumes I, II, III,VI, and VII of
Latourette 's classic A History of the Expansion of Christianity
(1937-1945) . Substantial works on the church in Asia are Hoke
(1975), Hodder (1890), Neil (1948), and Anderson (1968). Moffett
(1992) especially, but also Latourette (1937,1938) cover the early
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spread of the church in Asia. Colless (1969) is the foundational
study on pre-Portuguese Christianity in Malaya. England (1990)
updated the work of Colless.
Roxborogh' s 1989 concise outline history of the church in
Malaysia is a good introduction to the people, missions, and issues
in Malaysian church history. Another useful survey is Flemming's
Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, the Church in a Racial Melting Pot
(1968) . By far the most thorough writing on Malaysian church
history (though it excludes non-Protestant missions) is Herron's A
History of the Protestant Christian Churches in West Malaysia and
Singapore (1977) . Sng (1980) is the best one-volume church history
for Singapore and much of Malaysia.
In addition to the general church histories, there exist
numerous denominational histories and histories of various
missionary societies. One of the best sources of information on
the London Missionary Society (LMS) work in Malaya is the firsthand
accounts of LMS pioneer in Malaya, William Milne in Memoirs of the
Rev. William Milne (Morrison 1824) . Morrison added occasional
remarks to his compilation of Milne's written documents. Tomlin's
(1844) compilation of missionary journals and letters provides
another source. One can also glean from O'Sullivan (1984) and Bird
(1982) . Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir (1970) gives a rare view of how
some missionaries were seen by their Malay teacher.
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The major histories of the pre- independence Anglican Church in
Malaysia are Ferguson-Davie (1921), Henrich (1934), Loh (1964),
Pascoe (1901), and Thompson (1951).
A perceptive analysis of the formative years of the Methodist
mission in Malay is found in Barclay (1956) . Oldham (1907 and
1913) and Thoburn (1892 and 1894) are especially helpful in that
they are firsthand accounts of the two founders of Methodism in
Malaysia. Nathalie Means (1935) is a fine account of the first 50
years of Malaysian Methodism. Doraisamy (1982) is a good, longer
history. Women in the Methodist Church in Malaysia (1985) is also
useful .
Thiran (1990) is the only complete history of the Christian
Brethren in Malaysia. "The Story of One Hundred Years of the
Lord's Blessings" (1964) covers the Brethren Church in Melaka.
Band (1948) treats the history of the English Presbyterian
Church worldwide. Harcus (1955) is a brief history of the
Presbyterian Church in Malaysia. Johnson (1988) is the most
thorough work on Presbyterianism in Malaysia and Singapore. Though
it principally deals with one particular church in Singapore, it
also covers many aspects of the Presbyterian Church in Malaysia and
Singapore .
F.G. Lee (1963) is a short history of the Catholic Church in
Malaysia. Cardon (1939) provides an account of the years 1511-
1888. St. Francis Xavier 's letters during the Portuguese years in
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Melaka are recorded in Coleridge (1872) . The definitive work on
Xavier with considerable detail on Melaka is Schurhammer (1980 and
1982) . Williams (1985 and 1988) discusses the Catholic Church's
relationship with colonialism.
The most helpful journal, which covers all aspects of British
colonial rule from its inception in 1824 to Malaysian independence
in 1957 is the Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society. It continued after independence under the slightly
different title of the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society. The United Empire also focuses on the British
colonies. Other journals providing firsthand accounts of British
colonial Malaya are the F.M.S. Government Gazette, Selangor
Journal, Straits Echo, Malay Weekly Mail, Planter, Journal of the
Incorporated Society of Planters, and the Journal of the Indian
Archipelago and Eastern Asia.
Articles by missionaries and church leaders in Malaya appear
in the International Review of Missions, The Moslem World, the
Journal of the Annual Meetings of the Boards of Foreign Missions of
the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Malaysia Message. The
Malaysia Message was published from 1891 to 1953, when it became
the Methodist Message. It is a valuable source of information on
Protestant churches generally.
A significant source is British colonial government reports.
These include Malayan constitutional documents, colonial office
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papers, annual reports for several of the Malay states, and other
works published by the Malayan Government Printing Office.
Arguably the most influential figure in British colonial
Malaysia was Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham. Swettenham, whose
attainments in colloquial Malay were exceptional, served in Malaya
for 34 years, from 1871-1904. He was a Resident (official advisor
and overseer) of the state of Selangor, and then Perak, and in 1895
became the Resident General (the chief federal officer) of the
newly federated states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and
Pahang. From 1901-1904 Swettenham ruled as the High Commissioner
of the Malay States and Governor of the Straits Settlement, the
local head of the entire colony. Swettenham' s several books (see
Bibliography) , government reports, and journal entries are
invaluable .
Another leading early colonial administrator was Sir Hugh
Charles Clifford, who spent 20 years in Malaya (1383-1902). He
succeeded Swettenham as Resident of Perak and later became Governor
of North Borneo. Like Swettenham, Clifford wrote prolifically
about the life of the Malays and colonial Malaya.
Malayan civil servant Sir Richard Olaf Winstedt was one of the
greatest Malay scholars of all time, and in colonial times was
rivaled only by missionary William Shellabear. Winstedt wrote
regularly for the Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal
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Asiatic Society. His numerous books (see Bibliography) remain
among the most useful in understanding Malay life.
Another distinguished Malay scholar, R.J. Wilkinson wrote at
around the turn of the century of Malay customs and beliefs.
Authors Bird (1883), Ireland (1905), Warnford-Lock (1907), Wright
and Cartwright (1908), Wells (1928) and Peet (1934), among many
others, provide personal sketches of life in Malaya.
Charles Allen (1983) and John Butcher (1979) give invaluable
information on the life of the British in Malaya. Allen makes a
few references to religion, but Butcher is oblivious to the
importance of the churches for expatriates.
Finally, there are a few Malay sources of information on Malay
history and the coming of the Western powers. The most important
are two of the all-time classics of Malay literature, the Sejarah
Melayu; Malay Annals (1970) and the
Hikayat Abdullah (Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir 1970) . The Sejarah
Melayu; Malay Annals, written in the 16th century and comprising
legends based on historical events, is an account of the rise of
Melaka and the Melakan Sultanate (1403-1511) . It is invaluable in
its Malay portrayal of Malay history and of the coming of the
Portuguese. The Hikayat Abdullah (Abdullah's History), originally
published in 1843, is the monumental 19th century writing of a
Malay scholar who worked as a Malay language
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translator and language teacher to British administrators and
missionaries. Among his pupils were LMS missionaries Claudius
Thomsen and Benjamin Keasberry, and no less than the founder and
first governor of Singapore, Sir Stamford Raffles.
Another important Malay work is an autobiographical account by
Abdul Majid, The Wandering Thoughts of a Dying Man (Roff 1978) .
Abdul Majid gives an insider's look at Malay life, including
Islamic observance, from 1887-1927. In addition to the above,
Bastin and Winks (1966) is a compilation of selected historical
readings by Malays and non-Malays.
Appendix B
Table 1
Monthly Family Budgets in 1930: European
and Asiatic Standards
European Standard Asiatic Standard
Details (only
some items) 5 p.m. Details S p.m.
1. Food Market and cold
storage� 130
2. Drinks and 4 bottles whisky,
2 gin, etc.�Tobs
Servants'
Wages
4, Light and
Water
5. Transport
36.03; 12 tins
cigarettes
Boy�30, cook�30,
lukang air�20,
kebun�20,
amah�35,
syce�35.
dhobi�n
Petrol for 25
miles/day�
25.16
Deprecia
tion of car
7. Education
8. Clothes
School for child
in Singapore� 13;
child at prep.
school in U.K.;
tuition� 120;
doctor, travel,
clothes, etc.�
57
(for three in
MaJaya)
Clubs
Rent (6% of salary)
11. Widows' & (4% of salary)
Orphans'
Fund
12. Miscel- Dentist, life
laneous insurance,
holidays, books,
etc.
167.00
47.63
182.00 I
30.00
53.47
42.50
190.00
80.00
61.00
48.00
32.00
26.40
servant�
10, dhobi,
barber, etc.
72.90
3.60
20.00
By bus
6.55
11.04
12.70
Baju.sa- 13.00
rungs, etc.
30.00
6.21
Total Salary of 800
p.m.. + 10% tem
porary allowance,
-f 10% married
allowance
960.00 Salary of l60
p.m., + 10%
temporary
allowance
176.00
:3urce: Compiled from daca in Report of the Commission on the Temporary Allou^-
ances (Singapore. 1931).
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Appendix C
Sources
(Sources on Malay Religion, Culture, Ethnicity, and Politic)
From Malay writers we have the Sejarah Melayu; Malay Annals
(1970) which was written in the 16th century of the life of
Melaka, especially of the royal court, during the 15th and early
16th centuries. The Hikayat Abdullah (Abdullah's History)
(1970) , originally published in 1843, gives direct reports of all
aspects of life of early 19th century Malaya. Roff's The
Wandering Thoughts of a Dying Man (1978), which records Abdul
Majid' s reflections from 1887-1927 about life and death, provides
insight into Malay religious practice. An interesting source of
pre-colonial Malay values and ethics in the 15th century epic
poem "Death of a Warrior, " which explores the relationship
between blind loyalty to Malay rulers and loyalty to truth. Here
we find the seeds of the historic Malay tension between
allegiance to traditional authority and allegiance to Islamic
law .
We also glean information about Malay religious practice
from the accounts of British colonial administrators, such as Sir
Hugh Clifford, Sir Stamford Raffles, and Sir Frank Swettenham.
Swettenham (1900a) gives a lengthy description of Malay religious
practice -
501
Traveler Isabella Bird's (1883) impressions of 19th century
Malays are interesting. Of special pertinence are her
observations about Malay Islamic practice. Allen (1983) is a
compilation of journal entries and letters by British expatriates
in Malaya in the first half of this century. Several of the
entries offer glimpses into Malay religious practice. Numerous
Christian missionaries in Malaya give early descriptions of Malay
Islam. Among these are Thoburn (1884) and Oldham (1914), the
founders of Methodism in Malaya, Legge (1898), Cherry (1907 and
1923), Tisdale (1913), Wheeler (1928), Browne (1936), and
Marrison (1957) .
The writings of Malay scholars Cole (1945), Wilkinson (1923
and 1957), and Provencher (1978) deal specifically with Malay
customs and beliefs. Cole and Wilkinson spent much of their
lives in Malaya, and wrote from personal observation. Winstedt's
The Malays, a Cultural History (1950) is a standard work on the
subject, Ryan's more concise The Cultural History of Malaysia
(1971) is also helpful. Karim (1992) contains several articles
about various aspects of traditional, pre-Islamic Malay culture,
Kahn (1992) is another excellent source on Malay culture.
Finally, Hamid (1964) is a fine, brief survey of Malay religion
and culture.
Besides chapters on traditional Malay social-political
worldview, Osman (1985) also includes a study of Malay folk
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tales. Winstedt (1923) and Wilkinson (1924) each wrote about
Malay literature and folklore. C.C. Brown (1969) is a
compilation of Malay proverbs. Folk tales and proverbs give
insights into Malay values.
The best works on Malay magic are Winstedt (1951) and
Endicott (1970) . Both show how elements of magic were
incorporated into Islam. Banks (1983) discusses Malay beliefs
about spirits in his thorough treatment of Malay kinship systems.
Coming down to the present, De Koninck (1992) discusses the
effect of modernization on Malay kinship networks. Mauzy (1987)
also discusses modern Malay cultural changes. Conkey's (1992)
description of Malay funeral rites shows that, with all the
modernization and Islamization, the beliefs of traditional spirit
religion remain strongly entrenched. Conkey is one of many who
examine the interaction of Malay folk religion with Islamic law.
This brings us to the complex relationship between Malay
ethnicity and Islam. The issues of Malay identity and culture.
Islamic observance and Islamic revivalism are so overlapping and
interconnected as to make discreet categorizations impossible.
The list of sources is by no means exhaustive, but merely
highlights the key works on each particular topic.
^
^As for Islam in general, Denny (1985) is the best
introduction to Islam. Denny (1990) is also useful in that it
focuses on Islam in its cultural setting. Cragg (1985) is
excellent in helping Christians understand Islam. Maududi (1977)
is a good insider's (Muslim) source for gaining an understanding
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The definitive history of Islam is Hodgson's three-volume
The Venture of Islam (1974) . The Cambridge History of Islam
(1970) by Holt, Lambton, and Lewis is also significant, as is
Lapidus' A History of Islamic Societies (1988) . Voll (1982) is a
fine history of Islam through modern times, especially the
political history of Islam in the last two centuries.
To begin to help us see Southeast Asian expressions of
Islam, and more particularly, Malay Islam, and to note
commonalities with and divergence from Arabic expressions, the
following sources are invaluable. Israeli (1982) writes about
Islam in Asia. Lawrence (1989b) discusses Islam in South Asia,
and both Johns (1987) and Peacock (1989) are excellent articles
about Islam in Southeast Asia. Hooker (1983), Ibrahim, Siddique,
and Hussein (1985) , and Abdullah and Siddique (1986) are
collections of articles about Islam in Southeast Asia.
Provencher (1982) traces Islam in Malay history and Islam in
contemporary Malay culture. Yegar (1979) explores the nature of
Malayan Islam in the British colonial era. Jomo and Cheek (1992)
write specifically of Malaysia's Islamic movements.
Although he doesn't cover the most recent trends in
Malaysia, Roff (1967) remains the definitive work on the
historical developments in Malay Islam, nationalism, and ethnic
of Islam. Musk (1990) is a thorough treatment of the major
features of Islamic folk religion.
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identity since the coming of the British. The interplay of
ethnicity and religion in Malay identity is a primary interest in
our study. Perhaps the most significant work on this subject is
Judith Nagata's The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam (1984).
Mutalib (1990) is another substantial work on Malay ethnicity and
Islam. Mutalib discusses the relative strengths of what he calls
the "Islamic pull" and the "ethnic pull" of Malay identity. Voll
(1982), Milner (1986), and Ackerman and Lee (1988) are others who
explore the subject of Malay ethnicity and religion. Nagata
(1974) and Von der Mehden (1987) are also about ethnicity and
religion and the selection of ethnic identity in a pluralistic
society. Though not specifically about Malaysia, Chew (1992)
discusses ethnic integration in racially pluralistic societies.
Kahn and Loh (1992) is a compilation of articles about Malay
traditional culture and Islam, Malay-style Islam versus universal
Islam, and Islamic demands versus the necessity for pragmatism in
a pluralistic society.
Another concern is the question of Islamic reaction to
modernization and Western secularism. Donohue and Esposito
(1982), Esposito (1983), Haddad (1983), and Peacock (1978 and
1989) , all address the issue of Islamic response to
modernization .
A related area, and one which is of great interest to us in
that it has direct bearing on Malay identity and on efforts at
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Malay evangelism, is the recent popularity of Islamic revival
movements in Malaysia. Bruce Lawrence's Defenders of God (1989a)
is a well-written examination of fundamentalism and its
relationship to nationalism and modernization. Faruki (1983) and
Dekmejian (1988) give the bases of Islamic revival and general
descriptions of what Islamic resurgence entails. Haddad, Voll,
and Esposito (1991) is an excellent source on the history and
types of Islamic revival movements. Muzaffar (1987) contains
sketches of Islamic resurgence worldwide.
Government politics enter deeply into any discussion of
Islamic revivalism. Hunter's The Politics of Islamic Revivalism
(1988) is an important source here. Milner (1983) writes of
Islam and the Muslim state. Milne (1967 and 1980) and G. Means
(1976) are helpful for an understanding of the Malaysian
political system in general. Bakar (1986) discusses the
relationship between Islam and Malay nationalism. Sanneh (1991),
a brief but insightful article about Islam and nationalism, has
bearing on the issues of Malay ethnic nationalism versus
international Islam. Noer (1983) covers the political dimensions
of Islam worldwide and in Malaysia specifically. Bannerman's
(1988) discussion of the role of the shari'ah (Islamic law) in
pluralistic societies is applicable to the Malaysian situation.
Wilmot (1984) gives a Malay view of the importance of Islam for
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the whole of Malaysian society. Kessler (1992) explains the
changing nature of Malay political culture. Barraclough (1983)
shows the relationship of the Malaysian government to Islamic
revival movements.
Esposito (1991b) and Nagata (1987) show the evidences for
and the effects of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Nagata
(1984), Von der Mehden (1988), Nash (1991), and Jomo (1991)
provide thorough descriptions of the history, character,
ideologies, distinctives, and interrelationships between the
various Islamic revival movements in Malaysia, and their
relationship to Malaysian politics. Based on interviews with
Malay university students in England, Anwar (1987) is
particularly pertinent to our empirical study in that it
specifically covers Islamic revival movements among Malay
university students.
Also relevant to my student interviews is Poston (1991 and
1992), who writes of Islamic revival movements in the West.
Gutbi (1991) writes of Islamic organizations in the U.S.,
including those targeting university campuses. Haddad (1987)
discusses the question of how Muslims in the U.S. should practice
Islam. Von der Mehden' s (1983) "American Perceptions of Islam"
gives insight into why American Christians may be reluctant to
befriend Muslims.
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APPENDIX D
Malay Students Tntervi p.wp.d
Breakdown by Sex
UK
UMSL
lU
PA
Men
13
16
10
4
Total 43
Total inen-4 3
Women without
head covering
14
12
8
0
Women with
head covering
14
8
3
6
34 31
Total women-65
Total UK
Total UMSL
Total lU
Total PA
Overall
= 41
= 36
= 21
= 10
=108
New
1 Year
2 Years
Breakdown by Sex and Length of Stay (UK)
Men
5
2
6
Total 13
Total men-13
Women without
head covering
3
3
8
14
Women with
head covering
1
12
1
14
Total new = 9
Total 1 year=17
Total 2 yrs.=15
Total UK =41
Total women-28
Breakdown by Sex and Length of Stay (UMSL)
Men
New
1 Year
2 Years
Women without
head covering
2
8
2
Women with
head covering
Total new = 6
Total 1 year=20
Total 2 yrs.=10
Total 16
Total men-16
12 8
Total women-2 0
Total UMSL =3 6
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Breakdown by Sex and Length of Stay (ID)
Men Women without
head covering
Women
head
with
covering
New 10 8 3 Total new = 21
1 Year 0 0 0 Total 1 year= 0
2 Years 0 0 0 Total 2 yrs.= 0
Total
Total men-
10
-10
8
Total women-11
3 Total lU 21
Breakdown by Sex and Length of Stay (PA)
Men Women without
head covering
Women
head
with
covering
New 0 0 0 Total new = 0
1 Year 0 0 4 Total 1 year= 4
2 Years 4 0 2 Total 2 yrs.= 6
Total
Total men-
4
-4
0
Total women-6
6 Total PA 10
Breakdown of New Students
Men Women without
head covering
Women
head
with
covering
UK 5 3 1 Total UK 9
UMSL 2 2 2 Total UMSL = 6
lU 10 8 3 Total lU 21
PA 0 0 0 Total PA 0
Total
Total men-
17
-17
13
Total women-19
6 Total new = 36
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Breakdown for One-Year Students
Men Women
head
without
covering
Women
head
I with
covering
UK 2 3 12 Total UK 17
UMSL 8 8 4 Total UMSL = 20
lU 0 0 0 Total lU 0
PA 0 0 4 Total PA 4
Total
Total
10
inen-10
11
Total women-31
20 Total 1 year==41
Breakdown for� Two-Year Students
Men Women
head
without
covering
Women
head
with
covering
UK 6 8 1 Total UK 15
UMSL 6 2 2 Total UMSL = 10
lU 0 0 0 Total lU 0
PA 4 0 2 Total PA 6
Total
Total
16
men-16
10
Total women -15
5 Total 2 yrs.==31
APPENDIX E
Malav Student Questionnaire
510
1. How long have you been in the U.S.?
2. You are: ^Male
Female
3 . Where are you from in Malaysia?
4. Where did you go to school/college/university before coming
to the U.S.
5. At which university are you now studying?
RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS
6. It is easy to become friends with Americans.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
7. List the nationality/race of your five best friends in
Malaysia .
- Questions 8-10 are not for new students -
8. List the nationality of your five best friends in America.
9. How many American friends do you have with whom you do
things together on a regular basis?
10. During the past year, how many times have you been in an
American home?
11. Here in America, where and with whom do you live?
12. Here in America, where and with whom do you eat?
13. If you have a job, where and with whom do you work?
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE
14. In the last year, would you say that you have:
a. become more religious
b. remained about the same
c. become less religious
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15. If you went to a two-year university-level program (such as
ITM or MSM) before coming to the U.S., would you say that
you:
a. became more religious when in the program
b. remained about the same
c. became less religious when in the program
16. Generally, how religious do you consider yourself?
a. very religious
b. quite religious
c. somewhat religious
d. not very religious
17 . About how often on the average did you attend a prayer
service or Islamic class at any mosque/ Islamic center during
the past year?
a . never
b, just during Ramadan /Hari Raya Puasa (and maybe one or
two other times)
c. about once every other month
d. about once a month
e. about twice a month
f. once a week usually
g. two or more times a week
18. During the past year, did you attend an usra (Islamic cell
group) ? How often?
19. About how often on the average did you pray (perform salaat)
during the past year?
a. five or more times a day
b. more than once a day, but less than five times a day
c. about once a day
d. a few times a week
e. about once a week
f . less than once a week
20. Which of the following is true of you concerning last
Ramadanl
a. I observed Ramadan strictly
b. I observed Ramadan most days
c. I observed Ramadan some days
d. I paid little attention to keeping the fast
how often did you eat halal food during the past year?
always
usually
sometimes
not usually
rarely or never
2 1 . About
a.
b.
c.
d.
e .
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22. How important do you think mosques are in keeping Muslims in
the Islamic faith?
a. very important
b. quite important
c. somewhat important
d. of little or no importance
e. I have no idea
23. One can be a good Muslim without attending mosque
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
24. Islam:
a. should be observed strictly
b. should be observed moderately
c. The observance of Islam should be adjusted to the
surroundings .
ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY - Give your own opinion!
25. A Muslim man and woman who are not related to one another
should not be alone together.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
26. Muslim women should not go out on the streets unless their
hair and arms are covered and their skirts are well below
their knees.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
27 . What constitutes appropriate dress for Islamic men and
women?
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KNOWLEDGE OF ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY - Give your own opinion!
Please feel free to explain your answers or to give additional
comments .
28. According to Islam, a wedding ceremony is supposed to indufe
the bersanding (the public sitting together of
bride and groom who reign that day as queen and king of
their community) .
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
29. If not explicitly taught by Islam, do you object to this
practice?
30. According to Islam, weddings should include the berinai
ceremony (the staining of the bride's fingers and nails
with henna) .
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
31. If not explicitly taught by Islam, do you object to this
practice?
32. According to Islam, a dead body should be placed in the
grave with its face turned towards the direction of Mecca.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
33. If not explicitly taught by Islam, do you object to this
practice?
34. According to Islam, a confinement period (a time when the
mother remains at home) should be observed by a mother
after the birth of her child.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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35. If not explicitly taught by Islaun, do you object to this
practice?
36. Bomohs (traditional healers/diviners/medicine men) help
to promote true Islam.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
37. Bomohs are a benefit to society.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
38. There are spirits that reside in various places, such as
swamps and jungles.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
39. Special care must be taken not to offend these spirits.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
40. There is semangat, a soul-substance or vital force, in all
things, including inanimate objects, plants, animals, and
human beings.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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UNIVERSAL ISLAM VS. MALAY NATIONALISM AND TRADITION IN MALAYSIA
Give your own opinion!
Please feel free to explain your answers or to give additional
comments .
41. To restore God's rule and inaug\irate a true Islamic social
order. Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by
Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint for
Muslim society.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
42. Although Islam is the official religion of Malaysia,
Malaysia should not become an Islamic state.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
43. Non-Muslims in Malaysia should not be required to live
according to the Sharia' ah.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
44. For Muslims in Malaysia, the Sharia' ah law:
a. should be more strictly enforced
b. should be less strictly enforced
c. should be left as is
45. It is OK for a Malay Muslim to participate in traditional
cultural practices such as the mcikyong play, the joget
dance, or the main pantai festival.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
46. Are you opposed to men participating in silat (traditional
martial art) ?
47. Are you opposed to women participating in silat?
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48. Silat supports Islam
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
49. Nationalism (rasa kebangsaan) is opposed to the spirit of
Islam.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
50. It is possible to be a Malay and not be a Muslim.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
51. A Malay should be free to choose whatever religion he or she
wished.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
52. In Malaysia, Islam must be propagated so that it becomes as
much the faith of the Chinese and Indians as it has been for
the Malays.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
53. A Malaysian Chinese or Indian who converts to Islam becomes
a Malay.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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54. Malaysian converts to Islam should receive bumiputera.
benefits.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
55. In Malaysia, non-Muslim religions should not use Bahasa
Malaysia (the Malay language) in their religious
publications.
56. The assertion of Malay cultural identity is incompatible
with Islamic principles (Malay culture is against true
Islam) .
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
57. UMNO (The United Malay National Organization - the ruling
party) should try to implement an Islamic government in
Malaysia. (One of the purposes of UMNO should be to try to
make the Malaysian government more Islamic.)
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
58. UMNO is doing a good job at implementing Islamic principles
in Malaysia. (You are satisfied with UMNO's level of
commitment to promoting Islam.)
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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PROSELYTIZATION - Give your own opinion 1
Please feel free to explain your answers or to give additional
comments
59. Muslims should try to inform non-Muslims about Islam.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
60. Muslims should try to convert non-Muslims to Islam.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
61. It is OK for non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims to their
faiths.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
62. It is OK for non-Muslims of one religion to try to convert
non-Muslims of another religion to their faith.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
63. Non-Muslim expatriate missionaries (non-Muslim religious
leaders from other countries) should be allowed to live in
Malaysia and to teach their religion in Malaysia.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
64 . Does Malaysia freely allow such people to come to Malaysia?
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BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER RELIGIONS
65. According to Hindus: (choose as many as you like)
a. God is absolutely separate and distinct from creation
b. there is only one Absolute Reality (the essence of
everything is the same)
c. God is a person
d. don't know
66. According to Hindus, being born into a low position: (choose
as many as you like)
a. is a chance happening
b. is the just consequence of one's previous lives/karma
c. is the will of a personal God
d. don't know
67. According to Hindus: (choose as many as you like)
a. time and the universe are cyclical (there is a never-
ending cycle of birth-death-rebirth)
b. the world is progressing from the time of creation to
a final judgment
c. the gods/God created the universe out of nothing
d. don't know
68. According to Hindus, the ultimate goal of life is to: (choose
the one best answer)
a. attain release from the cycle of birth-death-rebirth
b. reach heaven, a paradise of delights
c. be good enough to become a god
d. don't know
69. According to Christians, the Trinity consists of: (choose
only one)
a. God, Mary, and Jesus
b. God, Mary, and the Holy Spirit
c. God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus
d. don't know
70. According to Christians, Jesus: (choose one)
a. was a great prophet, but not God
b. was born when God procreated with a woman
c. was God in human form
d. don't know
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71. According to Christians, salvation/paradise is gained
through: (choose only one)
a. belief in Jesus* death on the cross as a sacrifice
for sin
b. doing more good things than bad things/ trying to be a
good person
c. reciting the words of Jesus
d. attending church
e. don't know
72. According to Buddhists: (choose as many as you like)
a. Buddha is God, and became a man
b. Buddha was a man who reached spiritual enlightenment
and is now regarded by many Buddhists as divine
c. Buddha is the eternal creator of the universe
d. don't know
73. According to Buddhists, salvation/paradise is gained
through: (choose only one)
a. seeking release from human desire
b. obedience to the commands of God
c. faith/belief /trust in God and devotion to him
d. don't know
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE
74. With which of the following do you agree:
a. It is better to be a Hindu or a Buddhist than to have
no religion.
b. It is better to have no religion than to be a Hindu or
a Buddhist.
c. It is neither better nor worse to have no religion
than to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to
have no religion than to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
75. With which of the following do you agree:
a. It is better to be a Christian than to have no
religion.
b. It is better to have no religion than to be a
Christian.
c. It is neither better nor worse to have no religion
than to be a Christian.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to
have no religion than to be a Christian.
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76. With which of the following do you agree:
a. It is better to be a Hindu or a Buddhist than to be a
Christian.
^b. It is better to be a Christian than to be a Hindu or a
Buddhist.
c. It is neither better nor worse to be a Christian than
to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to be
a Christian than to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
77. With which of the following do you agree:
a. It is better to be a Hindu or a Buddhist than to
practice traditional spirit-religion.
b. It is better to practice traditional spirit-religion
than to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
c. It is neither better nor worse to practice traditional
spirit-religion than to be a Hindu or a Buddhist.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to
practice traditional spirit-religion than to be a Hindu
or a Buddhist.
78. With which of the following do you agree:
a. It is better to be a Christian than to practice
traditional spirit-religion.
b. It is better to practice traditional spirit-religion
than to be a Christian.
c. It is neither better nor worse to be a Christian than
to practice traditional spirit-religion.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to be
a Christian than to practice traditional spirit-
religion.
79- With which of the following do you agree;
a. It is better to practice traditional spirit-religion
than to have no religion.
b. It is better to nave no religion than to practice
traditional spirit-religion.
c. It is neither better nor worse to practice traditional
spirit-religion than to have no religion.
d. I am uncertain as to whether or not it is better to
practice traditional spirit-religion than to have no
religion.
80. Rank the following in order of your own personal preference:
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
^Judaism
no religion
Sikhism
traditional spirit-religion
If possible, give reasons for your ranking.
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CHRISTIANITY AND THE U.S.
81. The United States is a Christian country -
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
82. The teachings of Christianity strongly influence the U.S.
government .
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
83. The moral weaknesses of the U.S. can be attributed to
Christianity.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
84. Christians are against Islam and the Muslim World.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
85. Jews are against Islam and the Muslim world.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
86. Christians and Jews are partners in a Judeo-Christian
conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Uncertain
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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APPENDIX F
Questionnaire Data
Q #14 In the last year would you say you have:
a. become more religious
b. remained about the same
c. become less religious
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 3 22 1 26
women(-) 0 21 0 21
women(+) 5 20 0 25 72
Time in country
1 year 3 37 1 41
2 years 5 26 0 31 72
Q#16 Ifyou went to a two-year university level program before coming to the United States,
would you say that you:
a. became more religious when in the program
b. remained about the same
c. became less-religious when in the program
Respondent a b c Total
men 5 27 0 32
women(-) 4 22 0 26
women(+) 13 12 0 25
Group Total
83
Time in country
New 3 12 0 15
1 year 12 27 0 40
2 years 7 22 0 29 83
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Q#17 & 18 About how often on the average did you attend a prayer service or Islamic class at
any mosque/Islamic center during the past year?
a. never
b. just during Ramadan/Hari Raya Pausa (and maybe one or two other times)
c. about once every other month
d. about once a month
e. about twice a month
f. once a week usually
g. two or more times a week
Respondent a b c d e f g Total (jfroup Total
men 2 3 0 0 1 33 4 43
women(-) 7 0 2 0 6 19 0 34
women(+) 3 2 0 1 7 16 2 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 0 0 1 33 2 36
1 year 8 1 2 1 6 21 2 41
2 years 4 4 0 0 7 14 2 31 108
Q#19 About how often on the average did you pray (perform Salaat) during the past year?
a. five or more times a day
b. more than once a day, but less than five times a day
c. about once a day
d. a few time a week
e. about once a week
f less than once a week
Respondent a b c d e f Total Group Total
men 20 14 4 3 0 2 43
women(-) 14 12 6 0 0 2 34
women(+) 29 2 0 0 0 0 31 108
Time in country
New 27 6 2 1 0 0 36
1 year 21 12 8 0 0 0 41
2 years 15 10 0 2 0 4 31 108
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Q#20 Which of the following is tnie ofyou concerning last Ramadan>
a. I observed Ramadan strictly
b. I observed Ramadan most days
c. I observed Ramadan some days
d. I paid little attention to keeping the fast
Respondent abed Total Group Total
men 42 0 0 1 43
women(-) 34 0 0 0 34
women(+) 31 0 0 0 31 108
Time in country
New 36 0 0 0 36
1 year 41 0 0 0 41
2 years 30 0 0 1 31 108
Q#21 About how often did you eat halal food during the past year?
a. always
b. usually
c. sometimes
d. not usually
e. rarely or never
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 37 4 2 0 0 43
women(-) 23 10 1 0 0 34
women(+) 30 1 0 0 0 31 108
Time in country
New 35 1 0 0 0 36
1 year 36 4 1 0 0 41
2 years 19 10 2 0 0 31 108
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Q#22 How important do you think mosques are in keeping Muslims in the Islamic faith?
a. very important
b. quite important
c. somewhat important
d. of little or no importance
e. I have no idea
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 27 8 1 0 0 36
women(-) 19 12 1 0 0 32
women(+) 28 3 0 0 0 31 99
Time in country
New 31 3 1 0 0 35
1 year 25 8 0 0 0 33
2 years 18 12 1 0 0 31 99
Q#23 One can be a good Muslim without attending a mosque.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 3 14 1 3 16 37
women(-) 7 8 5 3 9 32
women(+) 7 12 5 3 4 31 100
Time in country
New 8 6 3 2 17 36
1 year 4 11 6 6 6 33
2 years 5 17 2 1 6 31 100
Q#24 Islam;
a. should be observed strictly
b. should be observed moderately
c. The observance of Islam should be adjusted to the surroundings.
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 37 1 5 43
women(-) 25 5 4 34
women(+) 23 5 3 31 108
Time in country
New 30 4 2 36
1 year 25 6 7 41
2 years 27 1 3 31 108
Q#25 Muslim men and women who are not related to one another should not be alone togeth
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 40 1 0 2 0 43
women(-) 31 0 0 3 0 34
women(+) 24 3 2 2 0 31 108
Time in country
New 36 0 0 0 0 36
1 year 34 2 1 4 0 41
2 years 25 2 1 3 0 31 108
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Q#26 Muslim women should not go out on the street unless their hair and arms are covered and
their skirts are well below their knees.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 39 3 1 0 0 43
women(-) 28 4 0 2 0 34
women(+) 25 3 2 1 0 31 108
Time in country
New 29 6 0 1 0 36
1 year 33 4 2 2 0 41
2 years 30 0 1 0 0 31 108
Q#28 According to Islam, a wedding ceremony is supposed to include the bersanding.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 0 0 2 0 41 43
women(-) 0 0 0 0 34 34
women(-t-) 1 0 1 5 24 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 0 0 36 36
year 1 0 1 3 36 41
2 years 0 0 2 2 27 31 108
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Q#29 Ifnot explicitly taught in Islam, do you object to the bersanding?
a. Yes
b.No
c. Uncertain
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 19 20 3 42
women(-) 6 28 0 34
women(+) 17 13 1 31 107
Time in country
New 15 20 1 36
1 year 15 25 1 41
2 years 12 16 2 30 107
Q#30 According to Islam weddings should include the berinai ceremony.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 3 0 5 1 24 33
women(-) 0 0 0 0 26 26
women(+) 2 0 3 5 18 28 87
Time in country
New 0 0 0 1 14 15
1 year 2 0 5 3 31 41
2 years 23 0 3 2 23 31 87
Q#3 1 Ifnot explicitly taught in Islam, do you object to the berinai ceremony?
a. Yes
b.No
c. Uncertain
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 2 22 9 33
women(-) 0 18 8 26
women(+) 5 18 5 28 87
Time in country
New 0 10 5 15
1 year 5 24 12 41
2 years 2 24 5 31 87
Q#32 According to Islam a dead body should be place in the grave with its face turned
the direction ofMecca.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 41 0 2 0 0 43
women(-) 34 0 0 0 0 34
women(+) 28 3 0 0 0 31 108
Time in country
New 36 0 0 0 0 36
1 year 37 0 4 0 0 41
2 years 30 0 1 0 0 31 108
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Q#34 According to Islam a confinement period should be observed by a mother after giving
birth of her child.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 5 2 10 4 22 43
women(-) 0 0 8 6 20 34
women(+) 1 4 6 5 14 30 107
Time in country
New 1 0 2 10 23 36
1 year 1 5 12 3 19 40
2 years 4 1 10 2 14 31 107
Q#3 5 Ifnot explicitly taught by Islam, do you object to this practice?
a. Yes
b.No
c. Uncertain
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 6 33 4 43
women(-) 1 33 0 34
women(+) 1 26 2 29 106
Time in country
New 0 36 0 36
1 year 1 35 4 40
2 years 7 21 2 30 106
Q#36 Bomohs help to promote true Islam.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total
men 0 4 25 12 2 43
women(-) 0 3 26 5 0 34
women(+) 0 0 13 10 8 31
Time in country
New 0 0 32 4 0 36
1 year 0 7 17 12 5 41
2 years 0 0 15 11 5 31
Q#37 Bomohs are a benefit to society.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 10 18 9 6 0 43
women(-) 1 5 18 14 1 0 34
women(+) 0 0 13 10 8 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 32 4 0 36
1 year 6 17 11 6 1 41
2 years 4 4 15 6 2 31 108
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Q#38 There are spirits that reside in various places such as swamps and jungles.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 20 12 4 4 3 43
women(-) 24 5 1 4 0 34
women(+) 16 4 6 2 3 31 108
Time in country
New 19 12 2 3 0 36
1 year 22 3 9 5 2 41
2 years 19 5 0 2 4 31 108
Q#39 Special care must be taken not to offend these spirits.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 4 7 5 9 19 43
women(-) 7 4 5 9 9 34
women(+) 0 2 8 8 13 31 108
Time in country
New 3 2 3 16 12 36
1 year 2 9 10 6 14 41
1082 years 6 2 5 4 14 31
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Q#40 There is semangat, a soul-substance or vital force in all things including: inanimate objects,
plants, animals, and human beings.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Groi
men 2 0 10 16 15 43
women(-) 0 0 12 15 7 34
women(+) 1 1 9 11 9 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 4 21 11 36
1 year 2 1 19 12 7 41
2 years 15 0 8 7 15 31 108
Q#41 To restore God's rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order. Western-inspired civil
codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only acceptable blueprint forMuslim society.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 6 2 4 5 26 43
women(-) 0 0 2 2 30 34
women(+) 12 5 2 2 10 31 108
Time in country
New 3 0 0 5 22 36
1 year 9 4 0 3 25 41
2 years 6 3 2 1 19 31 108
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Q# 42 Although Islam is the official religion ofMalaysia, Malaysia should not become an Islamic
state.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 22 1 1 6 13 43
women(-) 23 4 1 2 4 34
women(+) 2 6 2 9 12 31 108
Time in country
New 12 7 2 2 2 36
1 year 14 4 2 11 10 41
2 years 13 2 1 3 12 31 108
Q#43 Non-Muslims in Malaysia should not be required to live according to the Shari'ah.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 28 10 2 2 1 43
women(-) 27 7 0 0 0 34
women(+) 4 6 8 4 9 31 108
Time in country
New 23 7 2 2 2 36
1 year 19 7 7 3 5 41
2 years 17 9 1 1 3 31 108
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Q#44 For Muslims in Malaysia, the Shari'ah law:
a. should be more strictly enforced
b. should be less strictly enforced
c. should be left as is
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 29 0 14 43
women(-) 14 0 20 34
women(+) 27 0 4 31 108
Time in country
New 11 0 25 36
1 year 34 0 7 41
2 years 25 0 6 31 108
Q#45 It is OK for Malay Muslims to participate in traditional cultural practices such as festivals,
drama, and dance.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 0 5 2 11 25 43
women(-) 0 3 0 14 17 34
women(+) 25 5 1 4 19 31 108
Time in country
New 0 7 2 12 15 38
1 year 25 3 1 7 28 41
2 years 0 3 0 10 18 31 108
Q#46 Are you opposed to men participating in Silat?
a. Yes
b.No
c. Uncertain
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 0 30 0 30
women(-) 0 25 2 27
women(+) 0 14 0 14 71
Time in country
New 0 30 0 30
1 year 0 17 0 17
2 years 0 22 2 24 71
Q#47 Are you opposed to women participating in Silat?
a. Yes
b.No
c. Uncertain
Respondent a b c Total Group Total
men 3 27 0 30
women(-) 0 25 2 27
women(+) 4 10 0 14 71
Time in country
New 4 26 0 30
1 year 2 15 0 17
2 years 1 21 2 24 71
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Q#48 Silat supports Islam.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 5 8 3 3 1 20
women(-) 6 8 5 0 0 19
women(+) 0 2 1 2 1 6 45
Time in country
New 6 10 7 3 0 26
1 year 2 1 0 1 1 5
2 years 13 7 2 1 1 14 45
Q#49 Nationalism is opposed to the spirit of Islam.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 0 0 4 7 30 41
women(-) 20 0 1 8 17 26
women(+) 10 2 3 6 10 31 98
Time in country
New 2 0 2 6 26 36
1 year 5 2 4 5 21 41
2 years 3 0 2 6 10 21 98
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Q#50 It is possible to be aMalay and not be a Muslim.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 31 4 3 0 5 43
women(-) 27 4 0 0 3 34
women(+) 16 5 4 1 5 31 108
Time in country
New 26 5 4 0 1 36
1 year 30 3 3 0 5 41
2 years 18 5 0 1 7 31 108
Q#5 1 A Malay should be free to choose whatever religion he or she wishes.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 20 7 4 3 9 43
women(-) 13 5 1 6 9 34
women(+) 7 6 2 2 14 31 108
Time in country
New 24 2 4 1 5 36
1 year 10 10 2 3 16 41
2 years 6 6 1 7 11 31 108
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Q#52 In Malaysia, Islam must be propagated so that it becomes as much the faith of the Chinese
and Indians as it has been for the Malays.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a
men
women(-)
women(+)
12
4
12
d
22
23
5
Total
43
34
31
Group Total
108
Time in country
New 5 0 9 22 0 36
lyear 15 7 5 12 2 41
2 years 8 3 3 16 1 31 108
Q#53 AMalaysian Chinese or Indian who converts to Islam becomes a Malay.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Groi
men 4 0 1 5 33 43
women(-) 2 0 0 0 32 34
women(+) 0 1 1 6 23 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 0 0 36 36
1 year 0 0 2 7 33 42
2 years 6 1 1 4 19 31 109
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Q#54 Malaysian converts to Islam should receive bumiputera benefits.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 4 5 5 2 27 43
women(-) 0 2 5 0 27 34
women(+) 11 6 5 3 6 31 108
Time in country
New 3
1 year 6
2 years 6
26
24
10
36
41
31 108
Q#55 In Malaysia, non-Muslim religions should not use BahasaMalaysia (the Malayan
language) in their religious publications.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 1 1 1 4 36 43
women(-) 0 0 0 1 33 34
women(+) 2 2 5 6 16 31 108
Time in country
New 0 0 0 2 34 36
1 year 2 1 5 6 27 41
2 years 1 2 1 3 24 31 108
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Q#56 The assertion ofMalay cultural identity is incompatible with Islamic principles. (Malay
culture is against true Islam.)
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 0 2 18 16 0 36
women(-) 0 10 23 8 0 41
women(+) 1 7 13 10 0 31 108
Time in country
New 0 2 18 16 0 36
1 year 10 10 23 8 0 41
2 years 1 7 13 10 0 31 108
Q#57 UNMO (The United Malay National Organization - the ruling party) should try to
implement an Islamic government in Malaysia. (One of the purposes ofUNMO should be to try
to make the Malaysian government more Islamic.)
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 10 4 3 4 2 23
women(-) 9 5 2 4 0 20
women(+) 21 4 1 2 0 28 71
Time in country
New 8 1 2 2 0 13
1 year 19 3 1 6 0 29
2 years 13 9 3 2 2 29 71
543
Q#58 UNMO is doing a good job at implementing Islamic principles in Malaysia. (You are
satisfied with UNMO's level of commitment to promoting Islam.)
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a
men 3
women(-) 2
women(+) 3
c
14
4
7
Total
23
20
28
Group Total
71
Time in country
New 3 0 5 2 3 13
1 year 3 7 7 10 2 29
2 years 2 8 13 4 2 29 71
Q#59 Muslims should try to inform non-Muslims about Islam.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 39 4 0 0 0 43
women(-) 19 15 0 0 0 34
women(+) 23 7 1 0 0 31 108
Time in country
New 34 2 0 0 0 36
1 year 31 10 0 0 0 41
2 years 18 12 1 0 0 31 108
Q#60 Muslims should try to convert non-Muslims to Islam.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 23 15 0 4 1 43
women(-) 19 15 0 0 0 34
women(-i-) 18 9 2 2 0 31 108
Time in country
New 22 12 0 2 0 36
1 year 26 12 1 2 0 41
2 years 12 15 1 2 1 31 108
Q#61 It is OK for non-Muslims to try to convert Muslims to their faiths.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 1 1 17 2 2 11 43
women(-) 1 1 14 0 1 8 34
women(+) 9 6 0 4 12 31 108
Time in country
New 8 18 0 3 7 36
1 year 18 9 1 2 11 41
2 years 5 10 1 2 13 31 108
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Q#62 It is OK for non-Muslims of one religion to try to convert non-Muslims of another religion
to their faith.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 25 17 1 0 0 43
women(-) 27 7 0 0 0 34
women(+) 12 10 7 2 0 31 108
Time in country
New 23 12 1 0 0 36
1 year 20 15 5 1 0 41
2 years 21 7 2 1 0 31 108
Q#63 Non-Muslim expatriate missionaries (non-Muslim religious leaders from other countries)
should be allowed to live in Malaysia and to teach their religion in Malaysia.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 17 8 4 3 11 43
women(-) 18 6 4 0 6 34
women(+) 13 3 2 7 6 31 108
Time in country
New 17 3 4 0 12 36
1 year 13 8 5 6 9 41
2 years 18 6 1 4 2 31 108
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Q#64 Does Malaya freely allow expatriate missionaries to come to Malaysia?
a. yes
b. yes, except in Kelantan
c. not sure but I think so
d. don't know
e. not sure, but I don't think so
f. no
Respondent a b c d e f Total Group Total
men 9 6 1 14 9 4 43
women(-) 8 4 2 14 1 5 34
women(+) 1 5 0 2 9 1 4 31 108
Time in country
New 5 2 0 19 8 2 36
1 year 13 6 2 8 3 9 41
2 years 14 2 3 10 0 2 31 108
Q#69 According to Christians, the Trinity consists of
a. God, Mary and Jesus
b. God, Mary and the Holy Spirit
c. God, the Holy Spirit and Jesus
d. don't know
Respondent a b c d Total Group Total
men 15 2 8 5 30
women(-) 15 1 3 5 24
women(+) 7 2 10 4 23 77
Time in country
New 18 4 7 2 31
1 year 13 1 8 3 25
2 years 6 0 6 9 21 77
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Q#70 According to Christians, Jesus
a. was a great prophet, not God
b. was bom when God procreated with a woman
c. was God in human form
d. don't know
Respondent a b c d Total Group Total
men 2 1 21 7 31
women(-) 3 2 11 6 22
women(+) 3 2 9 9 23 76
Time in country
New 2 0 23 7 32
1 year 4 2 9 10 25
2 years 2 3 9 5 19 76
Q#71 According to Christians, salvation is gained through:
a. belief in Jesus' death on the cross as a sacrifice
b. doing more good things than bad things/trying to be a good person
c. reciting the words of Jesus
d. attending church
e. don't know
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 7 12 3 4 12 38
women(-) 2 7 1 6 7 23
women(+) 7 6 1 1 11 26 87
Time in country
New 7 15 0 2 8 32
1 year 3 6 2 2 16 25
2 years 6 4 3 7 6 26 87
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Q#80 Rank order the following according to your own personal preference:
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
Judaism
no religion
Sikhism
traditional spirit-religion
13 wouldn't answer
18 all are the same
14 all are the same except no religion is worse
3 all are the same except no religion and spirit religion are the worst
2 all are the same except spirit religion and no religion are the worst
6 - Christianity/Judaism best ... no religion worst
2 - Christianity/Judaism/Spirit religion are the best ... no religion worst
1 - Christianity/Judaism best . . nor religion and spirit religion are the worst
1 - Christianity best Judaism 2nd . all else are the same
3 - all are the same . . . Christianity/Judaism are worst
2 - no religion is best spirit rehgion 2nd ... all else are the same
1 - Christianity/Judaism best Hinduism 2nd all else same
Christianity 1 2 Christianity 1 1 Christianity 1
Judaism 2 Buddhism 2 Buddhism 2
Buddhism 3 Hinduism 3 Hinduism 3
Sikhism 4 Sikhism 4 Spirit Religion 4
Hinduism 5 Spirit Religion 5 Sikhism 5
Spirit Religion 6 No Religion 6 Judaism 6
No Religion 7 Judaism 7 No Religion 7
Christianity 1 1 Christianity 1 1 Christianity 1
Judaism 2 Judaism 2 Hinduism 2
Buddhism 3 No Religion 3 Buddhism 3
Hinduism 4 Sikhism\Hinduism 4 Sikhism 4
Sikhism 5 Buddhism 6 Judaism 5
Spirit Religion 6 Spirit Religion 7 Spirit Religion 6
No Religion 7 No Religion 7
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Buddhism 1
Christianity 2
Hinduism 3
Judaism 4
Sikhism 5
Spirit Rehgion 6
No Religion 7
Hinduism 1
Sikhism 2
Buddhism 3
Judaism 4
Christianity 5
No Religion 6
Spirit Religion 7
Spirit Rehgion 1
Hinduism 2
Buddhism 3
Christianity 4
Judaism 5
Sikhism 6
No Religion 7
Q#81 The United States is a Christian Country.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 4 11 1 18 8 41
women(-) 3 3 0 16 12 34
women(+) 2 7 2 12 5 28 103
Time in country
New 2 4 0 11 19 36
1 year 4 12 2 18 3 38
2 years 3 5 1 17 3 29 103
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Q#82 The teachings ofChristianity strongly influence the U. S. government.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 3 6 7 15 10 41
women(-) 0 4 2 20 8 34
women(+) 2 5 7 12 1 25 100
Time in country
New 15 7 5 18 5 38
1 year 2 5 4 18 9 38
2 years 2 3 7 11 6 29 105
Q#83 The moral weakness of the U.S. can be attributed to Christianity.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 3 4 9 15 10 41
women(-) 2 4 4 12 12 34
women(+) 0 7 7 1 13 28 103
Time in country
New 0 1 8 6 21 36
1 year 2 5 9 16 6 38
2 years 3 9 3 6 8 29 103
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Q#84 Christians are against Islam and the Muslim worid.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 20 17 2 2 0 41
women(-) 14 15 3 2 0 34
women(+) 1 1 12 5 0 0 27 102
Time in country
New 22 12 2 0 0 36
1 year 17 19 2 0 0 38
2 years 6 13 6 4 0 29 103
Q#85 Jews are against Islam and the Muslim world.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 24 14 1 2 5 41
women(-) 20 12 2 0 0 34
women(+) 13 10 5 0 0 28 103
Time in country
New 28 7 1 0 0 36
1 year 17 19 2 0 0 38
2 years 12 10 5 2 0 29 103
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Q#86 Christians and Jews are partners in a Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam and the
Muslim world.
a. strongly agree
b. agree
c. uncertain
d. disagree
e. strongly disagree
Respondent a b c d e Total Group Total
men 15 6 13 13 8 51
women(-) 2 1 11 9 11 24
women(+) 4 13 7 2 2 28 103
Time in country
New 2 7 8 4 15 36
1 year 3 10 10 13 2 38
2 years 2 3 13 7 4 29 103
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